

M Ī M Ā Ṃ S Ā
THE VĀKYA-ŚĀSTRA OF ANCIENT INDIA

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P R E F A C E

It was when I read the *Vidhi-pāda* with my Honours students that I got interested in the study of the *Mīmāṃsā-sāstra*, and a happy mould was given to this interest of mine by my revered *Guru*, Professor H D Velankar, who instructed me to work out the subject '*Mīmāṃsā, the Vākya-sāstra of Ancient India*'. It was at his instance and under his inspiring guidance that I have worked out the whole thesis, investigating in detail the claim of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* to the title of *Vākya-sāstra*. In doing this I have restricted myself mainly to the oldest work on the subject (The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of *Jaimini*) and the oldest extant commentary thereon (The *Bhāṣya* of *Śabara*). Occasionally, however, I have also referred to some later works on the subject such as the *Śloka-vārtika*, the *Tantra-vārtika*, and the *Tuṭṭikā* by *Kumārila*, the *Nyāya-mūlā-vistāra* of *Mādhava*, the *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa* of *Apadeva* and the *Artha samgraha* of *Laugākṣi Bhāskara*.

The following pages contain the first volume of my thesis which was accepted by the University of Bombay in 1946. The remaining portion along with an Introduction giving a brief account of *Mīmāṃsā* literature and tenets will soon appear as volume II. The present work, as even a casual glance through the table of contents will make it clear, is an attempt to set forth systematically the *Mīmāṃsā* views on *Language, Word, and Sentence*, particularly as discussed or suggested by *Jaimini* and *Śabara*.

For my work I have laid under contribution the enlightening works of the late Dr Jha, and also that of the late Dr Keith, a constant reference to which has helped a great deal to solve many a knotty point and given a definite shape to several hazy notions. Thanks are also due to Mahāmahopādhyāya, Dr Umesha Mishra, M A, D Litt, Ex-Director, Nithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, Professor of Sanskrit, Allahabad University, a well-known *Mīmāṃsist* and disciple of Sir Ganganath Jha, for being kind enough to write a Fore-

word to this work. Nor can I forget here Shri D. M. Tilak who merely out of friendship has undertaken the publication of a work that would perhaps mean more expenditure than gain.

The Lion's Share of credit of whatever may be found to be worthy of it in the present work must, however, go to my revered *Guru* who has been a perpetual guide to me, and but for whose encouraging words, I am afraid, it would never have been possible for me to carry to completion the present work. At the same time, however, I have to claim all responsibility for whatever defects (including the several misprints) have remained and crept into my work inspite of all the care bestowed on it.

H. P. T. College,
June, 1959

G. V. DEVASTHALI

FOREWORD

It is a matter of great pleasure to me to have been asked to write a Foreword to this very important work of Indian thought which was supplicated by Dr G V Devasthali, M A , Ph D , as a thesis for a doctorate degree to the University of Bombay in 1946 under the title *Mīmāṃsā the Vākyaśāstra*. It is a well-known fact that the proper study of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā has been practically neglected for the last four or five centuries even in Mithilā, its very home of origination. We know what a great popularity the subject had even in the 15th century during the reign of Bhairavendra Simha of Mithilā when in course of a *Cātuṣcarana-Yāga* of a tank 1400 Mīmāṃsakas had been invited to attend and witness the Yāga. But at the same time it is a matter of great satisfaction that the tradition of the study of Mīmāṃsā and also of the performance of sacrifices has been preserved in the South by the sincere votaries of the Veda.

It is a fact which does not require any proof that the Veda is the earliest and the most authentic record of human civilization in India and is the source of all our knowledge. It is indeed the *knowledge* itself in all its entirety. It was, therefore, very necessary to lay down rules to preserve the integrity of the Veda along with its correct and authentic interpretation. With this purpose in view the great thinker of the past composed the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-śāstra. So has been said by Bhatta—

धर्मे प्रमीयमाणे तु वेदेन करणात्मना ।

इतिकर्तव्यताभाग मीमांसा पूरयिष्यति ॥

and also by the great Jāṇnāyāyika Jayanta—

विचारमन्तरेण व्यवस्थितवेदवाक्यार्थानवधारणान्मीमांसा वेदवाक्यार्थ-
विचारात्मिका वेदाकरस्थेतिकर्तव्यतारूपमनुविभ्रतीति ।

In fact, Mīmāṃsā-śāstra is as important as the Veda itself, it is, therefore, that it has been said that '*Mīmāṃsā pratyā-sannatvena Vedaśkaḍeśabhūtaḥ*' Without the help of this Śāstra, proper study of the Veda is not possible. Hence,

they say that *Vicārasahāyo hi śabdah svārtham nirākāṅksam prabodhayitum ksamah*

This is the purpose why Dr. G. V. Devasthali took up the critical study of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and presented his investigations through his thesis *Mīmāṃsā, the Vākyasāstra*. This work is now presented to the scholars in the form of a book. It contains almost all the important philosophical aspects of Śabda for the proper understanding of the interpretations of the great writers on the system. Dr. Devasthali is fully qualified to undertake this strenuous and at the same time most responsible task. He is himself brought up in the tradition and has been under the expert guidance of Professor H. D. Velankar of Bombay. Dr. Devasthali imbibes the true and honest spirit of Indian Culture without which it is impossible to understand the lines of thinking of the great Rsis of our country. He approaches the subject and problems connected with it as a *jyñāsu* and puts forth his investigations very honestly. He has supported all his statements with proper quotation from and references to the Ākara texts. This book will really serve the very basic purpose for the proper understanding of the problems of Mīmāṃsā and I am glad that Dr. Devasthali has been able to acquit this task so successfully and has filled up a great desideratum.

Israbhukti,
1, Allengany Road,
Allahabad, 2
March 12, 1959

Mahāmahopādhyāya
UMESHA MISHRA, M.A., D.Litt.
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LANGUAGE

1 The main aim of JAIMINI in writing his *Mīmāṃsā sūtra* (MS) was to set forth in a systematic form the idea of *Dharma* as revealed by the oceanic Scriptural Texts when properly interpreted. He has, therefore, himself gone through the laborious task of interpreting all the available texts and set down in clear and precise terms the results of his investigations. It was, however, inevitable that he should also give us glimpses of what principles he has followed in interpreting the texts before him and how he has arrived at the results he has stated. S'ABARA also has followed Jaimini in what he has done. He does not rest satisfied with merely explaining the *Sūtrārtha*, but goes a step further and fully discusses and illustrates not only those principles which have been actually enunciated by JAIMINI, but also those that have been merely suggested by him. Not few again are the principles which, though obviously utilised by JAIMINI, have been enunciated and illustrated for the first time by S'ABARA only.

2 While executing this task of interpreting the Scriptural Texts, therefore, it is but natural that these great propounders of the *Mīmāṃsā Sāstra* should have offered their own views on the language of the Scriptures in general in comparison with that of the common parlance. JAIMINI often refers to this latter in expressions like *lokavat* or *yathā loke*¹ which in almost every place is expounded by S'ABARA by presenting analogous cases from the language of common parlance. S'ABARA even holds, in several places in his *bhāṣya* pretty long discussions regarding similarity or otherwise between the *laukika vākya* and the *Vaidika vākya* or

[N.B.—References are to the आनन्दभट्ट edition of the शाबर भाष्य Poona 1929-34]

1 cf. MS I 2 20, 29, II 1 12, IV, 1 6, VI 8 26, X 2 23, 3 44, 51, 6 8, 7 66, XI 1 26, 60.

between the language of the Scriptures and that of common parlance. In fact he has begun his *bhāṣya* with a remark² on the language, of course of the *Sūtras*. But we find that what he has said about the language of the *Sūtras* also holds good in the case of the language of the Scriptural Texts. Thus he avers that words in the *Sūtras* must, as far as possible, be understood to convey the same sense as they are used to convey in common parlance. He even warns the reader or the interpreter against any attempt to read additional thoughts in the original *Sūtras* by supplying words from his own pocket, or by attaching imaginary or technical significance to their words. For he adds this would involve a laborious process. The *Sūtras* are meant to expound and systematise the teaching of the Scriptural Texts. But before they can achieve their aim they themselves will have to be explained if it is assumed that they are couched in words which are different from those of common parlance and have different significations. But this *gaurava* can be avoided by holding that the words of the *Sūtras* are identical with those that we meet with in common parlance and as such need no explanation for themselves.

3 This view is set forth by JAMINI with reference to the language of the Scriptural Texts at MS 1-3-30 where in the ambiguous terms he states that the sense conveyed by the words of the Scriptural Texts is in no way different from the one that attaches to them when they are used in common parlance. This he says is proved by the fact that the texts lay down injunctions regarding the performance of certain acts. Now if these injunctions are to be obeyed they must be understood first. But how can they be comprehended by the people for whom they are meant if they are not couched in a language they can understand?

2 लोके येवर्थेषु प्रसिद्धानि पदानि तानि सति सम्भवे तदर्थान्येव सूत्रेष्विषयवन्त-
व्यम् । नाप्राज्ञादेर्भेदेन परेकस्मिन्निर्वाच्यं परिभाषितव्यं वा । एव वेदवाक्यान्वे-
षेभिर्ग्राह्यावन्ते, इत्याद्या वेदवाक्यानि ग्राह्येयानि ह्यपवादार्थाच्च ग्राह्येया इति प्रबल-
गौरव प्रसज्येत । [SB on I 11, p 1 f]

3 प्रयोगवोदनाभावादर्थैकत्वमधिभागात् ।

This shows that the injunctions must be couched in the words of common parlance which in other words means that the words of the Scriptural Texts must be the same as those in common parlance and also that they must convey the same sense wherever they are used. A stronger ground for such an assumption is supplied by JAIMINI in the expression *avibhagāt*. They must be accepted as being not different from one another because no difference is noticeable between the two. Thus it is clear that the words in the Scriptural Texts must be accepted as being the same as those in common parlance, and also as conveying the same significations wherever they are used.

4 And what has been asserted about the words is also true of sentences. JAIMINI has clearly stated that the signification of the sentence in the *Veda* is in no way different from that of ordinary parlance⁴. He, therefore, would appear to recognize no distinction between the language of the *Veda* on the one hand and that of common people on the other, both as regards the word as well the sentence, and also as regards the meanings they convey. This by implication means that the Vedic Texts are to be interpreted on the same principles on which we interpret sentences in our common parlance.

5 It is here interesting to note how the *pūrva-pakṣin* tries to show that the words in the Scriptural Texts must be accepted as being different from the words in the common parlance and also as conveying senses which are widely different from what they do there. The very difference of nomenclature shows this difference. The one we call by the name *Vaidika*, while to the other we give the name of *Laukika*. Does this not prove that they are different from each other? Again there is the difference of formation which is only too obvious to deny. And if thus the *Vaidika S'abda* is different from the *Laukika S'abda* does it not naturally follow that there must be a corresponding difference between their *arthas* also? But if this does not suffice there are several Scriptural Texts which will clearly

and conclusively prove that the sense of the words in the *Veda* is quite different from the one that is conveyed by them in common parlance. Take the text like “*Uttānā vai devagavā vahanti*”, or “*Etad vai dāvyam madhu yad ghatam*”. The former tells in the *Veda* those that move on their back are called bulls, while the latter shows that honey in the *Veda* is ghee. But we never understand these words as conveying such meanings in our common parlance. This therefore is a conclusive evidence to prove that the significations of the words in the *Veda* are different from those in common parlance.”

6 All this argumentation on the part of the *Pūva-pakṣin* can, however, easily be shown to be fallacious. Difference of nomenclature by itself does not prove the difference of the thing named. For we do find one and the same thing also receiving different names with reference to the different characteristics it might possess. It is the presence of such peculiar characteristics in the language that is responsible for the difference of nomenclature. Difference of characteristics

5 तत्रान्ये लौकिका शब्दा अन्ये वैदिका अन्ये चेष्टामर्था इति ब्रूम । कृत । व्यपदेशभेदाद् रूपभेदान्च । इमे लौकिका इमे वैदिका इति व्यपदेशभेदः । ‘अग्निर्वृत्राणि जडघनम्’ इत्यन्यदिद् रूप लौकिकादप्रतिशब्दात् । शब्दान्यन्वाच न त एवार्थाः । अपि च ममामनन्ति, ‘उत्ताना वै दक्षगवा वहन्ति’ इति । ये देवाना गावस्ते उत्ताना वहन्ती-स्तुक्ते गम्बन् एव य उत्ताना वहन्ति ते गोशब्देनोच्यन्ते इति । तस्मादन्यो वैदिक-गोशब्दस्यार्थः । तथा ‘एतद् दध्य मयु यद घृतम्’ इति वेदे घृते मयुशब्दः । तस्मादमीषामन्येऽर्थाः । [SB on I 3 30, p. 290 f.]

6 This argument is put forth by Jaimini and Sabara while discussing the quest on whether निगदः are different from यजूषि. The पूर्वपक्षिन् takes his stand on the difference of nomenclature (व्यपदेशभेद) and argues that they are different. But Jaimini refutes the argument by saying ‘गुणाया व्यपदेशः’ Ms II 1 43] which Sabara explains in the following words अथ यदुस्त व्यपदेशभेद इति स चैकत्वेऽपि गुणतो भवति । यथा, एतो ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्नाम, इन परिव्राजका इति । एवमुच्चैस्त्वेन गुणेन तान्येष यजूषि व्यपदिश्यन्ते निगदा इति । [P. 442]

or difference of formation is merely dialectical and does not warrant the assumption of an essential difference of the language itself. And the very fact that we do perceive the absence of difference between the two is enough to show that there is no difference of language.⁷ As regards the texts quoted by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* it must be pointed out that the construction put on them by him is inadmissible. Of the two parts in the first text the latter is, according to him, the *uddeś'ya* and the former is, of course, the *vidheya*. But by its very nature we know that a *vidheya* must be something hitherto unknown, and such a matter is to be found not in the former but, in the latter part of the text, which must, therefore, be accepted as the *vidheya*. But if that is accepted as the *vidheya*, then the former can't be accepted as being so at the same time, for such an assumption would mean courting the charge of syntactical split. Thus it is clear that in the text under consideration the former part is the *uddeś'ya* while the latter is only the *vidheya*, and not *vice versa* as the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would have it. But the more serious objection against the view of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is that it involves *ānarthakya*. If the *Vaidika Ś'abdas* are totally different from the *Laukika Ś'abdas* and convey totally different significations how can you understand the significations of the words *ye*, *uttānāḥ*, and *vahanti* which together according to you give the *lakṣana* of *go*? And if the sense of these words is not comprehended how can you understand the character of the bull which also is not known? And if the *go-lakṣana* that, according to your interpretation, is the main signification of the text is not understood, does it not follow that the text is rendered nugatory? All this can be avoided by rejecting the interpretation of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* and taking the latter part of the text as the *vidheya*. But, it may be argued, even so the sentence remains as useless as before, since it conveys no sound sense. This objection, however, can be met with the rejoinder that it can be made to serve a useful purpose by construing it as being eulogistic. In the same manner it is

7 न तेषामेषा च विभागमुपलभामहे । अत एवैकशब्दत्वम् । तास्तांश्चार्थान्व-
गच्छाम । अतो नान्यत्वं च वदाम । [SB on 1 3 30, p 291 f]

not difficult to show how in the second text also the *Pūrva-pakṣin* has hit upon a wrong construction and how there also the *mādhutva* of *ghṛta* is to be understood as being only eulogistic and not literal.⁵

7 Regarding *Vākyaārtha* also both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA declare that there is no difference in the meanings of the words forming sentences used in the *Veda* and those in common parlance, and it is but proper that it should be conveyed in the former in exactly the same way as in the latter.⁶

8 Thus the main view that is held by JAIMINI and S'ABARA regarding the language of the Scriptures may be summed up by saying that it is quite on a par with the language of common parlance not only as regards the words and their significations, but also as regards the *vākya* and the *Vākyaārtha*.

9 This very principle again has been very explicitly stated by S'ABARA both positively as well as negatively by declaring that the significations of words are to be determined by common usage and not by Vedic usage. And the truth of this remark he has amply illustrated in his commentary on MS I 4 10. The question¹⁰ is whether *baruh* and other

8 यच्चान्न य उक्तानां बहन्त न द्वयत्वा, यद् घृत तन्मय—इति । नास्तु वचन यदुक्तं न नी बहन्ता गो व ब्रूयान् । ये गारस्त उक्तानां बहन्तास्तथ तत् । यद् चान्न वचनं गार विरायते, उक्तानां बहन्तास्तुवाद स्यात् । न चोक्तानां बहन्त प्रसिद्धा केचन । न निरायता विरायत्याः । तेषु निरायमानानु न ग्रन्थे गौत्र विरायतुम् । अथत हि तथा वाक्यम् । यद् चान्य वदिकास्तान् उक्तानां दानामथा न ग्रन्थे । तत्र नतरी शक्यता विज्ञानलक्षण गौत्र विज्ञानम् । न चोक्तानां बहन्ता वचनार्थक, स्तुत्यर्थनार्थवद् भविष्यति । एव घृतस्य मयुत्वम्— । तस्मात् एव शब्दा अर्थश्च । [SB on I 3 30, p 292]

9 अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थ । [MS I 12 32] अविशिष्टस्तु लोक प्रयुज्यमानानां वद च पदानामपि । म यत्र लोक विहितस्तथा वदार्थं भावितुमर्हति । [SB on I 2 32, p 150]

10 This point will be fully discussed in the chapter on प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त below

words are to be accepted as *samskāra-s'abdas* on the strength of Vedic usage or as *jāti-s'abdas* on the strength of *Laukika* usage S'ABARA declares himself in favour of the latter alternative and s¹ ws how the former is inadmissible by its very nature. If these words are accepted as being *alaukika* how will you determine their significations? You can't do it merely on the authority of the *Veda*. For even then the assumption of a particular sense as arising from these words shall not be done without taking into consideration the sense conveyed by the ordinary words that precede and follow the words in question. It is only a desire to avoid the *anarthakya* of the former and the latter *padas* that can justify the assumption of some *alaukika artha*, and if that is so then the popular or the *laukika* and the *asamskrta* significations of the preceding and succeeding words will have to be taken into consideration before one can get an idea of what exactly will save them from being *anarthaka*¹¹. This clearly shows that Vedic usage can't help us to determine the significations of words and sentences. The only help in that field is the ordinary usage as found in our common parlance.

10 Both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA have practised the principle they have preached by constantly referring to the *Laukika* usage of words¹². They have expressly stated that the relation between *S'abda* and *artha* is not made by *S'āstra*. It is *autpattika* and has to be known from *loka*

11 न चालौकिकानां सता वेदादेव पूर्वोत्तरपदसम्बन्धमनवेक्ष्य शक्यतेऽर्थोऽव्यवसायम् । पूर्वोत्तरपदे अनर्थके मा भूतामित्येव स परिकल्प्येत । अशक्यस्त्वनवगम्यमानः परिकल्पयितुम् । अर्थवती च ते पदे पूर्वोत्तरे लौकिकेनासकृतप्रयोगेण भविष्यति । [SB on 14 10, p 343]

12 ci समुदितेष्वेषु यजतिशब्दो भवति लोके । [SB on समुदाये in IV 2 27, p 1241], हुतमनेनेत्येवजातीयके वक्तारो भवन्ति लोके । [SB on IV 2 28, p 1242], पर्यायशब्दश्चान्तवचनो लोके दृश्यते । [SB on IV 3 8, p 1324], एव चक्षुषातार्थं लौकिका अपि प्रतिपद्यन्ते । [SB on VI 2 13], उभयत्र हि पर्वशब्दो लोके प्रसिद्धः । काले च समुदाये च, आ हिमवत आ च कुमारीभ्यः । [SB on IX 2 51, p 1738], सर्वत्र चाधिपत्ये पतिशब्दः प्रयुक्तः आ हिमवत आ च कुमारीभ्यः । [SB on IX 3 32, p 1760], etc etc

only ¹³ *Laukika* usage and nothing else is the means of getting acquainted with the sense of any word ¹⁴ Even the *Nāmadheya* words (i.e., the proper names of the sacrifices) are not *pārtbhāṣika* or technical like the terms *guṇa* and *vṛddh*. Even they convey the *laukika artha* if properly analysed ¹⁵ Cases are not rare where JAIMINI and S'ABARA determine the signification of a word by referring to the *laukika* usage. For they both hold that *loka* is the only authority so far as *s'abdārtha* is concerned ¹⁶ The same principle is again observed while interpreting a sentence and we find both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA either implicitly or explicitly justifying their way of interpreting the text by adducing illustrations from common parlance ¹⁷

11 But this view of '*Lokavādayoh S'abdārthakṛyam*' as advocated by JAIMINI and S'ABARA is not easily accepted by

13 गुणाद्वाच्यमेतान् स्यात् सम्बन्धस्याशास्त्रहेतुत्वात् । [MS III 24]
न हि शास्त्रहेतुः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो भवति । निन्योऽसौ लोकतोऽवगम्यत इत्युक्तम्
'औपसिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः' इति । [SB on III 24, p 754]

14 सर्वेषामेव शब्दानामर्थज्ञाने लौकिक प्रयोगोऽन्यथाय । [SB on VI, 1-1 p 1347]

15 तथा हि सर्वेष्वेव कर्मणामधेयेषु अर्थममन्वयेनानुवादभूतो नामशब्दो वर्तत
न लौकिकार्थनिरुक्कारेण परिभाषामात्रेण, वृद्धिगुणवत् । यथा अग्निहोत्र, इवेन,
ज्योतिष्ठाम इति । एव द्वादशाह ज्ञाने अर्थान्वयन नामधेय, नाथमिवावेनेति [SB on
X 641, p 2006]

16 शब्दार्थश्चापि लोकवत् । [Ms X 344] लोको हि शब्दार्थावगमे प्रमाणम् ।
[SB on IX 3 13, p 1751]

17 cf द्रव्योपदेश इति चेत् । न तदप्यत्राश्लोकवत् तस्य च शेषभूतत्वात्
[Ms II. 1 11-12], श्रुतितो वा लोकवद्विभागः स्यात् । [MS X 68],
यथा लोके शतं देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोर्दीक्षिताभिन्युक्ते समासाद्यो विधीयते, यदेतच्छतं
तदेनयोर्दीक्षितामिति । [SB on X 68 p 1912], . लोकऽप्यध्वयवधर्मणावयवी
मस्तस्य एवेति । यथा दार्धं कर्शं शोभनो देवदत्त इति । [SB on X 643,
p 2007], यथाऽस्मिन्नाह ये ब्राह्मणास्त आनीयन्तां देवदत्तो, यज्ञदत्तो, विष्णुमित्र इति
भवन्ति लोकेऽनुवादमात्रस्य वक्तार । एवमतदपीति । [SB on X 724, p 2034]

the *Pūrva-paksin* without any protest. Thus an attempt is made to show that though apparently it is quite true that the words and the sentences and their significations are the same in the *Veda* as well as in the common parlance, yet there is a vital difference between the language of the former and that of the latter. In common parlance language is a means to convey our thoughts to others. There our main purpose is the understanding of the *artha*. In the *Veda*, however, we have to deal with the *devatās* on the one hand and with the *angas* on the other, and the former are *apratyakṣa* while the latter are *acetana*. But what visible purpose can be served by the *samlāpa* with these *apratyakṣa devatās* or these *acetana angas*? And if only an unseen purpose is to be served thereby well, mere recitation of the texts is enough for that purpose so that there is no necessity of having any *artha-jñāna* from them. Thus the *Pūrva-paksin* concludes that language in common parlance is used to convey some *arthas*, and unless those *arthas* are understood it will be impossible to carry on any transaction. The same, however, is not the case with the Scriptural Texts, for nothing is lost if their significations are not understood. Hence the language of the *Veda* must be understood as being different from that of common parlance¹. In refutation of this view, however, it has been pointed out by the *Sūtrakāra* as well as his commentator that the texts do serve a useful purpose by pointing out the *Devatā* and the *angas* without a knowledge of which the performance of the *yāga* itself would be an impossibility. Thus it is not now true to say that in the Vedic Texts *artha-jñāna* is not a very important or an essential matter, for the required know-

18 नैवम् । लोके तैरर्थैरवबुद्धे सव्यवहारः । इह देवताभिरप्रत्यक्षाभिर्यज्ञाद्गैश्चाचेतनैः
सलापे न कश्चिदज्ञस्योपकारः । यद्यदृष्टं परिकल्प्येत, उच्चारणादेव तद् भवितुमर्हति ।
यदि कर्तव्यं तत् प्रयोजनवत् । उच्चारणं च न कश्चित् कर्तव्यं, यद्यप्यर्थं यद्यर्थः ।
यद्यर्थो न प्रख्याप्यते न किञ्चिदनर्थकम् । यदि न प्रयुज्यते समाम्नानानर्थक्यम् । तस्मादु-
च्चारणादपूर्वम् । [SB on I 2 32, p 150]

ledge of the *Devatā* and the *angas* is given to us by the *artha* of these texts only ¹⁹

12 Another attempt is made to distinguish between the language of the *Veda* and that of the common parlance. It is argued that in common parlance we speak of things already known, while the *Veda* speaks of things hitherto unknown. Thus in ordinary parlance a specific mention of good qualities of some thing does tend to create a liking for that thing, but the same result will not follow if the qualities that are thus spoken of are not already known. Thus the liking can't arise as the natural result of the Vedic texts since they speak of *avidita* things only. How can this liking then be created? Well, if at all it is to be created by the *Veda* it must come from the most authoritative part of the *Veda*, the *vidhu*. And if the *vidhu* is not able to create this liking, what can poor *arthavāda* do in that direction? The very fact that the *vidhu* has failed to create a liking, shows that it has created a doubt, and when a doubt is once created by the *vidhu* even the strongest terms of praise shouted out by the *artha-vāda* will not have the power to remove the doubt and create the liking that we are speaking of. Thus we find that whereas in common parlance terms of eulogy tend to engender a liking for the thing that is praised, nothing like that can be said to take place in the *Veda*. Hence, the *Pūrva-pakṣin* argue, we must understand the language of the *Veda* as being different from that of common parlance ²⁰. This point urged by the *Pūrva-pakṣin*, however can't be accepted. It is true that the *Veda* speaks

19 अर्थप्रपादनार्थमेव यज्ञमन्त्रोच्चारणम् । यन्मन्त्रं न दत्तनाभिर्यज्ञात्प्रत्येकमलापे प्रयोजनमस्तीति, यज्ञे यज्ञस्यप्रकाशनमेव प्रयोजनम् । कथम् । न यत्प्रकाशितं यज्ञे यज्ञादग्रे च यागः शस्त्रोऽभिनिर्वर्तयितुम् । तस्मान् नन्विष्यैवमर्थप्रकाशनं महान्यकारकमेव, तच्च करोतीत्यवगम्यते । तस्मादस्यैव प्रयोजनम् । तच्च दृष्टं न शस्यमपवादितुं नार्थभेदानं प्रयोजनमिति । [SB on 12.32, p. 150 f.]

20 In justification of the *अर्थवाद* texts in the *वेद* is set forth the following argument: इति चे पश्यसि—स्तुतिरनर्थिका, न च शब्देनावगम्यते इति । लौकिकानि वाक्यानि भवन्तो विदाकुर्वन्तु । तथा—इयं गोः केनैवा देवदत्तीया,

of *avidita* things, but it does not, therefore, follow that these *avidita* things can't be eulogised or that a liking for them can't be created by eulogistic words. For whether we know a thing or not we begin to like it if it is highly talked of. Such is our daily experience. Again it is not true to argue that when a *vidhu* fails to create a liking for a thing it creates a doubt and therefore becomes useless. There are certain injunctive texts which have no *artha-vāda* texts relating to them. Such *vidhus* do the work of not only enjoining a particular act but also that of creating a liking for it. When, however, a *vidhu* has an *artha-vāda* text related to it, it is assumed that the *vidhu-vākya* does the work of only enjoining the act, while the task of creating a liking for the act is said to be done by the *artha-vāda*. The *vidhu* and the *artha-vāda* together form one sentence, so that the *vidhu* has an expectancy for the *artha-vāda*.²¹ Even in common parlance a similar phenomenon may be observed, so that it is not very sound to seek to distinguish the language of the *Veda* from that of common parlance on the strength of this point of distinction which is more apparent than real.

एषा हि बहुक्षीरा, कृयस्य, अनटप्रज्ञा चेते । कतम्यन्यप्युक्त गुणानिधानात् प्रवतन्त-
तरी केतार । बहुक्षीरति च गुणानि गानम गम्यत । तद्वद् वेदेऽपि भव्यत ।

[SB on I 2 20, p 134] It is as a rejoinder to the above argument that the पूर्वपक्षिन् tries to show the distinction between the लौकिक and the वैदिक भाषाऽ in the following words नैतदवम् । लोक विदितपूर्वा अर्था उच्यन्ते बहुक्षीरादय । तेषा विज्ञानमेव न प्रयोजनम् । अतः प्रशमा गम्यते । अविदितवादे न भ्रद्वीरन् पूर्ववचनादिव । विदितत्वादेव च प्ररोचयन्ते । वैदिकेषु पुनर्यदि विविशब्देन न प्ररोचयन्त नतरामर्थवादेन । जाताशब्दो हि विश्वशब्दे स तदानीम् । अथ विविशब्देन प्ररोचत, किमर्थवादेन । [SB on I 2 21, p 134]

21 किमर्था स्तुतिरिति चेत् । कथ रोचेत नोऽनुग्रायेतेति । ननु प्राक् स्तुतिवचनाद-
नुष्ठान भूतिकामान्नात् सिद्ध, स्तुतिवचनमनर्थकम् । न हि यदा स्तुतिपदसन्निधानं तदा
पूर्वेणैव विधिः, यदा स्तुतपदसम्बन्धो न तदा भूतिकामस्यालम्भो विधीयते । यथा पटो
भवति पट उत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । निराकाङ्क्ष च पदद्वयम् । यदा च तस्मिन्नैव रक्त इत्यपर
ध्रुयते तदा रागसम्बन्धो भवतीत्यर्थः । भवति च रक्त प्रत्याकाङ्क्षा । एव यदा न स्तुति-
पदानि, विविशब्देनैव तदा प्ररोचना, यदा स्तुतिवचनं तदा स्तवनेन । ननु एवं सति

13 And yet it must be admitted that there are some features which do distinguish the *Vaidika vākya* from the *Laukika vākya*, the most important of these being that while the former is *apauruseya* the latter is *pauruseya*. Discussing the question in full details JAIMINI and his commentator have drawn the conclusion that *s'abda*, *artha*, and the *sambandha* between the two are *mutya*,-- and that *vākyaārtha* is obtained from the *padārthas* only, nay *Vākyaārtha* is nothing but the sum total of the *arthas* of the constituent *padas*,²² so that human hand can have no scope so far as the Vedic texts are concerned. This in other words means that they are *apauruseya*. This naturally brings in another point of distinction between the two types of *vākyas* viz that the *Vedic vākya* is always *pramāna* or *tathya* while the *Laukika vākya* may or may not be so. For in the case of a *Laukika vākya* its connection with a *human agency* provides ample scope for error to creep in. Such is not, however the case with the *Vedic vākya* where human agency has no scope whatsoever, so that it is the *s'abda* that forms the only means of obtaining an idea of the things dealt with in the Scriptures. And when *s'abda* directly imparts to us the knowledge of anything it can't but be right. For it is contradiction in terms to say '*Mithyā bravūt*' with reference to *s'abda*. *Bravūt* means *budhyamānasya nimitam bhavati*, and if *s'abda* is thus found to be the *numitta* of *artha-jñāna* how can you say

किं स्तुतिवचनेन यस्मिन् सत्यविवायकम् । भा भूतत् । तदभावेऽपि पूर्वविवर्तितं प्ररोच-
यिष्यत इति । सत्यं विनापि तेन पि उत प्ररोचनम् । अस्ति तु तत् । तस्मिन् विद्यमाने
योऽर्थो वाक्यस्य सोऽगम्यते स्तुति प्रयोजनं तयो । तस्मिन्विद्यमाने विविना
प्ररोचनमिति । ननु सत्येऽपि स्तुतिपदेषु पूर्वस्य विविस्वरूपत्वाद्विभिरभिप्रेतं स्यान्न विव-
क्ष्येत स्तुतिपदमन्व । आह--स्तुतिपदानि ह्यनर्थकान्यभविष्यन् साकाङ्क्षाणि ।
भवन्त्वनर्थकानीति चेत् । न गम्यमानेऽर्थेऽविवक्षितार्थानि भवितुमर्हन्ति । योऽसौ
विबुद्धः, स शक्नोति निरपेक्षोऽर्थं विवातु, शक्नोति च स्तुतिपदानां वाक्यशेषी
भविष्यति । प्रत्यक्षश्च वाक्यशेषभावः । अतोऽस्माद्विधेः स्तुतिमवगच्छाम । [SB on
127, p 117 f]

22 cf MS I | 523, and SB thereon. Also cf वृत्तिवार्थग्रन्थ
on pp 41-58

23 cf MS I | 24-26, and SB on the same

it is not its *numta*, which is tantamount to saying that it is not *pramāna*.' Nor is there any ground like subsequent sublation (*vyabhūcāna*) or a defect in the instrument (*dustam karanam*) which would compel us to accept its *mutīvāva*. And analogy of the *Laukika vākya* is of no use here for the *Laukika vākya* is not the same as the *Vedic vākya*. Hence though the *Laukika vākya* is found to be sometimes *tathya* or *pramāna* and sometimes *vitatha* or *apramāna*, the same can't be the case with the *Vaidika vākya*²⁴ which by its very nature must be *pramānam iva*. A third point of distinction between the two that has to be noted is that in the *Laukika vākya* the *abhiprāya* or some *drṣta artha* is more important

24 चोदना हि भूत भवन्त भविष्यन्त सूक्ष्म व्यवहित विप्रकृतमित्येवञ्जातीयकमर्थं शान्कोत्यवगमयितुं नाम्यत् किञ्चनेन्द्रियम् । नन्वतथाभूतमर्थं ग्रह्यान्चोदना यथा यत्किञ्चन लौकिक वचन नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्तीति । तत्तत्तथ्यमपि भवति वितथमपि भवतीति । उच्यते—विप्रतिषेधमिदमुच्यते ब्रवीति वितथ चेति । ब्रवीतीत्युच्यतेऽवबोधयति बुध्यमानस्य निमित्तं भवतीति । अस्मिन् निमित्तभूते सत्यवयवद्वये सोऽवबोधयति । यदि च चोदनाया सत्यामभिहोत्रात्स्वर्गो भवतीति गम्यते कथमुच्यते न तथा भवतीति । अथ न तथा भवतीति कथमवबुध्यते । असन्तमर्थमवबुध्यत इति विप्रतिषेधम् । न च 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यतो वचनात् सदिग्धमवगम्यते भवति वा स्वर्गो न वा भवतीति । न च निश्चितमवगम्यमानमिदं मिथ्या स्यात् । यो हि जनिस्वा प्रभवसते नैतदेवमिति स मिथ्या प्रत्यय । न चैव कालान्तरे पुरुषान्तरेऽवस्थान्तरे देशान्तरे वा विपर्येति । तस्माद्वितथ । यत्तु लौकिक वचन तच्चेत्प्रत्ययिताः पुरुषादिन्द्रियविषय वाऽवितथमेव तत् । अथाप्रत्ययितादिन्द्रियविषय वा तावत् पुरुषबुद्धिप्रभवमप्रमाणम् । अक्षयश्च हि तत्पुरुषेण ज्ञातुमृते दचनात् । अपरस्मात्पौरुषेयाद्वचनादेवगतमिति चेत्तदपितनैव तुरुषम् । नैवजातीयकेष्वपि पुरुषवचनं प्रामाण्यमुपैति जात्यन्यानामिव वचनं रूपविक्षेपेषु । नन्वविदुषामुपदेशो नावकरूपते, उपदिष्टवन्तश्च मन्वादय तस्मात् पुरुषा सन्तो विदितवन्तश्च यथा चक्षुषा रूपमुपलभ्यत इति दर्शनादेवावगतम् । उच्यते—उपदेशा व्यामोहादपि भवन्ति । असति व्यामोहे वेदादपि भवन्ति । अपि च पौरुषेयाद्वचनादेवमय पुरुषो वेदेति भवति प्रत्ययो नैवमयमर्थ इति । विप्लवते हि स्वल्पि कश्चित् । पुरुषकृताद्वचनात्प्रत्यय । न तु वेदवचनस्य मिथ्यात्वे किञ्च प्रमाणमस्ति । न तु सामान्यतोदृष्टपौरुषेय वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनग्राह्यादिदमपि वितथमवगम्यते । न । अन्यत्वात् । न अन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वेतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति । अन्यत्वादेव । न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति । अपि च पुरुषवचनसाधर्म्याद्वचनं

than the *s'abda*. In fact the *s'abda* is used there only as a means of conveying the artha or the *abhiprāya* ²⁰. Naturally therefore, in a *Laukika vākya* the *s'abda* in its *vācārtha* is not always strictly honoured. Sometimes the *vācārtha* is set aside and some *lāksanika artha* is accepted so as to suit the *abhiprāya* of the speaker ²¹. Sometimes even devices like

विनयमित्यनमान व्यादशादवगम्यते । प्रत्यक्षस्तु वेदवचनेन प्रत्यय न चानुमान
प्रत्यक्षविरोधी प्रमाण भवति । तस्मान्चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः श्रेयस्करः । [SB on I 12,
pp 13 17] Also cf the वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ beginning 'यन् पौरुषेये हि शब्दे
य प्रत्ययस्त्वनस्य मिथ्याभाव आशङ्क्यत and ending with तस्माच्चोदनालक्षण
एव धर्मः । [p 47]

25 लोके कर्मणिप्रत्ययः । [MS XI 126]. अर्थालोके विहितः, प्रतिप्रधान
स्यात् । [MS XI 162] यच्च लोकादिनि, लोके कर्मणिप्रधानम् । कार्यवशात्
वृद्धयुक्तोऽप्यकुदाश्रयि, अपकृत्युक्त सकुदाश्रयः, नाश्रयति वा । अथेह शब्दलक्षणे
कर्मणि यथाशब्दार्थः प्रसिद्धः । तस्मात्लोकवदेत्यहंश्रयः । [SB on XI 126,
p 2114] 'अर्था'ने प्रदास्य सकुदवकृता क्रिया । यदे सकृत्कृतं सर्वं प्रकाशयति
सकृत् क्रियते, अथ न प्रकाशयति ततोऽसकृत् । तत्तद्व्यत्ययः प्रत्ययसामर्थ्यम् । अथेह
विहित उपपत्तौऽनुपपत्तौ वा गम्यते, न प्रत्यक्षेण । [SB on XI 162, p 2129]
शब्दलक्षणे कर्मणि शब्दामिहितं गम्यते न लोकाभिप्रायः । [SB on X 557,
p 1968] लोके कर्मणिप्रत्ययः भवति, न शब्दप्रत्ययः । यथोऽर्थस्तथा क्रियते, न
यथा शब्दः । यद् न शब्दवैयर्थ्योऽवगम्यते, तर्हि गानुपेयमात्रं । [SB on VI 827,
p 1516] शब्दप्रमाणं वाक्यम् । यन्लब्धं अहं तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । ———। लाक तु
कार्यं दृष्ट्वा चोदितमचोदिनमननुष्ठियत एव । [SB on III 236, p 793 f]
लोके कर्मणिप्रत्ययः, शब्दलक्षणं पदवेदः । [SB on III 117, p 726 f] लोकेऽर्थ-
लक्षणं मध्यवर्तकम् । यत्र यथावत् सम्यक्, उक्तोऽनक्तो वा स सम्यक्तेव । इह तु वेदे
शब्दलक्षणं । [SB on III 116, p 725], also cf SB on X 83, p 2058 f]

26 लोकऽन्यत् प्रवृत्तिसार्थस्यानुनादभूत शब्द उच्चार्यमाण सामान्यक्रियासम्बन्धा
भिसर्माश्रयोन्धारित इति गम्यते । ———। इह तु शब्दपूर्विका क्रियाप्रवृत्तिः ।
[SB on X 648, p 2008]

27 cf २४ यथा लोके प्रत्ययभेदेवदत्त इत्युच्यते । यद्यपि स्तुषाकादिभिरधिक
प्रत्ययो भवति तथापि भुजौ प्रत्यो निर्दिश्यते व्यञ्जनान्योदनाद्यनि । [SB on
X 829, p 2079]

adhyāhāra, and *viparināma* are resorted to while interpreting a *Laukika vākya*²⁸ And all this is admissible because in a *Laukika vākya* it is the *abhuprāya* of the speaker, rather than the *s'abda*, which matters most. Quite different, however, is the case with the *Vaidika vākya* which being *apauruṣeya* can't be said to be based on some *abhuprāya* or *artha* of the speaker. In it *s'abda*, and nothing else but *s'abda*, is *pramāna*,²⁹ so much so that while interpreting a Scriptural Text we have to accept the direct sense that is conveyed by it. Other devices of interpretation such as *adhyāhāra* and *viparināma*, which find scope in the interpretation of a *Laukika vākya* are evidently, and as a general rule, not admissible in the case of a *Vaidika vākya*. Hence it is that we find S'ABARA often referring to the general rule that *Laksana* is not admissible in a *Vidhu-vākya*³⁰ Here it may be noted that this point of distinction applies to the *Vidhu-vākyas* only and not to all *vākyas* whatsoever.³¹ Thus whenever a human being is laying down an injunction the *vākya* that he utters, the *Laukika vidhu-vākya*, will be interpreted and obeyed with due respect to the intention of the speaker. This is what is clearly stated by JAIMINI when he writes *Loka karma artha-laksanam*,³² or '*Arthāt loka*

28 लौकिकेषु न शब्देष्वेव गम्यते । तानि हि विज्ञेयं प्रयुज्यमानान्यध्याहार्य-
पदानि गौणानि विपरिणतव्यवहितार्थानि च प्रयुज्यन्ते । तस्मात्तस्माद्व्याप्त्यन्तवगम्ये-
ष्वप्यर्थेषु भवति तत्परूपो मिथ्याप्रत्ययः । यथा मृगतृणादिषु । [SB on IV 3 2,
p 1247]

29 cf Nos 25 and 26 above. Also read न शब्दप्रमाणकाला-
मन्तरेण शब्दव्यवर्तिन्याद्याः । [SB on VI 1 3, p 1353] शब्दलक्षणे च
कर्मणि शब्दो न प्रमाणम् [SB on X 5 44, p 1962]

30 नन्वनुवादेषु लक्षणा । नानुवादक्षे लक्षणया दोषः । [SB on I 4 22
p 364] अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधौ । [SB on IV 4 19, p 1278].
यज्ञायुवशब्दानुवादक्षे न्याय्यो न विविषक्षे । गौणो हि स आयुवशब्दः स्फ्यादिषु ।
[SB on IV 1 8, p 1201]

31 विधौ हि न परः शब्दार्थं प्रतीयते ।

32 MS XI 1 26

*vidhitah prati-pradhānam syāt*³³, and S'ABARA also has very well elaborated this point in several places. This importance attaching to *s'abda* in a *Vaidika vākya* gives rise to another point of distinction between a *Laukika vākya* on the one hand and a *Vaidika Vākya* on the other. The former are sometimes found to be *anarthaka*. We do come across such sentences as '*Das'a dādīmāni sad apūpāh*' or '*Jarad-gavo gayati mattakāni*'. Such *vākyas* are totally *anarthaka*. We also come across some *vākyas* which though not totally *anarthaka* like those quoted above are yet partially *anarthaka* containing some *pada* or *padas* which may be *anarthaka*. Thus *Laukika vākyas* are open to *ānarthakya* in both these aspects³⁴. Such, however, is not the case with the *Vaidika vākyas*. For *ānarthakya* of neither of these varieties can find any place therein³⁵. Not only the *Vaidika vākya* as a whole, but every part of it i.e., every constituent *pada* thereof must yield some *artha* of its own. This is what is meant by the general rule '*Arthavatvam nyāyyam*' or negatively '*Ānarthakvam anyāyyam*' which has been time and again referred to by S'ABARA in his *Bhāṣya*. From this naturally springs up another corollary viz., more words, more sense. For if the signification of two words is the same as what is yielded by one, it naturally means that the second word is useless or redundant. But *ānarthakya* is the last thing that can be admitted in the case of a *Vaidika s'abda*. Hence it follows that more sense must be yielded by the other word or that the greater the number of words the greater the sense. Thus the interpreter of a *Vaidika vākya* has to take care that he does not leave out any word or

33 MS XI 1 26

34 लौकिकानि वचनान्युपपन्नार्थान्प्रपन्नार्थानि च दृश्यन्ते । यथा देवदत्त गाम
+रात्र इत्येवमादीनि, दक्ष दाडिमानि षडपूषा इत्येवमादीनि च । [वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ,
p. 47]

35 This point has been very well discussed and established by
शबरस्वामिन in his commentary on कृते वा विनियोग इत्यतः कर्मणः* सम्बन्धात् ।
[MS II 32 pp. 103 104]

words uninterpreted, or that he takes into account the signification of each and every word in the text that he is interpreting

14 The views of JAIMINI and S'ABARA regarding the language of the Scriptural Texts may now be briefly set forth as follows —There is no difference between the two so far as the word, the sentence and their significations are concerned. The significations of words can't be determined by Vedic usage or by *S'āstra*. Ordinary usage of the common parlance is the only means by which to determine the *S'abdārtha*. The Vedic Texts must therefore, be interpreted always in accordance with the *Laukika* usage, so that every principle that is adopted by the interpreter of the Vedic Texts must be supported by *Laukika* usage. In addition to this every word in the Vedic Texts must be accepted as yielding some special signification of its own, so that no part of the text might be rendered useless or nugatory. And lastly the *Vaidika vidhi* has to be understood in its *vāc्यārtha* to the exclusion of the other devices of interpretation such as *adhyāhāra* and *viparināma* which are often resorted to in interpreting a *Laukika vākya*. Thus though the language of the Veda is the same as that of common parlance in almost every respect for the purposes of interpretation yet it must be borne in mind that the former must be so interpreted as to derive some significance from each one of its component parts sticking to the *vāc्यārtha* as far as possible, whereas in the latter this rule may not be so strictly followed

WHAT IS S'ABDA?

1 Commenting on MS I 1 22 S'ABARA refers to the view of *S'ikṣākārāḥ* on this question and writes, "*S'ikṣā-kāra apy evam āhur vāyu āpadyate s'abdatām iti*" This view, however, is not accepted as the *Siddhānta* view, for if *s'abda* is accepted as being made up of *vāyu* it would necessarily mean the acceptance of the *antvaiva* of *s'abda* which is not acceptable to the *Mīmāṃsaka* who holds *s'abda* to be *mutya*. We are not here much concerned with this side of the problem. What we shall confine ourselves to at present is the question as to what it is that constitutes *s'abda*. In other words our problem is, 'Is *s'abda* to be understood as the sum total of the constituent syllables or are we to postulate the existence of some thing like *sphota* and call it by the name *s'abda*?'

2 The question is very well discussed by the *Vṛttikāra* in his commentary on MS I 1 5. The *prima facie* view on this point is that *s'abda* must be accepted as being quite different from the syllables constituting it. It is accepted on all hands that *s'abda* is meant to convey a sense or an idea. Both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA say that the main purpose of words is to yield sense.¹ The *s'ūtra-kāras* also lend their weight to this view when they declare that 'a verb yields an idea which is constituted of a series of successive events which together go to make one complete action'.² From all this it is clear that *s'abda* is the direct and primary means of *artha-jñāna*. Now what can this *s'abda* be? It certainly can't be the syllables only. For on that assumption it will not be possible to explain the phenomenon of *artha-jñāna*.

1 शब्देस्त्वर्थविविक्तात् etc [MS VII 2 1]. शब्दानामर्थविवानं कार्यम् [SB p 1542]

2 एव तस्याख्यातस्यार्थमुपदिशन्ति उपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तमाहेति । [SB on VI 2 13, p 1396] शास्त्रकारा अप्रेषमाहु 'पूर्वापरीभूत भावमाख्यातेनाच्छेदे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तम्' । [वृत्तिकारग्रन्थः, p 4].

arising from *s'abda* *Artha-jñāna* may be said to arise from the constituent syllables taken singly, or from the same taken together, or from the *smṛti* of the syllables. But all these alternatives are found to be unsatisfactory since none of them can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of *artha-jñāna* arising from *s'abda*. To assert that we get *artha-jñāna* from the syllables taken singly is contrary to all experience. The combination of these syllables it is impossible to think of since these syllables are not only successive but also transitory. Nor do we ever perceive anything over and above the syllables that can be termed their combination. The postulation of the *smṛti* of the syllables does not mend matters in any way, for *smṛti* is on par with the syllables themselves i.e., it is transitory and the combination of the *smṛtis* of all the syllables is similarly impossible. It is thus difficult to see how *artha-jñāna* can arise from *s'abda* if the latter is understood as being nothing more than its constituent syllables.³ And even if an attempt is made to explain and justify the phenomenon by saying that the constituent syllables give rise to *artha-jñāna* through the medium of *samskāras* or any thing like that, still the fact remains that such an assumption would make *s'abda* only a secondary means of *artha-jñāna*, which, however, is directly contrary to the experience of the *Lauṛika* and the *Sāstra-kāra vacanas* referred to above. And lastly this view is also open to the charge of having recourse to *adrsta-kalpanā* which at any rate seems impossible to avoid.⁴ The *Pūva-pakṣin* would not,

3 अथ गौरित्यत्र क शब्दः । गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्ष । श्रोत्र-
ग्रहणे त्वर्थे लोके शब्दशब्दः प्रसिद्धः । ते च श्रोत्रग्रहणा । यथेवमर्थप्रत्ययो नोपपद्यते ।
कथम् । एकैकाक्षरविज्ञानेऽर्थो नोपलभ्यते । न चाक्षर्यतिरिक्तोऽन्यः कश्चिदस्ति
समुदायो नाम यतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । यदा गकारो न तदौकारविसर्जनीयो । यदौ-
कारविसर्जनो यो न तदा गकारः । अतो गकारादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽन्यो गोशब्दोऽस्ति
यतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । अन्तर्हिते शब्दे स्मरणादर्थप्रतिपत्तिश्चेत् । न । स्मृतेरपि
क्षणिकत्वादक्षरैस्तुल्यता । [वृत्ति० p 45 f]

4 पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्यो वर्णः प्रत्यायक इत्यदोषः । नन्वेव शब्दादर्थं
प्रतिपद्यापदे इति लौकिक वचनमनुपपन्नं स्यात् । ----ननु च शास्त्रकारा अप्येवमाहुः ।

therefore, accept the position that a word is nothing more than the syllables constituting it and postulates the idea of a mediate *sphotarūpa* which is revealed by syllables and which is associated with meaning

3 The *Siddhāntin* on his part refutes all these objections and ultimately establishes the conclusion 'AKSARĀNY EVA PAADM' Taking up the question of *artha-jñāna* arising from *s'abda*, he points out that as we utter the constituent syllables one after the other some impressions are left by those syllables that pass away on our mind. Thus we get the impressions of all the syllables belonging to the *S'abda* but the last. Then all these impressions combine with the last syllable, and from this combination it is that we get the resulting *artha-jñāna*. Thus according to the *Siddhāntin* there is no need to postulate the existence of something like *sphota* intervening between the syllables on the one hand and the *artha-jñāna* on the other. It is true that this would apparently make *samskāras* the prominent *nimitta* of *artha-jñāna* and leave *s'abda* in the background. But this objection loses all its force by the fact that *s'abda* (i.e. the constituent syllables) does after all remain the important means of *artha-jñāna* even according to *Siddhānta* view. This prominence of *s'abda* for *artha-jñāna* can be shown by pointing out that there is a relation of *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* between the syllables or the *s'abda* on the one hand and the *artha-jñāna* on the other as is shown by the *anvaya* and the *vivartika* i.e. by the fact that the latter can arise only in the presence of the former but never in the absence thereof⁵. Nor would it be right to postulate the existence of some thing like *sphota* the existence of which can't be proved by *pratyakṣa* or any other *pramāṇa* simply to avoid *s'abda* being rendered secondary in the process

पूर्वापरीभूत भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतोत्पन्नमप्रभृत्यपवर्गं पर्यन्तम् इति यथा ।
 — ननु सस्कारकल्पनायामदृष्टकल्पना । [वृत्ति pp 46 47, 48]

5 अपि च नैतदेवमनुपपन्नार्थम् । अक्षरेभ्यः सस्काराः सस्कारादर्थप्रतिपत्तिरिति
 सम्भवत्यर्थं प्रतिपत्तावधाराणि निमित्तम् । गौण एवार्थप्रतिपत्तौ शब्द इति चेत् । न
 गौणोऽक्षरेषु निमित्तभावः । तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । [वृत्ति p 47]

of *artha-jñāna* Will it be wise, asks the *Siddhāntin*, if it is urged that to avoid the word *agnī* being rendered secondary in the sentence '*Agnī Mānavakah*' it should be taken to mean that *Mānavaka* is fire ?⁶ Again the very fact that we do not perceive any distinction between the *s'abda* on the one hand and its constituent syllables on the other, and also the fact that we rather perceive their *abheda*, is enough to show that *s'abda* is nothing besides the syllables constituting it. As for the last objection based on *adrsta-kalpanā* it may be pointed out that the *prima facie* view involves more of this *adrsta-kalpanā* inasmuch as it takes for granted not only the *adrsta samskāras* which are required to reveal the *sphota* but also the *adrsta sphota* itself.⁷ Thus it can be seen how all the objections levelled against the *Siddhānta* view regarding the nature of *s'abda* are idle. It is also clear how the constituent syllables, making the *s'abda*, give rise to *artha-jñāna*, which arises from the last syllable aided by the impressions left by the preceding syllables. It may, therefore, be now accepted as the right view regarding the real nature of *s'abda* that, as ŚABARA has put it 'AKSARĀṆI EVA PAIDA'. And these *aksaras* which constitute the *S'abda* are, it should be noted all of them *nitya*, we only reveal them (and not produce them) by our vocal efforts.

6 अपाणि गौण स्यात् । नगौणः शब्दो मा भूदिति प्रत्यक्षादिभिरनवगम्यमानोऽर्थः शब्दं परिकल्पयितुम् । न ह्यग्निर्माणवक इत्युक्तेऽग्निशब्दो गौणो मा भूदिति ज्वलन एव माणवक इत्यवधीयते । न च प्रत्यक्षो गकारादिभ्योऽन्यो गोशब्द इति । भेद दर्शनाभावाद्भेददर्शनाच्च । गकारादीनि हि प्रत्यक्षाणि । तस्माद्गौरिति गकारादिवि-सर्जनीयान्त पदमन्तराण्येव । अतो न तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तमन्यत् पद नामेति । [वृत्तिः, p. 18]

7 शब्दकल्पनायां सा च शब्दकल्पना च । [वृत्तिः, p. 48]

S'ARDA & APAS'ABDA.

1 The *Mīmāṃsaka* holds that *s'abda* is *ṇitya* that *artha* is *ṇitya*, and that the relation between the two is also *autpattika*, or natural which is only another expression for *ṇitya*. Now the question is with reference to the fact that the idea 'cow' we find represented in ordinary language not by one word 'go' alone, but in addition to it by several other words like *gāvī*, *gonī*, and *gopotalikā*. Are we to suppose that all these words are *autpattika* as the *mīmāṃsaka* would use the term? Or is it that only one of them viz *go* is *autpattika* whereas the rest are not to be regarded as such? Acceptance of this latter view would necessarily mean the acceptance of the view that only one of these words is the right word and that the rest are only *apas'abdas* or *apabhraṃśa* words. The *Pūrvapakṣin* makes use of all the arguments which the *Siddhāntin* uses to prove the impossibility of a man-made *saṃskṛta* and argues that all words must be accepted as being equally *autpattika*¹. The *Siddhāntin*, however points out that the utterance of a word is a highly elaborate process, and that the uninitiated often commit mistakes while uttering the words. Does it not happen that in trying to avoid mud by jumping over it we fall into the mud itself? Or does not a man sip water twice though he wants to do it only once? Similar is the case with the utterance of words. It is thus the incapability of the speaker that is at the root of such inaccurate forms of words as *gāvī*, or

1 गौर्गौवी गणी गोपोतलिका इत्येवमादयः शब्दा उदाहरणम् । गोशब्दो यथा सास्नादिमति प्रमाण, किं तथा गान्धादयोऽप्युत नति सदेह । किमत्रैक शब्दो-
विच्छिन्नवारम्पर्योऽर्थाभिप्रायी, उतरेऽप्यव्रण, उत सर्वेऽनादयः । सर्व इति ब्रूम ।
कुतः । प्रत्ययात् । प्रनीयते हि गान्धादिभ्यः सास्नादिमानर्थ । तस्मादितो वर्षशतेऽ-
प्यस्यार्धस्य सबन्व आसीदेव । तत परेण, ततश्च परतरेणेत्यनादिता । कर्ता चास्य
सबन्वस्य नास्तीति व्यवस्थितमेव । तस्मात्सर्वे साधव सर्वैर्भाषितव्यम् सर्वे हि
साधवन्त्यर्थम् । यथा हस्त कर पणिरिति । अर्थाय ह्यत उच्चार्यन्ते नादृष्टाय । न
क्षेपामुच्चारणे शास्त्रमस्ति । तस्मान्न व्यवतिष्ठेत कश्चिदेक एव साधरितरेऽसाधव इति ।
[SB on I 3 24, p 252 f]

gāvī, and that there is no unbroken tradition supporting them. But it may be asked how is it that they give rise to *artha-jñāna*? The only reply to this question is to be found in the similarity which these wrong forms have to the right word. It is on account of this similarity that the hearer is reminded of the right word, and it is from this remembered form that *artha-jñāna* arise. It will thus be seen that the *apas'abdas* by themselves have no power to convey any sense. They do so only through the medium of the correct forms of words, of which they remind the hearer owing to the resemblance that they have with them. JAIMINI has enunciated this argument in MS I 3 29 while ŚABARA has expounded it by adducing an illustration from common parlance. Just as in a statement like '*As'maken āgaccha*' the word *as'makath* first reminds the hearer of the proper forms viz. *as'makebhyah* and then through this latter presents the real or the intended significance, similarly the wrong forms like *gāvī* when heard, first bring the right word to the mind of the hearer and then through that right word viz. *gauh* give rise to *artha-pratīti*. The only difference between these two cases is that in the former the word is the same, but the *vibhaktis* are different, and the wrong *vibhakti* conveys the sense of the correct *vibhakti* by conveying the latter to the mind of the hearer, while in the latter, the form or the word that is uttered is itself different from the right word that is intended to be uttered'. Hence we conclude that of the several forms that a word may be found to have in a language

2 शब्दे प्रयत्ननिष्पत्तेरपरावस्य भागित्वम् । [MS I 3 25] महता प्रयत्नेन शब्द-मुच्चरन्ति । - - - - । तत्रापराध्येतापि उच्चारयिता । यथा शुष्के पतिष्यामीति कर्दमे पतति, सकृदुपस्पृश्यामीति द्विरुपस्पृशति । ततोऽपरावात् प्रवृत्ता गाव्यादयो भवेयुः, न नियोगतोऽविच्छिन्नपारम्पर्या एवेति । [SB on I 3 25, pp 275-277]

3 सादृश्यात्साधुशब्देऽप्यवगते प्रत्ययोऽवकल्पते । [SB on I 3 26, p 277]

4 एकदेशत्वाच्च विभक्तिव्यत्यये स्यात् । [MS I 3 29], अत एव हि विभक्ति-व्यत्ययेऽपि प्रत्ययो भवति । अश्वकैरागच्छामीत्यश्वमशब्दैकदेश उपलब्धे, अश्वकेभ्य इत्येव शब्द स्मर्यते । ततोऽश्वकेभ्य इत्येषोऽर्ध उपलभ्यत इति । एव गाव्यादिदर्शनाद् गोशब्दस्मरण, नत सास्नादिमानवगम्यते । [SB p 289]

only one can be accepted as being right while the rest have to be labelled as *apas'abdas*

2 The origin of the *apas'abda* will thus be found to be in the incapability for proper pronounciation on the part of the uninitiated speaker But that by itself does not account for the full vogue which these so-called *apas'bdas* have gained in the language S'ABARA commenting on MS I 3 28 has shown how the initiated on hearing the wrong forms used by the uninitiated try to use them while speaking with them with the idea of making themselves easily intelligible to them This then explains how wrong forms gain currency in a language⁵

3 JAIMINI at MS I 3 26 has laid down that it is unjust to think of one sense having many words to convey it In explaining this *sūtra* S'ABARA remarks that since one word is enough to convey an idea and since the phenomenon of the perception of the intended meaning arising from the other forms of words can be otherwise explained as above there is no ground to hold that the other forms also are the right or the *autpattika* forms⁶

4 But how are we to know which of these several forms is the right one? In reply to this JAIMINI points out that the sole guide in the matter of words and their correct usage are the *abhivyuktas* The reason why they are to be accepted as such in this matter is supplied by S'ABARA, who in commenting on MS I 3 27 points out that the *abhivyuk-*

5 तदशक्तिव्यानुरूपत्वात् । [MS I 3 28]. अथ यदुक्तम् — अर्थोऽवगम्यते गान्धादिभ्यः, अत एषामप्यनादिरर्थेन सबन्ध इति । तदशक्तिरेषां गम्यते । गोशब्दमुच्चारयितुकामेन केनचिदशक्त्या गात्रीत्युच्चारितम् । अपरेण ज्ञात सास्नादिमानस्य विवक्षित तदर्थं गौरित्युच्चारयितुकामो गात्रीत्युच्चारयति । तत शिक्षित्वाऽपरेऽपि सास्नादिमति विवक्षिते गात्रीत्युच्चारयन्ति । तेन गान्धादिभ्यः सास्नादिमानवगम्यते । अनुरूपो हि गान्धादिर्गोशब्दस्य । [SB p 289]

6 अन्यवश्यानेकशब्दत्वम् । [MS I 3 26] न चैष न्यायो यत् सदृशाः शब्दा एकमर्थमभिविविशमाना, सर्वेऽविच्छन्नपारम्पर्या एवेति । प्रत्ययमात्रदर्शनादभ्युपगम्यते । नादृश्याभ्याधुनवदेऽप्यवगते प्रत्ययोऽवकुरुते । तस्मादेकोऽमीषामनादिरन्येऽपभ्रशाः । [SB p 277 1]

tas are constantly in touch with the proper usage of words so that it is not possible that they should forget it. Hence the conclusion is that whatever form of a word is accepted by the *abhiyukta* as right is the right form, while the rest are only to be considered as *apas'abdas* ⁷. It is here interesting to note that according to S'ABARA the *abhiyuktas* are the inhabitants of *Āryāvarta*, who without any break perform their religious duties and are thus in constant touch with the correct usage of words ⁸.

5 Thus as regards the question of the right form of *s'abda* the following observations may be made —

(i) It is not right to accept the existence of more forms of a word than one as conveying the same sense (cf ANYĀVAŚ'CA ANEKAS'ABDATVAM)

(ii) Hence, of the several forms that a word may be found to have in a language, only one shall be accepted as right, while all the rest shall be regarded as wrong or *apas'abdas* (cf.) TASMĀD EKOS'MISAM ANADIR ANYE PABHRAMS'HĀ)

(iii) The *apas'abdas* owe their origin to the want of capacity in the speaker to go through the elaborate process of uttering a word without committing any mistake (cf MAHATĀ-PRAYATNENA S'ABDAM UCCANTI TATO PARĀDHĀT PRAVRITA GAVYADAKAḤ)

(iv) These *apas'abdas* have no power to convey any sense by themselves but they do so by reminding the hearer of the right form of the word in question to which they bear a close resemblance (c TAD-ASAKTIHANURUPATVAT)

7 तत्र तत्त्वमभियोगविशेषात् स्यात् । [MS I 3 27], कथं पुनस्तत्र तत्त्वं शक्यं विज्ञातुम् । शक्यमित्याह । अर्थिनो ह्यभियुक्त भवन्ति । दृश्यते चाभियुक्तानां गुणयतामविस्मरणमुपपन्नम् । प्रत्यक्षं चैतद् गुप्यमानं न भ्रश्यत इति । तस्माद् यमभियुक्ता उपदिशन्ति एष एव साधुरिति, स साधुरित्यवगन्तव्यः । [SB p 278 f]

8 के शास्त्रस्थाः । शिष्टाः । तेषामविच्छिन्ना स्मृतिः शब्देषु वेदेषु च । तेन शिष्टा निमित्तं धृतिस्मृत्यवधारणे । [SB on I 3 9, p 217 f] आर्यावर्तनिवासिनां शब्दार्थोपायेभ्यः अभियुक्तानामभिव्याहरतां कर्माणि चातुतिष्ठतामन्यजनपदवासिभ्यो म्लेच्छेभ्यः समीचीनतरं आह्वारो भवति । [SB on MS II 3 3, p 581]

(v) The *abhivyuktas* are the sole authority on which to decide any question regarding the correct usage of words. Only that form of a word shall, therefore, be accepted as right and original which is declared to be as such by the *abhivyuktas*. The rest are, of course to be put down as incorrect and imitations of the right one (cf. TATRA TATTVAM ABHIYOGA-VISESAT SYAT)

(vi) The *abhivyuktas* are the inhabitants of *Āryāvarta* who are in constant touch with the usage of words and are regular in the performance of their duties.

6 In the end it must be pointed out that the rule 'ANYAYAS CA ANEKASABDATVAM' refers only to such different words as are in form closely similar to each other and convey the same meaning, or in other words to different forms of the same word caused by different modes and capacities of persons uttering that word. For, it is said that the different forms convey the correct meaning by reminding us of the correct form of that word owing to the resemblance between the two, and this means that this is possible only where such a resemblance between the words exists and not in the case of words like *kara*, *pām*, and *hasta* which do not bear any resemblance to each other in form. In the case of such words which convey the same sense ŚĀBARA himself has pointed out that words like *kara*, *pām*, and *hasta* have all of them to be accepted as being right and it has also to be accepted that the relation of these words with their sense is *autpattika* on the strength of the *abhivyuktopadeśa* as in the case of other words.⁹ Thus ultimately the important rule to follow in matters concerning words and their correct usage is the *abhivyuktopadeśa*. And is this not exactly what we are doing even to-day?

9 इत्तं करः पाणिस्त्र्येवमादिषु तु अभिव्युक्तोपदेशादनादिरर्मापमर्देन सम्बन्ध इति
[SB. 6n I 3 26, p. 278]

THE EXACT IMPORT OF S'ABDA

1 Coming now to the question of the exact import of *S'abda* we find that both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA answer this question by saying that the real import of a *s'abda* is *Ākṛti* and not *Vyakṛti*. But before actually taking up the discussion S'ABARA first of all explains the terms *Ākṛti* and *Vyakṛti*, pointing out that the former signifies the mere generality that pervades all individuals belonging to class while the latter signifies an individual i.e. some thing which is possessed of some characteristics which it possesses in common with none else¹. Now the question is which of these is expressed by a word. But it may be asked, why should there be any doubt at all in this matter? Well, it is because on hearing the word 'go', for example, we may be getting the idea of generality but when matters come to action we find that it is connected with generality with the individual. Thus actual usage would seem to show that a word express both *Ākṛti* as well as *Vyakṛti* (in succession).

2 Coming to the actual question we find that there are several considerations² which make *ĀKṚTI-VĀDA* unacceptable. The authenticity of the Scriptural texts is unquestionable, and we find several of these enjoining such acts as killing sprinkling and cutting with reference to some *pas'u*. These acts it will be impossible to perform if by the word *pas'u* only a generality were meant. On the other hand all these can very well be performed if the word were taken to signify an individual possessing the generality. Nor will it do to argue that the word will as far as possible be taken to signify *Ākṛti*, and it is only when there is the danger of the *ānarthakya dosa* that it will be accepted as expressing a *Vyakṛti*.

1 का पुनराकृतिः का व्यक्तिरिति । द्रव्यगुणकर्मणा सामान्यमात्रमाकृतिः । असाधारणविशेषा व्यक्तिः । [SB on I 3 30, p 294, 296]

2 कुतः संशयः । गौरित्युक्ते सामान्यप्रत्ययाद्, व्यक्तौ च क्रियासम्बन्धात् । [SB on I 3.30, p. 296]

3 These are to be found in Ms I 3 30-32

For this would mean making the word express two senses which is a position that cannot plausibly be allowed to stand. But then how to account for the notion of generality that we get from a word? The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers the question by saying that *Ākṛti* is the mark (*cihna* or *linga*) that leads the hearer on to the *Vyakti*. Just as the idea of *danda* that we get on hearing the word *dandin* only serves as a mark to perceive the man with the stick which alone is the real sense of the word *dandin*, similarly the *Ākṛti* that is conveyed by a word is only the mark (*linga*) to perceive the *Vyakti* which alone must therefore, be accepted as the real sense expressed by a word.⁴

3 USAGE, also seems to go against *Ākṛti-vāda*. We have such expressions as '*Sad deyaḥ*' and '*Caturvimsaur deyaḥ*' where numerals are used with reference to words like *gāvaḥ* which seem clearly to signify *Vyakṛtis* and not *Ākṛtis*. For *Ākṛti* is only one so much so that it is impossible to think of any numeral except one with reference to it.⁵

4 Again the acceptance of the *Ākṛti-vāda* would lead to the futility of the *ĀRATINIDHI S'ASTRA*, for the substitution will be an impossibility if *Ākṛti* is accepted as the real import of words like *pas'u*. For the word *anya* will have no sense, since any *pas'u* will be the same and not *anya* if *Ākṛti* (i.e. *pas'utva*) were the meaning of the word *pas'u*. It is evident that every *pas'u* is possessed of *pas'utva* so much so that no *pas'u* can be described as being *anya*. To

4 व्यक्तं पदार्थ इति । कुतः । प्रयोगचोदनाभावात् । आलम्बनश्लेषणविशसनादीनां प्रयोगचोदना आकृत्यर्थे न सम्भवेत् । यत्रोच्चारणार्थक्यं तत्र व्यक्त्यर्थः, अतोऽन्यत्राकृतिवचन इति चेत् । उक्तम्, अन्यायश्चानेकार्थत्वम् इति । त्वं सामान्यावगतिरिति चेत् । व्यक्तिपदार्थकस्याकृतिश्चिह्नभूता भविष्यति य एवमाकृतिकः स गौरिती । यथा यस्य दण्डोऽस्ति स दण्डीति । न च दण्डवचनो दण्डिशब्दः । एवमिहापि । [SB. on I 3 30, pp 296-301]

5 न तत्र द्रव्याश्रयवचनं शब्दो भवेत् यथाकृतिः शब्दार्थो भवेत् । षड् देया द्वादश देयाश्चतुर्विंशतिर्वेद्या इति । न ह्याकृतिः षडादिभिः सख्याभिर्युज्यते । तस्मान्नाकृतिवचनम् । [SB. on I 3 31, p 301f.]

avoid this contingency also, therefore, it is that *Vyakti-vāda* has to be accepted ⁶

5 But this *VYAKTI-VADA* of the *Pūrva-paksin* can't be said to be wholly satisfactory. Take, for example, texts like '*S'yenacitam cinvīta*'. If the word *s'yena* is not *Ākṛti-vācaka* how can you obey the above injunction? For, what is needed for making a *s'yena* is the *sādrśya* of the figure prepared with the bricks with an actual *s'yena*. This *sādrśya* must naturally be with the form which is common to all *s'yenas* i.e. with *s'yenatva jāti*. If it is only with a single *s'yena vyakti* then this will not be possible for all sacrificers of all different places and times to do, for how will they hit upon the same *S'yena vyakti*? And how could the earlier sacrificers have done it and how will the future ones do it? Nor could it be with a *Vyakti* which is devoid of all *sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas*, for this absence of all *sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas* exists in all *vyaktis* of all classes and not merely in the *s'yena-vyakti*, so that there is no sense in prescribing the *s'yena* in particular. *S'yena ākṛti* is, however, possible to make up. Thus it will be seen that if some texts seem to favour the *Vyakti-vāda*, there are others which seem to favour the *Ākṛti-vāda*.⁷ Thus so far as the Scriptural Texts are concerned both the views are equally supported by them. For just as the *vyakti-vādin* takes *Ākṛti* only as a mark (*cihna*) leading to the perception of *vyakti* which according to him is the real import of the word, similarly the *ākṛti-vādin* would take *vyakti* only as a mark which would lead on to the perception of the *Ākṛti* which, he would argue, is the real significance of a word. It is, therefore, necessary

6 यदि पशुहवाकुन पलायेत अन्य तद्वर्णं तद्व्यसमालभेत इति । यथाकृतिवचना शब्दो भवेदन्यस्यालम्भो नोपपद्येत । अन्यस्यापि पशुद्रव्यस्य सैवाकृतिः । तस्माद् व्यक्तिवचन इति । [SB on I 3 32, p 302]

7 आकृति शब्दार्थः । कुन । क्रियार्थत्वात् । इत्येनचित् चिन्वीत इति वचनमाकृतौ संभवति यथाकृ-त्यर्थ इत्येनशब्दः । व्यक्तिवचनेन न चयनेन इत्येनव्यक्तिरुपादयितुं शक्यत इत्यशक्यार्थवचनादनर्थकः । तस्मादाकृतिवचनम् । [SB on Ms I 3 33, p 302]

to seek some more decisive grounds on which to solve this problem.

6 Such a definite ground we get in the fact that the same word is used with reference to several individuals, which decides the issue in favour of the *Ākṛti-vāda*. The very fact that two or more *Vyaktis* can be denoted by one and the same word is enough to show that it signifies something which is common to them all.⁹ For if it is argued that the word *go* may be applicable to other *go-vyaktis* devoid of all *sāmānya-viśeṣas*, then we point out that it is on account of this absence of all *sāmānya-viśeṣas* itself that the word *go* is applied to another *go-vyakti* which is like the first and this absence of all *sāmānya-viśeṣas* itself is the *sāmānya* which is signified by the word *go*. Nor would it do to argue that what is denoted by the word every time is not the absence of *sāmānya-viśeṣas* but *Vyakti* which is but the substratum of all these *dharmas*. For thereby the word *go* will be applicable not only to all *go-vyaktis* but to *as'va-vyaktis* as well, since 'h' *hāt* is also a *vyakti* in the sense of the term as explained above.¹⁰ If to avoid this contingency it is argued that the word applies only to those *vyaktis* where its use is

8 न नभयत्र क्रियाया अमम्भव एव व्यपदिश्यते । नाकृतिः शब्दार्थः । कुत । क्रिया न समवेदाकृतौ शब्दादे, त्रीहीन्प्रोक्षति इति । तथा न व्यक्ति शब्दार्थः, क्रियैव न समवेद् व्यक्ते शब्दार्थत्वं, अनेनचित् चिन्वीत इति । यद्युच्येत त्रीहीन्प्रोक्षति इति व्यक्तिरक्षणार्थाकृतिरिति, शक्यमन्यत्रापि अनेनचित् चिन्वीत इति वदितुमाकृतिरक्षणार्था व्यक्तिरिति । किं पुनश्च उच्यते । [SB on I 3 33, p 303]

9 आकृतिः शब्दार्थः इति । यदि व्यक्ति शब्दार्थो भवेद् व्यक्त्यन्तरे न प्रयुज्येत । अथ व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रयुज्यते, न तर्हि व्यक्ति शब्दार्थः । सर्वसामान्यविशेषविनिर्मुक्ता हि व्यक्तिरित्युच्यते । [SB on I 3 33, p 303]

10 नैव दोषः । व्यक्त्यन्तरे सर्वसामान्यविशेषविनिर्मुक्त एव प्रवर्तिष्यते । यदि व्यक्त्यन्तरे सर्वसामान्यविशेषवियुक्ते प्रवर्तिष्यते, सामान्यमेव तर्हि तत् । नेत्युच्यते । यो ह्यर्थः सामान्यस्य विशेषाणां चाश्रयः, सा व्यक्तिः । व्यक्तिवचनेनैव शब्दो न सामान्ये न विशेषे वर्तते, तथा स्वाश्रयमेवाभिधाति । तेन व्यक्त्यन्तरे वृत्तिरदोषः । न हि तत्सामान्यम् । यदि व्यक्त्यन्तरेषु अपि भवति, सर्वसामान्यविशेषवियुक्तायामश्वव्यक्तौ गोशब्दः किञ्चित् न वर्तते । [SB on I 3 33, p. 303]

known by the *Abhiyuktas* it will be difficult to explain how the word can apply to a new-born cow¹¹ But this is actually observed to happen And even if the above view is accepted for the sake of argument, it will be found to render class-perception an impossibility For according to it, this *vyakti* or that *vyakti* for which *Samketa* is known by us by usage alone will be recognised as a *govyakti*, but actually we find that any *govyakti* even when so far unseen by us also produces the *go-pratyaya* in us¹² So the view that the application of a word to a *vyakti* depends on usage has to be rejected¹³ If it is said that the word may be applied to a *vyakti* which possesses certain *s'akti*, we reply that the *s'akti* may not exist in all the *vyaktis* denoted by the word It is the nature of a *s'akti* that it exists in some *vyakti* but not in others How then will the word denote the *vyakti* which is not possessed of the *s'akti*? Again, *gotva* it certainly can't be For to argue that the word *go* applies to that *vyakti* where *gotva* is found to exist would mean the acceptance of the idea of *vis'ista-vyakti* i.e. the *pratiti* of the *gotva-vis'ista-vyakti* But in such a *pratiti* the qualifying attribute i.e. *gotva* will naturally be perceived first and this means that *Ākrti* is the first import of *s'abda*¹⁴ Here it

11 आह—येष्वेव प्रयोगो दृष्टेषु वर्तियते न सर्वत्र । न चाश्वव्यक्तौ गोशब्दस्य प्रयोगो दृष्टः । तस्मात्तत्र न वर्तियते । यदि यत्र प्रयोगो दृष्टस्तत्र वृत्तिः, अथ जातार्या गवि प्रथमप्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति तत्रादृष्टत्वात् । [SB on I 3. 33, p 303]

12 सामान्यप्रत्ययश्च न प्राप्नोति । इयमपि गौरिति, इयमपि गौरिति, इय वा गौरिति, इय वा गौरिति स्यात् । भवति च सामान्यप्रत्ययोऽदृष्टपूर्वायामपि गोव्यक्तौ । [SB. on I 3 33, p 303]

13 तस्मान्न प्रयोगापेक्षो गोशब्दो व्यक्तिवचन इति शक्यत आश्रयितुम् । [SB on I 3 33, p 304]

14 एव तर्हि शक्ते स्वभाव एष, यत् कस्याचिद् व्यक्तिं वर्तते कस्याचिन्न, यथा अग्निरुष्ण, उदकं शीतम्, एवमेतद् भविष्यतीति । नैव सिध्यति । न ह्येतद् गम्यते कस्याचिद् व्यक्तिं वर्तते कस्याचिन्नेति । सत्यमेतत् । गोशब्दं लक्षणं भविष्यतीति । यत्र शब्देन तस्यां व्यक्तिविति । एव तर्हि विशिष्टा व्यक्तिः प्रतीयेत । यदि च विशिष्टा, पूर्वतः विशेषणमवगम्येत । न ह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टं केचन प्रत्येतुमर्हन्तीति । [SB on I. 3 33, p 304]

may be argued that *Ākṛti* is denoted by the word no doubt but only as a *vis'esana* and not as the real import of a word, just as the idea of a *danda* is conveyed by the word *dandin* not as its real signification but only as a *vis'esana* of it. Or it may be even conceded that a word conveys both *Ākṛti* as well as *Vyakti* so that in some cases the former is subordinate to the latter while in some other cases the relations are reversed¹⁵. Such a position, however, is totally unacceptable, for if *Ākṛti* is once admitted as the *artha* of the *s'abda* go, it must be supposed to have exhausted its *abhidhā* power in expressing it. Nor is it necessary to extend the *abhidhā* power of the word so as to perceive the *Vyakti* for *Ākṛti* is invariably associated with *Vyakti*, and it is on account of this invariable association between the two that on the perception of this *Ākṛti* a *Vyakti* can easily be perceived¹⁶. Where is then the necessity of extending the *abhidhā* *s'akti* to the *Vyakti*? Besides that the perception of *vyakti* arises not from *S'abda* can be easily seen from the *anvaya-vyatiṛeka* relation existing not between *s'abda* and *vyakti*, but between *Ākṛti* and *vyakti*. For one who perceives the *Ākṛti* is invariably observed to perceive the *Vyakti* also even in the absence of a word. On the other hand if through some mental disturbance one is unable to perceive the *Ākṛti* even on the word being uttered it is impossible that *Vyakti* will be perceived by such a person. This shows that the presence or the absence of the perception of *Vyakti* on the part of the observer depends on the presence or the absence of the perception of the *Ākṛti* on his part, and that it has

15 अन्तु विशेषणत्वनाकृति वक्ष्यति विशेषणत्वेन व्यक्तिम् । न ह्याकृतिपदार्थकस्य व्यक्तिर्न पदार्थो, व्यक्तिपदार्थकस्य वा नाकृति । उभयमुभयस्य पदार्थः । कस्यचित् किञ्चित् प्राधान्येन विवक्षितम् भवति, तेन अप्राकृतिगुणभावेन व्यक्तिः प्राधानभावेन विवक्ष्यते इति । [SB on I 3 33, p 304]

16 नैतदेवम् । उभयोरुच्यमानयोगुणप्रधानभावः स्यात् । यदि चाप्राकृतिः प्रतीयते शब्देन, तदा व्यक्तिरपि पदार्थः इति न शक्यते वदितुम् । कुत । आकृतिर्हि व्यक्त्वा नित्यमवस्था, सवन्विध्यां च तस्यामवगताया सवन्व्यन्तरमवगम्यते । [SB on I 3 33 p 304]

nothing to do with the uttering or hearing of *śabda*¹⁷ On the strength of this *anvaya-vyatireka* relation existing between the *Ākṛti* and *Vyakṛti* we again conclude that it is not necessary to extend the *abhidhō śakti* of a word to the *Vyakṛti*

7 Then why not say that a word conveys the idea of a *vyākṛti-vis'ista ākṛti*? Such a view is not acceptable for the simple reason that such an assumption would disqualify a word from being applicable to *vyakṛty-antara-vis'ista-ākṛti*¹⁸

8 Irresistible, therefore is the conclusion that a word expresses *Ākṛti* alone and that this *Ākṛti* in its turn conveys the idea of *Vyakṛti* by implication¹⁹

9 As for the *Pūrva-pakṣin*'s argument that *Ākṛti* is conveyed only as being subordinate to *Vyakṛti*, the *Siddhāntin*'s only reply is that to him it does not matter in what capacity *Ākṛti* is conveyed by a word. If it is accepted that *Ākṛti* is conveyed by a word he is satisfied. For the question of the mutual relation between the *Ākṛti* and the *Vyakṛti* is a matter which can't be decided by the *śabda-śakti*. It has to be decided on the strength of some other factor viz the purpose in view for which the word is employed. If *Ākṛti* is spoken of with reference to itself it shall be *pradhāna*, but if it is spoken of with reference to something else then it will be *guna-bhūta*. The word has no power to decide this²⁰

17 तदेतदात्मप्रत्यक्ष, यच्छब्द उच्चारिते व्यक्ति प्रतीयत इति । किं शब्दादुताकृतेरिति विभागो न प्रत्यक्ष । सोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवगम्यते । अन्तरेणापि शब्द य आकृतिमवबुध्येत, अवबुध्येतैवसौ व्यक्तिम् । यस्तूच्चारितेऽपि शब्दे मानसादपचारात् कदाचिदाकृति नोपलभेत न जातुचिदाविमा व्यक्तिमवगच्छेत् । [SB on I 3 33, p 304 f]

18 ननु व्यक्तिविशिष्टायामाकृतौ वर्तते । व्यक्तिविशिष्टायां चेद्वर्तते व्यक्त्यन्तर-विशिष्टा न प्रतीयेत । [SB on I 3 33, p 317]

19 तस्माच्छब्द आकृतिप्रत्ययस्य निमित्तम् । आकृतिप्रत्ययो व्यक्तिप्रत्ययस्येति । [SB on I 3 33, p 317]

20 ननु गुणभूता प्रतीयत इत्युक्तम् । न गुणभावोऽस्मत्पक्षस्य बाधकः । सर्वथा तावत् प्रतीयते । अर्थाद् गुणभाव प्रधानभावो वा । स्वार्थं चेदुच्चार्यते, प्रधानभूता ।

10 But what about the analogy of the word *dandin* referred to above ? Just as the word *dandin* always signifies a *danda-vis'ista* person but never the *danda*, though from the word *dandin* itself we do get the ideas of both the *danda* as well as the *danda-vis'ista* person, similarly why not say that a word is really expressive of the *Ākṛti-vis'ista vyakti* though it also conveys the idea of *Ākṛti* ? Here it must be noticed that the analogy of the word *dandin* is not conclusive, since there is a vast difference between the word *dandin* on the one hand and words like *gauh* on the other. The former is a composite word made up of two separate parts or words which express two different meanings i.e. *danda* and *Deva-datta*, but such is not the case with the latter. For in the word *gauh* there is no part of it which conveys *govā* alone and another which conveys *govāṅkṛt* alone. Again the former is never used to convey the idea of the *vis'esana* viz *danda* alone, while the latter are often used to convey merely *Ākṛti* which is said to be the *vis'esana*, as e.g. *S'yaena vajeta*. The *ĀKṚTI-VIS'ISTA VYAKTI-VĀDA* therefore, has to be rejected as unsatisfactory particularly because even in the case of the word *dandin* the *vis'esana* viz the idea of *danda* must come first or else the *vis'ista-kalpanā* itself will be an impossibility which shows that the perception of the qualifying attribute must come first. And if *Ākṛti* is thus accepted as being perceived first it is but natural to accept that *Ākṛti* forms the real import of a word for the reasons discussed in detail above. Thus on the strength of *Anvaya-vatutva* we must conclude that the real import of *vābda* is not *vyākṛti* but *Ākṛti*.¹

अथ न स्वार्थे, परार्थमेव, ततो गुणभूता । न तत्र शब्दव्यापारोऽस्ति । [SB on I 3 33 p 317]

21 ननु च दण्डाति, न तावद्दण्डशब्देन दण्डोऽभिधीयते, अथ दण्डविशिष्टोऽवगम्यते । एवमिहापि न तावदाकृतिरभिधीयते, अथ चाकृतिविशिष्टा व्यक्तिरगम्यते इति । नैतत् साधु उच्यते । मग्न दण्डशब्देन दण्डो नाभिधीयते, न स्वप्रतीति दण्ड दण्डिऽत्ययोऽस्ति । अस्ति तु दण्डिशब्दस्यैकदेशभूतो दण्डशब्दो, येन दण्ड इत्यर्थः । तस्मात् साध्वेतत् यत् प्रतीति विशेषणे विशिष्ट इतीत्यत इति । न नु 'गोशब्दवत्' कश्चिदाकृते

11 But *Ākṛti-vāda* can't be found to be wholly acceptable if the objections levelled by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* against it as stated above are not refuted. This, however, is not very difficult to achieve. The texts enjoining killing and such other acts will not be rendered nugatory even on accepting the *Ākṛti-vāda*, for as has been stated above though *s'abda* expresses *Ākṛti*, this latter in its turn necessarily conveys the *Vyakti* by implication. Thus it may be stated that the *Ākṛti* *vacana* words in such texts are used to mark out the *vyaktis* which form the substratum of the acts enjoined by them. So what happens in such texts is that the words first convey the idea of *Ākṛti*, but this *Ākṛti* is found to be useless so far as the particular action is concerned. The *Ākṛti*, therefore, by implication conveys the *vyakti* that is connected with it, so that the danger of *ānarthakya* is warded off.²²

12 The objection on the score of the numerals used in apposition to nouns can also be refuted by pointing out that even there it is the number that is intended to be enjoined and that the *Ākṛti-vacana-s'abda* is used only as a *vis'esaka*.²³ The same is the case with the last objection,

प्रत्यायन, अन्यो व्यक्ते । यत् उच्येत तत् आकृतिवचनात्, न गोशब्द आकृतिवचन इति । न च यथा दण्डिशब्दो न दण्डे प्रयुक्त एव गोशब्दो नाकृतौ । तदर्थमेव निदर्शित केवलाकृतिविधान इत्येवमशब्द इति । तदेवमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामस्ति इत्येवम्वक्तिसंबन्धे इत्येवमशब्दोच्चारणादाकृतिवचन इति गम्यते । न तु ब्रह्माकृतिसंबन्धमन्तरेण ब्रह्मिण्यक्तौ शब्दस्य प्रयोगो दृष्टः । तस्मादाकृतिवचनः शब्द इत्येतज्ज्याय । [SB on I 3 33, p 317 f]

22 तदर्थत्वात् प्रयोगस्याविभागः । [MS I 3 35.] आकृत्यर्थत्वान्छब्दस्य यस्या व्यक्तेराकृत्या संबन्धस्तत्र प्रयोगः । प्रोक्षणा हि द्रव्यस्य कर्तृत्वतया श्रूयते । कृतमस्य । यद् यजतिसाधनम् । अपूर्वप्रयुक्तत्वात्तस्य । नाकृते । अशक्यत्वात् । तत्र ब्रह्मिशब्द आकृतिवचनः प्रयुज्यते प्रोक्षणाश्रयविशेषणाय । स ह्याकृतिः प्रत्याययिष्यति आकृतिः प्रतीता सती प्रोक्षणाश्रयः विशेष्यतीति । तेनाकृतिवचनं न विरुध्यते । इति । [SB on I 3 35, p 319]

23 एव षड् देया गावो दक्षिणा इति दक्षिणाद्रव्ये सख्यायाः प्रयोक्तव्ये गावस्याकृतिवचनो विशेषकः । [SB on I 3 35, p 319]

for the word *anya* there is used with reference to the substitute and is qualified by the *Ākr̥ti-vacana ś'abda*²⁴

13 Thus it may now be stated as a *s'iddhānta* that words like *go* and *as'va* are expressive primarily not of a *Vyakti* but of *Ākr̥ti* or class²⁵

24 तथा, अन्यमिति विनष्टस्य प्रतिनिधेरन्यत्वसम्बन्धे तत्र पशुशब्द आकृतिवचन आकृत्या विशेषयताति । [SB on I 3 35, p 31.]

25 तस्माद् गौरस्य इत्यवमावय शब्दा आकृतेर्निवायका इति सिद्धम् । [SB on I 3 35, p 31.]

The curious reader may also read the वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ beginning with 'एष गौरित्यस्य शब्दस्य कोऽर्थः' and ending with यथा चाकृति शब्दार्थस्तथोपरिष्ठाद्विपुणतमुपपादयिष्याम इति । [pp 49—52] where the वृत्तिकार has justified आकृतिवाद against a Buddhistic attack

THE RELATION between S'ABDA and ARTHA

1 Having determined the nature and the accurate form of *s'abda* and also the exact import conveyed by it we now proceed to discuss the question of the mutual relation between the two. But it may be asked whether there is any possibility of there being any connection between them at all. They can't be connected by *sams'lesa* or *samyoga*. For had they been so connected the utterance of the words *ksura* and *modaka* would have resulted in the cutting and the filling of the mouth respectively. Such however, is not our experience. Nor is it possible to think of any other relation such as the *kārya-kārana-bhāva* or the *numitta-naimittika-bhāva* or the *ās'rayās'rayi-bhāva* existing between the two. The first two *sambandhas* are impossible since both *s'abda* as well as *artha* are *nitya*. As for the third it is also rendered impossible by the fact that they have different *ās'rayas*, for *s'abda* is known to reside in *ākāś'a* while *artha* is found to reside on *pṛthivī*. What relation can then be found to exist between them?"

2 The simple answer to this question given by the *Mīmāṃsaka* is that *s'abda* is *pratyāyaka* and *artha* is *pratyāyaka*, and hence it can reasonably be assumed that there subsists between them the *pratyāyaka-pratyāyaka-bhāva* or the *samjñāsamjñālakṣana-sambandha*. But if such a relation exists between *s'abda* and *artha* we should expect *s'abda* to convey its *artha* even on its first hearing. Our experience, however, is that a *prathama-s'ruta s'abda* is not *pratyāyaka*. This means that the *sambandha* between the word and the sense is not of the *pratyāyaka-pratyāyaka* type, for had it been so even the *prathama-s'ruta s'abda* should have been *pratyāyaka*.

1 नैव शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः । कुतोऽस्य पौरुषेयताऽपौरुषेयता चेति । कथम् । स्यान्चेदर्थेन संबन्धः क्षुरमोदकशब्दोच्चारणे मुखस्य पाटनपूरणे स्याताम् । यदि सन्धेवलक्षण संबन्धमभिप्रेत्योच्यते । कार्यकारणनिमित्तनैमित्तिकाश्रयाश्रयिभावादयस्तु, संबन्धाः शब्दस्यानुपपन्ना एवेति । [वृत्ति, P. 43]

But it is not so. This argument can, however, be retuted by pointing out to our experience. That a *s'abda* is *pratyāyaka* and *artha* is *pratyāyya* is established by experience, for we do find that *s'abda* invariably conveys *artha*. But what about the fact that it does not convey *artha* when *prathamas'ruta*? Well, if we find that the word does not become *pratyāyaka* when it is *prathamas'ruta* we must assume that it becomes *pratyāyika* when it is heard as many times as it is necessary for it to be *pratyāyaka*. For this is how we can account for our experience. Nor can it be called *apratyāyaka* because it does not convey the sense when it is *prathamas'ruta* just as the eye can't be called *adrastr* merely because we find that it can't give us perception of an object unless it is aided by (or in the absence of) light. We never say that the eye is not the seer because it can't see in the absence of light, on the contrary we do accept the eye as the seer and take light as its *sahakāri kārana*. In the present case also then we must take *s'abda* as the *pratyāyaka* and the *bahukrtvah s'rayana* as the *sahakāri kārana* in the absence of which *s'abda* may not be *pratyāyaka*.²

3. But it may be argued that at any rate this relation i.e. *pratyāyakapratyāyya-sambandha* between *s'abda* and *artha* must be accepted as being man-made and hence *anitya*, if it requires to be grasped by hearing the word more than once. Evidently *s'abda* can have no natural connection with *artha*, for while the former is perceived in the mouth inside the body the latter is perceived on the ground outside the body. Even in ordinary language we do distinguish the one from the other, saying, 'This is *s'abda* and not *artha* and vice versa'. The same again is shown by their different natures, the former is something to be uttered while the latter is

2. उच्यते । श्रोतव्यं व्यादेश्यं सवन्वस्तमेकं न व्यपदिशति भवान् प्रत्यायकस्य प्रत्यायकस्य च न सङ्गासङ्गिलक्षण इति । आह यदि प्रत्यायकः शब्दः प्रथमश्रुतिं किं न प्रत्याययति । उच्यते । सर्वत्र नो दर्शनं प्रमाणम् । प्रत्यायक इति हि प्रत्यय एव ट्वाऽगवच्छामो न प्रथमश्रुति इति । प्रथमश्रवणे प्रत्ययमट्वाद्यावत्कृत् श्रुतेनेत्यसङ्गाऽयं सङ्गत्यवधारितं भवति तावत्कृत् श्रुतादविवर्गम् इति । यथा चक्षुर्द्रष्टुं न वक्ष्येन प्रकाशेन विना प्रकाशयतीत्यद्रष्टुं न भवति । [वृत्तिः, p. 43 f.]

something to be perceived. If thus *s'abda* and *artha* are two entities separately existing, the only conclusion that can be drawn regarding their mutual relationship is that it must be *kṛtaka*—as *kṛtaka*, for example, as the relation between a rope and a jar which are two separate entities enjoying in dependent existence. We, therefore, conclude that some human being must have fixed the relation between *s'abda* and *artha* and then must have composed the *Vedas* for *vyavahāra-siddhi*.³

4 Such a view of the relation between *s'abda* and *artha* is, however, not acceptable to JAIMINI and his commentator, S'ABARA, who time and again⁴ have harped on this point declaring in no ambiguous terms that the relation between *s'abda* and *artha* is *utpattika* or *nitya* or *apauruṣya*. It is also further pointed out by them that it is on account of this *utpattikatva* of the *s'abdārtha-sambandha* that a word can be expressive of one signification and one only and that it can't be made to express any signification save the one with which it is naturally connected.⁵

5 As the *prima facie* view it has been stated above that *s'abdārtha-sambandha* is *kṛtaka* and that the *Vedas* have

3 यदि प्रथमश्रुतो न प्रत्याययति कृतकस्तर्हि शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः । कुत । स्वभावतो ह्यसम्बन्धावेतौ शब्दार्थौ । सुखे हि शब्दमुपलभामहे भामावर्थम् । शब्दोऽयं न त्वर्थोऽर्थोऽयं न शब्द इति च व्यपदिशन्ति । रूपभेदोऽपि भवति । गौरिति शब्दमुच्चारयन्ति सास्नादिमन्तमर्थमवबुध्यन्ते इति । पृथग्भूतयोश्च य सम्बन्धः स कृतको दृष्टः, यथा रज्जुघटयोरेति । [वृत्ति, p. 45] Also read अथ क सम्बन्ध इति । यच्छब्दे विज्ञातेऽर्थो विज्ञायते स तु कृतक इति पूर्वमुपपादितम् । तस्मान्मन्यामहे केनापि पुरुषेण शब्दानामर्थं स इ सम्बन्धः कृत्वा व्यववर्तुं वेदाः प्रणीता इति । [वृत्ति, p. 52 f]

4 औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः [MS. F. 15] नाम्नस्तु औत्पत्तिकत्वात् [MS. VII. 3. 38] नौत्पत्तिकत्वात् [MS. VII. 2. 5], विकारो नौत्पत्तिकत्वात् [MS. VI. 8. 41], उत्पत्तिनामधेयत्वादः भक्त्या पृथक्स्तीषु स्यात् । [MS. VIII. 3. 22] औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नो सम्बन्धः । [SB. on VI. 8. 41 p. 1522, VII. 2. 5, p. 1543, and VIII. 3. 3, p. 1550]

5 औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नो सम्बन्धः । यन्नाम यस्मिन्नर्थे औत्पत्तिकेन सम्बन्धेन प्रसिद्धः, तस्मिन्नेव सदा विज्ञेयः नान्यत्र च । तथाऽव्यवस्थायाः शब्दार्थे विश्वासो न स्यात् । उक्तम्—अन्यायश्चानेकार्थत्वमिति । [SB. on VII. 3. 3, p. 1550]

been composed by some human being for carrying on *vyavahāra* after fixing the relation between *śabda* and *artha*. But the main defect of this view is that there is no *purusa* whom they can prove to be *sambanddhā*. This existence of this *sambanddhā* can't for obvious reasons, be proved by *pratyakṣa*. And if *pratyakṣa* falls off the other *pramānas* also, dependent on *pratyakṣa* as they are, are of no use in this matter. It will not do to say that the *sambanddhā* though not *pratyakṣa* to the people of today, must have been so to the people of ancient times, for had he been so we should certainly have received some traditional information about him. And though there is every possibility of the tradition being broken you must put forth strong reasons to show that it has actually happened like that in this case. The orchards and the tanks on the *Himālayas* for example, must be the work of some *purusa*, and yet we to-day have not the slightest knowledge or tradition about him. But in that case the absence or break of tradition is caused by *dis'otsāda* or *kutotsāda* which ultimately results in the separation of the author from them in memory of men. The same can't however be said about *śabda* and *artha* for there is no period imaginable when man was not connected with *śabdārtha-vyavahāra*.

Thus if there is no break or *vijoga* there is no reason why there should be no *smarana* of the *sambanddhā* if at all there was any. This absence of the *smarana* of the *sambanddhā*, therefore, can be taken as an indication of the absence of *sambanddhā* himself. And the absence of *sambanddhā* thus proved takes away all wind out of the sails of the *prima facie* view.

6 But it may be argued that the *sambanddhā* was dropped from the memory because there was no necessity of remem-

6 तदिदानीमुच्यते । अपौरुषेयत्वात् संबन्धस्य सिद्धमिति । कथं पुनरवगम्यते अपौरुषेय एव संबन्ध इति । पुरुषस्य संबन्धुभावात् । कथं संबन्धा नास्ति । प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणस्याभावात्, तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्चेत्तरेषाम् । ननु चिरन्तत्वात्प्रत्यक्षस्याविषयो भवेदिदानीन्तनाकम् । न हि चिरवृत्तः सन्न स्मर्येत । न च हिमवदादिषु कूपारमादिवदस्मरण

bering him in the *s'abdārtha-vyavahāra* which could be carried on without remembering him. Do we not brush aside many things from our memory when they are found to be useless for our immediate purpose? Does it mean that they do not exist? Mere non-remembrance can't be a ground strong enough to prove the absence of a *sambanddhā*. We find that we are concerned only with the *sambandha* between *s'abda* and *artha* and not with the *sambanddhā* also. The same was the experience of the ancients also who, therefore, naturally did not care to retain any memory of the *sambandha-kartā* since it was all unnecessary for their immediate purposes. The absence of *sambanddhā*, therefore, is not proved. Such an argument on the part of the *Pūrva-paksin* can, however, be easily shown to be fallacious. It is true that people are concerned with the *sambandha* only and not with the *sambandha-kartā* also. But it is not true to argue, therefore, that the remembrance of the *sambanddhā* is futile. For the remembrance of the *sambanddhā* is a prerequisite of *vyavahāra-siddhi*. If any *vyavahāra* is to be fruitful there must first of all be full agreement between the *sambandhakartā* and the *vyavahartā* for if there is no *sampratipatti* or if there is *vipratipatti* (disagreement) between the two there shall be no *artha-siddhi*. The words *siddhi* and *makāra* for example will not convey the senses of *ai* and *au* and a *saiva-guru tika* respectively when used by one who does not agree with PĀNINI and PINGALA or when used in connection with any transaction which has no connection with the *sūtras* propounded by them. This shows that *artha-siddhi* presupposes the *sampratipatti* or agreement between the *kartā* and the *vyavahartā*. But how can there be this *sampratipatti* if there is no *smarana* of the *kartā*? It is therefore wrong to argue that *kartṛ-smarana* is not necessary for our immediate purposes. On the contrary it is highly essential to have the *kartṛ-smarana* if at all our *vyavahāras* are to be crowned with success. But as

अवितुमर्हति । पुरुषवियोगो हि तेषु भवति देशोत्सादन वा कुलोत्सादेन वा । न च
शब्दार्थव्यवहारवियोगः पुरुषाणामस्ति । [वृत्तिः, p. 53]

there is no *smarana* we conclude that there was no *kartā* "

7 Again there is nothing wrong in arguing that non-remembrance of an existing thing is possible. But the converse of this is not true, and it is wrong to conclude that all non-remembered or non-perceived things do exist because some existing things are not remembered. The mere non-remembrance of a thing can't be taken as ground enough, for postulating the existence of a thing as it is done by the *Pūrva-paksin*. For if such a process is allowed we may as well argue that since non-perception of an existing thing is possible, therefore, here's horn because it is *anupalabdha*, must be an existing thing. The point is that the existence of a thing can be admitted only if it is proved by some *pramāna*, but never in the absence of any *pramāna* at all "

8 But it may be pointed out that the existence of the *sambandha-kartā* can be proved on the strength of the *pramāna* called *arthapatti*. Even today we find that people are not able to grasp the sense of the words which are not connected by some person with an *artha*. For otherwise (i.e. if the *sambandha* had been natural and not man-made) people would have understood the sense of the words on hearing them even for the first time. But we find that the sense of the words which are heard for the first time is not understood by the people. This shows that we have per force

7 स्यादन्तः । सर्वत्रमात्रव्यवहारीणे निष्प्रयोजनं कर्तृस्मरणमनाद्रियमाणा विस्मरेयुरिति । तत्र । यदि हि पुरुषः कृत्वा सर्वत्र व्यवहारयेत् व्यवहारकालेऽवश्यं स्मर्तव्यो भवति । सम्प्रतिपत्तो हि कर्तृप्रवह्वार्यं मि यति, न विप्रतिपत्तो । न हि वृद्धिश्चदेन अपाणिनेर्यवहारत आर्द्व प्रतीयेत पाणिनिकृतिमननुमन्यमानस्य वा । तथा मकारे पाणिनाकस्य न सर्वगुह्यिकः प्रतीयेत, पिङ्गलकृतिमननुमन्यमानस्य वा । तेन कर्तृव्यवहारो सप्रतिपत्ते । तेन वेदे व्यवहारद्विरवश्यं स्मरणीयं सर्वत्रवश्यं कर्ता स्यात् । व्यवहारस्य च । न हि विस्मृते वृद्धिराद्वैजित्यस्य सूत्रस्य कर्तारि 'वृद्धिर्यस्याचामादि' इति किञ्चित् प्रतीयेत । [वृत्ति, P 53 f]

8 यद्यपि च विस्मरणमुपपद्येत, तथापि न प्रमाणमन्तरेण स्ववधार प्रतिपद्येमहि । यथा विद्यमानस्यानुपलम्भनं भवताति नेतावता विना प्रमाणेन क्षशविषाण प्रतिपद्यामहे । [वृत्ति, P 55]

to accept the *sambandha-kartā* as being absolutely necessary for a successful transaction today. Similarly, therefore, we shall have to accept the existence of the *sambandha-kartā* for the ancient period also. For had there been none such how could people have understood the *s'abdārtha* at all? This argument, however, is not sound. The main flaw in the whole argument arises from the fact that the *Pūrva-pakṣin* has here forgotten the real nature of the *pramāṇa* called *arthāpatti*. With reference to this *pramāṇa* the most important point to remember is that it can find scope only when no other possible explanation of the existing facts can be presented. In *arthāpatti* we try to explain the existing facts which are apparently inexplicable, and for doing this we postulate or presume the existence of some other fact. But the presumption of this fresh fact may be allowed only if it is found impossible to explain the existing facts in any other way. But as soon as such an alternative explanation is made available the *arthāpatti* will lose all scope. Impossibility of any other solution or explanation is, thus, the very foundation or soul of this *pramāṇa*, and before taking one's stand on it one has, therefore, to make sure that this foundation is not slippery. Bearing in mind this peculiar character of *arthāpatti* let us now turn to the question of the presumption of the *sambandha-kartā*."

9 According to the *Pūrva-pakṣin* no word was in the beginning connected with any *artha* at all. Then it was that somebody established the connection between *s'abda* and *artha* and thus it is that words have come to acquire the significations that they have today. This is no doubt one way of explaining how *s'abdārtha-vyavahāra* started and continues. But this is not the only solution. *Uddha-*

९ अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्ट धृतो वार्थोऽन्वया नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थकल्पना । यथा जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना । [वृत्ति, P 39] अदृष्टो योऽधृतो वार्थः स नास्तीत्यवगम्यते । तस्मिन्नपि दृष्टध्वेन धृतो वा न विरुध्यते ॥ विरुध्यमाने कल्प्ये स्याज्जायते तेन सोऽर्थवान् । विशेषध्वेन गम्येत ततो नैकोऽपि कल्प्यते ॥ [SB on II 21 p 462] तद्वि वचनात् कल्प्यते, यस्मिन्नकल्प्यमाने वचनमनर्थकं भवति । [SB on VI 63, p 1481]

vyavahāra may give us another possible solution of the whole problem. Even today we find youngsters getting at the *s'abdārtha* by observing the speeches and the consequent transactions of their elders. In the same way the elders of today must have caught *artha-jñāna* from the observation of the transactions of the elders of their times, and these latter again from those of their day. Thus we find that *viddha-vyavahāra* can explain very well the phenomenon of *artha-jñāna* from the *S'abda* so that there are now two possible explanations for the phenomenon under consideration, (1) the knowledge of the *s'abdārtha-sambandha-kartā* as in the case of the word *viddhi* of *Pāṇini* or of the word *makāra* of *Pingala* and (2) the *viddha-vyavahāra*. And when *viddha-vyavahāra* is actually seen to account for *artha-jñāna* why presume the *kāra-jñāna* and the consequent existence of a *sambandha-kartā*? Thus it is clear that there can be no scope for *arthāpatti* in this matter. And it may be added that of the two explanations suggested above the latter is all the more strengthened and as such rendered more acceptable by the fact that it is supported by the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* based on our actual experience.¹⁰

10. The absence of the *sambandha-kartā* can be proved in another way also. For it is impossible to think of a day on which the *s'abdās* and *arthas* had no connection whatsoever with one another and were for the first time brought into connection with one another by some human agency.

10 नन्वर्थापत्त्या सबन्धम प्रतिपद्येमहि न शक्यतमबन्धान्छब्दादर्थे प्रतिपद्यमानानुपलभ्यते । प्रतिपद्यन्ते प्रथमप्रवणेऽपि प्रतिपद्येन । तदनुपलभ्यनादवश्यं भवितव्यं सबन्धेन चम सिद्धवदुपदेशात् । यदि सबन्धुरभावाभियोगतो नार्था उपलभ्येरस्ततोऽर्थापत्त्या सबन्धवारमवगच्छाम । अस्ति त्वन्य प्रकार । वृद्धानां स्मरणेन व्यवहारमाणानामुपलब्धन्तो बाला प्रत्यक्षमर्थं प्रतिपद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते । तऽपि वृद्धा यदा बाला आसन्नदान्यन्यो वृद्धेभ्यस्तोऽन्येभ्य इति नास्त्वादिरित्येव वा भवेत् । अथवा न कश्चिदेकोऽपि शब्दस्यार्थेन सबन्ध आसीत् । अथ केनचित् सबन्धा प्रवर्तिता इति । अत्र वृद्धव्यवहारे सति नार्थादापद्यत सबन्धस्य कर्ता । अपि च व्यवहारवादिन् प्रत्यक्षमुपदिशन्ति, कल्पयन्तीतरे सबन्धवार, न च प्रत्यक्षे प्रत्यर्थिनि कल्पना साध्वी ।
[वृत्ति, p 55 f]

Such an assumption necessarily pre-supposes the *sambandha-kartā* and the *sambandha-kriyā*. But how could this *sambandha-kriyā* be carried out? Is it not that the *kartā* will have to catch hold of some existing words with established meanings with which to establish the *sambandha* between the *s'abdās* and the *artha*s which are totally unconnected with each other? But were these existing words connected with *artha*? Well, they could not have been so, for we are talking of a day when there was no *artha-sambandha*. How were these words then connected with their *artha*? For that you will have to assume an ever new series of words that you will be required to accept so that the *sambandha-kriyā* itself will have to be given up as an impossible task. The only course open to you assumed *kartā*, therefore is to catch hold of some *siddha* words whose connection with *artha* is not a matter to be brought into existence, but must have existed even before the *sambandha-kartā* who must be accepted to have known it from *videtā-vyavahāra*. Thus ultimately we find that *artha-jñāna* has to be explained on the strength of the *videtā-vyavahāra* at every stage and its aid has to be invoked even after postulating the existence of a *sambandha-kartā* ¹¹

11 To question as to how youngsters can catch *artha* if they do not know the *sambandha* would be to question a fact of our own every day experience. For we actually find youngsters doing it every day. Never for once do we find them getting at *artha-jñāna* with the help of the ministry of a *sambandha-kartā*. Hence the existence of a *sambandha-kartā* for want of any sound proof must be denied ¹²

11 न हि सवन्धव्यतिरिक्तं कश्चित्कालोऽस्ति । यस्मिन् न कश्चिदपि शब्दः केनचिदर्थेन संबद्ध आसीत् । कथम् । सवन्धक्रियैव हि नोपपद्यते । अवश्यमनेन सबधं कुर्वता केनचिच्छब्देन कर्तव्यं । येन क्रियेत तस्य केन कृतं । अथान्येन केनचित् कृतं, तस्य हेनेति तस्य केनेति नैवावतिष्ठते । तस्मादवश्यमनेन सबधं कुर्वताऽकृतसंबद्धा केचन शब्दा बृहस्पतिव्याहारीणां अभ्युपगन्तव्याः । अस्ति चेद व्यवहारसंदिग्धं नियोगत उक्तं भावितव्यमित्यर्थापत्तिरपि नास्ति । ['वृत्ति', p. 57]

12 स्यादेतत् । अप्रसिद्धसंबद्धा बालाः कथं बद्धेभ्यः प्रतिपन्नन्त इति । नास्ति

12 We can now go even a step further and add that the presumption of a *sambandha-kartā* is absurd. *Sambandha-karana* means ultimately giving names to things. But it is not possible to assume that all things having names were in existence on the day on which the naming ceremony took place. Some things at least can reasonably be said to have come into being at a later stage. Then how is it possible to think of this *saṃjñā-karana* taking place in the case of such things as were not present on the day on which this supposed ceremony took place? *Samjñā-karana* is for the perception of and with some particular reference to some *śabdas* of existing things. But neither of these is possible in the case of the things of the future or of things not in existence at the time of the *saṃjñā-karana*. This then proves the absolute futility of the assumption of the *sambandha-kartā*¹³. Similarly have JAIMINI and Ś'ABARA shown that it is impossible to think of any *sambandha-kartā* in the case of the *Veda* also¹⁴.

13 In conclusion therefore it may now be said that since 'the existence of the *sambandha-kartā* can't be proved by any *pramāna*' it is but fair to assume that there is no such *kartā*, and hence 'there is nothing wrong in assuming that the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is not *man-mad* but *autpattika* or *niitya*'.

14 As regards the bearing of this conclusion on the *Mīmāṃsa* theory as a whole it may be pointed out that according to the *mīmāṃsaka*, *śabda* is an unquestionable *pramāna* since it is not contaminated by *purusānupravesa*. The *laukika śabda* is found sometimes to be *apramāna* because it is so contaminated. Thus if any contact with

दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम । दृष्टा बाला वृद्धेभ्यः प्रतिपद्यमाना न च प्रतिपन्ना सबधा
सम्बन्धस्य कर्तुः । तस्माद् वैषम्यम् । [वृत्तिः, P. 58]

13 अनुपलब्धे च देवदत्तादावर्थेऽनर्थकं सङ्गाकरणमशक्यं च । विशेषान् प्रतिपत्तुं हि
सङ्गाः क्रियन्ते विजयाश्चेद्विद्युः । तद्विरोधेऽप्यज्ञायमानेषु भयमप्यन्वयकृतम् । तस्मादपौरु-
षेय-शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः । [वृत्तिः, P. 58]

14 cf MS II 27-32, and SB thereon

human hand be shown in the case of *s'abda* or *artha* or their mutual relationships the *prāmānya* of the *Veda* would certainly suffer. But when all these three are conceived to be *niitya* and therefore *apauruṣeya* the validity of the *s'abda* or the *Veda* remains unchallenged. For *s'abda* in itself is always *pramāna*. In *laukika-vyavahāra* it sometimes becomes *apramāna* owing to its being employed by an *apramāna puruṣa*. But in the case of the *Veda* there is no *puruṣa-sambandha* and hence there is no possibility of its being open to *apramānya* in any way¹⁵

15 अपौरुषेय शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्ध । तस्य अग्निहोत्रादिलक्षणस्य ज्ञान प्रत्यक्षा-
द्विभिरनवगम्यमानस्य । तथा च चोदनालक्षण सम्यक्सम्प्रत्यय इति । पौरुषेये हि
शब्दे य प्रत्ययस्तस्य मिथ्याभाव आशङ्क्येत । परप्रत्ययो हि तदा स्यात् । अथ शब्दे
ब्रूति कथं मिथ्येति । न हि तदानीमन्यत पुरुषादवगतिमिच्छाम । etc [वृत्ति,
p 41 f], also read नन्वतथाभूतमप्यर्थं ब्रूयात् चोदना—न तु वेदवचनस्य
मिथ्यात्वे किञ्चन प्रमाणमस्ति । [SB on I 12, pp 13-17]

HOW TO DETERMINE THE S'ABDARTHA ?

1 Though it is now established that *Ākṛti* is the real import of a word and not *Vyakti* yet the question remains as to what particular *Ākṛti* is denoted by a particular word? And this question is very important so far as *vyavahāra* is concerned. We shall therefore try to lay down the means and criteria which according to JAIMINI and S'ABARA, help us to determine the *s'abdārtha*.

2 The simplest way of determining the *s'abdārtha* is given by S'ABARA in an automatic sentence. YAH PRATYATE SA S'ABDARTH and the rule appears to be so universal in its application that one really can't imagine that any objection may be levelled against it. But take for example, the word *pūrva* in the sentence *Pūrvō dhāvati*. Here do we not get the idea of *apara* also from the word *pūrva*? But can it be rightly said that *apara* is also the sense of the word *pūrva*? But here it must be remembered that though the idea of *apara* is somehow conveyed by the word *pūrva*, it is not intended to be conveyed¹. Nor does it serve any immediate useful purpose. Hence the above-mentioned rule regarding *s'abdārtha* may be modified and it may be said that 'Whatever sense is conveyed and is also intended to be conveyed is the real significance of a word'. This rule has been stated by JAIMINI in very simple terms when he writes, TADAGAME HI TAD DṚṢYATE etc. and has been very well explained by S'ABARA in the following words, 'YASYA CĀGAME YAD UPATYATI SA TASYARTHA ITI GAMYATI'. This may be styled the rule of ANVAYAVYATIREKA².

1 अणव्यायांऽपि हि प्रतीयते । यथा पूर्वो वाक्येति । स पूर्व इत्युच्यते यस्यापरोऽस्ति । तेन पूर्व इत्युक्तेऽपरो गम्यते । न त्वपरो धावतीति श्रवणाप्रतीयते । — — । यथैव हि पूर्व इत्युक्तेऽपरो गम्यत एव केवल, न तु स विधीयते कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे एवमिहापि सख्या प्रतीयत एव केवल etc [SB on IV 1 14, p 1204]

2 शब्दवत्तुपलभ्यते तदागमे हि तद् दृश्यते तस्य ज्ञानं यथान्येषाम् । [SB on IV 1 15]. यस्य चागमे बहुपजायते, स तस्यार्थ इति गम्यते । तस्य ज्ञानं, यथान्येषां

3 The next source of *artha-jñāna* is the ABHIKUYTAS or the S'ĀSTRASTHAS JAIMINI clearly lays down that the S'ĀSTRASTHAS are to be looked upon as the sole authority on the question of *s'abdārtha*,³ and S'ABARA paraphrases him in the words 'YAH S'ĀSTRASTHĀNĀM SA S'ABDĀRTHAH Numerous' are the places where S'ABARA refers to this source of *s'abdārtha-jñāna* and instead of the word *s'āstrastha* he uses the simpler terms *abhuyukta* or *s'istas*? But who are these *s'āstrasthas* or the *abhuyuktas* or the *s'istas*? And why are they *pramāna*? S'ABARA answers these questions by pointing out that their tradition and acquaintance with the *Vedas* and the *s'āstras* is unbroken, and hence they are to be looked upon as an authority in matters regarding words and their significations.⁵

4 Another source or rather a class of sources is *mgama*, *nirukta*, and *vyākaraṇa*. In the *Vedas* we get, for example, words like *jabharī* and *turpharītū*. They apparently convey no sense so that the first of the above-mentioned rules does not apply in their case. And the words may prove to be unintelligible—nay, they have proved so—to the *abhuyuktas* or the *s'istas* themselves. With reference to such word S'ABARA lays down that their *artha* shall be determined with the help of *mgama*, *nirukta* and *vyākaraṇa*.⁴ Thus it will be seen

शब्दानाम् । अभ्यमानयेयुक्तेऽश्चानयनं प्रतीयते । गामनयेति गवानयनम् । तत्राश्वोऽपैति,
गौश्वोपजायते । तेन ज्ञायते, अभ्यशब्दस्याश्वोऽथो गोशब्दस्य गौरिति च ।

[MS I 3 9]

3 शास्त्रस्था वा तन्निमित्तत्वात् । [SB on VIII 2 24 p 1610],

4 शब्दार्थाधिगमे चाभियुक्तोपदेशः प्रमाणम् [SB on I 3 10 p 226],
अभियुक्ता शब्दार्थेषु शिष्टा [SB on I 10, p 226]. यः शास्त्रस्थानां स शब्दार्थः ।
[SB on I 3 9 p 217], also cf SB on MS I 3 27

5 के शास्त्रस्था, [See page 25, n 8 above] अर्थिनो अभियुक्ता
etc [See page 25 n 7 above], आर्थावर्तनिवासिना शब्दार्थोपायेष्वभियु-
क्तानां [etc See page 25, n 8 above]

6 विद्यमानोऽप्यर्थः प्रमादालस्यादिभिर्नोपलभ्यते । निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणवशेन
धातुतोऽर्थः कल्पयितव्यः । यथा शृण्वेव जर्भरी तुर्करीत् इत्येवमादीनि अर्थिनो-

that this source is to be tackled only in the absence of the two sources noticed above and also of the one to be noticed next.

5 The three main sources of *artha-jñāna* noticed up to now help us to determine the artha of words belonging to the language of the *Āryas* only. But how shall we determine the senses of words which do not belong to the language of the *Āryas*, but which we may come across sometimes even in Scriptural texts? This question has been answered by JAIMINI and S'ABARA by laying down that in the case of such borrowed words we must accept their original sense which they are generally used to convey in the language from which they are borrowed. Take for example the words *pika n-ma sa'a* and *tāmarasa*. No attempt shall be made to determine the sense of these words with the help of *mgama*, *mrūk'a* and *vākaraṇa*. On the other hand we must accept them as conveying the senses of *kokila*, *artha dārumava pama* and *pauma* which they are used to convey in the original language from which they are borrowed. Thus in the case of borrowed words the rule is *CODHAM ITI PRATYĪTA AVIRODHAT PRAMĀṆINA*. But if there are any words whose sense is not understood by the *Mlecchas* also then and then only we may have recourse to *śiṣṭas* or to *mgama*, *mrūk'a* and *vākaraṇa*.

मिथुनानि द्विवचनान्तानि लभ्यन्ते । ...अवयवप्रमिद्धा च लौकिकेनाद्येन विशेष्यन्ते ।
जर्मिणी भर्तारि, तुर्कगीतु इन्ताराविति । एव सर्वत्र [SB on सत परमविज्ञानम् ।
MS I 2 41 p 156] also cf. SB on MS I 3 10

7 यत् निगमनिरुक्त व्याकरणानामर्थवत्तेति । तत्रेयामर्थवत्ता भविष्यति न यत्र
मन्त्रैर्यवगम शब्दार्थः । अथि च निगमादिभिरर्थे कल्पमानेऽन्यवस्थित शब्दार्थो
भवेत् । तत्रानिश्चय स्यात् [SB on I 3 10 p 227 f]

8 चोदित तु प्रतीयेनाविरोधात् प्रमाणेन । [MS I 3 10] चोदितमशै-
रपि शिक्षानवगत प्रतीयेन । यत् प्रमाणेनाविरुद्ध तदवगम्यमान न न्याय्य स्यक्तुम् । यत्
शिष्टाचार प्रमाणमिति, तत्रत्यज्ञानवगतेऽर्थे । यत्त्वभियुक्ता शब्दार्थेषु शिष्टा इति ।
तत्रोच्यते । अभियुक्ततरा पक्षिणा पोषणे नन्वने च म्लेच्छाः । युक्त निगमनिरुक्त etc
See n 7 above [SB on I 3 10 p 228 ff]

6 But there might be cases where one and the same word might show different usages among different peoples. Thus there are the words *rājan* and *īājya*⁹. According to one view the former is a *jāti-s'abda* or an *autpattika s'abda* and from it is derived the latter which primarily denotes '*rājnah karma*' and is by usage restricted to *janapada-paripākana*. According to others, however, the latter is the *jāti-s'abda* signifying *janapada-paripālana* and from it we get the word *rājan* which primarily denotes *tasya karta* and is only by usage applied to *kṣatriya-jāti*. Now which of these views is to be accepted as the right one? S'ABARA declares that the former is the right view of the matter with the remark that a usage which is less wide is not to be accepted when it conflicts with another wider one, for the simple reason that the wider usage is accepted by even those who have the narrower one¹⁰. Another criterion that he puts forth in this matter is that what conflicts of course with the *s'āstras* is certainly less acceptable than what, though actually not supported by *s'āstra*, at least does not conflict with it. And as the inhabitants of the *Āryāvarta* are constantly in touch with *s'abdāthopāyas*, their view is unquestionably more acceptable than that of the *antvajanapadavāsi mlecchas*¹¹. Here it must how-

9 यदि तावज्जातिशब्दो राजेति ततस्त्व कर्मतिज्जनपदपरिपालने राज्यशब्दो भविष्यति । तेनार्थावर्तनिकासिर्ना प्रयोगो न विरोत्स्यते । अथ यदि राज्यशब्द परिपालने नित्यसबद्धो भविष्यति ततस्तस्य कर्तेति राजशब्द क्षत्रियजातौ तस्मिन्तो भविष्यति । तत्रान्धाणां प्रयोगो न विरोत्स्यते । तस्मान्न प्रयोगदर्शनादुभावापि राजराज्यशब्दौ जातिपरिपालनार्था नित्यसबद्धावित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । को नु खलु निर्णयः । राजजातीयस्य कर्म इत्यतः परिपालनं राज्यशब्देनोच्यते । एव हि स्मरन्तो ऽभियुक्तास्तस्य कर्मेति ध्यन्प्रत्ययं विदधति । न तु तस्य कर्मेति प्रत्ययलोपः प्रातिपदिकप्रवृत्तिर्वा समामनन्ति । तस्माद्राज्ञं कर्म राज्यम् । न राज्यस्य कर्ता राजा । [SB on II 3 3, p 584]

10 ननु जनपदपुरपरिरक्षणवृत्तिमनुपजीवत्यपि क्षत्रिये राजशब्दमान्धा प्रयुज्यते प्रयोक्तारः । न ब्रूमो न प्रयुज्यत इति ।... । असर्वलौकिकस्य प्रयोगस्य सार्वलौकिकेन प्रयोगेण विरुध्यमानस्याप्राप्ताप्य स्यात् । अभ्युपगच्छन्ति हि ते जनपदिनः सार्वभौम प्रयोगम् । [SB on II 3 3 p 580]

ever, be noted that whenever there is a conflict between an *anumāna* and *pratyakṣa prayoga* (actual usage) or between *pravoga* and *smṛti*, the latter is to be regarded as stronger in each case. Thus, to take up the words *rājan* and *rājya* again, According to one view *rājya* is *rājñah karma* which means that the word *rājya* is a *yangika śabda* derived from the word *rājan* which is the original word. According to the other view on the other hand *rājan* is *rājyasya kartā* which means that *rājan* is a *yangika śabda* derived from the word *rājya* which is to be taken as the original word. But here we find that the former view is directly supported by the *sūtra* *Lasya karma* while the latter has no such *sūtra* to lend any direct support to it. Then the supporting *sūtra* will first of all have to be framed on the strength of usage and then with that *sūtra* the view will have to be justified. This naturally shows the weakness of the latter view the weak point being that whereas the former is supported by *smṛti* the latter is not so supported. This rule is clearly laid down by ŚĪBĀRA when he writes *PRAYOGĀCCH SMṚTIH BĀHYASĪ* or *PRAYOGO DURBĀH SMṚTEH*.

11 अपि चाविप्रगता लौकिका धर्मा विप्रगीतेभ्य प्रत्ययिततरा भवन्ति । तथार्थावर्तनिकासिनी शब्दाध्यायवैश्वमिष्युक्तानामभिव्याहरता कर्माणि चानुतिष्ठतामन्यजनपदवासिन्यो म्लेच्छेभ्य समीचीनतर आचारी भवति । [SB on II 3 3 p. 581]

12 यत्तुक्तमनुमानाद्राज्यस्य कर्ता य स राजा श्वौदमेवे पितोदमेव इति । उच्यते । अनुमानादयोगो बलवान् । राज्यस्य कर्तारं राज्येनृमिमहे । शत्रियं तु प्रत्यक्षं प्रयुज्जानन्पलभामहे । तथा योगमयनमिममहे राज्यस्य कर्ता राजेति । राज्ञः कर्म राज्यमिति तु स्मरन्ति । अनुमानाच्च स्मृतिमनमिमते स्म । स्मरन्तस्तप्रत्यक्षमुपलभन् । तत्र तत्र स्मृतिर्बलीयसीति । आह । यो यो राज्यं करोति तत्र राजशब्दं प्रयुज्जते । न यद् राज्ञः कर्म तद्राज्यमिति । तेन मन्यामहं राज्ययोगो राजशब्दप्रवृत्तौ निमित्तम् । न तु राज्ययोगो राज्यशब्दप्रवृत्ताविति । न श्रूयो प्रयोगाद्वयं राज्ययोगो राज्यशब्दप्रवृत्तौ निमित्तमवगच्छाम । इति । कथं तर्हि । स्मरणान् । प्रयोगान्च स्मृतिर्बलीयसी । प्रयोगादि स्मृतिरनुमयेत । ... यत्तुक्तम् आन्ध्रा अपि राज्ययोगाद्राजानमनुपगच्छन्तीति । परिहृतमतत प्रयोगो दुर्बल स्मृतेरिति । [SB on II 3 3 pp. 585-587]

7 One more rule we have to remember in this connection. In a short simple sentence S'ABARA has stated this rule as follows — LAUKIKAH PRAYOGH S'ABDĀRTHAPARICCHEDE

HETUH'. It must be remembered that the words in a *vidhi-sūtra* like the *Vedas* or the words of law should be understood exactly as we understand them in the ordinary language. This rule S'ABARA has iterated in many places and has emphatically stated it at the very outset also of course in connection with the method of interpretation of the *Sūtras* of JAIMINI. He clearly warns the reader that the words of the *sūtras* must be understood to convey the senses which they are known to convey in ordinary parlance. And what he says of the *sūtras* is also true of the *Vedas*. As has been already pointed out above we must remember that *ANUMANĀ* is weaker than *Prayoga* and *prayoga* is weaker than *smṛti* and also that an *asārvalaukika* or a *vīpragūta* *prayoga* is weaker than a *sārvalaukika* or an *avīpragūta* *prayoga*.

8 The main axioms therefore on the strength of which to determine the *artha* of the *utpatīkaś'abda* may be now stated as follows —

1 'Yasyāgam vad upajāyate sa s'abdārthah |

2 'Yah s'āstrasthānām sa s'abdārthah or S'abdārthādhu-
gam cābhivuktōpade sah pramānam |

3 Nigamanuktasvākanavās'na dhātuto'ithah kalpa-
yitasvah |

4 Coditam as'istam api s'istanavagatam prāṇyeta |

5 Asārvalaukika-prayogasya sārvalaukika prayogena
vividhvamānsya apīumānsam svāt

6 Avīpragūtā laukikā artha vīpragūtibhyah pratyavī-
tarā bhavanti |

7 'Anumānāt prayogo bahavān |

8 Prayogo dubalah smṛtich |

9 'Laukikah prayogah s'abdārthaparicchede hetuh |

THE PRAVRTTINIMITTA OF ŚABDA

1 Now we look at *Śabda* and its *artha* from a still different point of view. Take, for example, the word *putra*. By itself the word shall denote the *ākṛti* or class, but at the same time we perceive that the word can come into existence only if the particular person to be referred to by the word is related to some other person as his son. This in other words, means that *sambandha* is the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of the word *putra*, or that the word *putra* is a *sambandhi śabda*. Take another word say *vāpa*. This word also does denote the *ākṛti* to which it belongs, but at the same time we know that its existence depends on the particular *samskāras* which have to be performed over a pillar before it can be termed *vāpa*. The word *vāpa* may therefore, be termed a *samskāra śabda*. Similarly the word *rāya* depends for its existence on the connection of the *karman* with *rājan* which shows that *rāya* is a *vaṅtika* word. In the last two cases it may easily be seen that *samskāra* and *yoga* constitute the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of the words *vāpa* and *rāya* respectively. We have now to see the various *pravṛtti-nimittas* which according to ŚĀBARA and JAIMINI are responsible for the currency of the various words in a language.

2 But before actually taking up the question of the *pravṛtti-nimittas* we must try to find out a way to determine what a *pravṛtti-nimitta* is. And this we find very vividly done by ŚĀBARA when he says 'YI NAIMITTIKĀH SABDĀH TL

NIMITTAM UPALABHYA PRAYUJYANTH YATHA DANDĪ CHATRI ITI. Thus the rule is that of the several factors that can be thought of as lying at the root of the usage of a word only that can be said to be so in the real sense of the term in the absence of which the term can't be used at all. The word *vāpa*, for example will not be used at all if the particular *samskāras* are not performed over the pillar. *Samskāra*, therefore as has been already remarked above is the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of the word *vāpa* or the word *vāpa* is a *samskāra śabda*.

3 Now while coming to the actual consideration of the *pravṛtti-nimittas* of words it is needless to remark that *jāti* or *ākṛti* is itself the chief one of them, since when there is nothing in particular to be conveyed by a word it conveys *jāti* or *ākṛti*. In such cases, therefore, *Ā* must be looked upon as the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of that word. Such words are called *JĀTINIMITTĀH SABDĀH* or *JĀTISĀBDĀH*. With reference

to these *jāti'sābdāh* however we have to bear in mind one important rule viz 'Words which are found to denote *jāti* in one place must be accepted as such in all places'. The word *barhih*, for example in old naya parlance is used as a *jāti-sābda* without any reference to any *samskāra* at all. In Vedic texts it appears to denote consecrated grass. Are we then to take the word *barhih* in the Vedas as a *jāti'sābda* or as a *samskāra'sābda*? This question is to be answered by observing the above-mentioned rule, and hence the conclusion is that the word *barhih* is to be understood as a *jāti'sābda* and not as a *samskāra'sābda*. Thus it may be stated that whenever *jāti* is found to be the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a *sābda*, as a rule in the language the *sābda* must be accepted as a *jāti'sābda*, though in some special cases the word might appear to denote something else *samskāra* for example. To assume that such words are primarily *samskāra'sābdas* and only owing to similarity they are secondarily used as the *jāti'sābdas*, would be incorrect as it would involve an *ānantarās'raya*, for the *injunction* of the *samskāra* presupposes the existence of the *jāti'sābda* and this latter that of the *samskāra'sābda*. But here the *Loka pravoga* is the determinant cause of the nature of the *sābda*.

4 The next *pravṛtti-nimitta* is now *YOGA* or connection and the words having this *nimitta* are called *YAUGIKA S'ABDAS*. The word *proksanī* for example is found used with reference to *sanskṛta* as well as *asanskṛta* articles, and one may, therefore, feel inclined to call it a *jāti'sābda* on the strength of the rule given above. But it must be noted that this word

1 For the whole discussion read MS I 4 10, and SB. thereon . . .

is neither a *jāti s'abda* nor a *samskāra s'abda*. For what is *prokṣanī*? We find that the word *prokṣanī* is formed by combining *upasarga*, *dhātu* and *pratyaya* together. Now the *jātinimittatā* of this *samudāya* has to be inferred from usage, while we shall be following the well-known currency (*prasiddhi*) if we take the root-meaning in conjunction with *upasarga* and *pratyaya* and take it to mean *āpah*. And *prasiddhi* which is *pratyakṣa* is certainly stronger than *ānu-mānā*. Hence this word is *yaugika*. What is meant by the term *yaugika* is also incidentally pointed out by S'ABARA when he writes *Rājas'abdah prasiddho mūlam/Ādyogād rājas'abdah*. Thus it is clear that when a word comes into usage not directly for its own *artha* but owing to some connection (*yoga* or *samyoga*) with some other word already in usage such a word is called *yoga-siddha* or *yaugika*. This rule is suggested by JAIMINI also in the *sūtra* '*Prokṣanīsu arthasamyogāt*'. The word *nūmanthya* is another example of a word belonging to this class.

5. SAMSKARA (or *karma*) is another *pratyuti-nimitta* which is responsible for the currency of words like *yūpa*. With reference to this, however we have to bear in mind the rule already noted above. If a word is sometimes found to be used as a *jāti s'abda* it must be always looked upon as being a *jāti s'abda*, though in some cases it might appear to be used with reference to consecrated articles or as a *samskāra s'abda*. We may by way of example take the word *barhih*. Now here it may be interesting to note how S'ABARA justifies

2 प्रोक्षणीशब्दः प्रति सवेहः किं सस्कारनिमित्तः, उत जातिनिमित्तः, उत नैमित्तिक इति । तत्र सस्कारेषु सत्सु दर्शनात्सस्कारशब्दतायामवगम्यमानायामसंस्कृते शब्दलानाञ्जातिशब्दः । असंस्कृताखेवासु प्रोक्षणीभिर्द्वज्जिता स्म इति कर्मिन्विद्देशे भवन्ति वक्तारः । तेन जातिशब्द इति प्राप्ते यौगिक इत्युच्यते । कुत । अर्थसंयोगात् । प्रोक्षणी इत्युपसर्गः शतुप्रत्ययसमुदायस्य जातिनिमित्तः । प्रयोगादनुमीयते । सेचनसंयोगात् उपसर्गांशुत्करणप्रत्ययसहितोऽसु प्रवर्तत इति प्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भविष्यति । यद्यान्यदपि, सेचन प्रोक्षकशब्देनोच्यते तदा तन्मयोगादवासु भविष्यतीति न समुदायार्थः कल्पयितुं शक्यते । तस्माद्यौगिकः । [SB on प्रोक्षणीष्वर्थसंयोगात् । MS I 4 11, p 344]

the rule on logical grounds. If words like *barhih* are accepted as SAMSKĀRANIMITTASABDA setting aside their *laukika* usage we shall be accepting their *alaukikatva*. But how can we determine the signification of such *alaukika* words? Surely it is impossible to determine their signification from the scriptures only without taking into consideration the connection which they have with the preceding and the succeeding words. For the *artha-kalpanā* of such words is actuated by the idea of saving the *pūrvottarapadas* from being rendered nugatory. But it is not possible to assume what is not perceived or conveyed, which in other words only means that we have to accept the *laukika* sense that is conveyed by these words. Again we find that the preceding and the succeeding words gain their significance by this *laukika artha*. This shows that *laukika* usage has to be accepted or in other words that words like *barhih* are to be accepted as *jātiśabdāh* and not *samskāra śabdāh*³. This rule regarding the *balābala* of *samskāra* and *jāti* as *pravṛtti-nimittas* is suggested by JAİMİNĪ in the *sūtra*, *Barhiṣṭyavayorasamskāraśabdālābhād atacchabdah* (I 4 10).

6 A fourth *pravṛtti-nimitta* is to be found in SAMBANDHA which must be distinguished from *yoga*. *Rāja* as we have seen above is a *yaugika* word and has the word *rājan* as its *prasiddhimūla*. Here it can be seen that the word *rāja* depends for its *prasiddhi* on the word *rājan*. But the same can't be said of the word *rājan* which is independent. Thus it may be said that a *yaugika* word is dependent upon some *jātiśabda* which by its very nature is independent. Now take the word *putra*. We see that the word *putra* depends for its *prasiddhi* on the *sambandha* of the person with another person his father. Thus the word *putra* can be used with reference to a person only if he is connected with another person as his son. And his very phenomenon we may observe in the case of the word *ut*. Thus we find that between the words *rājan* and *rāja* the former is a *jātiśabda* and serves as the foundation for

3 SB on MS II 3 3

4 SB on MS I 4 10

the currency (*prasiddhimūla*) of the latter, but between the words *putra* and *piti* neither can be said to be the *prasiddhi-mūla* of the other. They so to say, are mutually dependent and are therefore *SAMBANDHIS'ABDAS*. This characteristic feature of the *sambandhis'abdā* is very clearly stated by S'ABARA when he writes *SAMBANDHIS'ABDĀS'CA SARVE sūpekṣa vīna padāntarāna na paripūṇam artham abhivadanti*. The word *devatā* is another instance of this class of words for 'Yā vadantham codate sā tasyaiva devatā nānvaya. Here we must note another important bearing that this view has in the *Mīmāṃsāśāstra*. Ordinarily when a particular ingredient or accessory material required for a sacrificial act is not available it is laid down in the *Mīmāṃsāśāstra* that the deficiency may be made up by taking the *pratindhi* of that required material. This device of taking a substitute is possible in some cases but not in all. Thus if the *paśu* for example is lost he can be substituted by another animal that may be taken as *paśu*. But the sam-

5. For the same idea expressed in different words read बहुव चापेक्षिकम् । किञ्चिदपेक्ष्य ततोऽधिकं बहु इत्युच्यते । अमत्यामपेक्षायामपरिपूर्णमेतत् । यथा पुत्र इति किञ्चिदपेक्ष्य भवति, नान्यथा । तत्र प्रकृतं सनिहितं चापेक्ष्य निर्णयः । सहस्तं च सनिहितम् । तस्मात्ततोऽधिकमपरिमितमिति । [SB. on अधिकं वा स्यात् बहुव्यादितरेषां मन्त्रानात् MS VI 7 24 p. 1500]

Here we may note another rule that is suggested by Jaimini and explained by Sabara regarding the interpretation of a सन्निविशब्द, particularly when there is a doubt regarding the exact sense conveyed by it. The word अपरिमितं according to the पूर्वपक्षिन्, ambiguous and no definite limit can be put to the signification of this word. But the सिद्धान्त view is that such सापेक्ष शब्द convey no sense by themselves. They have to be interpreted with reference to some other word or words which are प्रकृत and सनिहित. Applying this rule अपरिमित is taken to mean अधिक than सहस्त which latter is प्रकृत and सनिहित. [cf MS VI 7 23 f.]

6. This forms the subject of the निश्चयकर्मणः प्रारब्धकर्मणश्च श्रुत-
न्यायपञ्चाशे प्रतिनिविना समापनाविकरणम् । [MS VI 3 13 17]

can't be said of a *devatā*, for whoever is taken as the *pratimā* can never be the *devatā* with reference to that act. *Putra*, for example, is a term that can apply to a particular person only when we are speaking with reference to a particular man who is his father. There it is impossible to use the word *putra* with reference to any other person so long as the other related person is the same. Similarly so long as we are thinking of a particular act, only a particular being shall be called its *devatā* and it is impossible that the word may apply to any other being. This stated in technical terms means that *devatā* can have no *pratimā*.⁷ *Bahu*, *pūrva* and others may be cited as other examples of *sambandhuśabdas*.

7 RŪDHI according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, is another important *pravṛttinimitta*. The word *kuśāla*, for example, if taken literally means 'one who cuts *kuśa* grass', and by indication may denote all the numerous qualities that such a person is required to possess. But usage has restricted the sense of this word to such an extent that it now signifies nothing more than *niṣṇatā*. This in the process is surely an instance of *lakṣanā* and is cited as such by rhetoricians like MAMMATA. *Śābara*, however, does not admit of *lakṣanā* in such cases. According to him *niṣṇatā* is now the *vāc्यārtha* of the word *kuśāla*, and this *vāc्यārtha* has so to say grown upon the word *kuśāla*. Here then the *pravṛttinimitta* behind such words as *kuśāla* and *pravīṇa* is *rūdhi*. *Aparimīta* is another *rūdhishabda* which by usage means *bahu*. With reference to such words a question may be raised. *Aparimīta* taken literally means 'not measured or limited'. This is the *vāc्यārtha*, but the *rūdhārtha* of this word viz *bahu* is obtained by *lakṣanā* only, which in other words

7 देवतायां च तदर्थत्वात् । [MS. VI. 3. 19]—देवता नाम यदर्थं किञ्चित्चो-
षते सा । अन्यथा तस्य स्थाने प्रतिनिधीयमाना न देवता स्यात् । चोदिता हि देवता
भवति । नाचोदिता । सबन्धिशब्दश्चैव । या यदर्थं चोषते सा तस्यैव देवता, नान्यस्य ।
[वतेति सबन्धिशब्दो न जातिशब्दः । तस्मादपि न देवतायां प्रतिनिधिरिति ।
SB. p. 1419]

means that *bahu* is the *lakṣyārtha* of the word *aparimīta*. But as a general rule the *vāc्यārtha* is stronger than the *lakṣyārtha* so that we have to accept the *vāc्यārtha* rather than the *lakṣyārtha*. How is it then that in words like *kuśāla* we set aside the general rule and accept the *lakṣyārtha* setting aside even the *vāc्यārtha*? In this connection S'ABARA does admit that in such words we do apparently have cases of *lakṣanā*. But he argues that here usage is so strong that directly on hearing the word we find that it as it were grows upon us and gives rise to the perception of the *rūdhārtha*. Hence in such cases *lakṣanā* (properly to be called *rūdhā*) is evidently stronger than the *abhidhā*. Nay it is to be considered as *abhidhā* itself. Such a phenomenon generally occurs in cases where a word is a composite word so that it yields one signification when taken as a *samudāya* (whole) but another when taken as being composed of several parts. Thus in such cases the sense yielded by the constituent parts of such words is the *vāc्यārtha*, while the sense given by the words as a whole is the *lakṣyārtha* or the *rūdhārtha* and in such cases the rule to remember is that the former is always weaker than the latter. This rule may be stated in the words of S'ABARA by saying that 'AVAYAVA-PRASIDDEH SAMUDĀYAPRASIDDHIR BALIYASI'. Another fine illustration of this class of words is '*Vakana*'.

४ अपरिमिते शिष्टस्य मन्त्राप्रतिषेवस्तच्छ्रुतित्वात् । कल्पान्तर वा तुल्यवत्प्रस
 र्दानत् । [MS VI 7 21-22] अपरिमिते श्रूयमाणे ब्रम् । शिष्टस्येकादे
 मन्त्रेयस्य या मन्त्र ना प्रतिषिध्यते । कुत । तच्छ्रुतित्वात् । परिमितशब्दश्रवणा
 द्दणितमवगम्यते । तन्चैकोदिकम् । तस्य न शब्देन प्रतिषेध क्रियते । तत् श्रुतोऽर्थ
 वृत्ती भवति । इत्यथा ऽ परिमितशब्दे प्रसिद्धिस्त्यज्येत । लक्षणया बहुत्वमस्यार्थ
 कल्प्येत । तस्मान् परिमितस्य प्रतिषेव इति । कल्पान्तर वा स्याद्, अपरो दानकृतो
 विधीयते । यथेका देवति दानविधिकल्प, एवमपोऽपि दानविधिकल्प स्यात् । तेन
 हि पूर्वण तुल्यमनन्द प्रमख्यायत् । काऽस्य पूर्वण तुल्यता । प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्यावगमिका
 श्रुतिरस्तीति । पूर्वत्र हि देशशब्दश्रुत्या दान विधीयत इति । इहापि देशशब्दश्रुति ।
 सा श्रूयमाणा शन्कोति दान निवातुम् । प्रतिषेवे हि विधायमाने वाक्यस्य व्यापार ।
 तत्त्व दुर्बल श्रुति प्रति । तस्मात्कल्पान्तरम् ।

8 All these *pravṛttinimittas*, it may be noted, have reference to the *vāc्यārtha* of the words and not to their *lakṣyārtha*. Thus words are called *jātiś'abdāḥ*, *samskāraś'abdāḥ* and so on presumably because they ultimately stand for *jāti* or *samskāra* &c. Quite different however is the sphere of *lakṣanā* which has its foundation in the inapplicability of the literal sense, and which also has different *pravṛttinimittas* (if they can be so termed) which we shall deal with in a subsequent chapter.

यच्चपरिमितशब्दे प्रसिद्धिर्बाध्यत इति, समुदायप्रसिद्धिखयप्रसिद्धेर्बाधिवैव समधिगता । ननु नात्र प्रसिद्धिः । लक्षणेयम् । यद् बहु तत्र शक्य परिमातुम् । तस्मादपरिमितत्वेन लक्ष्यते बहुत्वमिति । तच्च नानेकस्मिन्नशक्यपरिमाणे मति बहुषु रुढः । अपरिमितमस्य धनम्, बहु इत्युच्यते ।

यथा कुशल प्रवीण इति बहुषु कुशानां लातुर्गुणेषु ससु निपुणतायामेव कुशलशब्दो रोडादृढिशब्द एव भवति । बहुषु च वीणावादनस्य गुणेषु ससु निपुण एव प्रवीणशब्दो वर्तमानो रुढ इत्युच्यते । तस्मात् सत्यपि लक्षणात्वे श्रुतिसामर्थ्याद्बोद्धति शब्दः । तस्मात्समुदायप्रसिद्ध्याऽपरिमितचब्दे व्यवप्रसिद्धिर्बाध्यते । अश्वकर्णशब्दवत् । अतः कल्पान्तरमिति । [SB ७७ VI 7 21-22
op 1499—1500]

THE BARHIRNYĀYA

1 AT MS III 11 1-2 JAIMINI and his commentator have discussed the *balābala* of the two varieties of senses known as *mukhya* and *gauna* respectively. But before actually taking up the topic for discussion the commentator first discusses the question as to whether this division of *arthas* into two classes can reasonably be admitted. With this object in view he first takes up the definitions of the terms *mukhya* and *gauna* saying that the *mukhya* or the primary signification is that which is perceived from the word, and is so called because it is as it were the face of the word. On the other hand that signification which is known from the primarily perceived signification on the strength of some connection is to be termed *jaghanya* since it is as it were the hinder part of the *śabda*. This latter is also called *gauna* owing to its being connected with some *guna*. The definitions of *mukhya* and *gauna* as stated above are however not wholly free from defect. For it may be argued that all *arthas* are perceived from *śabda* only so that there is no point in trying to distinguish between *arthas* and *arthas* and labelling them as *mukhya* and *gauna*. Take, for example the sentences *Agni jvalati* and *Agni mānavakah*. Now just as in the former sentence the idea of fire is perceived from the word *agni* similarly it is from the word *agni* alone (and from no other source) that the idea of *Mānavaka* (ie his *patnī*) by which he resembles fire) in the latter, so that according to the definition of the *mukhyārtha* noted above both these senses will have to be counted as being *mukhya* since both are conveyed by the *śabda agni*. But

1 क पुनर्मुख्य को वा गौण इति । उच्यते । य शब्दादेवावगम्यते, स प्रथमोऽथो मुख्य । मुखमिव भवतीति मुख्य इत्युच्यते । यस्तु खलु प्रतीतादर्थात्केनचित्संबन्धेन गम्यते, स पश्चाद्वावाज्जघनमिव भवतीति जघन्य । गुणसंबन्धाच्च गौण इति ।

2 यद्येव सर्वं च मुख्य । सवा हि शब्दपटुम्यते । यद्येव ह्यग्निर्जलतीत्युक्ते ज्वलनेन प्रत्यय, एवमेवाग्निर्माणवक इति शब्द एवोच्चारिते माणवके सप्रत्यय ।

such a conclusion we can't admit, for we know that only one of these viz the idea of fire is the *mukhya artha*, while the other is only *gauna*.

2 To remedy this defect the above definitions may be revised by saying that *mukhyārtha* is that sense which is perceived from the word independently of any attributive adjunct, while that which is perceived from a word accompanied and aided by a qualifying adjunct is *gauna*. But even this does not set matters all right. For a word can't be assumed to convey a sense which it has no power to convey irrespective of the fact of its being or not being accompanied by qualifying adjuncts. Thus if a word conveys a sense when accompanied by any adjunct we shall have to admit the sense as being conveyed by the word only and admit the adjunct as only the *sahakārī kāraṇa*. Thus the presence or absence of a qualifying adjunct can't give us ground enough to distinguish one *artha* from the other, for in either case the sense will be perceived from or conveyed by the *śabda* only. It is the *śabda* that is the *nimitta* of *artha-jñāna*, and as soon as the *nimitta* comes into being, whether it is accompanied by a qualifying adjunct or not, the *naimittika* viz the perception of *artha* must come into being. This means that there can be no distinction between a *sopapada śabda* and a *virūpapada śabda*, which in the light of the definitions under discussion amounts to saying that there is no distinction between *mukhya* and *gauna artha* at all. An attempt to distinguish between the two by pointing out that the idea of fire is obtained from *śabda* while the idea of *Mānavaka* is obtained from the *samudāya* viz of both the words *agnih* and *mānavakah* would be of no use for the simple reason that *agnih* and *mānavakah* can't be taken as a *samudāya* in the same sense in which

3 अथोच्येत यस्मिन्निरूपपदाच्छब्दात्प्रत्ययः स मुख्यः, यस्मिन्सोपपदात्स
गोण इति । नैतद्युक्तम् । यस्य हि शब्दस्य रूपवत्स्यत्विदर्थस्य निमित्तं, सोपपदस्यापि
तदेव रूपं, निरूपपदस्यापि । न च शक्यं निमित्ते सति नैमित्तिकेन न भवितुम् ।
किमतो यथेवम् । इदं शक्यते वदितुमुपपदादहेतुं न सोऽर्थो भवति, उपपदे तु सजात
सोऽर्थः सजनिष्यत इति ।

the word *as'vakarna* is called by that name. We do clearly perceive the two words viz *Agni* and *Mānavakah* conveying their senses separately, and not conjointly as the words *as'va* and *karna* in the term *as'vakarna*. Nor can it be a *vākyaṛtha* and the analogy of the sentence '*nīlam utpalam*' as it can't render any help in this matter, for in a sentence like the above one both the words viz *nīlam* and *utpalam* convey the ideas of *nīlatva* and *utpalatva* which both are ultimately the attributes of one and the same individual. Such, however is not the case with the words *agni* and *mānavakah* which convey two attributes viz *agnitva* and *mānavakatva* which are quite distinct and separate from each other ordinarily abiding in two different individuals. Thus, there seems to be no plausible ground on which to distinguish the *mukhyārtha* from the *gaunkārtha* and the best course seems to be to admit that the *agni* expresses both fire as well as *Mānavaka* and that there is no distinction between *mukhya* and *gauna artha* ¹.

3. Here perhaps it may be argued that the distinction between the two *arthas* may be based on *prasiddhi* so that the sense which is well known is the *mukhya artha* and that which is little known is *gauna*. But this argument is only flimsy for it may be pointed out that *prasiddhi* after all is nothing but *prajñāna* or knowledge or wellknownness and it is impossible to distinguish one *prajñāna* from another as wellknownness whether it exists in few or more places is always the same. For *Prajñāna* is knowledge and whether it is extensive or restricted (*vyūtha* or *manāk*) it does not lose its characters of being knowledge. Nor will it also do to argue that *vyūtha prasiddhi* and *Manāk Prasiddhi* are used by us to signify frequency or otherwise of the use of the

१ न नामो समुदायार्थं शक्यते विज्ञानम् । अन्यथ्यतिरेकाभ्यां हि विभाङ्गा वगम्यते । अथ वाक्यार्थोऽयमित्युच्यते । नैव शक्यम् । न शनन्वितं पदार्था भवति वाक्यार्थं । तदेव वक्ष्यताम् । अग्निशब्द एनाय वस्तुनवचन । अग्निशब्द एव माणव कभ्याभिधातेति । तस्मात् सृज्यो गोण इति कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

५ अथोच्यते, यं सुष्ठु प्रसिद्धं यं सुज्यं, यो मनाविव सा गोण इति । इदमपि नोपपद्यते । प्रसिद्धिर्नाम प्रज्ञानम् । न च प्रज्ञाने कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति ।

expressions, so that *prayoga-bāhulya* it is that distinguishes the *mukhyārtha* from the *gaunārtha* which is characterised by *prayogātaptva*. For even this explanation is not quite satisfactory, since the very fact that a *s'abda* conveys an *artha* is enough to show that it has a *sāmarthya* to convey it, and so long as the *sāmarthya* is there it matters little whether its *prayoga* is *susthu* or *manāk*. For this *alptva* or *bahutva* of *prayoga* cannot make any difference between the senses from the point of view of the *sāmarthya* of the *s'abda* by which they are conveyed. For in any case the sense will be yielded by the *s'abda* and will as such have to be labelled as *mukhya* only.⁶ Irresistible, therefore, appears to be the conclusion that *artha* is always *mukhya* (i.e. only of one type in so far as its relation with the *s'abda* is concerned), and that it is futile to try to divide *arthas* into two classes as *mukhya* and *gauna*.

4 This *prima facie* view can't be declared to be unsatisfactory. For we find that while the idea of fire is conveyed by the word *agni*, the idea of *Mānavaka* is not conveyed by it. This is obvious from the general rule that one word can reasonably be said to convey one *artha* and one alone, and if the word *agni* is accepted as conveying the idea of fire it is but clear that it can't be accepted as conveying the idea of *Mānavaka* also. Here perhaps one may ask as to why we should not accept the idea of *Mānavaka* as being directly conveyed by the word *agni* rather than the idea of fire. The answer to this question is to be found in our own every day experience. For we do find people perceiving idea of fire from the word *agni* even without making any reference to the idea of *Mānavaka*, but never do we find any one getting the idea of *Mānavaka* from the word *Agni* without referring to the idea of fire. That this is so is shown by usage. Nor, the word *agni* is popularly used (if it is not used to signify fire) to refer only to a person or thing that

6 अधोऽन्येत, यस्य बहुषु प्रयोगोऽस्ति समुख्य, अल्पसु प्रयुज्यमानो गौण इति । नैतदेवम् । अल्पसोऽपि प्रयुज्यमानो नास्ति सामर्थ्ये प्रत्याययेत् । अतः सोऽपि शब्दात्प्रतीयत इति मुख्य एव । [SB p. 748]

is intended to be described as being similar to fire. This in other words means that the word *agni* is used with reference to such persons or things owing to their similarity with fire. *Agni-sādrs'ya* is, therefore the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of this word in such cases. But how can this *sādrs'ya* be perceived if the thing itself viz. fire is not perceived? We have, therefore to conclude that the idea of fire is first perceived from the word *agni* and then is perceived the idea of *sādrs'ya*. This means that the word *agni* is primarily the means of perceiving the idea of fire and not that of *Mānavaka*. Hence we conclude that the word *agni* primarily applies to fire and not to *Mānavaka* to which it may apply only secondarily. Similarly the word *Barhiḥ* primarily applies to *trna* and not to the *trna-sādrs'a* things. It is, therefore, not sound or reasonable to say that there can be no distinction between *arthas* and *arthas*.

5 From the foregoing discussion it is now clear that all *arthas* are not alike. Some are *mukhya* while others are *jaghanya* or *gauna*. *MUKHYA ARTHA* is that which is primarily conveyed by a *śabda*, while the *gauna artha* is that which of course is conveyed by the word but only through the *mukhvartha*. Having seen thus the necessity of admitting this twofold division of *arthas* into *mukhya* and *gauna* we now proceed to discuss the next question as to which of these *arthas* should be understood as being regularly conveyed by the word. This question is very well discussed by JAIMINI and ŚABARA in an *adhikarana* which is commonly known by the name *BARHIR-NYĀYA*, from the circumstance

7 अत्रोच्यते । अस्यत्र विधेयः । माणवको नाग्निशब्दाऽप्रतीकते । कथमवगम्यते । उक्तम्, अन्यायधानेकार्थत्वमिति । कथं न विपर्ययः । उच्यते । अनादृत्येव माणवकप्रत्ययः ज्वलनमग्निशब्दात्प्रतीयन्ती दृश्यन्ते । न त्वनादृत्य ज्वलनप्रत्ययः माणवकमग्निशब्दात्प्रतीयन्ति । कुत एतत् । यो योऽग्निसदृशो विवक्ष्यते, तत्र तत्राग्निशब्दो नियत इति । अत एवाग्निगतसादृश्यादयं तु दृश्यते । अतोऽग्निसादृश्यस्य प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तम् । न च ज्वलनेऽप्रतीते तस्मादृत्य प्रतीयते । तस्माज्ज्वलनस्याग्निशब्दो निमित्तम्, न माणवकस्य । तस्माज्ज्वलने मुख्यो न माणवकः । एवमेव तृणशब्दस्य बर्हिःशब्दो निमित्तः, न तृणसदृशप्रत्ययस्य । [SB. p 749.]

that the word they have chosen there for consideration is *Barhih* occurring in the *mantra* '*Barhiṣ devasadanam dāmu*' The question as stated by them is connected with the *mantra* portion of the *Veda*. It has been stated and proved elsewhere that the main purpose of the *mantra* portion of the *Veda* is to bring to mind the enjoined act at the time of the performance. This, of course, it must do only by yielding its *artha*. But as there are two types of *arthas* which can be perceived from words, the question naturally arises as to which of these *arthas* is to be understood as being conveyed by the words of the *mantras*. Are we to take only the *mukhya* or only the *gauna*, or both as being conveyed by them?

6 The *Pūrva-pakṣin* argues that since it is possible to perceive both the *arthas* from the *mantras* there is nothing wrong in concluding that both the *arthas* should be accepted as being conveyed by them, and all the more so because there is nothing to prevent us from doing so. There is no factor which would restrict our perception to only this or that particular *artha* to the exclusion of the other.⁸

7 The *Siddhāntin*, however, demurs and points out that it is not possible to hold that the words of the *mantras* would convey both the *arthas* simultaneously in spite of the assertion of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* to that effect. Since the *mantras* occur in some context, therefore it is but natural that it forms a syntactical unit with the main sentence i.e. the *vidhi vākya* which lays down a particular act, so that ultimately the idea to be derived from the *mantra* comes to be that one should accomplish by the *mantra* whatever one is capable of accomplishing thereby. But for want of any other possibility we have to admit that the *mantras* help in

8 तदेव द्वैते सति मुख्यपरता शब्दस्य, उत गौणपरतापीति युक्तो विचारः । किं तावत्प्राप्तम् । मुख्ये गौणे च विनियोगः । कुतः । उभयस्य शक्यत्वादुभयमपि बहिः शब्देन शक्यते प्रत्याययितुं तृणं च तृणसदृशं च । तृणं साक्षात्, तृणसदृशं तृण-प्रत्ययेन । यच्च नाम दर्शपूर्णमासयोः साधनभूतेन बहिः शब्देन शक्यते प्रत्याययितुं तत्पदं प्रत्याययितव्यम् । विनियोगनार्थं हेत्वभावात् । [SB, p. 749]

the performance of an act by bringing to mind its several details which they can do only because they are endowed with an ever-ready power of expressing an *artha*. But because owing to the context and *ekavākya*tā with the *Vidhivākya* it must convey the *Mukhya artha* and because it can not convey both simultaneously it is evident that the *mantras* are to be employed in their primary and not their secondary signification.⁹

8 But it may be argued that even the *gauna artha* is conveyed by the *mantra*, of course, after first conveying the *mukhyārtha* and hence there would be nothing wrong if a *mantra* is accepted as also conveying its *gauna artha* (and is employed in that sense too) which is also connected with it. But when the purpose of the *mantra* is served by conveying its *mukhyārtha*, where is the necessity of going further and perceiving the *gaunārtha*? The *arthābhūdhāna* is for the purpose of avoiding the *mantras* being rendered nugatory and as this purpose of *ānarthakvaparihāra* is served by conveying the primary signification there remains no purpose or motive for the secondary before the *Mukhyārtha* and since after the conveyance of the latter there is no motive for the former being conveyed, we must conclude that *Mukhyārtha* alone is conveyed by a *Mantra* and not the *Gaunārtha* also.¹⁰

9 Again there are many different means by which the *gaunārtha* can be conveyed, and if *mantra* is invariably

9 एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूम । मुख्य एव विनियोक्तस्यो मन्त्रो न गौण इति । कुत उभयस्याशक्यत्वात् । प्रकरणे हि समाप्तान्तरप्रधाने न क्वाक्यतामुपैति । तत्रैतदा पठति, यच्छकनुयादनेन मन्त्रेण सावशितु तथा सावयेदिति । स चासावर्थाभिधान मयोगान्द्वन्द्वोपकर्तुं, न गौणमर्थं शक्नोत्यभिधानम् । तस्मान्न गौणे विनियोगः ।
[SB p. 191]

10 ननु मुख्यप्रत्ययान्द्वन्द्वे गौण प्रत्याययितुम् । सत्यमेतत् । मुख्यप्रत्ययानेनैवावश्य प्रयोजनवत्ता निर्वनन्ति न गौण प्रति विनियोगे किञ्चिदप्रमाणमस्ति । मुख्ये विनियोगेन नानर्थक्यं परिह्रियते । परिहृत आनर्थक्ये न गौणाभिधानमापत्तिः । न अनभिधाय मन्त्र गौणमभिधत्ति शब्दः । अतः प्रमाणाभावात् गौणे विनियुज्येत ।
[SB p. 190]

accepted as one of these it naturally means that the other ways of conveying it have to be dismissed. But where is the ground or *pramāna* for doing so? *Mantrāmnāna* could certainly not have the power to exclude the other means of conveying the *gaunārtha* for fear of a *paraśamkhyā*, which has no motive. But it may be asked, on what ground or *pramāna* do you take the *mantra* as the means of conveying the *mukhyārtha*? Our reply to this question would be that we do so to save the *mantras* from being rendered *anarthaka*. For if the *mantra* is not used even in its *mukhyārtha*, then it would not be able to help the main sacrificial act in any way and would consequently be rendered totally useless. Hence we have to conclude that the *mantras* are to be employed in their primary significations only.¹¹

10 Again, it may be asked, why does the *Mantra* convey its *Mukhyārtha* at all, if its *Gaunārtha* alone is ultimately to be employed? If it is said that the *Mukhyārtha* has to be conveyed since the *Gaunārtha* cannot be otherwise understood, we reply there do exist other means of getting the *Gaunārtha* such as *Arthāpatti* etc. and *Mukhyārtha* of the *Mantra* is not the only means for it. Again, if it is argued that *Mukhyārtha* is to be accepted as one of the several alternative remedies for getting the *Gaunārtha*, we reply that in this case, *Mantrāmnāna* does not become compulsory, for, it is the conveying of the *Gaunārtha* with which we are concerned and not necessarily with the *Mantra* so that *Mantra* may be easily neglected. This however is against practice. On the other hand, if once the *Mantra* is admitted as necessary for conveying the *Gaunārtha* by acci-

11 अपि च । गौणस्य प्रत्यायने सामर्थ्याद् बहवोऽभ्युपायाः प्राप्नुवन्ति । सामर्थ्यं च शब्दैकेश इत्युक्तम् । अर्थाद्वा कल्पनेकदेशत्वादिति । तत्र मन्त्रे नियोगतो गौणं प्रति विनियुज्यमान उपायान्तरं दिना प्रमाणेन बाध्येत । मन्त्राभ्यानां प्रयाणमिति चेत् । न तस्योपायान्तरनिवृत्तौ सामर्थ्यमस्ति । ननु मुख्येऽपि विनियुज्यमानस्यैव एव दोषः । नेत्युच्यते । यदि मुख्येऽपि न विनियुज्येत नैव प्रधानस्योपकुर्यात् । तत्र तस्योत्पत्तिरनर्थिकैव स्यात् । तस्मादस्ति गौणे मुख्यं च विशेषः ।
[SB, p 750]

pting a *Niyama*, then there remains no purpose for the *Mantra* to convey the *Gaunārtha*, after it has once conveyed its *Mukhyārtha*, its purpose, namely *ānarthakyaaparihāra* being served by the *Mukhyārtha* itself as said above ¹²

11 The general conclusion or the principle to be deduced from the whole discussion, therefore, is that *of the senses viz mukhya and gauna it is only the mukhya which is to be accepted as being conveyed by the Mantra and it alone has to be connected with the enjoined act,*¹ which when applied to similar case means that words, as far as possible, must be understood as conveying their *mukhyārtha* alone which, as will be noticed later on, supplies us with one of the prerequisites of *lakṣanā* to be discussed in the next Chapter

12 अपि च यो गौणे मन्त्र विनियुङ्क्ते स वक्तव्य । किमर्थं मुख्य प्रत्यायसीति । स चेद् ब्रूयाद्, नान्यथा गौणप्रत्ययोऽस्तीति । प्रतिब्रूयादेनमन्येऽपि गौणप्रत्ययस्यान्युपाया सन्तीति । अथ स एवमभियुक्त प्रतिब्रूयात् मुख्यप्रत्ययोऽपि पाक्षिकोऽन्युपाय इति । ब्रूयादेन, न तर्हि नियोगतो गौणे विनियोजनीय । यदा गौणप्रत्ययाय मुख्यमुपादत्ते, तदेतदापतित भवति मुख्य एव विनियोग इति । अर्थेन च प्रतीतेन प्रयोजन, न प्रत्यायकेन मन्त्रेण । अतोऽन्यनायुपायेन गौण प्रत्याययितव्य । न स एव मन्त्र आदर्तव्य । अथापि मन्त्रेण प्रत्यायकेन प्रयोजन इत्याक्षयापि मुख्यप्रत्यायनैव निर्वत्त प्रयोजनमिति नतर्ग गौणे विनियुज्येत । [SB p 750r]

13 तन्मान्मह्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये सार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति सिद्धम् । [SB, p 751]

ABHIDHĀ AND LAKṢANĀ

1 We have seen in the last chapter how and why we have to use the *mantra* in its *mukhyārtha* rather than *gaunārtha* or *lakṣyārtha*. We have also seen in one of the preceding chapters how we can determine the signification of a word. Now we shall proceed to consider what the rhetoricians describe as the powers of words. Here at the outset we may note that according to the *mīmāṃsaka* there are only two *śabda-vṛttis* or *śaktis* viz ABHIDHĀ and LAKṢANĀ. In fact the *mīmāṃsaka* means *abhidhā* only when he uses the term *śabda-śakti*, but there are cases where even he finds that the sense that a word yields by *abhidhā* is useless and has as such to be set aside. And then he adopts what he calls the GAUNĪ VṚTTI or BHAKTI which is the same as *lakṣanā*.

2 Now as regards the *mukhyārtha* we have already noted the various means of determining it and it has also been noted that as a rule, it is not right to assume one word as having more senses than one. This principle is generally accepted by the *mīmāṃsaka* who holds that where words appear to have two or more significations only one is their *mukhyārtha* while the others are conveyed only through *sādrśya* or other relations by *lakṣanā*. Thus the word *barhi* primarily means 'grass' in general and is applied to the sanctified grass only secondarily through *sādrśya*. Another instance we get in the word *parvan* which is found used in the sense of *kāla* as well as of the *samudāya* (i.e. of the two sacrifices called *Dars'a* & *Purnamāsa*). But the right view of the matter, based on context and derivation, is that the word primarily denotes the *samudāya* and is only secondarily used in the sense of *kāla* owing to the *samudāya-sambandha*¹. Similar is the case with the word *caru* which

1 नायमुभयत्र पर्वशब्दो वर्तते । यदि कालवचनस्तत्सम्बन्धात्समुदाये गम्यते ।

* यदि वा समुदायवचनस्तत्सम्बन्धात्काले । अन्यतरवचनो नोभयवचनः । तत्र समुदायवचने कल्प्यमाने प्रकरणमनुगृहीतं भवति । अपि च पृष्ठाते पर्वशब्दः । . पृष्ठादिश्च

on the strength of *smṛti* texts is declared to denote primarily the *odana* and the *sthāli* only secondarily - But the word *mātā* presents a different case altogether. It means 'mother' and also 'one who measures (corn)'. And both these are the *vāc्यārthas* of the word *mātā*¹. In such cases it is the context that helps us to determine the exact signification of the words in a particular passage². As a matter of fact though such a word appears to be one, it is not one but two. For we find that the word *mātā* meaning the mother is not the same as the word *mātā* meaning one who measures corn.

3 But when we use a word or hear it used what does our first perception refer to? Do we perceive the form of the word or the sense conveyed by it? This question crops up while the sense of the text '*Rathantaram uttarayor gāyati*' is being discussed. The *Pūrvā-pakṣin* suggests that the *mukhyārtha* of a word is the form only and not the sense that it conveys. And it is only because the form is found to be unfit for the action that is spoken of in the text that we set it aside and take up the *artha*. Hence, he argues, as long as we can do by taking to the form only it is needless for us to go further and take the word as conveying any *artha* at all. Thus in the text under consideration we stick to *ś'abda* i.e. its form alone and take the text to mean 'He applies the word *Rathantara* to *Kavatīs*'. This view, however, is summarily dismissed as being the worse, for *ś'abda*

दाने प्रसिद्ध । दानानि च समदाया । तस्मात्समुदायाभीष्ट्या । एव शब्दावयव-
प्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भवति । [SB on IX 2 53, p. 179]

² cf. X 1 44; and SB thereon

3 अनेकस्याग्रेक शब्दो भवति वाचकः । तद्यथा मातेति मातरमपि वदति
मातारमपि । माता च परम देवत समा च पुत्रेष्वित्येतैरपबद्धमानो जननीवचनोऽ-
वगम्यते । माता सम क्षिप्रश्चेत्येभिरनुव्रियमानो धान्यस्य मातुर्वाचकः । [SB on X
114, p. 1810]

4 छागोपकरणमस्योपदक्षितम् । यदुपदक्षने पशुशब्दश्छागाभिप्राय इति गम्यते ।
यथा युगवच्च उपदक्षित ईपाचक्रादिसुनिधाने चेदक्षमानयेत्यव्ययते तदा यानाक्षमपि
कृत्य व्रत इति गम्यते, न तु विदेवनाक्षमिति । [SB on VI 8 35, p. 1510]

*the sambandha being autpattika it is inadmissible to apply any word to any thing which it has no power to denote.**

*But it must be remembered that this principle holds good only if the notion expressed by the text under consideration is meant to refer to the signification of the word that is used in connection with it. But, however, the notion has reference to *s'abda* i.e. the form only, then the word will have to be understood to stand for its form alone and not for its *artha*. Thus for example, if *agni* is enjoined as the deity of a particular *havi* it won't do it if we use any synonym of the word *agni* to mention the deity. For *devatā* is something which is stated and enjoined by *s'abda* only so that it is the *s'abda* or its form that is primarily conveyed in this case, and not the *artha*. Here one may be reminded of a *sūtra* of *Pāṇini* wherein he lays down that in grammar a word stands for its form only and not for its *artha* except when it is a *samjñā*.⁷ The reason for framing such a rule is obvious. For grammar, we know is a *s'abda-śāstra* and gives us rules for making the correct forms of words. The rules, therefore, have reference to the form of the words rather than to the senses that are conveyed by them. It is, therefore, but proper that words in grammar stand for the form not for the *artha*.

5 शब्द उच्चरिते तत्र तावन्मुखा प्रतिपात् । शब्दे कार्यसम्भवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । यथा गामानवेति । इह तु शब्द एव कार्यं सम्भवति, नार्थे । अतोऽत्र शब्द विज्ञास्याम । पूर्वस्मादेश वाद पापीयान् । कस्मात् । औत्पत्तिकस्त्वत् । औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नो सबन्ध । यो हि शब्दो यस्मिन्नर्थे औत्पत्तिरेव सबन्धेन प्रसिद्धो न ततोऽन्य प्रत्याययितुं शक्नोति । न हि गोशब्देनाश्वोऽभिधातुं शक्यते । [SB on शब्दमात्रमिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिकत्वात् । MS VII 2 45, p 1512f]

6 यत्र ह्यर्थे कार्यमासाद्यते तत्र शब्दोऽर्थप्रत्यायनार्थो भवति यत्राशेन प्रयोजनम् । यत्र पुन शब्द एव कार्यं तत्र कार्यसम्भवार्थं शब्द एव प्रत्याययितव्य । देवतायाश्च यज्ञसाधनभावो न रूपेण भवति । केन तर्हि । सबन्धिना शब्देन ।..... तस्मान्न शब्द अर्थप्रत्यायनार्थमुच्चरिते स चार्थं पुन शब्द प्रत्याययेदिति । लक्षित-लक्षणा हि तथा स्यात् । किं तर्हि । शब्द एव हविषा सबन्धते । तत्सम्भवादर्थोऽपि देवता भविष्यति । यस्य हि शब्दो हविषा तादर्थ्येन सबन्धते सा देवता । शब्दे कार्यस्यासम्भवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । इह तु शब्दे एव कार्यं सम्भवति । तस्मान्नार्थ-प्रत्यायनार्थं शब्द इति । तदुक्त वक्तिकारेण, न वा शब्दपूर्वको ह्यर्थस्तस्यैव तस्मादर्थनिष्पत्तिरिति । [SB, on X 4 23, p 1922f]

7 ख रूप शब्दस्याशब्दसज्ञा [अष्टाध्यायी I 1 13]

5 In addition to the several points regarding the *vācārtha* that have been noticed up to now we have to note one more important point in the same connection. *Ānarthakya*, as we know, is the last thing that is admissible in the case a Scriptural text. But will it do if an attempt is made to avoid this *ānarthakya* by giving any *artha* to any *śabda*? The answer to such a question is a definite no. We have already seen that the relation between *śabda* and its *artha* is *utpattika* so that it is impossible to attach any sense to any word save the one with which it is naturally connected. Thus *ānarthakya-prasanga* can't be ground strong enough to father any signification upon any *śabda* even when it has no power to convey it. This point is stated by Ś'ABARA while discussing the signification of the expression '*caturthe caturthe*' *ham*' in the text '*Caturthe caturthe hany ahīnasya grhyate*'. The *Pūva-pakṣin* holds that we must take the expression to mean 'every fourth day', for it is thus only that the repetition of the word *caturthe* would be properly interpreted. Otherwise the repetition would be redundant. But the *Siddhāntin* argues that it is not wise to try to save the *vīpsā* from *ānarthakya* by assuming an *artha* which the words have no power to convey. For *ahīna* has only one day which can be called the *caturtham aha* in the real sense of the term. Hence by 'every-fourth day' we shall have to understand 'the fourth, the eighth and such other days'. But that is not the sense that is conveyed by the words '*caturthe caturthe*' *ham*'¹¹ For the word *caturtha* can never mean the eighth or the twelfth and so on. Thus we must remember that just as it is incumbent on the interpreter of the Scriptural texts that he renders no part of the texts *anarthaka*, similarly it is equally incumbent on him to see that no word is made to yield any sense which it has no power to convey.¹² Violation of this rule results in the *dosa* called *abhudhāna-vipratipatti* which has been explained by Ś'ABARA as incongruity between the words uttered and the sense intended to be conveyed. Thus, for example, there

11 cf. MS. A 5 55 56 and SB. thereon

12 नानर्थक्यमापत्ततीति अशब्दार्थः कल्पनीयः । [SB, on A 5 56, 190.]

would be *abhudhāna-vipratipatti* if a word in the plural is used to express one thing, for the *artha* of the *bahu-vacana* is *bahutva* and not *ekatva* which is intended to be conveyed. Thus when the sense actually conveyed by a word does not agree or tally with the sense intended to be expressed there springs up this *abhudhāna-vipratipatti*¹³. It would thus be clear that words must be so construed as to convey only their natural signification and not any signification that the interpreter may find it necessary to assign to them. This very rule gives us the corollary that has been stated by S'ABARA when he declares that a *sāmānya-vācī śabda* can't denote *vis'eṣas*, at least not by *abhudhā*¹⁴.

6 Now before we pass on to consider *lakṣanā*, let us see how JAIMINI and S'ABARA interpret the text '*Saptadaś'arathur vai vājapeyasya yūpa bhavati*'. Here the *Pūrvapakṣin* is in favour of resorting to *lakṣanā* on the word *yūpa* and taking it to signify the *sodasī-pātra*. For, he argues, that *Vājapeya* has no *yūpa* at all. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that even if the *Vājapeya* has no *yūpa* in it directly, yet it may be said to have *yūpa* as its *anga* from the fact that it is an *anga* of *pas'u-yāga* which itself is an *anga* of *Vājapeya*. Thus just as a man can be said to be related with his grand-son because he is related to his son who is related with his son, similarly the *Vājapeya-yāga* can be said to be related to the *yūpa* because it is related to the *Pas'u-yāga* which in its turn is related to the *yūpa*. The genitive ending applied to the *Vājapeya* in the text under discussion signifies only the *sambandha* of the *Vājapeya* with the *yūpa*, and since this *sambandha* can be easily understood without resorting to *lakṣanā* as shown above it would be certainly wrong to set aside the

13 केवमभिवानविप्रतिपत्तिर्नाम । यदन्यथाभिधानमन्यथाभिधेयम् [SB on X I 3 11]

14 न हि सामान्यवाची शब्दो विशेषानभिवदति । यदि चाभिवदेदयजाते गवि नायकत्वेत । पूर्वदर्शनाभावात् । सामान्ये च दृष्टपूर्वत्वादवक्तरूपते । तस्मान्न सामान्य विशेषानभिवदति— । अभिवदन्वा न मुख्यया वस्तुयाऽभिवदेत कथं तर्हि । लक्षणाया । लक्षणा च व्युत्पत्त्या वाच्यते [SB on X 8 1b, p. 20713]

vācārtha and resort to *lakṣanā* For *lakṣanā* after all is a *dosa* inasmuch as by resorting to it we set aside the direct and natural signification of a word or words and take up the indirect one It is, therefore, only as the last resort that recourse can be had to *lakṣanā*, but not so long as it is possible to find out any way out of it ¹¹ (SAPTADASĀRATĪM NAYĀYA)

7 But sometimes it happens that the literal sense of words obtained by the various means noticed above is found to be inapplicable in the context This ultimately is found some times to lead to the *ānarthakya* of some word or words or, even the whole text Now in ordinary parlance such a state of things may be allowed For we often find that in ordinary parlance there are many words or groups of words which are really *anarthaka* *Laukika vākyas* are in fact, sometimes *anarthaka* also But the same can't be said about the Vedic texts Veda is never *apramāṇa*, as the *Mīmāṃsakas* would have it, and as such it is impossible to accept the *ānarthakya* of even a word, nay even a syllable, in a vedic text JAIMINI, and his BHĀṢYAKĀRA have time and again emphasized this fact both positively as well negatively laying down that *ĀNARTHAKYA IS ANYĀYYA* and that *ARTHAVATTVA IS NYĀYYA* Hence it is that close adherence to the literal sense is not always advisable In such cases the secondary or the figurative sense of a word or an expression has to be accepted Thus for instance, in the sentence '*Simham ālabheta*' it is not necessary to adopt the secondary sense of the word *simha*, for even with its direct signification it can very well fit in with the context and thus allow the sentence to make good sense But in sentences like '*simno Devadattah*' or '*Agnau tisthati*', or '*Chatrino gacchanti*' we find that they make little sense if we

15 आनर्थक्यात्तदङ्गोऽपि । [MS III 1 18], अथ यस्योपकारिण उपकरोति भवति स तस्य सम्बन्धो मुख्येनैव सम्बन्धेन । न चैकान्तरितमिति कृत्वाऽसम्बन्धो भवति । यथा देवदत्तस्य नप्तेति पुत्रेण चासावन्तरितः । अथ देवदत्तेन मुख्येनैव सम्बन्धेन सम्बध्यते । तस्मादेव एव पक्ष आश्रयणीयः । न ह्यतस्मिन्पक्षे कश्चिदपि लक्षणाशब्दो भवतीति । [SB, on III 1 18, p 724]

stick up to the *vācārtha* of the words *simhah*, *agnau* and *chatrinah* respectively. Hence we, in our attempt to avoid the *ānarthakya-dosa*, try to find some other sense which will suit the context and at the same time can be, of course indirectly, conveyed by these words. Thus it is clear that *LAKSANĀ* is resorted to only as a means to avoid *ĀNARTKYA-DOSA* and that it can be resorted to only if the literal sense is found to be unsuitable in the context, and that too only as the last resort¹⁶

8 The first and the foremost principle to be borne in mind in this connection is that *between the two powers of a word viz ŚRUTI (or ABHIDHĀ) and LAKSANA, the former being more conventional or direct is certainly stronger and hence preferable*. This principle has been repeatedly stressed by S'ABAKA in his commentary in different places in slightly varying expressions¹⁷. Thus though *lakṣanā* has no scope against *Śruti* or *abhudhā* it does not mean that it has no scope at all. All

16 Cf. यदाब्जस्येन शब्दार्थो नावकल्पते तदा लक्षणयापि कल्प्यमान साधुर्भवति । यथा अग्नौ तिष्ठति, अवटे तिष्ठति अप्रिसमीपे तिष्ठत्यवटसमीपे तिष्ठतीति भवति सव्यवहारः । लक्षणापि हि लौकिक्येव [SB, p 148], श्रुत्यसम्भवे लक्षणयापि व्यवहारो भवति । यथाग्नौ तिष्ठत्यवटे तिष्ठतीति । [SB, p 148], श्रुत्यसम्भवे लक्षणापि न्याय्यैव । [SB, p 1280], अमति श्रुत्ये लक्षणार्थो ग्राह्यः । [SB, p 1551], सुहृदाभावे गौणो गृह्यते [SB, p 1457] सम्भवति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणार्थोऽप्यग्राह्यः । [SB, p 1560], भवति लक्षणयापि शब्दार्थः [SB, p 1280], अगतिश्चैवा लक्षणापरिग्रहः । [SB, p 1545], त्रित्वं हि चतुष्टया दीनि साहचर्यालक्ष्णोति लक्षयितुम् । लक्षणा त्वाधिता भवति । किं कियताम् । अगत्याधीयते । सत्या गतौ नाश्रयितव्या । [SB, p 2021]

* व्रीहीन्प्रोक्षतीति व्रीहिजातिर्निर्दिश्यते । व्रीहिद्रव्यलक्षणार्था वा अपूर्व साधनविशेषलक्षणार्था वा । [SB on IX 1 13, p 1600]

17 अतिश्च लक्षणाया ज्यायसी । [SB, p 134] श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये अतिर्ज्यायसी । [SB, p 324], श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या न लक्षणा । [SB, pp 565, 1244 1262] श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । [SB, p 1210, 1222], अतिश्च लक्षणाया गरीयसी । [SB, p 1260], अतिश्च लक्षणाया बलीयसी । [SB, p 1276], श्रुतिलक्षणयोश्च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । [SB, p 1556], अतिश्च लक्षणातो न्याय्या । [SB, p 2213]

cases of *s'ruty-asambhava* are sure to lead us into the domain of *ānarthakya* unless we resort to *laksanā*. *Laksanā* or the power to indicate is, therefore, a great weapon against *ānarthakya* which is sure to arise in some cases out of the unsuitability of the *vācyārtha* to the context. *S'RUTY-ASAMBHAVA* OR *MUKHYĀBHĀVA* is, therefore, often laid down as the 'most important prerequisite of *LAKSANĀ*'

9 But the inapplicability of the *vācyārtha* is not the only basis for *laksana*. Take, for example, the text '*Vēdam adkītya snāyāt*' which if literally interpreted would mean 'After studying the *Veda* one should take bath'. But if one takes bath immediately on the completion of his Vedic studies what visible purpose can be served by *snāna*? In fact we shall have to suppose that *snāna* serves only an unseen purpose. But as far as possible one must avoid assuming an *adrsta artha* where a seen purpose is possible. It is for avoiding this *adrstārthatā* that in the text under consideration we resort to *laksanā* and take it to mean 'As soon as one finishes his Vedic studies one should relinquish the vows of *asnāna* and others but remain with his guru and prosecute the *dharma-jijñsā*'.¹⁸ *Drste satī adrsta-kalpanā* is certainly a more serious drawback than *laksanā*, for whereas the former involves an assumption not warranted by our experience in any way, the latter is a matter of every day experience and has been sanctioned by usage.¹⁹ Avoidance of conflict or contradiction between the several words of the text itself or between several texts of the Scriptures affords yet another basis for resorting to *laksanā*, as is seen in the case of the text like '*Aditir dyau*

18 न वा इदं स्नानमदृष्टार्थं विधीयते । किंतु लक्षणाया अस्नानादिनियमस्य पर्यवसानं वेदाध्ययनसमकालमाहुः । वेदमधीत्य स्नायाद्भस्कुलान्मा समावर्तिष्ठेत्, अदृष्टार्थतापरिहारायैव । [SB, on I 11, p. 7]

19 लक्षणेते चेद्वरं लक्षणा कल्पिता न यागामिधानम् । लौकिकी हि लक्षणा, ह्योऽप्रसिद्धकल्पना । [SB, p. 121] लक्षणा वारष्टकल्पनाया ज्ञायसी । प्रमाणाद्धि सा भवति and लक्षणा वारष्टकल्पनाया ज्ञायसी ।

aditir antariksam or *'Tvam eva mātā tvam eva pitā'* ²⁰ And lastly it may be found necessary to adopt *LAKSANĀ* in view of the context. Thus, for example, the word *sarva* in texts like *'Pūrnāhutyā sarvān kāmān avāpnōti'* has to be understood by *laksanā* to stand for only those *kāmas* that are intended at the time when the sacrifice is started ²¹. We thus see that it becomes necessary to resort to *laksanā* under four different circumstances which make it impossible to avoid *laksanā*. We have to set aside the *vāc्यārtha* and take to *laksanā* if by sticking to *vāc्यārtha* we find that (1) a text or any part thereof is rendered useless or meaningless, or (2) yields a sense which is incongruous with the sense conveyed by the other parts, or (3) is found to serve no visible purpose and hence requires us to assume some invisible purpose, or lastly (4) it is so required by the preamble, if we may so translate the word *ĀDHİKĀRA*.

10 Having thus seen the circumstances under which *laksanā* has to be resorted to in the case of a word or words we are now confronted with the questions as to (1) what sense or senses are conveyed by *laksanā* and (2) how. The latter of these namely the manner in which the *laksyārtha* is conveyed, has been fully answered and discussed by *S'ABARA* in more places than one. While commenting on *MS VIII 3 34* *S'ABARA* lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the word can't yet abandon it for good. For if the *vāc्यārtha* is entirely abandoned how can the *laksyārtha* be conveyed at all ²². Hence even this *laksyārtha* is bound to be *s'abadārtha*, for a word even by *laksanā* has no power to convey *as'ab-dārtha* i.e. some sense, with which it can't have any connection.

20 गुणाद्विप्रतिषेधं स्वात् । [MS I 2 39] and SB thereon

21 सर्वस्वमाधिकारिकम् । [MS I 2 16], सर्वकामाप्तिवचनं गौणम् । असर्वेषु सर्ववचनमधिकृतापेक्षम् । [SB, p 129]

22 स्वार्थे वर्तमानं सादृश्यं गमयति । स्वार्थं जहत्कथं गमयेत् । [SB, on VIII, 3 34]

by any stretch of imagination -- And if a word is to have any connection with the *lakṣyārtha* it can have it only through its *vācārtha*. Thus if the word does not convey the *vācārtha* first there is no possibility of its going further and conveying the *lakṣyārtha*. All this in simple terms means that the *lakṣyārtha* must be connected in one way or the other with the *MUKHYĀRTHA*, or to put it in one word as given by *MAHMATA* there must be *TAD-YOGA*. This very principle has again been very well explained by *S'ABARA* under MS 1.4.23²⁴

11 Now we come to the question of the exact nature of the secondary sense that we arrive at with the help of *lakṣanā*, or in other words the different kinds of *TADYOGA* which make the *lakṣanā* possible. In this connection it may be noted in general that a word figuratively may be found to convey (i) the sense of the possessive suffix (*MAIVARIHA LAKṢANĀ*) (ii) the place (*DESA LAKṢANĀ*), (iii) the *dharma* or *guna* (*DHARMA-LAKṢANĀ* OR *GUṆA VĀPI*), (iv) the time (*KĀLA LAKṢANĀ*), (v) the action (*KARMA LAKṢANĀ*), (vi) the *KĀRYA* or the *SĀDHYA* (vii) the *KARANA* or the *SĀDHANA*, (viii) some *SAVĪTĪYA* or (ix) the *LINGIN*. But which of these is conveyed in any particular example depends upon the will of the speaker, though some general indications regarding these can be given with some degree of certainty.

12 Thus '*Udbhūdā yajeta*' is according to the *pūrvapakṣin* an illustration of the *MAIVARTHA-LAKṢANĀ*. In other words the sentence can be put as '*Udbhūdā yāgena svargam*

23 न च लक्षणया प्रयोगेऽशब्दार्थं परिच्छिद्यते । रुक्कारण स्वार्थे वर्तमानोऽर्थान्तरं लक्षयति । स्वार्थं जहन्नेव लक्षयेत् । [SB on VIII 3 24, p. 1622]

24 कथं नु स्वार्थमिवाग्नेन इत्यव्यवस्थेति चेत् । अर्थसंबन्धात् । सिंह इति निर्वृतिं प्रसह्यकारिता तत्र प्रायेणेति प्रसह्यकारीति गम्यते । अर्थप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात् । यो हि गम्यते प्रसह्यकारिणः प्रत्याययेयमिति स यदि सिंहशब्दमुच्चारयति सिध्यत्यस्याभिप्रेतम् । सिहार्थं प्रतीतं संबन्धादितरमर्थं प्रत्याययति । एव स्वार्थमिवाग्ने तद्गुणसंबन्धं प्रतीयते । [SB on I 4 22, pp. 357-360]

bhāvayet 'But how can this apposition between *udbhūta* and *yāgena* be explained?' The *pūrva-pakṣin* does it by adopting the *matvartha-lakṣanā* and paraphrasing the word *udbhūta* as *udbhūdvatā*, for he argues *lakṣanā* being *laukikī* is certainly to be preferred to *aprasiddha-kalpanā* which is involved in taking the word *udbhūta* as the name of a sacrifice. The *Siddhāntin*, however, points out that the word *udbhūta* on the strength of etymology can signify the *yāga*, so that there is no question of the so-called *aprasiddha-kalpanā* being involved in such an interpretation, and the apposition can be easily explained by the *vāc्यārtha* (or rather the *yaugikārtha*) only. Hence concludes the *Siddhāntin* there is no scope for *lakṣanā* in the text in question.²⁵ Here, however, it may be noted that though the conclusion of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is wrong, yet the principle voiced by him viz. that *lakṣanā* is to be preferred to *adrsta-kalpanā* is certainly very sound. With reference to this first kind of *lakṣanā* it may be stated as a general rule that it may mainly be used in explaining the appositional use of words in such cases where the *yaugikārtha* or the *vāc्यārtha* may not be competent to do so. Thus, for example, the text '*Somena vajeta*' is to be explained as '*Somavatā yāgena istam bhāvayet*' by resorting to *matvartha lakṣanā* since it is impossible to explain the *sāmānādhikaranya* between *Somena* and *Yāgena* in any other way.

13 *Des'a-lakṣanā* is very well illustrated in the popular expressions like '*Agnau tisthati*' or '*Avate tisthati*'. A

25 यागेन कुर्यादिति यजेतेत्यस्यार्थः । करणं हि यागः । उद्भिदायपि हि तृतीया-
निर्देशात् करणम् । तत्रोद्भिदा यागेनेति कर्मनामवेद्यत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्यादामञ्ज-
स्यम् । द्रव्यवचनत्वे मन्थर्यलक्षणाया सामानाधिकरण्यं स्यात् । लक्षणेति
चेद् वरलक्षणा कल्पिता न यागाभिधानम् । लौकिकी हि लक्षणा, इतोऽप्रसिद्धकल्पनेति ।
.....अनुवादा उद्भिदादयः । कुत प्राप्तिरिति चेत् । ततोऽभिधीयते । उच्छब्द-
सामर्थ्याद्भिच्छब्दसामर्थ्याच्च उद्भिच्छब्दः क्रियावचनः । उद्भेदनं प्रकाशनं पशूनामनेन
क्रियते इत्युद्भिद् यागः । . . . एव सर्वत्र । [SB, on I 4 2, p. 323ff.]

26 बाह्वो देशलक्षणा भविष्यति । कवतीषु रथन्तरं गायत्रीत्युच्यते । न च
शक्यते कवतीषु रथन्तरं गानुम् । तत्र देशलक्षणा भवति कवतीदेश इति । [SB on
VII 2 12, p. 1545] •

Vedic example of this type of *laksanā* is found in the text 'Kavāṭisu rathantaram gāyati' where the direct sense of the word *kavāṭisu* does not fit in with the context. Hence naturally we have to resort to *laksanā*, and it is proposed by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* that the word *kavāṭisu* should be understood to stand for *kavāṭi-des'e*. This, of course, is not accepted by the *Siddhāntin* who points out that *rathantara* is not a *samskāra śabda* so that there is no difficulty even if we accept the literal sense of the word *kavāṭisu*. Hence for want of *mukhyārtha-bādha* there is no occasion for *laksanā* at all in the text under discussion.²⁷ What we have to note here is the particular type of *laksanā* that is proposed by the *Pūrva-pakṣin*. By way of curiosity it may also be pointed out here that ŚĀBARA has given us another example of this *laksanā* in the expression 'Gangūyām gāvah'.²⁸ Which corresponds to 'Gangūyām ghosah' which is generally given by the rhetoricians as an illustration of what they call the ŚIDDHĀ LAKSANA LAKSANA.

14 The text discussed in the last paragraph can also be interpreted by making the word *rathantara* yield a different sense by *laksanā*. Thus the *Pūrva-pakṣin*, proposing an alternative construction, suggests that the word *rathantara* in the text should be understood to signify *rathantara-dharmāḥ*.²⁹ This proposal of DHARMA LAKSANA is also rejected by the *Siddhāntin* who refuses to admit any *laksanā* at all in the text as shown above. Sentences³⁰ like 'Simha

27 अगतिश्चैवा गच्छणापरिग्रहः । विवर्ति । कर्मशब्दः स्यात् । रथन्तरादिगतिनास्यस्य सकारकर्मणो वाचकः । कुतः । उक्तो न्यायो गीतिषु समाख्येयत्र । तत्र गीतिविशिष्टायाम्भ्येषु शब्दो दृष्टः । [SB on VII 213, p 1545]

28 cf SB on VII 14, 1530

29 धर्मलक्षणा वा स्यात् । रथन्तरधर्मा वा कवतीषु रथन्तरशब्देनातिदिश्यन्ते । यथा रथन्तरे प्रस्तूयमाने पृथिवी मनसा ध्यायेदित्येवमादयः । यथा आचार्ये प्रेषिते आचार्यानि भवतामाचार्य इति आचार्यश्रुताचार्याभ्यामतिदिश्यन्ते । [SB, p 1545]

30 गुणादायमिवान स्यात् etc [MS III 2 4], गुणसयोगाद्गौणमिदममिवान भविष्यति । भवति हि गुणादप्यभिधानम् । यथा सिंहो देवदत्तः, अग्निमणिवत् इति । [SB p 755]

Devadattah and *'Agnir mānavakah'* are given as popular examples of this type of *lakṣanā*. In such sentences words like *simha* and *agni* have to be understood as signifying not lion and fire (which is their literal signification), but their qualities. This type of *lakṣanā* corresponds to the GAUNĪ SĀROPĀ LAKṢANĀ of the rhetoricians usually illustrated, by the example *Gaur vāhikah* with this difference that according to rhetoricians the *Lakṣyārtha* is the *vyakti* while according to *Mīmāṃsakas* it is the *dharma*s. This roughly agrees with the first of the three views about the taking effect of the *gaunī lakṣanā*. The general condition paving the path for this type of *lakṣanā* is very well noticed by ŚĀBARA in the words 'PARA-S'ABDAH PARATRA PRAYUKTAS SAN DHARMĀNATI DIŚATI'³¹ and 'S'RUTYARTHĀSAMBHAVĀC CALAKṢANAYĀ DHARMĀNĀM GRĀHAKA UCYATE'³². It would appear as if this *dharma-lakṣanā* is called *guna-vāda* by JAIMINI at MS I 2 10³³. Thus '*Stenam manah*' is given as an example of GUNA VĀDA and ŚĀBARA explains the sentence in the words '*Yathā stenah pracchannarūpa evam ca manah ity gaunah 'abdah*'. But it may be noted that the term *guna-vāda* has been used by JAIMINI and ŚĀBARA in a sense much wider than *dharma-lakṣanā*. It means according to them *upacāra* or secondary application in general, as is evident from the fact that *anrtavādinī vāk* is given as another example of *guna-vāda* where *lakṣanā* conveys not *dharma* or *guna*, but *bāhulya* or *prāśastiya*³⁴. Hence we find JAIMINI laying down RŪPA and PRĀYA as two possible grounds for GUNA VĀDA among others³⁵.

31 cf SB on MS VII 48

32 cf S on MS VII 3 17

33 गुणवादस्तु । गौण एष वादो भवति यस्तन्निधिं स्तोतव्ये सम्बन्धन्तरं स्तुयते । [SB, p 213]

34 गुणवादस्तु रूपात् । यथा स्तेनाः प्रच्छन्नरूपा एव च मन इति गौणं शब्दः । प्रायश्च अमृतवादिनी वागिति [SB on I 2 11, p 127]

35 रूपायैत् प्रायैत् । [MS I 2 11]

15 Next in order comes what may be called KĀLA-LAKSANĀ. Very often time is indicated by referring to some particular incident usually taking place at that hour. Thus our popular expression '*goraja muhūrta*' is nothing but a simple example of this type of *laksanā*. For in cities like Bombay there is no possibility of dust being raised by the hoofs of cows returning to their pens, and yet we do use the term to signify the hour of the evening when the incident—wherever it happens at all—happens. This idea is very well expressed by S'ABARA by taking another example while commenting on MS VI 4 42. A person invites a friend (say for dinner) saying '*s'ankha-velāyām āgantavyam*', though as a matter of fact no conch may be blown in the village where they are staying. Will it be right on the part of the friend not to go to the person at all arguing that as no conch is blown in that village there is no hour that can be designated as the *s'ankha-velā*? Certainly it can't be so. For in such cases what is intended to be expressed is not the actual blowing of the conch (or any other incident like that) but the hour at which it is known usually to take place.³⁶

16 KARMA-LAKSANĀ presents a phenomenon which is just the opposite of the one that is involved in the *kāla-laksanā* explained in the last paragraph. The latter occurs when a word expressive of an incident or an act is used to indicate the hour, while the former requires that a word expressive of time primarily be used to indicate an act or an incident. Thus in the text '*Amāvāsyāyām pinda-pitṛyāñ-na caranti*' or in the expression '*Amāvāsyāyām nu'si*' the word *amāvāsyā* primarily denoting time is proposed to be understood as secondarily indicating the sacrifice called *dars'a*.³⁷

36 यथा शङ्खवेलायामगन्तव्यमिति । यस्मिन्नाह ग्रामे इदं शङ्खो नाभ्यस्यते तस्मिन्नाह स तथा कालोऽस्तीति नागमन परिहास्यते । [SB on VI 4 42, p 1454]

37 नाम वास्याशब्द कर्मवचन । किं तर्हि । कालवचन । काले धृति कर्मणि । लक्षणा । [SB on XII 2 14, p 2243], अत्र काल एवाय मुख्य शब्दो न कर्मणि, कर्मणि लक्षणा । [SB on IV 4 19, p 1278]

17 Now we come to a type of *lakṣanā* where a word expressive of the *sādhya* or the *kārya* is used to indicate the *sādhana* or the *kāraṇa*, and vice versa. In the text '*Prsthair upatisthate*', for example, the word *prstha* is to be understood to signify, not the sacrificial act called *prstha*, but the mantras which are used during the performance of that act.³⁸ Similarly in the text '*Atha yat tristubhā paridadhātū nāntam gacchati*' the word *tristubh* stands for *usuk-kakubhau*, on which S'ABARA remarks '*KĀRINA KĀRYAVAD UPACĀRAH KRIAH*'.³⁹

18 Somewhat similar is the type of *lakṣanā* that we meet with in texts like '*Yajamānah prastarh, yajamāna ekādas'akapālah*'. It is obvious that this apposition of the two words *yajamāna* and *prastara* or *yajamāna* and *ekādas'akapāla* can't be adequately explained by sticking to the *vācyārtha* of these words. Hence by *lakṣanā* the word *yajamāna* has to be understood as being equivalent to *yajamāna-siddhikara*. Thus the *sāmānādhikaranya* between two words can be explained by adopting what may be called the *SIDDHIKARATVA LAKṢANĀ* which is illustrated by S'ABARA by the popular illustration '*Rājā pattigānakah*'.⁴⁰

19 One more principle underlying *lakṣanā* as noted by JAIMINI IS BHŪMĀ OR BĀHULYA. There is a text '*Śrītir upa-*

38 अभिधानोपदेशाद्वा विप्रतिषेधाद् द्रव्येषु पृष्ठशब्दः स्यात् । [MS VII 3 36 and SB there on]

39 त्रिष्टुभमेवायमुष्णिक्कुम्भाविति ब्रूते । दयम् । त्रिष्टुभो वीर्यमित्येवमन्ते सस्युते । त्रिष्टुभो वा एतद्वीर्यं यदुष्णिक्कुम्भाविति । कारणे कार्यवदुपचारः कृतः । [SB on V 3 6, p 1323]

40 तत्सिद्धिः । [MS I 4] , इह तु यजमानः प्रस्तरं यजमानः एक-
कपाल इति कीदृशो गुणसंबन्धः प्रतीयते । तत्सिद्धिकर इति । सर्वो ह्यात्मनः कार्यसिद्धिं
करोति । अन्योऽपि यस्तस्य कार्यमिद्धिं करोति स तस्मिन् चरिते हृदयमागच्छति ।
यथा राजा पत्तिगणक इति । पत्तिगणको राज्ञः कार्यं साधयति । स राजशब्द उच्चरिते
प्रतीयते । एवमिहापि यजमानकार्यं प्रस्तरैककपालौ साधयत । तस्मात्तौ यजमान-
शब्देन प्रत्याप्येते [SB, p 360f]

dahātī which interpreted literally means '*Srstimantrakā upadadhātī istakāh*'. Now all the *Mantras* which are required for the *istakācayana* are given beforehand and the text must be understood as referring to them only. However, some of these *Mantras* are *asrstilinga* (not containing word *srsti* or root *sṛj*). Yet they are to be in the *sṛstimantras* by the AJAHALLAKA-NĀ based on *Bhūmā*⁴¹.

20 Widely different, however, is the process involved in the type of *lakṣanā* which JAIMINI has noted in the *sūtra* LINGA SAMAYĀYĀT. The text in question here is '*Prānabhṛta upadadhātī istakāh*' which like the one noted above if taken literally would mean '*Prānabhṛtmantrakā upadadhātī istakāh*' which thus would not include the *aprānabhṛtmantras* and lead to their *ānarthakya*. The word *prānabhṛt* must, therefore, be taken to mean not only one *mantra* or two having the word *prānabhṛt* in them, but a whole group of *mantras* in the first of which the word *prānabhṛt* is prominently found to occur. This case is analogous to what is known as the CHAIRINYĀYA. Thus in the sentence '*chatrino gacchanti*' the word *chatrinah* taken literally stands for persons holding umbrellas. But in the sentence quoted above this direct sense is not meant to be expressed. What is meant to be expressed by the word *chatrinah* is a group of persons among whom one or more persons are seen to hold an umbrella. Here the underlying principle is not *bhūmā* or *śāhulya*, but the PRĀDHĀNYA of the expressed. The basis for *lakṣanā* in such cases is some peculiar or prominent characteristic (*Linga*)⁴² which is notifiable in any part of

41 भूग । [MS I 4

], कथं नु असद्विषु च सद्विशब्द

इति । भूम्ना । इद्वस्तत्र सृष्टिलिङ्गा मन्त्रा अल्पशो विलिङ्गा । [SB, p 363f]

42 लिङ्गमवधारयत् । [MS I 4

], लिङ्गसमाधायाम् शब्द

परत्र वर्तते । यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीत्येकेन छत्रिणा सर्वे लक्ष्यन्ते । न चायं शास्त्र-
मच्छब्दः सद्विशब्दश्च जद्वस्वार्थं मन्त्रगणं लक्षयेत् । यद्वर्णे च सृष्टिप्राणमच्छब्दौ
समवेतौ तावपि परिगृह्येते । यथा छत्रिशब्देन स्वार्थलक्षणार्थेन सोऽतिरिच्छन्ती गृह्यते ।

[SB, p 365], also cf SB on III 8 44

portion of what is to be indicated

21 Lastly may be noted the principle of euphemism (PRAŚAMSĀ) which gives us one more variety of *lakṣanā*. Take, for example, the text 'Apaś'avo vā anye go-aśvebhyah paś'avo go-aś'vāh'. It is not literally true to say that all animals other than cow or the bull and the horse are *apaś'us* i.e. no *paś'us* at all. Then why are they so described? The simple answer to this question is given by S'ABARA in the words 'Go-aś'vān praśamsitum anyesām paś'ūnām nindā' ⁴³ In this connection it may be observed that this basis for *lakṣanā* is sometimes akin to the one noticed under the name *dharma-lakṣanā* above. For after all what else can be intended by *praśamsā*? JAIMINI at MS VIII 2 6 clearly states that the word *soma* is used for *praśamsā*, and S'ABARA explains the same by taking the additional illustration of 'Yathā simho Devadattah iti' and rounds up the whole discussion with the remark 'TASMĀN NĀMĀYAM DHARMĀNIDEŚAH'

22 Having thus noticed the various senses conveyed by *lakṣanā* in different sentences we may now note one circumstance which is common to all these illustrations. Just as *lakṣanā* requires that there should be *mukhyārtha-bādhā* and that the *lakṣyārtha* must be conveyed by the *s'abda* through its *vācyārtha*, similarly does it require that the *lakṣyārtha* adopted must satisfy the need of the case. It will not do to take up any *artha* in any case. Thus, for example, in the example 'Gangāyām ghosah' it is possible to take the word *gangāyām* to stand for a number of things besides the *gangā-tata* which is the sense that we accept. But all the others we reject and accept only the *gangā-tata* as the *lakṣyārtha* because the former are not useful for our purpose which is served by the latter alone. Thus the general rule is, as S'ABARA has very nicely put it, 'YENA CA TATRA PRAYOGJANAM SA LAKṢYATE'. This shows how all the three condi-

43 प्रशसा [MS I 4], and SB thereon

44 प्रशसा सोमशब्द [MS VIII 26], and SB thereon

tions of *lakṣanā* as laid down by the rhetoricians have been noticed by *mīmāṃsakas* also when they hold that before *lakṣanā* can be resorted to there must be '*S'rutyasambhava*' and that the *lakṣyārtha* must be conveyed through the *vāc-yārtha* only, and that it must serve the need of the case. It must, however, be noted that PRAYOJANA (the 3rd condition) spoken of by the *Mīmāṃsakas* is not the same as the PRAYOJANA of the rhetoricians mentioned in connection with *lakṣanā*. For the latter is *vyangya* i.e. conveyed by *vyāñjanā* which certainly can't find any place in the *mīmāṃsā* view which refuses to accept *vyāñjanā* as a *s'abda-s'ūka* at all. Thus *prayojana* as spoken of by the *Mīmāṃsakas* as a condition for *lakṣanā* is not a technical term, but has the ordinary sense viz. the purpose in view. It is but natural, therefore, that the *MĪMĀMSAKA* does not recognize *RŪDHI* as one of the pre-requisites of *lakṣanā* as the rhetoricians do it as an alternative for *prayojana*, for he does not accept *RŪDHI LAKṢANĀ* at all. As we have already seen above '*Kuśāla*' and '*Pravīna*' which are given as illustrations of *RŪDHI LAKṢANĀ* by the rhetoricians are only cases of *abhidhā* according to the *mīmāṃsaka*⁴⁵

23 This circumstance about *lakṣanā* gives us another fact about it viz. that it would be wrong if after taking up a *lakṣyārtha* we are again required to resort to *lakṣanā* for a second time in the case of one and the same word. This subsequent *lakṣanā* is termed *lakṣita-lakṣanā*. *Lakṣanā* once adopted must yield a sense which would satisfy the need of the case, so that there would be no question of resorting to *lakṣanā* for a second time. *S'ABARA* in his *bhāṣya* has given us two examples of this *LAKṢITĀ LAKṢANĀ* while commenting on MS X 4 23 and MS X 5 58. In the former place⁴⁶ the question is as to what is indicated by the

45 SB. on MS VI 4 42

46 SB. on VI 7 22, see n 9 above

47 see n 6 above

word *agni* when it is used to enjoin the *devatā* (of a *havih*) If the word is taken to stand for the *artha* i.e. fire and not for the *s'abda* i.e. its form only, we find that the purpose of the passage is not served. For as we know it is by its verbal form, rather than its physical form, that a *devī* serves the purpose of the sacrifice. Hence if the word *agni* is accepted to stand for the *artha* i.e., fire we shall have to set that sense aside as being irrelevant for our purposes and by *lakṣanā* adopt the verbal form as being the sense indicated. Thus we first of all go from *s'abda* to *artha* and then come back again from *artha* to *s'abda*. But is it not better to avoid this lengthy process by taking the form as being denoted by the word in the very beginning and avoid any *lakṣanā* at all? The other instance given by S'ABARA is exactly of the same type as can be judged from the following remark of S'ABARA in that connection. '*Anyathā rathantarasāmānū adhyavasiyamanercca padam lakṣyate pade-na sāmā satsā lakṣitalakṣanā syāt*'⁴⁸

24 One more circumstance we have to notice about *lakṣanā*, and this again is the natural outcome of the fact that *lakṣanā* is *laukikī*. Thus we find that before we hit upon the *lakṣyārtha* we are already acquainted with the requirement of the sentence in question. This shows that the *lakṣyārtha* is something that is already known. Now we know that what is already known can't be the province of a *vidhī*. It must be *anuvāda*. Hence we come to the conclusion that *lakṣanā* is possible in an *anuvāda* only and that it may never be allowed in a *vidhī*. This very fact is sometimes differently stated by saying that a sentence where we are required to resort to *lakṣanā* shall not be construed as a *vidhī*,⁴⁹ it must be taken as an *anuvāda* only. Several

48 cf. SB. on A. 5.58, द्वितीयवर्णकम्

49 अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधौ । [SB, p. 1278], नानुवादपक्षे लक्षणाया दोषः । [SB, p. 364], यत्रानुवसत्तद्व्यानुवादपक्षे न्याय्यो न विविपक्षे । गौणो हि स आनुवसत्तद स्फुटादि । [SB, p. 1201], विधौ हि न पर शब्दार्थ प्रतीयते । [SB, p. 141]

indeed are the places in which S'ABARA in his *bhāṣyā* has referred explicitly to this fact about *lakṣanā*, but in one place (MS X 2 47) he has very clearly explained the truth behind this rule. The question is with regard to the sense of the word *yājayet* in the text '*Tataḥ samvatsare asthīn yājayet*' where it is pointed out that because this is a *vidhi* therefore it is not allowed to resort to *lakṣanā* and take the term *yājayet* to indicate something else. It is here that S'ABARA remarks that a figurative signification is not perceived from a *vidhi-śabda*. He then goes on to justify his statement by pointing out that a figurative word is connected with a sense which is determined on the strength of some other i.e. *laukika pramāna* *. What is meant is that *vidhi* is *svataḥ-pramāna* so that the sense to be perceived from a *vidhi* will have to be perceived from the words of the text only and from nowhere else. But the figurative sense is known from some *pramāna* other than *śabda* or the words of the text. This shows that the *lakṣyārtha* can't be the purport of a *vidhi vākya*. This in other words means that *lakṣanā is not admissible in an injunctive statement*. It must however, be remembered that this rule does not hold good in the case of sentences of ordinary parlance where we speak of things already known from other sources. Thus in common parlance it is quite possible to lay down an injunction in figurative words. The truth of this remark can be very well realised when we find injunctive sentences like *Amī pistapindāḥ śimhāḥ kṛvāntām* where the word *śimhāḥ* is evidently used in a figurative sense.

25 Now before we bring this section to a close let us see why *lakṣanā is after all to be looked upon as DOSA*, and try to value it in comparison with some other *dosas*. Here it must be noted that setting aside the natural and direct mode

50 न च गौणोऽर्थो विविक्तवाक्यमर्थे । अन्येन हि प्रमाणेन परिनिष्ठेऽर्थे
गौणं वाक्यं सङ्गच्छते । यथा गौरनृवच इति गोत्रातिविशिष्टं पशुरनृवच्यते न
वादीक । गौरस्य वादीक इति न सवादे वादीके गौणः शब्द उच्यते । [SB on MS
X 2 47 p 1847]

of interpretation and adopting an unnatural or an indirect one is a *dosa*, for the simple reason that the latter involves *gaṭ-rava* and is, as such, slow in its working. Any mode or construction which yields us the required sense in a shorter span of time and with less trouble is certainly what we should like to prefer, and hence the other we reject as being more elaborate and hence faulty. Looking at *lakṣanā* from this point of view we find that it obviously involves a lengthier process than *abhidhā* and is consequently to be looked upon as a *dosa*. But as we have already seen above we have sometimes to accept it to avoid some evils which are still worse.

26 Thus, for example, *ĀNARTHAKYA* is a greater evil. Is it not wrong to lose a whole text for the sake of one word or phrase? Would it not be wise to do some injustice to one word or expression and thereby save the whole text from being rendered nugatory? Now a text may become nugatory or *anarthaka* if it yields no good sense or if it yields some sense which is contradicted by our experience or by some other Scriptural text or texts. Whenever we are led to such circumstances we have to resort to *lakṣanā*. Thus we see that *LAṢANĀ* is preferable to *ĀNARTHAKYA* per se or *ĀNARTHAKYA* caused by *VI*PRATISEDHA. *ADRSTA KALPANĀ* is another evil which must be accepted as being greater than *LAṢANĀ*. For *lakṣanā* is, after all, *laukikī* and sanctioned by usage, while *adrsta-kalpanā* or *aprasiddha-kalpanā* has no such sanction behind it. *S'ABARA* points out *VI*YAVADHĀNA and *VI*ĀKAPHEDA as two other evils as being worse than *lakṣanā* and hence to be discarded in favour of the latter. In the text '*Khale-vāṭi yūpa bhavati*' there is a question regarding the construction of the word *khalevāṭi*. Is it to be construed with *yūpa* or with *bhavati*? If it is constructed with the word *yūpa*

51 खलेवाल्पा युक्ता विधीयते न यूपस्य खलेवालीता । तथाऽव्यवहितेन भक्षित्वा सवन्धात्प्रसक्तं वाक्यम् । इतरथा व्यवहितेन परोक्ष स्यात् । खलेवालीशब्दश्च य खले वारणे प्रवर्तते तस्य वाचकः । तथाभूतश्च यूपकार्ये विनियुज्यते । ये खलेवाली स यूप इति । शक्यते च यूपकार्ये विनियोक्तुम् । यत् यूपशब्दः कार्यलक्षणार्थः इति । व्यवधानाल्लक्षणापि ज्ञाप्यसीति । प्रत्यक्षं हि लक्षणायां, 'परोक्ष व्यवधाने वाक्यम्' । [SB* on X 2 69, p 1861 f]

we shall have to take the word *yūpa* as indicating *yūpa-kārya* by what we have called the *KĀRYA-LAKṢANĀ*, while the construction of the word with the word *bhavati* is vitiated by *vyavadhāna*. Thus we are confronted with two evils, one of which per force we have to accept. Naturally, therefore, we accept the lesser evil and resort to the former construction. But how is *Lakṣanā* a lesser evil? This question has been answered by S'ABARA by pointing out that *vākya* is *pratyakṣa* in *lakṣanā* while it is *parokṣa* in *vyavadhāna*. What he means to say is that in the former though we have to resort to *lakṣanā* yet the *ekavākyatā* that we arrive at thereby is direct and does not involve any reshuffling of the constituent words. In the latter case, however there can be no *ekavākyatā* if we do not re-arrange the words in a different manner. Thus the *ekavākyatā* in the latter case is only indirect or *parokṣa* whereas in the former it is direct or *pratyakṣa*. That *lakṣanā* is to be preferred to *vākyabheda* has been shown by S'ABARA while commenting on MS XI 2 2 where while discussing the signification of the text 'Same *darsa-pūṇamāśābhyam vajeta &c*' he points out that the word *darsa-pūṇamāśābhyām* in the text must be understood as indicating the whole group of sacrifices like the *āgneya* so that the text may be construed as one *vākya*. Otherwise we shall have to admit the text as being *anekārtha* and thus admit *vākyabheda*. Here again we are confronted with two evils of which we have to choose one. And we choose the former viz *lakṣanā*. For *lakṣanā* after all is *laukikī* and can ultimately yield us good sense. But *anekārthatva* of what obviously is one *vākya*, is sure to lead to confusion⁵². This shows that *anekārthatva* or *vākyabheda* is a *dosa* of a more serious type than *lakṣanā*. This fact can be demonstrated in another way also. For *lakṣanā* as is evident is only *pada-dosa* i.e., it has reference to the *pada* or *śabda* only to which it does some injustice by setting aside its literal sense. But *anekārthatva* or *vākyabheda* is *dosa* of a *vākya*, since we find that in it ' ३

52 नन्वेवमपि लक्षणाश्रिता भवति । वर लक्षणा नैकवाक्यस्यानेकार्थत्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वेऽगमकत्वम् । लक्षणातुगमिका, लौकिकत्वात् । [SB on X, 2 2, p 2136]

are doing injustice not only to this or that *pada* in a sentence but to the sentence as a whole. This shows that *vākya-bheda* is a *dosa* of greater magnitude than *laksanā*, and must, on that account, be considered as being the worse of the two.

27 It is thus quite clear that *laksanā* is a *dosa* and we accept it only if we are forced to do so as the last resort for saving ourselves from some greater evils. Hence it is that every case of *laksanā* will have to be justified by itself. It won't be right to think that because a word is used figuratively in one text therefore, it must be so everywhere. A word shall be understood as being figurative only in that case where the conditions for *laksanā* are satisfied. But in cases where they are not satisfied *laksanā* would be inadmissible. Thus we do accept the word *simha* as being *lāksanika* in a sentence like '*Simho Devadattah*', but we may never do it in texts like '*Simhamālabheta*'.⁵³ Another natural corollary of this, that we must note, is what has been very accurately though concisely stated in the words '*Guṇe tu anyāvakalpanā*'. Whenever *laksanā* becomes unavoidable it shall be adopted in the case of only such parts of sentences or words as are *guṇabhūta* i.e. of minor importance.

53 तस्मिन्नेव वाक्ये स तत्र सप्रयुक्त इति गम्यते प्रमाणान्तरेण, न शब्देन । यत्र तु तत् प्रमाणान्तरं नास्ति न तत्र वर्तितुमर्हति । यथा सिद्धो देवदत्त इति देवदत्त-वचने प्रमाणान्तरेण, न तु सिंहमालभेत इति यत्र । तत्र तु तत् प्रमाणान्तरं नास्ति [SB on II 2 22, p. 531]

CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS

1 Having fully dealt with the several problems connected with *S'abda* and *artha* in general we now take up the question of the classification of words into what we call the parts of speech. Here we find S'ABARA giving us mainly two classes of words only and to all appearances JAIMINI also has done the same.

2 In the very first few *sūtras* of the second chapter of his work JAIMINI defines *karma-s'abāh* and *nāmān*, but he does not seem to have defined any other class of words in so very plain terms. Apparently therefore, it would seem as if JAIMINI admitted only two classes of words viz *nāmān* and *karma-s'abdāh* which latter only means verbs. SABARA on the other hand, goes a step further. In illustrating the *nāmān* or *nāmikyah vibhaktayah* he gives us the inflections of the words *vikṣa* and *s'ukla*. This shows that according to S'ABARA the term *nāma*, as used by JAIMINI, stands for both the noun proper and also the adjective, the latter being included under the term *nāma* possibly on account of its taking the case terminations like the nouns. Besides these two, S'ABARA has also given us one more class of words namely the *sarvanāma* which JAIMINI does not seem to have expressly mentioned in his work, but which like the *vis'esana*, is evidently to be included under the term *nāmān* for the same reason for which adjectives are. Thus we may now say that according to JAIMINI and his commentator there are four different classes of words viz *nāma*, *sarvanāma*, *vis'esana*, and *ākhyāta* or the *karma-s'abda*. A mention is, no doubt made by S'ABARA in several places of the *upasargas*, the *pratyayas*, and the *karma-pravacanīyas*, but they are not considered by him as independent words, that is such as can be used by themselves unless they are combined with some other word or words. We leave them out of the question and take up only the four above-mentioned classes for consideration.

3 JAIMINI defines NĀMĀNI as words on the utterance of which the forms of the objects denoted by them become apprehended. In simpler terms this means that *nāmāni* are the names of some accomplished objects or things as opposed to *karma-s'abdāḥ* which denote something which is yet to be accomplished¹. In short the former are *bhūtārtha* while the latter are *bhvyārtha*. As already noted above this term *nāmāni*, and consequently the definition also, is to be applied to *viśeṣanas* or *guna-s'abdās* and *sarvanāmas* as well².

4 In a more restricted sense, however, the term *nāma* applies to *dravya-s'abdās* and *Jāti-s'abdās* only. The *nāmāni* again are not all of one type. Take the nouns *Devadatta* and *puruṣa*, for example. Though both these are nouns according to the definition given above, yet they differ from one another in this that while the application of the former is restricted to one person only that of the latter is universal. In ordinary language of grammar we show this distinction by giving them the names of the proper and the common noun respectively, [or SAMJÑĀ or DRAVYA-S'ABDAS and JĀTI S'ABDAS].

5 Here it is interesting to note the various circumstances which according to JAIMINI would necessitate the assumption that a particular word is a *karma-nāmadheya* or a proper noun denoting a particular act or sacrifice. These we are given in the fourth *pāda* of the first *adhyāya*. The first of these is stated in the *sūtra* 'API VĀ NĀMADHEYAM YADUTPATIĀN

1 भावार्थी कर्मशब्दा etc [MS II 11], येषामुत्पत्तौ स्वे प्रयोगे रूपो-
पलब्धिरस्तानि नामानि etc [II 13], येषां तूत्पत्तावर्थे स्वे प्रयोगो न विद्यते
तान्याख्यातानि etc [MS II 14]

2 S'abara clearly paraphrases word नामानि by द्रव्यगुणशब्दा ।
cf तानि नामानि ते द्रव्यगुणशब्दा । ईदृशो द्रव्यगुणशब्दानामर्थः । ते द्रव्यगुण-
शब्दा इति वक्तव्ये तानि नामानीति सूत्रितम् । अतो नामानीत्येषां पर्यायशब्दः ।
[SB, p 387 f]

3 MS II 13

APŪRVAM AVIDHĀYAKATVĀT' ⁴ A word which when first used is *apūrva* i.e. quite new and yet is not mandatory or *vidhāyaka*, is to be looked upon as *karma-nāmadheya* i.e. the name of a sacrifice. The word *udbhud* is an illustration in point. In texts like '*Udbhudā yajeta*' what are we to understand by the term *udbhud*? In paraphrase the text would run as '*Udbhudā yāgena istam bhāvayet*'. But how are we to explain the *sāmānādhikaranya* between *udbhudā* and *yāgena*? If *udbhud* were to mean some *karana* with which to perform the act then the *sāmānādhikaranya* can't be construed literally. This per force brings in *lakṣanā* and we shall have to paraphrase the text as '*Udbhudvatā yāgena istam bhāvayet*'. But a resort to *lakṣanā* is admissible only when there is *mukhyārtha-bādha*. Again as a rule *lakṣanā* is to be avoided in a mandatory text as far as possible. An attempt must, therefore, be made here to avoid *lakṣanā*. And it is for avoiding *lakṣanā* that we take *udbhud* as a proper noun i.e. the name of an act, an assumption which directly accounts for the *sāmānādhikaranya* of *udbhudā* with *yāgena*. Thus the main principle in such cases is that a word is to be taken as a *nāmadheya* or proper noun for avoiding the MATVARTHA-LAKṢANĀ in a mandatory text ⁵.

6 In the very next *sūtra* is given the second ground for taking a word as a *karma-nāmadheya*. The *sūtra* is '*Yasmin gunopadeśah pradhānatobhisambandhah*'. In texts like '*Citrāyā yajeta pasukāmah*' the word *citrā* may be looked upon as *guna-vidhi* or a *karma-nāmadheya*. But if it is accepted as containing a *guna-vidhi* there would arise the *vākyabheda doṣa*, for it is impossible that the fruit viz. *pasu*s and the *guna* viz. *citrā* be both enjoined simultaneously by one text alone. To avoid this *vākyabheda doṣa*, therefore, it is that the word *citrā* has to be accepted as a *karma-nāmadheya*. In this text we find

4 MS I 42

5 Read SB on MS I 42

that the word *pas'ukāmah* enjoins one accessory detail, and we have a doubt as to whether the word *citrā* contains a *guna-vidhū* or a *nāmadheya*. When such is the case we have to take the word as a *nāmadheya*, for if that also were to be construed as containing a *guna-vidhū* there would actually be two *vidhūs* in one sentence, which is inadmissible. Hence it is said that *the word in such cases is to be construed as a KARMA-NĀMADHEYA lest there shou'd arise the VĀKYABHEDA DOSA*

7 The third ground covers what is well-known as the TAT-PRAKHYA NYĀYA, so called after the *sūtra* 'TATPRAKHYAM CĀNYASĀSĪTRAM' given by JAIMINI.⁷ '*Agnihotram juhōti svar-gakāmah*' is a sacrificial text where there is a doubt regarding the exact nature of the word *agnihotā*. It is possible to explain it as a *guna-vidhū* or as a *nāmadheya*. In the former alternative now there is no danger of the *matvar halakṣanā*, or *vākyabheda* it is true. But the greatest drawback here is that by its very nature it can't be a *vidhū* at all. For this word speaks of or enjoins, according to this view, either *Agni* or the *devatā* of the *homā* or *āhavanīya agni* as the *dravya* for *homa*. But both these are enjoined by other sentences and this sentence is not expected to do that. Thus the point is that *whenever a particular word appears to convey some details which are already conveyed by some other word or words such a word shall be considered a karma-nāmadheya*

8 TADVYAPADEŚ'A gives us the last ground for the construction of a word as *karma-nāmadheya*.⁸ In texts like 'S'yene-nābhīcaran yajeta' how are we to construe words like

6 MS I 43 Also cf यस्मिन्गुणविधिर्नामधेयमिति सदिग्धे गुणोऽपर उपदिश्यते प्रधानेन कर्मणा तस्य संबन्धः । कर्मनामधेयमित्यर्थः । गुणविधौ हि सति वाक्यं भिद्येत । [SB, p 329]

7 MS I 44, and SB Thereon

8 तद्व्यपदेशः च । [MS I 45] This is the wellknown तद्व्यपदेशन्यायः.

s'yena ? The answer to this question is that we should construe them as *karma-nāmadheya*. But why is there no vidhi of *s'yena* as a *guna* ? Because of the *tadvyapadesa* i.e. because the *vāga* is described with the help of it i.e. with *s'yena* as the *upamāna*, so that *s'yena*, being *upamāna*, is external to the *yāga*, and cannot be a *guna* or *anga* of it the *tadvyapadesa* which clearly occurs in the sequel viz *Yathā vai s'yeno nīpatya ādatte evam ayam bhūātrvyam nīpatya ādatte nam abhicarati s'yena*'. Thus whenever we find TAD-VYAPADEŚ'SA, the word is to be construed as not a GUNAVIDHI but as KARMA-NĀMADHEYA.

9 Thus the main grounds justifying the construction of a word as *karma-nāmadheya* detailed upto now can be briefly stated in the words of *Laugākṣī Bhāskara*⁹ as follows — 'NĀMADHEYAIVAM CA NIMITTACATUSTAYĀT MAIVARTHALAKṢANĀBHAYĀT, VĀKYA BHEDABHAYĀT, TATPRAKHYAŚĀSIRĀT, TADVYAPADEŚĀC CA ITI'.

To these may be added one more viz that which is given by JAIMINI¹⁰ in connection with the expression *darvihoma*. This expression is a compound word with the word *homa* as principal member and with the word *darvi* as only an *upasarjana*. Thus the whole compound denotes a particular act and is therefore to be regarded as a *karma-nāmadheya*. From this it would appear that when a compound expression has for its principal member a word denoting an act, the expression is to be understood as a proper noun denoting a particular act.

10 Now we come to the next class of words, the *pronoun*. Though JAIMINI has little to say regarding this class of words, we find that S'ABARA has noticed its peculiar characteristic in

9 cf. अर्थमग्रह, p. 100 [NSP edition, 1915]

10 ददिहोमो यज्ञमिधान होमसयोगात् । [MS VIII 41], होम-शब्दोऽत्र श्रयते । तत्प्रधानध्वज्य समास । दर्विशब्द उपसर्जन, होमश्च कर्म । अथवा जुहुयादिति कर्मोच्यते । तेन समुच्चितो, यदेकया जुहुयादिति । तस्मात् कर्मनामधेय स्थित तावत् । [SB, p. 1626]

two places¹¹ in his *bhāṣya*. The *sarva-nāma*, he observes, *always refers to the thing or the object that is previously mentioned, and must, therefore, be construed in accordance with the PŪRVOKTA word*

11 The next class of words that we consider is the *vis'esana*. In this connection it must be noted that though neither JAIMINI nor S'ABARA have expressly drawn any distinction between the two classes of adjective, viz the qualitative and the quantitative, yet from the several observations made by them regarding this class of words in several places it would appear that they recognized both these distinct types of adjectives and that they were very well aware of the peculiar characteristics of each. JAIMINI in several places uses the words *guna* and *samkhyā* to denote the two types. Even S'ABARA repeatedly uses the terms GUNAŚABDA and SAMKHYĀŚABDA. This would show that both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA did recognize these as two different types of adjectives. Thus adjectives are of two kinds the qualitative or the GUNA VIŚESANAS, and the quantitative or the SAMKHYĀ VIŚESANAS.

12 About *vis'esanas* in general and the *guna-vis'esanas* in particular S'ABARA has given us a few general rules. That an adjective modifies the sense of its *vis'esya* is too obvious to be mentioned. But what is important to notice is that in some cases an adjective used with or without a VIŚESYA signifies a TAD GUNA YUKTA VIŚESYA. Thus, for example, in the sentence '*S'onam ānaya*' what is meant by the word *s'onam* is '*rakta-guna-sambaddham aśvam*'. Here the adjective *s'ona* does not merely convey the idea of *raktatva*, but rather it conveys the idea of *raktatva* as belonging to a horse¹². This in other words means that the word *s'ona*

11 Read प्रकृतवाचीनि सर्वनामानि भवन्ति । [SB, p 1332], सर्वनाम च पूर्वोक्तेन शब्देनैकवाक्यतां याति । [SB, p 1210]

12 शोणमानयेति रक्तगुणसंबद्धोऽश्वः शब्देनैवानयतो विधीयते इति न वाक्यभेदो भवति । [SB on MS II 227, p 558 f], Also read यत्र हि शुक्ल इति वा कृष्ण इति वा etc [SB on I 125, p 96 f], and SB on X 268, p 1858

here stands for *s'ona as'va*. In thus interpreting the above sentence there is no *vākya-bheda*, for all the words together convey one *artha*, and at the same time they are found to be *sākāṅkṣa* when separated, which shows that they form one sentence¹³. Thus from this peculiar characteristic of the *guṇa-viśeṣanas* we get one more important rule of interpretation viz that a GUNA-VIDHI PARA VĀKYA enjoining some GUNA-ĀCAKA pada alone without a VIŚEṢYA can be understood as laying down both the GUNA as well as the GUNIN without exposing itself to VĀKYA-BHEDA. But if the VIŚEṢYA is used along with the GUNA-ĀCAKA PADA then the construction is sure to be viciated by VĀKYA-BHEDA. Similar is the case with the text '*Revatīsu vāravanītyam sāma kṛtvā paśūkāmo yajeta*' which must be understood as enjoining the *vāga* as qualified by all these qualifying adjuncts. Here it may be argued that unless the *viśeṣana* is enjoined it is impossible to enjoin the *viśeṣya*, for, how can you know the *viśeṣya* unless the *viśeṣana* is known? And if such is the case then in such sentences as the one discussed above there is clear *vākya-bheda*, since in them both the *viśeṣana* as well as the *viśeṣya* will have thus to be understood as being enjoined. But this objection can be refuted by pointing out that these words all of them form only one sentence since they are *ekārtha*¹⁴ they serve only one purpose and are at the same time *vibhāga sākāṅkṣa*, so that the *vākya-bheda* *dṛṣṭa* pointed out by the objector is more apparent than real¹⁵.

13 एकार्थत्वं विभागे च साकाङ्क्षत्वमित्येकवाक्यत्वमुपपद्यते । [SB on II 2 27, p 587]

14 यदा गुणविधिपर वाक्य भवति तदा द्वान्या वाक्याभ्यां प्रयोजन गुणद्वय-विवाने । अथ क्षोणमानयेत्युच्येत तत्र गुणविधिपरेऽपि वाक्ये पर्यवसित एव गुणद्वय-विवानम् । अतएव विशिष्टद्रव्यस्य प्रतीतत्वात् । न भवत्येकवाक्यस्यातिभारः । सर्वत्र बहुभिः पर्दविशिष्ट एक एवोच्यते इत्येकार्थत्वम् । विभज्यमानानि च पदानि साकाङ्क्षणीत्येकवाक्यत्वम् । [SB on MS II 3 14, p 601]

15 ननु रेवती विधीयन्ते वारवन्तीयमपि । यदि नैव विधीयेरन् नैव तद्विशिष्टो याग प्रतीयेत । न ह्यविधाय विशेषण शक्यते विशिष्टो विधातुम् तस्माद् बहुषु विधीय-

S'ABARA (and even JAIMINI himself) here goes even a step further and declares that the word *ś'ona* is an adjective primarily denoting colour, no doubt, yet in the case under consideration it denotes colour in connection with the *as'va-jāti* alone and none else, so much so that it must be considered a *jāti-s'abda*? JAIMINI has answered this question in the *sutra* it may now be stated that an adjective when used alone usually denotes the TAD GUNA VIŚIŚYA VIŚESYA and in some cases sanctioned by usage it may even be taken to be a JATI-S'ABADA But when is such an adjective to be looked upon as a *jāti-s'abda*? JAIMINI has answered this question in the *sutra* 'GUNAD VĀ DRAVYA-SABDA ŚYĀD ASARVA VIŚAYATVĀT', where he declares that the word *gāyatrī* can't be understood to be a *samkhyā-s'abda* because it is not universal in its application, i.e., it does not apply to all things that are twenty-four in number. Thus he suggests that adjectives are universal in their application and will be used with reference to any and every *dravya* which is possessed of the particular quality or the quantity denoted by them. When, therefore, we find that an adjective used without any *vis'esa* is universal in its application we should take it as signifying a *tad-guna-vis'ista vis'esa*. When, on the other hand, such an adjective is found by usage to be restricted to this or that particular substance and is as such not universal in its application it will have

मानेषु नैकार्थ्यम् । अत्रोच्यते-अर्थ इति प्रयोजनमभिधीयते । यावन्ति पदान्येक प्रयोजनमभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति तावन्त्येक वाक्यम् । न चात्र बहूनि प्रयोजनानि । न ह्यत्रानेकस्याभिप्रेतस्यानेक पद विधायकमस्ति । रेवतीष्वित्येतत् न केवल रेवतीनां विधायक रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमिति । अत्रापि पदद्वये वारवन्तीयशब्दो द्वितीयान्तः । नास्मात् सबन्धोऽभिप्रेतो गम्यते । प्रातिपदिकार्थस्याश्वतिरेकात् । कुर्वेत्यपि करो-तिर्न सबन्धमात्रे पर्यवसितः परप्रयोजनसबन्धमाह । एवमिदं हस्तु यजतिर्न परार्थः । तस्मादेकमेव पदार्थानां प्रयोजनम् । तस्मादेकवाक्यत्वम् । [SB on II 2 27, p 559 f]

16 रूपान्यत्वात् जातिशब्दः । [MS VI 8 49], यथा शोण इति वर्ण-वचनोऽश्वजातिगतं वर्णं वदति नान्यम् । तस्माद्रूपान्यत्वात् वयोमात्रवचनं किन्तु जातिशब्दः स्यात् । जात्याश्रय वयो वदेत् । [SB, p 1521 f], Also cf शुणाद्वा द्रव्यशब्दः स्यादसर्वविषयत्वात् । [MS VIII 3 16]

to be looked as a *jāti-s'abda*¹⁷ And it is with the help of these adjectives that both the *vis'esana* as well as the *vis'esya* can be enjoined without incurring the *vākya-bheda* dosa

13 Another important rule noted by S'ABARA is that *where both VIS'ESYA as well as the VIS'ESANA are used the latter is more prominent than the former with the result that whatever KĀRYA is enjoined or mentioned in that connection will be referred to the VIS'ESYA and not to the VIS'ESANA* In the sentence '*Rājapurusaḥ pūjyate*', for example, the word *purusa* is the *vis'esya* which is modified by the qualifying adjunct *rājan* and the word *pūjyate* enjoins the act of doing honour But who is to be honoured? Certainly not the king, but the man This clearly shows the truth of the rule *VIS'ESYE KĀRYAM PRATĪYATE, NA VIS'ESANE* What the *vis'esana* does is only the function of qualifying the *vis'esya*, and when this is done the *vis'esana* retires The rule, therefore, is that a *vis'esana* when used along with its *vis'esya* serves the purpose of only qualifying the *vis'esya*, and is, therefore, always subservient to the latter It is the *vis'esya*, and not the *vis'esana*, that is prominently before the mind's eye, and it is the *vis'esya* again (and not the *vis'esana*) that is connected with the act enjoined or spoken of in that connection¹⁸

14 The next rule that we have to notice is in connection with words like *dandin* where the *vis'esana* is not only directly mentioned but is included in the *vis'esya* itself In the word *dandin* it is the *danda* that is the *vis'esana* and the whole word itself is the *vis'esya*, as is clear from the fact

17 cf MS VIII 3 16, and SB Thereon

18 विशेष्य च बुद्धौ सनिहित भवति, न विशेषणम् । तद्विशेष्य विशेष्य निवर्तते । कथं ज्ञायते । विशिष्टानुबन्धसयोगात् । यथा राजपुरुष पूज्य इत्युक्ते पुरुष पूज्यते, न राजा । [SB, p 1602], विशेष्ये एव कार्यं प्रतीयते न विशेषणे । यथा राजपुरुष आनीयतामित्युक्ते पुरुष आनीयते, न राजा । यथा मृष्टं भुङ्क्ते देवदत्त इत्युक्ते न शाक मूत्रे वा प्रनीयते । यदेव प्रधानं तत्प्रतीयते [SB, 5p77], न ह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्ट केचन प्रचेत्तुमर्हन्ति [SB, p 304], प्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्ट प्रतीयते । [SB p 318]

that we have to paraphrase the word *dandin* as *danda-vis'ista purusa*. Now in such cases what is the exact sense that is conveyed by these words? It may be argued that since it is impossible to speak of the *vis'esya* before speaking of the *vis'esana*, therefore, words like *dandin* must be understood as denoting the *vis'esana* first and the *vis'esya* afterwards. But such a view is not admissible. For our experience is that what is intended to be conveyed by the word *dandin* is never the *danda* but always the *danda-vis'ista purusa*. Thus the *vācārtha* of the word *dandin* must be accepted to be the *vis'esya* and not the *vis'esana*. This rule is expressly stated by S'ABARA in the words 'YAD VIŚESANAM NA TAC CHABDENOCYATE' ¹⁹

15 Before we now pass on to the other type of adjectives we must note *two more rules* about *vis'esanas* in general as we find them stated by S'ABARA. It is clear that *guna-vacana s'abdas* are dependent upon their *vis'esya* and that if the *vis'esya* is not actually mentioned it is implied in the *vis'esana* itself. From this it follows that the *vis'esana* will receive the *linga* and the *vacana* of its *vis'esya* only, so that in the case of a *guna-vacana s'abda* it is the *GUNA* alone that is important i.e. *VIVAKṢITA* and not the *VACANA* or the *LINGA* ²⁰. The next thing to note is that a *guna* being *amūrta* has no capacity for being directly connected with a verb

19 ग्रहिशेषण न तच्छब्देनोच्यते । तद्यथा—दण्डीति दण्डनिमित्तं पुरुषवचनं । दण्डोऽस्य निमित्तं, नामिधेयः । [SB on VI 11, p 1347], न तावद्विज्ञाशब्देन दण्डोऽभिधीयते । अथ च दण्डविशिष्टोऽवगम्यते । [SB on I 3 33, p 317]

20 गणवचनानां हि शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्ति इत्यविशेष्यमाणाग्रामपि व्यक्तौ यदवश्यं प्राप्तं लिङ्गं तदाश्रयभूतं गुणस्य भवति । अविविधसिद्धेऽपि तस्मिँल्लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशोऽनुवादो भवत्येव । यथा शुक्लं पुमान्, शुक्ला स्त्री, शुक्लं नपुंसकम् । शुक्ल एव, शुक्लौ द्वौ, शुक्ला बहव इति । शुक्लौ शाटीमानयेते यद्यपि शाट्यान्वयः न विधीयते, शुक्लमात्रविधित्ता भवति न तत्र लिङ्गेन विशेषणं क्रियते तथाप्यनुवादभूतं स्त्रीलिङ्गनिर्देशो भवत्येव । शुक्लामानयेति । अनुवादभूतत्वाच्च न वाक्यभेदो भविष्यति । [SB on IX 1 33, p 1675]

It can be so connected through the medium of some *dravya* only so that *where a DRAVYA and a GUNA are mentioned in connection with an act, the GUNA shall be taken as qualifying that DRAVYA only and thus being connected with the KRIYĀ, only through the medium of the accompanying DRAVYA, and not independently of it*²¹ But if no *DRAVYA* is mentioned at all side by side with the *GUNA* then the *VIŚEŚANA* shall imply a *DRAVYA* and through it alone shall be connected with the *KRIYĀ* -²² Lastly it may be noted that though the function of a *viśeśana* is to qualify its *viśeśya*, yet it won't be able to do it unless it has got the *samarthyā* to do so which it possesses only when it is *vivaksita*. An adjective that has no *SĀMARTHYA* cannot qualify its *VIŚEŚYA* in its functions i.e., the *viśeśana* is not definitive but only descriptive like the *linga* and *vacana* of a candidate or of 'graham' in the text '*Grahaṇi sammārsti*'²³

16 Now we come to the other type of *VIŚEŚANAS* the *SAMKHYĀ-VIŚEŚANAS*. And the first thing that we may notice regarding them is the discussion as to whether the word *gāyatrī* is a *samkhyā-śabda*, and the conclusion arrived at by *S'ABARA* in that connection. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* is favourable to the proposition of taking this word as a *samkhyā-śabda* several reasons. The foremost of these is the constant association of the word *gāyatrī* with the number twenty-

21 अथैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोरैककर्म्यान्नियमः स्यात् । [MS III 112] , यत्रार्थैकत्वं श्रूयते द्रव्यगुणयोस्तत्र द्रव्यगुणावेकस्मिन्पदार्थे नियम्येयाताम् । कुतः । ऐककर्म्यात् एककार्यत्वात् । एक हि कार्यं द्रव्यगुणयो श्रूयते कस्यसंबन्धः । कथमेतदवगम्यते । एकवाक्यत्वात् । [SB, p 691]

22 साक्षाद्दि द्रव्यं क्रियां प्रत्युपकरोति । गुणस्तु विशिनष्टि साधनम् ।..... । गुणस्य क्रियामभिनिर्वर्तयत् एतदेव सामर्थ्यं य साधनं विशिष्यात् । आकाङ्क्षति च क्रिया साधनविशेषणम् । चिन्भूतो हि गुणः साधनं लक्षयति । [SB on III 112, p 695]

23 अपि च विशेषणे सत्यपि यदि ददातिरविशिष्टं पदान्तरे सम्बध्यतेऽविशिष्टं एव कार्यं प्राप्नोति । प्रयुज्यमानमपि हि विशेषणमश्वत् न विशेष्यं विशिनष्टि । [SB on X 363, p 1898 f]

four²⁴ He also supports his view by pointing out the text 'Ye *hi dve gāyatriau sā ekā jagatī*' Now this statement can be understood only if the word *gāyatrī* signifies the number twenty-four, for we know that *jagatī* has forty-eight syllables which is equal to twice twenty-four But if the word *gāyatrī* means only a *rc*, then the above statement will carry no sense for *jagatī*, to be sure, does not contain two *rks*²⁵ It is, therefore, proper to hold that *gāyatrī* is a *samkhyā-s'abda* This view of the *Pūrva-pakṣin*, however, has been rejected both by JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA who first point out that there is no truth in arguing that the word *gāyatrī* is always associated with the number twenty-four Had it been so the word ought to have been found to be applicable to any group of twenty-four *dravyas* or things Such, however, is not our experience Thus there is *vyabhicāra*, and the concomitance, therefore, being uncertain can't establish the word *gāyatrī* as a *samkhyā-s'abda*²⁶ But the positive reason in support of the opposite i.e. the *siddhānta* view is found in the existence of a separate word to denote the number twenty-four Now as we have already seen above it is inadmissible, as far as possible, that one sense be conveyed by more than one word, for the simple reason that words after all are nothing but *saṃjñās* meant for the establishment of *vyavahāra*, and as one *saṃjñā* is enough for *vyavahāra-siddhi* there is no necessity for coining another *saṃ-*

24 अथ गायत्रीशब्द सख्यावाचक । कथं ज्ञायते अव्यतिरेकात् । चतुर्विंशतिसख्यामेष न व्यभिचरति । न क्वचिच्चतुर्विंशतिसख्यया विना दृष्ट । चतुर्विंशतिसख्यादीनामु त्रिष्टुजगतीषु न कदाचिद् भवति । [SB on अव्यतिरेकात् तदा-
द्वयत्वम् MS VIII 3 12, p 1619]

25 यदि सख्यायां गायत्रीशब्दस्ततो जगत्यां द्वे चतुर्विंशतिसख्ये इत्येतद्वचन-
मुपपद्यते । अथ ऋचस्ततो द्वे ऋचौ जगत्यां न स्त इत्येतद्वचनमनुपपन्नं स्यात् ।
[SB on MS VIII 3 13, p 1619]

26 गुणाद्वा द्रव्यशब्द स्यादसर्वविषयत्वात् [MS VIII 3 16], गुणाद्
द्रव्यशब्द स्यात् । चतुर्विंशत्यक्षरयुक्तस्य द्रव्यस्य वाचक । वस्मात् 'असर्वविषय-
त्वात् । यदि सख्याशब्द स्यात्सर्वस्मिन्चतुर्विंशतिसख्येये वर्तते गौयथादौ । न च वर्तते ।
मस्म न सख्याशब्द । [SB., p 1620]

jñā for the same thing²⁷ Finally it is pointed out that *gāyatrī* is an *autpattika nāmadheya* for *rk*, so that if it is used to convey any other sense but that of a *rk*, with which it is permanently connected, it can be done only by resorting to *lakṣanā* on the basis *parimānasāmānya*²⁸ Thus it is proved that *gāyatrī* is not a *samkhyā-s'abda* If we can generalise from this, we may state the rule by saying that 'a word which directly is not a numerical adjective shall not be looked upon as a *SAMKHYĀ ŚABDA* even though it might be found to be used as such in some cases'

17 Another rule to be remembered in connection with the *samkhyā-viśeṣaṇas* is what is well-known in the form of the maxim 'SAIE PAÑCĀŚ AT' JAIMINI in one of his *sūtras*²⁹ takes the numbers ten and twenty and discusses this very principle According to the *Pūrva-paśin* it is wrong to say that ten are included in twenty³⁰ What are ten and twenty? Well, they are *gunas* both of them, and we know that a *guna* can't subsist on another *guna* Hence logically it is impossible to have ten included in twenty But this objection can be refuted by pointing out that by 'ten being included in twenty' we do not mean that '*Vimśatisamkhyāyām das'a samkhyā vartate*' What we mean by the expression is only that in a group of twenty things

27 सत्यायाश्च शब्दवत्त्वात् [MS VIII 3 18], चतुर्विंशतिसंख्यावाचक शब्दोऽस्तिचतुर्विंशतिरिति । नास्मादपरेण गायत्रीशब्देनार्थः । मन्त्राया व्यवहारार्थत्वादेकेन व्यवहारसिद्धेः । [SB, p 1621].

28 उत्पत्तिनामधेयत्वाद्भवत्या पृथक्सतीषु स्यात् । [MS VIII 3 22], औत्पत्तिकमेतद्वचो नामधेयमित्येतदुक्तम् । अत उत्पत्तिनामधेयत्वाशोऽयं जगत्यवश्ये चतुर्विंशत्यन्तरे पदमन्वये प्रयोगः स भक्त्या विज्ञेयः । न होक्तव्यं शब्दस्यानेकार्थता मन्त्रा गती न्याय्या । अत एतदुक्तम् ये हि द्वे गायत्र्यौ सैका जगतीति । यथा यौद्वौ कौरवौ स एको बाहीक इति । [SB, p 1621 f]

29 न विंशतौ दशेति चेत् । [MS VIII 3 14]

30 न विंशतौ दशसंख्यास्ति । न संख्या संख्यानन्तरे वर्तते । गुणो हि संख्या । न च गुणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते । एवमष्टाचत्वारिंशत्संख्यायां चतुर्विंशतिसंख्या नास्ति । [SB, p 1619]

ten things do stand as a part of that group³¹ Thus though the numerals are used alone without the *samkhyeya*, they denote the *samkhyā* together with the *samkhyeya* and not merely the *samkhyā* Thus we can now state the rule that 'A larger number (i.e. a SAMUDĀYA of so many things) contains within itself 'a smaller number (i.e. 'a group of so many things) as forming its part'

18 One more important characteristic of the numeral adjectives emerges out of this discussion Just as a *guna-vis'esana* when used alone stands for the *tad-guna-vis'is'a vis'esya* similarly a SAMKHYĀ VIŚESANA also when used alone without any *samkhyeya* denotes not merely the *samkhyā* but the *samkhyā-vis'ista samkhyeya* And as a corollary to this rule it may further be stated that ASAMKHYĀ can be subservient to an act only by qualifying the SĀDHANA of the act³² Thus again just as a *guna-vis'esana* can't be connected with the *kārya* directly but only through the *vis'esya* similarly the SAMKHYĀ VIŚESANA also can be connected with the *kārya* only through the *samkhyeya* and not directly without any medium

19 From the objection detailed above against the maxim 'SĀTE PAÑCĀŚĀT' there emerges one more point for discussion regarding *samkhyā* The *Pūrva-paksin* has argued that GUNĀ GUNESU NA VARTANTE' and hence that 'Na vimś'atau daś'a' It would appear as if he is arguing that one number can't give scope to another number This in other words means that one number necessarily excludes another Such a view, however, would not be right For, if that were so then there would remain only one *samkhyā* viz. the *parārdha* which is the last or the highest number that

31 न ब्रूम सहस्राणां सख्या वर्तत इति । किं तर्हि । अष्टचत्वारिंशत्सख्या-परिच्छिन्नेष्वक्षरेष्ववयवभूते द्वे चतुर्दशसिख्ये, न तु द्वे ऋचाविति । [SB on VIII 3 15, p 1619]

32 साधन परिच्छिन्दन्ती सख्या कर्मव्यङ्गीभवति । [SB on VIII 3 15, p 1620]

we count But such is not the case, for we do find all *samkhyās* being mentioned in the texts Moreover we say 'Yasya das'a gāvas santi tasya dvau pañchakau gavam' Such statements will be impossible if the view of one number excluding another were right Hence the conclusion that we arrive at in this connection is that 'SAMKHYA SAMKHYĀNTARAM NA NIVARAYATI' ¹

20 Another peculiarity of the SAMKHYĀVĪŚESANA that is noticed by S'ABARA is that it is PRIHAKIA V-NIVĒŚINĪ i.e. it subsists on so many different or separate units, and it must be remembered that this it does simultaneously ¹ From this it necessarily follows that a *samkhyā* can subserve the purpose of several things belonging to a group simultaneously ² In fact it is dependent on these things, and unless and until they come up to the required number the *samkhyā* cannot serve them at all The general principle that can be deduced from these characteristics of *samkhyā* is that whenever a particular number is enjoined with reference to a particular thing—say the *prayāgas* for example—if that group consists of the required number of things then there is no difficulty, but if the group is deficient

33 न सख्या सख्यान्तर निवर्तयति । यदि निवर्तयेदेकसख्यमेव स्यात् । यद्य दश गावस्तस्य द्वौ पञ्चकौ गवामित्येतद्द्वयं न स्यात् । भवति च तत् । तस्मान्न सख्या सख्यान्तर निवर्तयति । [SB on VIII 3 15 p 1619], Also read न चोत्तरस्यां सख्यायामुपात्तायां पूर्वाः सख्या उपात्ता भवन्ति इति । यद्य एका च दश च शतं च सख्यं च परार्द्धं चेति सर्वसख्या अनुक्रामति । यदि चोत्तरस्यां सख्यायामुपात्तायां पूर्वा सख्या उपात्ता भवन्ति ऐकसख्यमेव स्यात् । एकैव परार्द्धसख्या भवेत् । सा हि सर्वस्य उत्तरा । यतस्त्वेकाया अनुक्रान्ता अतो विज्ञायते चोत्तरस्यां सख्यायामुपात्तायां पूर्वा सख्या उपात्ता भवन्तीति । [SB on VIII 3 15, p 1620]

34 एकस्मिन्पक्षौ पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी सख्या नावकल्पते । [SB on II 2 21, p 525], पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी हि चत्वारिंशति सख्या पृथक्त्वेनाहो भवतीति । [SB on VIII 3 4 35 p 1614]

35 तन्त्रेण तूपकरोति सख्या । [SB on V 3 2, p 1321], संख्यायाश्च पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् । [MS A 517]

ie if the things constituting that group do not come up to the required number, then the deficiency is to be made up by repeating some one or more individuals of the group. Here it must be remembered that in such cases the required number refers not to the individuals of that group separately, but to the group as a whole, and hence it is wrong to repeat each individual of the group as many times. Again the *prthaktva-niveśinī* of *samkhyā*, as far as possible, is not to be violated so that we have to take up all the individuals that are available. But if even after doing so some deficiency is found to remain, it is to be made up by repeating some individual or individuals of the group as many times as it is absolutely necessary for making up the required number.³⁶ Thus *PRTHAKTVA-NIVĒŚINĪVA* and *TANTRĒNA UPAKĀRITVA* may be remembered as two important characteristics belonging to the *SAMKHYĀ-VIŚESANAS* alone, while the other characteristics noted above, of course, they will be found to possess in common with the other type of *VIŚESANAS*. Regarding this characteristic of the *samkhyā-viśeṣaṇa* we may also note that it is on account of this characteristic only that a *SAMKHYĀ* is said to denote *KARMA-BHEDA*. This is clearly stated by *JAIMINI* in the sūtra 'PRTHAKTVA-NIVĒŚĀT SAMKHYAYĀ KARMA-BHEDAH SYĀT'³⁷

21 Another observation that may be made with regard to the numerical adjectives is that they can be used with reference to things forming a group on account of some common

36 अपि वा सर्वसंख्यत्वाद्विचारः प्रतीयेत । [MS V 3 2], सर्वसंख्या सख्या कल्प्येत । कुत । पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी हि सख्या असति पृथक्त्वेऽभ्यासेन कल्प्येत । वाक्यसंभवो भेदस्य तावत्त्येवाभ्यस्येत । यावत्ति संभवति तावत्ति पृथक्त्वनिवेश एव न्याय्य । तस्मात्संख्यायैव सख्या । यत्तु पृथक्ताज्यवदिति । न पृथक्त्वस्य न संभवति । नासौ पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी । न चैकस्य क्रियमाणा सर्वेषां तन्त्रेणोपकरोति । तस्मादवश्यं भेदव्या । तन्त्रेण तूपकरोति सख्या । इतरापेक्षा हि सा भवति ।

सख्यायाश्च पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् । [MS X 5 17], पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी हि सख्या । यथा अष्टौ घटा इति । अभ्यासेनापृथक्स्यात् । तस्मादागमेन पूरयितव्येति ।

37 MS II 2 21, and also cf SB on MS X 4 6

factor bringing them together, or they may also be used with reference to things which by themselves do not form a group as such, but simply make up the number when counted together³⁸. Thus, for example, when we say 'Four walls make a house', the walls referred to here must be the walls of one and the same house and not walls belonging to different houses. Thus here the walls form a group by themselves owing to the circumstance that they all belong to the same house. But when we say 'Four trees' the case is quite different. Here the trees may be any four trees and not necessarily belonging to any particular place or of any particular variety. Thus here the number four is used with reference to the number that is made up by the trees when counted together. The main point of difference between the two classes is this that in the former the *samkhyā* can't be used if the walls do not belong to one and the same house, while in the latter there is no such difficulty, for there the *samkhyā* refers merely to the number that is made up by the individuals when counted together. This rule is evolved in regard to the text '*Daśa yajñāyudhāni*' which is discussed by Ś'ABARA where the *Pūrva-pakṣin* points out that the number ten can be predicated with reference to those several things viz *sphya* and others only if they are construed or held as being the *āyudhas* of *yajña* in the literal

38 एकार्थसम्बन्धेनैव सख्यावकल्पते, नानार्थसम्बन्धात्मा नावकल्पते । [SB on IV 17, p 1201]. समाने हि कस्मिन्निदानीयमाणे सख्याव्यवहारो भवति [SB on IX 2 21, प्रथमार्णकम्, p 1710], विशेषे हि कस्मिन्निदानीयमाणे भवति, इतरथा हि सर्वत्र सर्वसख्या भवेयुः । [SB on IX 2 24, p 1712], लोके हि निर्विशेषिते सख्याशब्द उच्यते एकजातीयेष्वन्ये भवति । कुत । अन्यथा व्यवहारानुपपत्ते । अमत्येकस्मिन् जातिविशेषे सर्वत्रान्यं सह परादस्य निविष्टा । परादस्य चावान्तरमस्यापि व्यवहारः क्रियते । येषामेकेन केनचित्सम्बन्धस्तेषां तमेकं सम्बन्धिनमपेक्ष्य सख्या निविशते । स तत्रैव सम्बन्धी वक्तव्यः । प्रकृतो वा प्रतीत्यः । अर्थाद्वा य आशयेत स उपादेयः । ——— । यथा शतमान्या दीयतामिति एकजातीयानां शतं न भिन्नजातीयानाम् । [SB on शब्दार्थव्यापि लोकवत् MS X 3 44, p 1886], सख्यापि पाठमिमांसा भविष्यति [SB on IV 18, p 1201]

sense of the term, and hence we must interpret this text as a mandatory text enjoining the act of giving away the *das'a yajñāyudhas*. This argument of the *pūrva-paksin* is based on the assumption that 'EKĀRTHASAMBANDHENAIVA SAM-

KHYĀ AVAKALPATE NĀNĀRTHA-SAMBANDHĀI SĀ NĀVAKALPATE' But as has been already explained above such is not the invariable rule regarding the usage of SAMKHYĀ which can be used PĀTHĀBHIPRĀYEṆA also S'ABARA points out this and argues that it is, therefore, not necessary to connect the *āyudhas* with *yajña* in its literal sense. These are called *yajñāyudhas* only by *lakṣanā* owing to similarity. And the very fact that the word *yajñāyudha* in this text is *lakṣanika* again shows that the text has to be construed as an *anuvāda vākya* rather than a *vidhi*, for, as has been already noticed before, a text involving *lakṣanā* should, as far as possible, be construed as an *anuvāda* rather than a *vidhi* ³⁹

22 And the last thing to note about the *numerical adjective* is that it may denote *pariyāya* as well as *yau-gapadya*, as in *Catur-grhesu devadatto bhuktavān*' and *'Trisu nāgadantakesu ghato' vasthāpyah*'. The point to be remembered in this connection is that when a SAMKHYĀ ŚABDA is construed with the KRIYĀ we have to take it as denoting YAU GAPADYA, but if it is not construed with the KRIYĀ then it shall denote PARIYĀY or ABHYĀSA only ⁴⁰

39 cf. MS IV 1 7-8 and SB on the same

40 एव श्रूयते एक साम तृचे क्रियते इति । साम्नि क्रियमाणे निर्वर्त्तो गुणभूता त्रिसहस्रा ऋग्गता श्रूयते । तत्र यद्येकस्यामृच्युपक्रम्य तस्या चैतत्त्रिसमापये-
युर्न त्रिसहस्रया साधनमस्य परिच्छिन्द्य । एकसहस्रापरिच्छिन्नमस्य क्रियमाण
स्यात् । तत्र श्रुतिर्बाध्येत । तद्यथा घट त्रिषु नागदन्तकेषु स्थाप्यतामित्युक्ते
न्यासज्ज्य स्थाप्यते, न पर्यायेण । एवमिहापि दृष्टव्यम् । ननु पर्यायेऽप्येवजातीयक
शब्दो भवति । यथा त्रिषु कुलेषु देवदत्तो भुङ्क्ते इत्युक्ते न यौगपद्यमवगम्यते । पर्याये-
णापि भुञ्जाने भवत्येष वादः । एवमिहापि पर्यायेण प्राप्नोति । इति । अप्रोच्यते ।
न तु त्रिसहस्रा भुजि प्रत्युपदिश्यते । येनैतदेव भवति । तत्र कुलशब्देन सङ्गृह्यते ।
त्रिषु कुलेषु न द्वयोरेकस्मिन्वेति । यदा भुजिनिर्वृत्ति प्रत्युपदिश्यते तदा यौगपद्येनैव

23 The next class of words that we have now to think of is the verb or *ākhyāta*. In the beginning⁴¹ of the second *adhyāya* of his work, JAIMINI has defined the *ākhyāta* in the following words 'यस्यैवैषां पितृणां अर्थे स्ये प्रयोगो नाविद्यते तान्य ऋक्ष्यानि' Verbs, according to him, are those words which on their origination i.e., utterance have no object (to be connected with). Thus, in short, verbs are words which speak of something which is yet to be accomplished or *bhavya*. The same idea is generally expressed by saying that *ākhyātas* are *bhūgarthā* while *ākhyātas* are *bhavyārthā*. In other words *ākhyātas* have been described as 'words denoting an action in the process of becoming' (*bhāvārthāḥ karmasabdāḥ*).

24 In two places ŚĀBARA has discussed as to what is the main signification of the verb. According to the *Pūrvapakṣin* the main point that is denoted by the verb is the agent. He in his support quotes the view of the grammarians to the effect that the idea that is perceived from a word is as a whole conveyed by the *prakṛti* and the *pratyaya* together. He also notes another view of theirs according to which the signification of the *pratyaya* is either the agent or the object. Then he argues that since the *pratyaya* is the principal part of the verb *prakṛti* being only subordinate to it, it is but natural to conclude that *pratyavārtha* is *pradhāna* or that *kartā* or

भोजयितव्यः । इह तु त्रिसह्या क्रियते इत्यनेन सम्बध्यते । एव सति क्रियायां त्रिसह्या विहिता भवति । तत्र स्वपदगतस्य किञ्चिद् विधायकेन विहितं भवति । इतरथा ऋच सह्यायाश्च सम्बन्धस्य पदान्तरगतेन शब्देन भावकोच्येत । तत्रार्थनिप्रकर्षः स्यात् । तस्मात् सामनिबन्धि प्रति त्रिसह्योच्यते । [SB on IX 214, p 1706f] न ह्यत्र ऋक् सामनिर्वृत्त्यर्थमुदादीयत । तस्मान्न शक्यमिदं वक्तु सामनिर्वृत्त्यावनभूतामृच त्रिशब्द परिच्छेत्स्यतीति । साम स्तोत्रस्य गुणभूत निर्दिश्यते— । तत्र प्रत्येच न्ययेन गान प्राप्तम् । न सामनिर्वृत्त्या सम्बध्यते । किं तर्हि । ऋभे । तत्रान्वया नावकल्पत इत्यभ्यासो लक्ष्यते । तिसृष्वन्यसितस्य सामेति । यथा त्रिषु कुलेषु देवदत्तो भोजयितव्य इति । यदा त्रिसह्याकुलैः सम्बध्यते तदाभ्यासो लक्ष्यते । एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB on IX 220, p 1710]

karma is the main point in the signification of a verb. This in other words means that the *ĀKHYĀTA* IS *KARTR PRADHĀNA* (even *KARMA-PRADHĀNA*) *rather than KRIYĀ-PRADHĀNA*. This view, however, has been refuted by *S'abara* who points out that the views of the grammarians referred to by the *pūrva-paksin* are right in so far as they pertain to verbal nouns i.e. nouns of agency derived from roots such as *PĀCAKA* and *LĀĀKA*. In such cases it is that *kriyā* is subordinate to the *kartā*. But such is not the case with the verbs. For the verb, as we know, is *bhāva-pradhāna*. This *bhāvapradhānatva* of a verb can be proved in another way also. When we say *yajeta* there at once arise the *ākāṅksās* of the *sādhana*, the *sādhyā* and the *itīkartavyatā*. Had the verb been *kartr-pradhāna* no such *ākāṅksās* would arise, for we never ask *kena kumartham and katham* when we hear the word *pācaka*. Hence we must conclude that the verb is *BHĀVA-PRADHĀNA* and not *KARTRPRADHĀNA*. It is on the basis of this *bhāvapradhānatva* of the verb that *S'ABARA* and *JAIMINI* arrive at the conclusion that the *kāmva karmans* shall be repeated for *phalādhukya*.⁴² *S'ABARA* in his connection goes

42 इह यजेत जुहुयादिति धातुना स्थित्यते, प्रत्ययेन कर्ता । तयो कर्ता प्रधानभूत उपसर्जनभूता क्रिया । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं धृत । अनुप्रयोगश्च कर्तृ-प्राधान्य एव भवति । पचति देवदत्त इति । तेन होतुर्यष्टश्च फलमुच्यते । सकृद्धतेन सकृदिष्टेन वाऽसौ होता यष्टा च जात । तत्र द्वितीयादिप्रयोगोऽनर्थक स्यात् कृतार्थ-त्वाद्भवत् । ... । नात्र होतुर्यष्टश्च फलं ध्रूयते । यत् प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं धृत इति । तत् कर्मनिमित्तेषु नामपदेषु पाचको लावक इत्येवमादिषु । आख्याते तु न कर्ता क्रिया प्रधानतः । किं तर्हि । भावप्रधानमाख्यातम् । भावना च न कस्यचिच्छ्रूयते । भावनाप्रयुक्तस्य साधनग्रामस्यापेक्षितत्वाद्, यजेत केन किमर्थं कथमिति । कर्तृप्राधान्ये कार्याभावात् न साधनाकाङ्क्षा भवितव्यम् । न हि भवति पाचक केन कथं किमर्थमिति । भावना च फलस्योच्यते, न क्रियाया । यच्च भाव्यते तद् व्यक्तमसत् । सतो हि भावो नोपपद्यते । असत्त्वेत्कर्मणा भाव्यते पुन पुनरपि कर्मणा भावयिष्यते । कृषिवत् । तस्मात् फलार्थिना काम्य यावदिच्छमन्य-सितव्यम् । [SB on MS XI 122 and 24, p 2013 f]

even further and points out that the *Pūrvā-pakṣin* has misunderstood the views of the grammarians ¹¹ When from a verb we get the perception of an act to be performed, we may also get some about the *kartā* and other *kāraṇas*. But these latter we get from the *ākhyāta śabda* not directly but only by implication, and what is got at by implication is not *śabdārtha*. This shows that *bhūva* is the real *artha* of an *ākhyāta*, and not *kartā* or *karma*. But what do the grammarians mean when they declare '*Kartari śap*' or '*Karman yak*'? ŚĀBARA answers this question by pointing out that these *sūtras* are to be read in the light of another *sūtra* that we find there to the effect that singular number shall be used to denote one *padārtha*, dual for two and plural for many. The *sūtras* in question thus mean that if the *kartā* is one then the verb shall be in the singular number, and so on. It is thus that we must interpret the *sūtras* if at all we want to get at the right signification of the same. Thus ultimately we see that *ĀKHYĀTA IS BHŪVA PRADHĀNA* and not *KARTR-*

43 सर्वेधाख्यातेषु क्रियानुष्ठानं श्रूयते न कारकं किञ्चित् । कथमेतद्भ्रम्यते । प्रत्ययात् । यत् क्रियामनुष्ठेयां प्रतीतः । ननु कर्तरिमपि प्रतीयन्ति । सत्यं प्रतीयन्ति न तु शब्दात् । कुतस्तर्हि । अर्थात् । यदा क्रियानुष्ठातव्या विधीयते तदार्थात्कारकन्यापारो गम्यते । यथार्थाद्भ्रम्यते न स श्रोतः । यच्च न श्रोतो न स वाक्याद्भ्रम्यते । कथमसौ प्रकरणं बाधियते । आह । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो प्रत्ययार्थं सह द्वयस्याचार्योपदेक्षात्कर्ता शब्दार्थं कर्म चेत्यवगम्यते । कर्तरि शप् कर्मणि यगिति प्रत्ययार्थं कर्तरि कर्म च समामनन्त्याचार्या । तस्माच्छब्दार्थं कर्ता कर्म चेति । उच्यते । नाचार्यवचनात्सूत्रकारवचनाद्वा शब्दार्थो भवति । प्रत्ययादसौ गम्यते । अनुष्ठेया क्रिया प्रतीता सती कारकाणि प्रत्याययतीत्यवगतमेतत् । अपि च नैव कर्ता प्रत्ययार्थं कर्म वेत्याचार्या आहुः । ननु कर्तरि कर्मणि च लकारं श्रूयते । नासौ कर्मणि कर्तरि वा श्रूयते । किन्त्वेकस्मिन्नेव वचनं, द्वयोर्द्विवचनं, बहुषु बहुवचनमिति तत्रापरवचनम् । तत्रैवमभिमन्वन् क्रियते । एकस्मिन्कर्तरि द्वयोः कर्त्रो बहुषु कर्तृषु इति । एव कर्मण्येकवादि सवन्धः । तत्र नैव भवति, कर्तरि भवत्येकस्मिन्नेति । कथं तर्हि । कर्तव्येकस्मिन्नेव वचनं कर्तुरेकैव इत्यर्थः । एव द्वित्वे, बहुत्वे कर्मणि च । एव वर्ण्यमाने लौकिकन्यायानुगतं सूत्रार्थो वर्णितो भवति । सूत्राक्षराणि च न्यायानुगतानि भवन्ति etc [SP on III 4 13, pp 913 26]

the word *ubhaya* together with the word *havis* is to be connected with the word *ārti* or whether the word *ubhaya* goes with *havis* only and can't be connected with the word *ārti* at all. The *pūrva-pakṣin* takes the former view and argues as follows —(1) Since a *vis'istārtha* viz *ubhayam haviḥ* is spoken of in the vicinity of *ārti*, therefore, *ārti* shall be connected with the *vis'istārtha* only⁶⁶ (2) Again the word *ubhaya* may be said to be connected with the word *havis* which in its turn is connected with *ārti*. This also shows that *ārti* is qualified by both *ubhaya* as well as *havi*⁶⁷ (3) And the connection of the word *ubhaya* with the word *havis* can be established on the analogy of sentences like '*S'uklā gaur ānīyatām*' on hearing which what the servant does is the bringing of a *s'uklatva-vis'ista* go, a fact which shows that in that sentence the *ānayana kṛiyā* is connected with *s'uklatva* as well as *go*. Similarly in the case under consideration *ārti* may be connected with both *ubhaya* as well as *haviḥ*⁶⁸. All these arguments of the *pūrva-pakṣin*, however, are fallacious. As regards the first it may simply be pointed out that though *vis'istārtha* is *sannihita* to the *ārti*, it does not mean that the *avis'istārtha* is set aside or prevented from being connected with it. For what is there to show that the *avis'istārtha* also may not be the *numitta* of the *prāyaś'tta*?⁶⁹ The second argument is vitiated by the fact that

चक्षुर्मार्तिविशेष्ये । सा च हविषा विशिष्यते । तथा हविरार्तिसम्बन्धनिवृत्तिर्निमित्तपञ्चशरावस्थ । शक्नोति च श्रुत्या त सर्वन्व वक्तुम् । हविरुभयसम्बन्ध तु वाक्येन ब्रूयात् । दुर्बल च वाक्य श्रुते । [SB on VI 4 23, p 1439 f]

66 विशिष्टार्थस्य सन्निधानाद्विशिष्टोऽर्थ आर्तिसन्निहित । किं पुनः स्याद्यद्येव भवेत् । तत् उभयविशिष्टार्तिर्निमित्तमिति गम्यते । [SB, p 1441].

67 ननुभयशब्दो हविर्विशेष्यति । [SB, p 1441].

68 विशेषवचनात्तन्निवर्तको भविष्यति । यथा शुक्ला गौरानीयतामिति नैवमभिहिते कृष्णामानयन्ति । शुक्लशब्द एनां गो कृष्णादिभ्यो निवर्तयति । [SB, p 1441].

69 इदं तावद्देवानाम्प्रियं प्रष्टव्यं । यस्यापि विशिष्टोऽर्थ आर्तिसन्निहितो भवति किं तस्याविशिष्टो दृष्टै पराणुयते । किमतो यत्र पराणुयते । एतदतो भवति । अविशिष्टताप्यार्तिर्निमित्त पञ्चशरावस्थ भवति । [SB, p 1441].

it is impossible to establish any connection between even *ubhaya* and *haviḥ*. For the word *ubhaya* can't exclude the idea of *anvātara*, since such power is not given to words. And a word that does not serve to exclude others can't be said to be *viśeṣaka*⁷⁰. The attempt to support the view on the analogy of sentences like '*S'uklā gaur ānīvatām*' is equally unsatisfactory, for the illustration stands on quite a different footing. There the main point of the order or injunction is the bringing or *ānayana*. If it had been otherwise i.e. if the main point had been the *gauh* i.e., an individual belonging to class of *go*, then certainly the word *s'ukla* would not have been able to qualify it⁷¹. Thus the principle that emerges out of the whole discussion is that when the *ākhyārtha* is principal the sentence must be understood as yielding the sense of the *ākhyāta* as characterised by the several qualifying adjuncts, but when the *ākhyātārtha* is only subordinate the accompanying factors in the sentence can't be connected with it, so that only the *ākhyātārtha* will be understood as being enjoined⁷².

33 The rule thus deduced from the above discussion is also substantiated by S'ABARA in a different manner⁷³. The *ākartī* or *guna* are spoken of only for being connected with

70 हवि शब्देनासबध्यमानो न शक्नोति विशेषेष्टम् । आनन्तर्यासम्भन्त्यते तर्हि । तथापि न समर्थः । न ह्यमौ निवृत्ति प्रयोजयति । [SB p 1441]

71 विषम उपन्यासः । न तत्र गवाकृत्या द्रव्य लक्षयित्वा तस्यानयनमुच्यते । तत्रापि चेदेवमभिव्यक्तं नेवैनां शुक्लशब्दो व्यशेद्यतः । उभयविशेषणविशिष्टं तु तत्रानयनं प्रधानमुच्यते । इह पुनरातिहविष्ट्वलक्षिते द्रव्ये पञ्चशरावः । [SB p 1441]

72 प्रधानभूते आख्यातार्थे सहस्य विशेषणं भवति परार्थे पुनर्वियुज्येति [SB, p 1441]

73 प्रधानभूते आकृतिगुणो वा तत्सबधार्थमुच्यते । तयोभयविशेषणविशिष्टं एकस्माद्वाक्योदवगम्यते । तद्विशिष्टं च कृत्वा कृती भवति । अन्यतरविशिष्टं कुर्वन्नश्रुतं कुर्यान् । यत्र पुनराकृतिलक्षिते द्रव्ये आख्यातार्थं कीर्त्यते तत्र सर्वेष्वेव तज्जातीयेष्वतो भवति । न तत्रैकस्मिन्निवृत्ते कृती मन्येत । अपरस्मिन्नपि ह्याकृतिलक्षिते तदुक्तमेव । तत्रोक्तमप्रतिषिद्धं किमिति न कियेत । आख्यातार्थं पुनः प्रधाने न तस्याकृतिलक्षितेन संबन्धः । तत्र तदाकृतिकान्तरेऽनुपसह्यमाणेऽपि कृतमेव प्रधानम् । सगुणं च

the *ākhyātārtha* when it is *pradhāna*, so much so that on listening to such texts one gets the idea of *ubhaya-viśeṣana-viśīṣṭa ākhyātārtha*, and acts accordingly. But if he brings into action only the *anyatara-viśīṣṭa ākhyātārtha* he would be doing something that is not enjoined by *s'ruti*.
 *When, however, the *ākhyātārtha* is spoken of with reference to a *dravya* mentioned by a *jāti-s'abda* i.e. when the *ākhyātārtha* is not *pradhāna*, it is but natural that it should apply to all *dravyas* of that class so much so that one can't feel satisfied by performing the act with reference to any one or the other of the *dravyas* characterised by that *ākṛti*. Thus it is that we arrive at the truth of the rule 'PRADHĀNABHŪTE ĀKHYĀTARTHE SAMHATYA VIŚEṢNAM BHAVATI PARĀRTHE PUNAR VIYUJYA ITI'

34 Having thus seen what JAIMINI and S'ABARA have to say regarding the main parts of speech we may now take up two more classes of words (not parts of speech in the real sense of the term), the TADDHITA and the SAMĀSA. And the first thing that we have to note about the former is that a TADDHITĀNTA formation is possible in the case of those words only that are SAMĀRTHA. The same idea is negatively put by saying that the TADDHITA formation is not possible in the case of words which are SĀPĒKŚĀ or SĀKĀNKSĀ. There is a discussion regarding the word *māhendra*. It is clear that this is a *taddhita* formation from the word *mahendra*. But the real question is whether this word *mahendra* is an independent word or whether it is only a *samāsa* constituted of the two members *mahat* and *Indra*. The *pūrva-paksin* would like to take it as only a *samāsa* and thus take the word *māhendra* as applying to all rks or things which are sacred to not *mahendra* but to *Indra* only, so that according to him *Indra* and *Mahendra* are not to be looked upon as two separate *devatās*. But the *siddhāntin* points out that

प्रधान भवति । न किञ्चिच्छ्रुतं द्वीयेतेति । तस्मात्तत्र विशेषण युक्तम् । न सिद्धं ॥
 इह हि हविराहुतिवस्य द्रव्यस्यात्मीं पञ्चशराव इत्युक्तम् । तत्र शक्यं विशेषणवचनेन
 प्रतिषेधवाचकेन निवर्तयितुम् । [SB, p 144 f]

acceptance of such a view would render the epithet *mahat* nugatory, and also would lead us to accept the *ādumattva* of the *Veda*. He, therefore, holds that *Mahendra* must be accepted as being different from *Indra*. Thus he proves on the strength of grammar also by pointing out the above-mentioned characteristic of *taddhita* formation. According to this rule the base of a *taddhita* formation must be an independent word and should have no *ākāṅksā* or *apekṣā* for any other word or *pratyaya*. Now if the *pūrva-pakṣa* view of the word *Mahendra* is accepted it will be found that the word *Indra* is rendered *sāpekṣa* for the term *mahat* and hence it is impossible that it should take the *taddhita* affix also. But why should this be so? What is wrong if we make the *taddhita* formation out of a *sāpekṣa* word? This question can be easily answered by pointing out how in such cases one and the same word is made to serve two different purposes which are quite incompatible with each other. When it is to be connected with the word *mahat* the word *Indra* is obviously an *anuvāda* being something *prasiddha*. But when it is to be connected with the *taddhita* affix the same word has to be accepted as being something which is not *prasiddha* and hence enjoined. But how can one and the same word signify simultaneously a thing as being *prasiddha* as well as *aprasiddha*? It is not possible to construe a word as being *vihitā* and at the same time *avihitā* i.e. of the nature of an *anuvāda* in one and the same *prayoga*. This shows the futility of any attempt to prove that *TADDHITA* formations can be had from *SĀPEKṢA* words also. From this it follows that the base of a *TADDHITA* formation must be looked upon as an independent word, and that when a duty is enjoined by the *TADDHITĀNIA* S'ABDA the entire base of the *TADDHITĀNIA* form must be accepted as being the duty intended to be enjoined, and that no attempt should be made to split up the base into any further component parts and take any section of the same as the duty enjoined⁷⁴.

74 इन्द्रोऽस्य ब्रह्मस्य देवनेति तद्वित्तमयोगो विज्ञास्यते । नच महत्त्वमपेक्षमाणस्य तद्वित्तमयोग उपपद्यते । तद्वित्तमयोगापेक्षस्य वा महत्त्वमवबन्धात् समासकल्पना ।

35* As a corollary to this rule discussed above we have to note the other fact viz that *the base of a TADDHITĀNTA formation can have no VIS'ESANA* This is naturally so, for if it is to have any *vis'esana* it would necessarily be *sākāṅka* or *sāpekṣa*, and would as such have no capacity to be the • base of any *taddhita* formation ⁷⁵

36 The next point we note about the base of a *taddhita* formation is that *its number is not directly conveyed to us by any portion thereof Its number is indefinite, and has to be fixed on the strength of VĀKYAS'ESA alone* ⁷⁶

37 We have already seen that a *taddhita* form is used for mentioning or even enjoining the *devatā* This can

न च तद्धितार्थे वृत्तस्य महत्त्वसम्बन्धः । न च समासार्थे वृत्तस्य तद्धितसम्बन्धः । न च तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे समासार्थे वृत्तिरिष्यते एतस्मिन्नेव तद्धितार्थे । न चायमिन्द्रशब्दोऽवि-
दितवत्त्वार्थं तद्धितार्थेन सम्बध्यते, विहितवच्च परार्थं महत्त्वेन सम्बद्धमनूयेत । विस्पष्ट-
ध्यायमन्योऽप्यो महेन्द्रो भवति । महानिन्द्रो भवतीति महेन्द्रः । अन्यध्वेन्द्रो हविषो
देवता भवतीति सकृदुच्चारणे नोभयं शक्येत । तस्मान्नेन्द्रो देवता महत्त्वविशिष्टः ।
महेन्द्रात्तु तद्धित उत्पन्नः । तस्मात्प्रातिपदिकमर्थवदिति गम्यते । न स्ववयवसम्बन्धेन ।
तस्माद्देवतान्तरमिन्द्रान्महेन्द्रः । अतः पर्युदसितव्य एष पक्षः । यदप्युच्यते इन्द्रस्य
वृत्रवधोत्तरकालं महेन्द्रत्वं दर्शयति, महान्वायमभूद्यो वृत्तमवधीदिति । तथा वेदस्था-
दिमत्तादौष प्रसज्येत । अतोऽन्य इन्द्रो महेन्द्रात् । [SB on II 1 16, pp
417 419], Also cf न हि सापेक्षं परनीवच्छब्दः । तद्धितार्थेन सलक्ष्यते । तस्मा-
त्केवलं परनीवान्देवतेति । [SB on MS III 2 39, p 796], न ह्यप्रशब्दादयं
तद्धित उत्पन्नः । समर्थानां हि तद्धित उत्पद्यते । न चाप्रशब्दस्य सामर्थ्यमस्ति ।
[SB on VI 1 9, p 1359] तद्धितं साकाङ्क्षमनोरपद्यत इति । आप्तये इत्येन्द्राग्नौ
न शक्यते वदितुम् । [SB on V 4 21, p 1342]

75 अथानिर्बुधन्वान् कियते तत्र बुधन्वानमिर्देवता स्यात् । तत्राग्नेय इति
सापेक्षे तद्धितनिर्देशो न स्यात् । न हि सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्भवति । न खल्वपि वृत्तस्य
विशेषणं प्रयुज्यते । तस्मान्नाग्नेर्विशेषणं बुधन्वता । [SB on X 4 31, p 1932]

76 तद्धितेनायं निर्देशः सौर्यमिति । तथाग्नेयमिति । तत्र वचनव्यक्तितर्क-
ज्ञायते किं सूर्यो देवता अस्य, उत सूर्यो च सूर्याश्चेति । तथाग्नेयेऽपि । स्याद् व्यव-
स्थितिरैकत्वस्य । कुतः । लिङ्गभावात् । लिङ्गगमनास्ति । किम् । वाक्यशेषे एकत्वं
भूयते । [SB on VIII 1 29 30, p 1600]

also be done by the dative⁷⁷ But of these two ways of *devatā-nurdes'a* or *devatā-vidhāna* the former is more direct and hence stronger than the latter In a *taddhita* formation we find that the *devatā* is conveyed by *s'rutī*, while in a *caturthī-samyoga* it is conveyed by *vākya* And *s'rutī* being stronger than *vākya* it is but natural that a *taddhita* form is stronger than *caturthī-samyoga* so far as *devatā-nurdes'a* or *devatā-vidhāna* is concerned⁷⁸ But is this *devatā*, conveyed by the *taddhita* form, enjoined or is it merely mentioned? The question in other words is whether the base of a *taddhita* form should be looked upon as being *pradhāna* and hence *vihita*, or *apradhāna* and hence only an *anuvāda*? Usage shows that both these alternatives are possible If the *devatā* is intended to be enjoined then the base may be *pradhāna*, but if the *devatā* is already known and a *mantra* is to be specified then the base would be *apradhāna*⁷⁹ Thus the *taddhita* formation may contain *devatā-vidhāna* or it may be merely *devatā-nurdes'a* or

77 तद्धितनिर्देशेन वा देवता चोद्यते चतुर्थीनिर्देशेन वा । तत्र हि तादर्थ्यं गम्यते । तादर्थ्यं च सति देवता भवति । न देवता नाम ज्ञान्या काचित् । द्वितीया द्विषिततमे कारके भवति । [SB on X 226, p 1741] तद्धितेन वा देवता-सम्योगो विज्ञायते चतुर्थ्यन्तेन वा । न चेद् तद्धितो न चतुर्थी । अतो न देवताविधि [SB on IX 114, p 1910], तद्धितशब्देन चतुर्थ्या वा सयुक्तस्य देवतार्थस्य वाक्यादभिप्रेतता गम्यते । फलसयोगस्तु वाक्यादेव यज्ञार्थस्य । [SB on IX 19, p 1652], किन्तु तद्धितनिर्देशोऽयम् । तत्र देवतया मन्त्रो लक्ष्यते [SB on III 221]

78 इह विवेका देवानां देवतात्वं क्वचिच्छ्रुत्या क्वचिद्वाक्येन । तद्धितनिर्देशे श्रुत्या चतुर्थीनिर्देशे वाक्येन । यत्र श्रुत्या देवतात्वं तत्राभिप्रेतया सहैकवाक्यत्वम् । यत्र चतुर्थी तत्र बाजिनेन । तदिह देवतात्वं प्रति श्रुतिवाक्ययोर्विरोधः । विरोधे च श्रुति-र्बलीयसी । इत्याभिप्रायाक्ये देवतात्वं विवेका देवानां न बाजिनवाक्ये इत्यभ्यवस्यते । [SB on II 223, p 533 f]

79 बहुक्तम् - गुणभूतदेवतावचनेन तद्धितशब्देन निर्देश इति । प्रधानभूत-देवताकेनाप्येवञ्जातीयकेन सबन्धे विधीयमाने निर्देशो भवति । [SB on X 123, p 1815], किन्तु तद्धितनिर्देशोऽयम् । तत्र देवतया मन्त्रो लक्ष्यते । [SB on III 221, p 776]

anuvāda for specifying a *mantra*. Thus it is evident that a TADDHITĀNTA denotes TĀDARTHYA or SAMBANDHA. But it must be noted that the *sambandha* that is thus conveyed by the TADDHITĀNTA need not necessarily be KṚTSNA-SAMBANDHA. A TADDHITĀNTA formation can be used to denote even the AKṚTSNA-SAMBANDHA.⁸⁰

38 From the capacity of a *taddhitānta* formation to denote *sambandha* there springs up another peculiarity about the *taddhitas*. It is obvious that *sambandha* can't exist in the absence of the *sambandhins*. Thus it would appear that unless the *sambandhins* are enjoined it is impossible to enjoin the *sambandha* between them. This, in other words, means that wherever the *sambandha* is enjoined we must take the *sambandhins* also as being enjoined, for in the absence of these latter the *sambandha-vidhāna* is bound to be *anarhaka*. Thus if a TADDHITA formation is used for the purposes of an injunction and thus lays down the SAMBANDHA, it automatically follows that before it can lay down the SAMBANDHA it must also lay down the SAMBANDHINS. This in other words means, that a *taddhitānta* can lay down simultaneously both the *sambandha* and the *sambandhins*. Thus with the help of a *taddhitas'abda* it is possible to lay down both the *devatā* as well as *karma* simultaneously without incurring the *vākya-bheda dosa*.⁸¹ It must however, be remembered here that such a construction should as far as possible be

80 यत्कृत्माग्नेय इविरिति वचनात्सर्वं होतव्यमिति गम्यते । तत्रानुमानिको होमसम्बन्धः । इह तु प्रत्यक्षो द्विरवदाने । अपि चाकृत्स्नसम्बन्धेऽपि तद्वितस्योपपत्तिः । ततो ग्रहीतव्यम् । इति । [SB on III 4 40, p 977]

81 तच्च कर्म गुणाश्च विधीयेरन् । अविभक्ता हि ते कर्मणो विधानार्थं तद्वितान्ते शब्दे । तत्र ह्यष्टाकपालस्याग्नेयता विधीयते । स एष एवमाग्नेयो भवति यद्यग्नेयं सकल्प्य दीयते । तेनायमनेन प्रकारेण यागो विहितो भवति । स एव विधीयमानो न शक्योऽग्निमष्टाकपालावविधाय विधातुम् । सम्बन्धो हि विधीयमानो न शक्यते सम्बन्धनावविधाय विहित इति वक्तुम् । तस्माद् गुणविषयः । [SB on I 49, p 340 f]

avoided, because after all it does suffer from the defect of *gaurava* at any rate

39 Coming now to SAMĀSA we may note first of all four or five general observations that S'ABARA has to make on compounds in general. Like the *taddhita* formations a SAMĀSA also is not allowable if its constituent members are SĀKĀNKSĀ or SADVITĪYA⁸². The reason for this is obvious. As a general rule a word is to be connected with only one word at a time. Now if a member of a *samāsa* is *sākānksa* or *sadvitīya* it will naturally have to be connected with the other word which accompanies it or for which it has got the *ākānksā*. And if by being thus connected it becomes *nirākānksa* there is no reason why it should be connected with any other word, nay it is impossible to connect it with any other word or expression. If, on the other hand, it is not connected with the word for which it is *sākānksa* and is only compounded with some other word, it is bound to remain *sākānksa* and hence become *anarthaka*, for, as we know, what is *sākānksa* is *apūurna* and hence ANARTHAKA. This very rule is positively stated by saying that only SMARTHĀ PADAS can combine into a SAMĀSA, and if it is asked as to what is meant by *padas* being *samartha* S'ABARA is ready with his reply that *padas* may be said to be *samartha* if they are related to one another as *vis'esana* and *vis'esya*⁸³. This

82 यथैव च साकाक्षस्य तद्वितार्थेनासम्बन्ध, एव समास्तेऽपि इन्द्रर्पितस्येति साकाक्षस्य नोपपद्यते । [SB on III 2 41, p 800], अत्रापि हि गायत्रीच्छन्दस इति सद्विशेषणस्य समासो नावकल्पते । [SB p 801], तत्र हि तद्वितो निरपेक्षस्य भवति, न सद्वितीयस्यैन्द्रर्पीत इति । समासोऽपि निरपेक्षस्य न सद्वितीयस्य । [SB on III 3 41, p 835], न चात्र पर्युदासोऽवकल्पते । न हि नशब्दस्य जटिल्यवाग्वा यवेधुह्यवाग्वा सामर्थ्यमस्ति । आहुतिशब्देन समस्तत्वात् । [SB on X 87, p 2064]

83 अपे चासस्यां प्रयाणामडानामेकस्यां साधारण्यां क्रियायामेकमिन्वा साधारणे गुणे त्रिशब्दस्याद्गशब्देन विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धाभावात् सामर्थ्यं न विद्यते । यानि त्रीण्यडमानि त्रित्वसम्बद्धानि तानि त्र्यड्यानीति । असति विशेषे व्यवहाराभावात् साकाक्षं भवति । [SB on X 7 11, p 2027], नन त्रिसंख्या ऋक्पादेनैवात्र

rule,* however, it must be noted, does not hold good in the case of the DVANDVA SAMĀSA where evidently there is no question of *vis'eyana-vis'esyā-bhāva* subsisting between the various constituent members. It will also be noted below that the DVANDVA compound is possible to have even from PADAS that are SAKĀNKSA since all its members are PRA-DHĀNA, and have as such capacity to combine into a SAMĀSA with other members inspite of SĀKĀNKSATVA. As a natural corollary of what has gone before may now be noticed another fact viz that TADDHITA formation and SAMĀSA both of them may not be admitted in one and the same expression.⁹⁴ This means that though the word *māhendra* has to be admitted as a *taddhita* formation from the base *mahendra*, yet this latter can't, however, be admitted as a *samāsa*. *Māhendra*, as the base of a *taddhita* formation, must be taken as an independent word as has been already shown above. One more general observation that Ś'ABARA has to make in this connection is that as with *taddhita* formation so with a SAMĀSA it is possible to make ANEKA-VIDHĀNA. Ordinarily ANEKA-GUṆA-VIDHĀNA is open to VĀKYA-BHEDA DOSA. But if a compound expression is used for doing it, it is not impossible to make ANEKA GUṆA VIDHĀNA and at the same time be free from the VĀKYA BHEDA DOSA.⁹⁵

40 We may here note how Ś'ABARA refers to the views of PĀNINI as well as KĀTYĀYANA on the *nañ-samāsa*. He

सबध्यते । अन्यथा अमति सामर्थ्ये समास एव न स्यात् । इति । [SB on IX 2 14 p 1707], समर्थानां हि पदानां समासो भवति । सामर्थ्यं च भवति विशेषण-विशेष्यभावे । असाधारणं च भवति विशेषणम् । [SB on II 3 1, p 572]

84 न चास्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे समासार्थे वृत्तिरिष्यत एतस्मिन्नेव तद्धितार्थे । [SB, p 419]

85 न मन्तव्यमनेकगुणविधानादविवक्षितं प्राग्भ्यमिति । अप्राप्तत्वात्प्रथमस्य नानुवादः । विधिरिव । समासेन च विदधतो नानेकगुणविधानं दुष्करम् । [SB on III 5 38, p 1011], शताग्निष्टोममित्यपि समास उभयविशेषणविशिष्टं गणमाह । स एक एवार्थः । यथा लोहितोष्णीषा ऋत्विजं प्रचरन्तीति । [SB on VIII 3 9, p 1617]

makes the *pūrvapakṣin* take his stand on the view of *kātyāyana* that *samāsa* is *ntya* and that the laying down of the option with reference to it is futile. Then in reply he points out that PĀNINI the great, has laid down the option and adds that PĀNINI being a *sadvādin* is more authentic than KĀTYĀYANA who is an *asadvādin*. *Sadvādin* is one who maintains the existence of a thing, while *asadvādin* is one who maintains the non-existence of a thing. Of these the *asadvādin* is relatively unreliable, because it is quite possible that he may not have noticed what actually exists. This, in other words, means that a positive statement is more reliable than a negative one. These views of PĀNINI and KĀTYĀYANA have been referred to by S'ABARA in two places where he has dealt with them in almost the same way. It is remarkable in this connection that he does not care to refer to the views of PATAÑJALIN on this point at all.⁵⁶

41 Now we come to the various kinds of *samāsas* in particular, and we note that S'ABARA has to say something about almost every variety of compounds except the *avyayībhāva*

86 किं द्वन्द्वगर्भो बहुव्रीहिरथ बृहद्रथन्तरे सामनी यस्येति, उतानेवपदो बहुव्रीहि बृहदस्य रथन्तरमस्येति ।—द्वन्द्वगर्भो बहुव्रीहिति । कुत । बृहद्रथन्तरशब्दयोरानन्तर्यात् । वृत्तिपक्षस्याश्रितत्वात् । वृत्तिपक्षे च समासस्य नित्यत्वम् । द्वन्द्वे च स्वार्थभिधानाच्छ्रुत्यनुग्रहोऽन्तरङ्गता च । इतरथा चोभयमपि बाधेते । अतो द्वन्द्वगर्भो बहुव्रीहि । ———। अपि च वृत्तिपक्षाभये सुतरां द्वन्द्वपदेनासामर्थ्यम् । न चैव नित्यो गो वृत्तिपक्षे नित्य समास इति । विभाषा हि स्म भगवान्पाणि- निरधीते । सामशब्दश्रुतिश्च बृहद्रथन्तरयोर्लक्षणतामाचष्टे । तस्मादसमस्ते सामनी स्यातामिति । [SB on X 6, p 1988 ff], आह । नन्वनुयाजसम्बन्धे नशब्दस्य समास प्राप्नोति । नित्यो ह्यस्य न शब्दस्य सुबन्तसम्बन्धेन समास इति वार्तिककारो भगवान्कात्यायनो मन्यते स्म । वाचचनानर्थक्यं च स्वभावसिद्धत्वादिति । नेति भगवान्पाणिनिः । स हि विभाषेति प्रकृत्येदं समासमुक्तवान् । सद्वादित्वाच्च पाणिनेर्वचनप्रमाणमसद्वादित्वाच्च कात्यायनस्य । असद्वादी हि विद्यमानमाश्रयुपलब्धं ब्रूयात् । तस्मात्पर्युदास इति । [SB on X 84, p 2060 f]

42* Of the TATPURUSA SAMĀSA he has to say something about the NAÑTATPURUSA as well as the VIBHAKTI-TATPURUSA, in addition to the general observations that he has to make about the *tatpurusa* as such. About the NAÑTATPURUSA he has noted that such a *samāsa* shall be ĀDYUDĀṬA so that if a word is not *ādyudāṭta* it can't be admitted as a *nañ-samāsa* though there is a possibility of its being understood like one. It is on this score that the word *ahīna* is not admitted by him as a *nañ-samāsa*⁸⁷. As for the expression *sthānvāhuta* he dissolves as a *sasthi-tatpurusa samāsa* and declares that it can't be dissolved as a *saptamī-tatpurusa* since it is against all rules to do so⁸⁸. Discussing the word *darvi-homa* he notices that in such *samāsas* the first member is *upasarjana* while the second is *pradhāna*. Hence it is that texts, where such compounds occur, must be so construed as to keep in with the *prādhānya* of their second member. Hence words like *darvi-homa*, i.e., words having a word signifying an act for the second member, have to be accepted as *nāmadheya śabdāḥ*,⁸⁹ while in expressions like *ratha-ghosa** words like *ratha* have to be understood as being subservient to words like *ghosa* i.e., to the second member of the compound which alone shall be connected with *kriyā* spoken of in connection with the compound expression⁹⁰.

43 It is while discussing the word *ratha-ghosa* that ŚĀBARA has made some observations regarding the BALĀ-

87 ननु ज्योतिष्टोमे एव गौणोऽहीनः । नेत्युच्यते । न हि मुख्यसमवे गौण-
ग्रहणमर्हति । ननु नन्समासो भविष्यति । तथा सति आद्युदात्तोऽहीनशब्दोऽभविष्यत् ।
मध्योदात्तस्त्वयम् । [SB on III 3 16, p 363 f]

88 स्थाण्वाहुतिरिति समाख्यानं च स्थाणुप्रधानाया इवाहुतेर्भवति । इति ।
कथम् । षष्ठीसमासोऽयम् । कर्मणि षष्ठी । ईप्सिततमं च कर्म । सप्तमीसमासो
लक्षणापेत इति कृत्वा नादर्थव्यो भवति । [SB on X 1 12, p 1809]

89 See page 31, n 10 above

90 रथघोषेणेति श्रूयते न रथेन घोषेण चेति । रथविशिष्टो घोषो लक्षण-
स्तोत्रोपकरणस्य । [SB on X 42, द्वितीयवर्णकम्, p 1911]

BALA of the TATPURUSA with the SĀMĀHĀRA-DVANDVA' In *tatpurusa* only the first member is subordinate or *gauna* while the second remains *pradhāna*, but in *samāhāra-dvandva* the idea of *samāhāra* is so prominent that both the members become *gauna* to it. Thus it would be seen that though in both the *samāsas* it is impossible to avoid *gaunatva* yet we have less of it in *tatpurusa* than in *samāhāra-dvandva*. Hence the rule that whenever possible TATPURUSA shall be preferred to SĀMĀHĀRA⁹¹. It must, however, be noted, that TATPURUSA is certainly to be set aside in favour of both the other types of the DVANDVA and even the KARMA-DHĀRAYA.

44 Let us take the case of *karma-dhāraya* first, and see why it is preferable to the *tatpurusa*. There is a text *Etayā nisādashapathim yājayet*' where the question is with regard to the interpretation of the expression *nisāda-sthapati*. There are two alternatives. The expression may be taken as *sasthī-tatpurusa* or as a *karma-dhāraya* compound. The *pūrvā-paksin* is in favour of taking it as a *sāsthī-tatpurusa*. But ŚĀBARA rejects that alternative for three reasons. If the word is dissolved as a *sasthī-tatpurusa* we shall have to accept *lakṣanā* on the word *nisāda* to yield the sense of a *sasthī*, secondly, we shall have to set aside the *dvitīyā-s'ruta* which becomes connected with both *nisāda* and *sthapati*, and lastly assume a *sasthī* which is *as'ruta*. But if it is taken as a *karma-dhāraya samāsa* all these *dosas* can be avoided. Hence it is that it is always better to take a *samāsa* as a *karma-dhāraya* rather than as a *tatpurusa*. This principle is generally known as the NISĀDA-STHAPATHI NĀYA⁹².

91 ननु तत्पुरुषनिर्देशोऽयम् । तेन परार्थेन रथस्य घोषविशेषणत्वेनोच्चारण न स्वकार्येण निर्देशः । अत्रोच्यते । द्वन्द्वनिर्देशोऽपीदृशो भवति । ——— नैतदेवम् । द्विवचनं हि तथा स्यात् । एकवचनेन च निर्देशः । तेनैको लक्षणः, स च घोषः ।...ननु समुदायेन समभिध्यादत्रो भविष्यति । न हि समुदायस्याशब्दार्थत्वात् । [SB on N 412 p 1919 f]

92 शब्दसामर्थ्याग्निपाद एव स्वपतिर्भवितुमर्हति । कस्मात् । शब्दसामर्थ्यात् । निपाद हि निषादशब्दः शक्नोति वदितुं श्रवणेनैव । निपादानां स्वपतिं तु रक्षणया

45. When the first member of a SĀMĀNĀDHIKARANA SAMĀSA i.e., a KARMDHĀRAYA compound is a SAMKHYĀ, the SAMĀSĀ shall always have the idea of SAMĀHĀRA prominent in it. This phenomenon has been not only noticed but also very well explained by S'ABARA. The *samkhyā*, in such compounds being the first member, is by its very position subordinate to the second member. But as has been already noticed above SAMKHYĀ is not 'only PRATHAKIVA NIVĒŚINĪ but also TANTRENA UPAKĀRINĪ. It is on account of these two peculiar characteristics that a *samkhyā*, if it is to qualify the second member, must have some *sādhārana* circumstance, *kriyā* or *guna* or at least *astitva* as a group, on the strength of which it may be so *samartha*. This in other words means that there shall always be *samāhāra* in such *samāsas*. These *samāsas* are generally given the name of DVIGU though S'ABARA has not stated the name as such.⁹¹

46. Now we come to the *dvandva* which has been noticed by S'ABARA in all its three varieties. As for *samāhāra* we have already seen above that in it the members are both of them subordinate to the idea of *samāhāra*, and that hence the SAMĀHĀRA DVANDVA is less powerful than the TAT-

ब्रूयात् । श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्वाध्या, न लक्षणा । अयोच्यते नैव दोष । निषाद-
शब्दो निषादवचन एव । षष्ठी संबन्धस्य वाचिकेति । तत्र । षष्ठ्यश्रवणात् । नात्र
षष्ठी श्रृणुमः । आह । लोपसामर्थ्यात् षष्ठ्यर्थोऽवगत इति । सत्यमवगम्यते । न तु
लोपेन । केन तर्हि । निषादशब्दलक्षणा । तस्याथ दौर्बल्यमित्युक्तम् । समानाधि-
करणसमासस्तु बलवान् । तत्र स्वार्थ शब्दौ वृत्तौ भवत । द्वितीया च विभक्ति-
नन्त्रेणोभाभ्या संबध्यते । तेन द्वितीयानिर्दिष्टो निषादो गम्यते । तत्र षष्ठ्यर्थं कल्पय-
ः श्रुतं गृहीयात् । तस्मान्निषाद एव स्थपति स्यात् । [SB on VI 151, p
1386 f].

93 यदि त्रिवच्यं विधानं स्यात् त्रिभिरिज्येतेति तत्र त्रिशब्दोऽङ्गशब्देना-
समर्थ एव स्यात् । असामर्थ्यं समासो नोपपद्यते । अपि चासत्या त्रयाणामङ्गानां
साधारण्यां क्रियायां . . [see page 132, n 83] साकाङ्क्षं भवति । कतमान्यङ्गा-
नीति । स्वपक्षेऽपि कथम् । तदुच्यते । समाहार एव समास । येषां समाहार उक्त,
एकक्रियागुणसंबन्धो वा तानि त्र्यङ्गानि । एषां च समाहार उच्यते । [SB, p
2 27]

PURUSA where at least one of the members remains *pradhāna*. The ITARETARA-YOGA type of *īDVANDVA*, however, represents the other extreme in this that therein both the members remain *pradhāna*. Hence we find that this compound is to be preferred to the TATPURUSA where at least one of the members has to be accepted as being *gauna*. There is, for example, the text '*Rājapurohitau sāyujya-kāmau yajeyātām*'. There the expression *rājapurohitau* can be taken as an *itaretara dvandva* or *ekāś'esa dvandva* or *sasthī-tatpursa* and hence there arises the question as to which of these alternatives should be accepted. It is here that S'ABARA has shown that ITARETARA DVANDVA is to be preferred to the TATPURUSA as also to the EKAŚĒSA DVANDVA. For, if we take it as *sasthī-tatpursa* and dissolve it as *rājñah purohitau* the sense thus obtained will be contradictory to the injunction '*Purohitam vrnīte*' which enjoins the *varana* of only one *purohita* ⁹⁴. Again if we dissolve it as *rājapurohitas' ca rājapurohitas' ca* and take it as an *ekāś'esa* even so we find that the sense yielded by the *samāsa* is not compatible with the expression *sāyujya-kāmau* which appears in the text, for a *purohita* can't have a desire for *sāyujya* with another *purohita* ⁹⁵. Thus we find that both these alternatives are vitiated by *vipratishedha*. Hence we accept the last alternative and take the expression as an *itaretara dvandva samāsa*. Even in doing so we have to resort to *laksanā* on the word *rājan*. But this *dosa* is far more insignificant than the *dosas* involved in the other alternatives.

47 One more important fact about the *itaretara dvandva* has been noticed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS X

94 नैवायमर्थोऽस्ति द्वौ पुरोहिताविति । एकस्य राज्ञ एक एव पुरोहित उपादेयत्वेन हि श्रूयते । पुरोहित करोतीत्येकत्व विवक्षितम् । [SB on VI 6 13, p 1484]

95 ननु तत्र राजपुरोहितश्च राजपुरोहितश्च राजपुरोहितौ यज्येयातामिति । उच्यते । न तौ सायुज्यकामौ भवत । स राजा पुरोहितेन सहैककार्यो भवति । न तु पुरोहित पुरोहितेन । उभावपि तौ राजानमभिचरन्तौ राजपुरोहितावित्युच्येते । न हि तावच्छन्तौ । [SB on VI 6 15, p 1485]

6 8 * There the question is regarding the exact sense of the text 'Ekūdas'inān prāyanīyodayanīyayor aturatrayor ālabheta' Does it enjoin the sacrificing of one set of eleven *pas'us* at the *prāyanīya* and another set of eleven *pas'us* at the *udayanīya*? Or does it enjoin the sacrificing of the eleven *pas'us* together at the *prāyanīya* and *udayanīya*? The latter of these alternatives is the right one For the *dvatvas'rutī* in the expression *prāyanīyodayanīyayoh* is *upādeya* and as such *vivakṣita* And if it is to be looked upon as being *upādeya*, our answer is that it is so because it is at the end of a *dvandva samāsa* The important characteristic of an *itaretara-yoga dvandva samāsa* is that it can occur only if both its members are *pradhāna* which they can be only if they are both of them *vihita* or *upādeya* A *samāsa* in general, as we have noted above, is not possible if its *padas* are *sākāṅkṣa*, but just opposite is the case with the *itaretara dvandva samāsa* where the *samāsa* can take place only if the members are *sākāṅkṣa* Thus we find that in an ITARETARA DVANDVA SAMĀSA both the members are VIHITA or in other words, as S'ABARA puts it, whenever we have an ITARETARA-DVANDVA SAMĀSA it is the SAMĀSĀRTHA that is VIHITA or enjoined The truth of this conclusion can also be seen from the fact that when a person is ordered 'S'atam Devadattayajñadattayor dīyatam' he distributes that *s'ata* between both *Devadatta* as well as *Yajñadatta* ⁹⁶ When, however, two

96 द्वित्वश्रुतिर्हि भवति प्रायणीयोदयनीययोरिति । सा चेदानीमुपादेयत्वेन न लक्षणया । कुत एकादशेनीविधौ सनिहिते वचनादेकादशेनी विधाय पुन अस्या ता लक्षयित्वा प्रयोजनविधिसंयतदमिधीयते । प्रायणीयोदयनीययोरिति । तत्र द्वन्द्वभाविनो प्रावान्यात् सत्यामपेक्षायां भवति समास । समासे चेतरेतरयोगाद्वैकादशेनी केवले प्रायणीये । सा उदयनीययुक्ते भवितुमर्हति । तद्वदुदयनीयेऽपि । तस्मात्प्रमुदायेऽपि वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः । यदि पुनर्नोपादेयत्वेनाश्रोक्तेतां तत्र द्वन्द्वभाविनोऽप्रावान्यम् । अप्रावान्येऽसत्यामाकाङ्क्षायां न समासो भविष्यति । तत्र प्रत्येक वाक्यपरिसमाप्ति स्यात् । उपादेयत्वं त्वेतच्छ्रूयते । तस्माद्विभाग इति । लोकावत् । यथा लोके शत देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोर्दीयतामित्युक्ते समासार्थो विधीयते । यदेतच्छत तदेतयोर्दीयतामिति । द्वन्द्वभ्रतिविधानसामर्थ्याच्छत विभज्यते । एवमेकादशिन्यपि विभज्यते इति । [SB on \ 68, p 1991 f]

such words enter into a *bahuvrīhi* compound with another word to which they are *samānādhikaraṇa* they shall not be admitted as being *upādeya* or *viḥita*. Such words shall be looked upon as *lakṣanā* and hence the whole compound shall be dissolved as an *an-ka-pada-bahuvrīhi* rather than a *dvandva-garbhā-bahuvrīhi*. Hence it is that text 'Prstivah sadaho brhadrathartarasāma' is interpreted as enjoining the use of the *brhat-sāma* on some days and the *rathanatarasāma* on the rest. This principle is also seen from the fact that when a man is asked 'Māsam ghrta-tailābhyām Devadatto bhojavitavyah' what he does is the feeding of *Devadatta* with *taila* for half month and with *ghrta* for the remaining half⁹⁷

48 Much discussion is held round the *ekas'esa dvandva* and its exact signification, and it is resolved that the *ekas'esa* primarily denotes *pumstva* and *dvitva*, and hence is *pumsor vācakāḥ* only. But by *lakṣanā* it may denote *pumān* and *strī* if the *s'abda* is not a *vidhū* but only an *anuvāda*. For by its very nature *lakṣanā* is inadmissible in a *vidhū*. There is the text 'Kṣaumi vasānau ādadhīyātām'. Now the question is with reference to the word *vasānau*. Does it signify two *puruṣas*, or one *strī* and one *puruṣa*? By *abhidhā* it can convey only two *puruṣas* while the sense of one man and one woman can be conveyed by it only through *lakṣanā*. Now *ādadhāna* and *sadvitīyah pumān* are *s'abdāntareṇa viḥita* so that in the text under consideration the *vidhūna* refers to *kṣauma* only, while the *ādadhāna kṛiyā* and *vasānau* are naturally *anuvāda*. There is no harm, therefore if we resort to *lakṣanā* and take *vasānau* as indicating a *sadvitīyah pumān*⁹⁸. When, however the

97 सामशब्दश्रुतिश्च बृहद्रथन्तर्योर्लक्षणतामाचष्टे । तस्मादसमस्ते सामनी स्याताम् । एतच्चोक्तमेव । विभागेऽपि साम्नोरविप्रतिषिद्धो बृहद्रथन्तरसामशब्द इति । यथा, मास घृततैलाभ्यां देवदत्तो भोजयितव्य इत्युक्तेऽर्धं मास घृतेनार्धं मास तैलेन । एवमिहापि शब्दोऽवकल्प्यते । [SB on X 68, p 1990]

98 शब्दान्तरेण विहितसामानस्य न विवायक, विहितत्वाच्च एव सद्धि-
तीयस्य तस्यापि न विवायकम् । अतस्तदसम्भवात् शौमस्य विधायिका लिङ् भविष्यति ।

śabda is *vidhāyaka*, or there is some particular context to the effect that such expressions shall be taken in their literal sense as signifying two *purusas* as in the sentence '*Dvāv-ānaya*' or '*Etena dvau rājapurohitaū sūyuyakāmaū yajvātām*' or in '*Yuvam hi stha' svah-patī*'. The general rule, therefore, regarding the *ekas'esa samāsa* can be very well stated in the words of S'ABARA 'YATRA NA ARTHAH PRAKARANAM VĀ VIŚESAKAM, VIDHĀYAKAŚ CA ŚABDAH, NĀSTY ANUVĀDAH TATRA DVAU PUMĀMSAU GAMYETE.'⁹⁹ The *au* ending primarily denotes *purusa-dvaya* only. So what PĀNINI means by writing the *sūtra* '*Pumān strīyā*' is not that the *au* ending denotes a *strī* and a *pumān*, but that whenever a *strī* and a *pumān* are spoken of by one word, it is the word of the masculine gender that shall be retained and have its natural *au* ending.¹⁰⁰ Thus it is evident that we can't get the idea of *strīpumsau* from the *ekas'esa-samāsa* unless we resort to *laksanā*. And if *Laksanā* is to be resorted to we can do it only in an *anuvāda-vākya*, but never in a *vidhū vākya*.

49 Coming to the BAHUVRĪHI we find that S'ABARA describes it as ANYA-PADĀRTHA, while discussing the expression

वाक्यसामर्थ्यात् । यत्स्मिन्पक्षेऽन्यन्ताय स्वार्थं जहातीति । नात्यन्ताय हास्यति । आधाने वास क्षौम कुर्यादिति । अस्मिन्पक्षे पुश्चद्व स्त्रीपुष्योर्वृत्त इति गम्यते । अस्ति हि तत्र तस्य निमित्तं पुमान् सद्वितीय । एवमादि च दृष्ट्वा भगवता पाणिनिना सूत्रं प्रणीतं पुमान् स्त्रिया इति । तस्य विषयं पुमान् शिष्यमाणं साधुर्भवति न स्त्रीशब्द इति । तस्मादेकं पुमान्नादधीतं, न द्वाविति । [SB on VI 1 23, p 1639]

99 SB on MS VI 2 2

100 ननु स्त्रीपुसोर्वाचकमौकारान्तं द्विवचनं स्मरन्ति । नेषा स्मृतैरस्तीति ब्रूम । आह । भगवतः पाणिनेर्वचनान्तात् स्मृतिमनुमाह्यामहे पुमान् स्त्रिया इति । उच्यते । न पाणिनेर्वचनं कुक्कुटावित्यौकारः स्त्रीपुसोर्वाचक इति । कथं तर्हि । यत्र स्त्रीपुसो सह वचनं तत्र सद्वितीयो वा पुमानिति कृत्वा अकारान्तस्यौकारं प्राप्नोति, स द्वितीया वा स्त्रीति कृत्वा एकारः । पुश्चद्वस्तत्र साधुर्न स्त्रीशब्द इति पाणिनेर्वचनम् । पुमान् शिष्यते इति च ब्रूने । तेन सुतरां गम्यते पुसोर्वाचक औकार इति । [SB on VI 1 22, p 1367]

*prapista-bhāga*¹⁰¹ Even like the other *samāsa*s this *samāsa* can take place if its members are *samartha*, but not otherwise. At another place discussing the expression *brhad-rathantarasāma* S'ABARA suggests that such *bahuvrīhi* can be dissolved as *dvandva-garbha* or as *aneka-pada-bahuvrīhi*. If *bṛhat* and *rathantara* are both *upādeya* or *pradhāna* then they will form a *dvandva samāsa*, and then the *samāsa* as a whole would be *dvandva-garbha-bahuvrīhi*. But if they are not *upādeya* or *pradhāna* and are only *lakṣana-bhūta* then the *samāsa* shall have to be taken as an *aneka-pada-bahuvrīhi*. In the case under consideration it is found that they are *lakṣana-bhūta*, and hence it is that S'ABARA takes the expression as an *anekapada-bahuvrīhi*¹⁰²

50 The last thing that we have to note now is the rule that S'ABARA has stated in the words, 'DVIVACANABAHUVACANĀNTĀNAM ASAMĀSAH'. The question is regarding the word *s'atāyuh* in the text '*S'atāyur vai puruṣaḥ*'. Will it do if the expression is dissolved as '*S'atāny āyur asva iti*'? The answer of course, is no, on the strength of the rule quoted above. It must be remembered that particularly when the first member of a *samāsa* is *samkhyā* it must be understood as being in the singular and never in the dual or in the plural¹⁰. Hence it is concluded that man can never live longer than a hundred years, and hence the word *samvatsara* in the expressions like '*Sahasra-samvatsara*' must be taken to denote not the year but only the day.

51 We have thus seen how S'ABARA (and even JAIMINI) have noticed the different types of words and how they have also noticed their various characteristics which every interpreter of any text will do well to bear in mind. In

101 इह तु प्रविष्टवदस्य भागशब्देन सहान्यपदार्थो बहुव्रीहिः । सोऽपि समर्थयोरेव । [SB on III 341 p 889]

102 Read SB on MS \ 645

103 अत्रोच्यते । शतान्यायुरस्येति विग्रहीष्याम । न च सखाशब्दानां समास इष्यते । न च समकानि भवन्ति । द्विवचनबहुवचनान्तानामसमास इति चाभियुक्तवचनात् । [SB on MS VI 733 p 1503]

the next section we shall see what observations they have to make regarding *linga*, *vacana*, *vibhakti*, and such other factors without a knowledge of which our equipment regarding the mode of interpreting a *śabda* is bound to remain inadequate and incomplete

LINGA, VACANA, VIBHAKTI ETC ETC.

1 Words as they are used in sentences are always in their inflected forms, so that every *pada* that we come across in any sentence will be found to have some *pratyaya* appended to it to convey the gender, the number, and the case, or the person, the tense or the mood, and the number respectively. Our survey of the *mīmāṃsā* rules of interpretation regarding the *pada* or *śabda* is bound to remain incomplete unless we take into account what JAIMINI and Ś'ABARA have to say as regards these other factors. This, therefore, we proceed to do in what follows.

2 Taking up *linga* first we find that Ś'ABARA has to give us two or three important rules in connection with it. That there are three *lingas* needs no mention. Nor is it quite necessary to note that a word of the masculine gender shall never denote a female and *vice versa*. But this has been very clearly stated by Ś'ABARA in his commentary on MS IX 1 45¹. It may, however, be remembered here that it is possible that a word of the masculine gender should indicate a female as we have already noticed while discussing in the last section the exact signification of the *Eka-ś'esa-dvandva samāsa*. Nouns have fixed genders, but not so the adjectives, which take up the gender (and also the number) of the nouns they qualify. Hence the *linga* of a *viś'esana* can't be said to be *vidhitsita*. It is only *nur-deś'a-bhūta*². Another thing to be noted about *linga* is that it is a *viś'esana* of the *prātipadika*, from which it follows that it can't be the *viś'esana* of any other *pada*. For as we have already seen, one and the same *pada* in one and the same *prayoga* can't have more connections

1 न च पुवचन द्वियमभिदितुमल भवति शब्द । [SB on IX, 1 45, p 1692]

2 See p 32 f, n 20 above

than one³ But when is *linga vivakṣita*? And when is it *avivakṣita*? S'ABARA has given very definite answers to both these questions while commenting on the *sūtra* 'TATHĀ CA LINGAM' (MS IV 1 17) and also on MS VI 1 8 In discussing the texts '*Agnīsomīyam paśum ālabhate*', '*Anadvāhou yunakti*' and '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate*' S'ABARA points out that the number as well the gender of the words *paśum*, *anadvāhou*, and *kapiñjalān* are *vivakṣita* because they are *upādeya* In these texts we see that the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna*, and as such the texts convey the sense of the *ākhyāta* as characterized by all the accompanying adjuncts *When, on the other hand, the AKHYĀTĀRTHA is not PRADHĀNA, or when a word is only LAKSANA-BHŪTA or JĀTYARITHA, then, of course, the LINGA and the VACANA are not VIVAKṢITA*⁵ This principle has been stated in clear terms by S'ABARA while discussing the text '*Dars'apūrnāmāsūbhyām svraga-kāmo yajeta*' where the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that only man has the *adhukāra* to perform the *yāgas*, since we find the word *svarga-kāmah* in the mas-

3 प्रातिपदिकविशेषण हि स्त्रीशब्दः । स्त्रियां यत्प्रातिपदिकं तत्तद्व्याख्याय इति । न विशेषणस्य पदान्तरेण संबन्धो भवति । यथा राजपुरुषो गच्छतीति ।— गुणवचनानां च शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्तीत्यविशेषितायामप्युचि स्त्रीलिङ्गं भविष्यति । इति । [SB on MS IX 1 33, p 1676]

4 प्रातिपदिकार्थो व्याख्यतवाच्येन संबध्यते, विभक्त्यर्थोऽपि । तथाहि तद्विशेषणविशिष्ट आलम्बो गम्यते । तत्रैकार्थत्वादेकवाक्यमवकाशपते । [SB on IV I 15 p 1205] (नात्र । e पशुमालभेत्तस्यत्र) जातिद्रव्यस्य लक्षणत्वेन श्रूयते । यदि लक्षणत्वेन श्रूयते ततः स्त्रिया अपि याग उक्तो न पुनर्वचनेन निवर्त्येत । इदं तु पशुत्व यागस्य विशेषणत्वेन श्रूयते । तत्र पशुत्वस्य यागस्य च संबन्धो न द्रव्ययागस्य । यथा पशुत्व यागसंबन्धमेकत्वं पुनस्तत्त्वं च । सोऽयमनेकविशेषणविशिष्टो यागः श्रूयते । स यथाश्रुत्येव कर्तव्यः । उपादेयत्वेन चोदितत्वात् । [SB on VI 1 9, p 1359]

5 See p 39 n 72 above, प्रधानभूते आकृतिर्गुणो वा तत्संबन्धार्थ-गम्यते । तत्रोभयविशेषणविशिष्ट एवमाद्याक्यादवगम्यते । [SB on VI 4 23, p 1441]

culine gender ' S'ABARA, however, points out that *the word there is only ĀKṢANĀRIḤA, so that its LINGA IS AVIVAKṢITA* and hence there is nothing wrong if we conclude that a *strī* also has as much right to perform the *yāgas* in question as a *purusa* '.

3 And what is true of *linga* also holds good in the case of *vacana*. In several places has S'ABARA noticed the rule that the number of a *pada* which is *uddiś'yamāna* is not *vivakṣita*. There is a text '*Das'ā-pavitrena graham sammāsti*'. The question there is whether the number of the word *graham* is *vivakṣita* or not. The conclusion in this case is that the number viz. *ekatva* in that text is not *vivakṣita* since the word *graham* is not *vidhi-gata*. It is used only as *lakṣana*, and a term that is used as a *lakṣana* is too general to be restricted by *vacana* or *linga*. From another point of view it may be seen that here *the ĀKṢANĀRIḤA IS APRADHĀNA*,

6 MS VI 16

7 न विवक्षितं पुलिट्पमिते । कुत । अविशेषात् । न हि शङ्कोत्येषा विभक्तिः स्वगङ्गाम लिङ्गेन विशेषम् । कथम् । लक्षणत्वेन श्रवणात् । स्वर्गे कामो यस्य तमेष लक्षयति शब्दः । तेन लक्षणेनाविकृतो यजेतेति शब्ददेशोऽन्यते । तत्र लक्षणमविशिष्टं त्रिधा पुंसि च । तस्माच्छब्देनोभाक्पि स्त्रीपुसावधिकृताविति गम्यते । तत्र केनाधिकार त्रिधा निवर्तते । विभक्त्येति चेत् । तत्र । कस्मात् । पुस्तवचनान्स्त्रीनिवृत्तावगतिः ।—नचानर्थक्यम् । निर्देशार्थत्वात् । [SB on Ms VI 18 p 1359]

8 नैतदस्ति ग्रहादिष्वेकवचनमुपेक्ष्य पदार्था वर्तन्त्या इति । कुत । ग्रहजात्या द्रव्य लक्षयित्वा समाग्रादि विधीयते । अविशिष्टं च लक्षणं सर्वद्रव्येषु । तत्र न गम्यते विशेषः, को ग्रहः समार्ष्टव्यः को नेति । सामान्यावगमाद्विशेषान्तरमात्रं सर्वप्रत्ययः । [SB on सर्वेषां वा लक्षणत्वादविशिष्टं हि लक्षणम् MS III 114, p 705 f], इह पुनर्यदेकवचनं श्रूयते तच्छ्रूयमाणमप्यविधीयमानत्वेन न निवर्तकं भवितुमर्हति । यथा कथिदोदनं निर्दिश्य श्रूयाथ एनं भक्षयेत्स्थित्वा माजारी वा स निवारयितव्य इति । तत्र यदि भक्षणं निमित्तत्वेन विधीयते न श्रमाजारीसम्बन्धस्ततः काकोऽप्यागच्छनिवार्यते, श्रूयमाणेऽपि ह्युनि माजारे वा श्रमाजारीसम्बन्धस्य निमित्तत्वेनाविधीयमानत्वात् । एवमिहाप्येकवचनसम्बन्धस्याविधीयमानत्वाच्छ्रूयमाणेऽप्येकत्वे ग्रहमात्रं समुज्येतेति । [SB, p 713]

and hence it will convey the ĀKHYĀTĀRTHA as not being characterized by the accompanying adjuncts. This in other words means that the text will convey only the simple ākhyātārtha, so that it is only the jāti of the word *graham* that is *vivakṣita*, but neither its *linga* nor its *vacana*. But in texts like 'Paśum ālabhate' we see that the ākhyātārtha is *pradhāna* so that the sentence in such cases has to be taken as yielding the SARVA-VIŚEṢANA-VIŚĪTA ĀKHYĀTĀRTHA. The cogency of these rules can be easily demonstrated as follows. In the text 'Graham sammārṣti' the *sammāṛjana kṛiyā* though *adrstārtha* is yet *gauna* or *apradhāna*. It is, therefore, naturally meant to be subservient to *graham*. Hence no question arises as to how many *grahas* are to be cleansed for we know that the *sammāṛjana kṛiyā* is meant for the *graha* i.e., any thing that is characterized by the *grahatva jāti*. This means that it is not to be performed in the case of one *graha* only which in other words means that the *ekatva* (i.e., the *vacana*) of *graham* in such cases is not *vivakṣita*. Matters are, however, quite different in texts like 'Paśum ālabhate'. There the *ālabhana-kṛiyā* being *adrstārtha* must be accepted as being *pradhāna*,¹⁰ and hence the question arises as to with how many *paśus* is that *kṛiyā* to be performed. The answer to this question is to be found in the *vacana* of the word *paśum*, which shows that the *vacana* of words like *paśum* in such texts is *vivakṣita*.¹¹ This rule regarding the *vivakṣitātva* of the *vacana* has been very briefly but explicitly stated

9 cf MS II 19 12

10 cf MS II 17

11 अइमिति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्योद्देश्यतया प्रयोजनवत्तया च प्राधान्यं गम्यते । ग्रहं प्रति गुणः सम्मार्गं प्रतिप्रधानं च गुण आवर्तनीय इति न्यायेन दावतो ग्रहाः सन्ति ते समार्जनीया एव निश्चये सति समार्जयितव्यं ग्रहेयत्तायाः अनुभूतित्वाद्देयगतमेकत्वं श्रूयमाणमप्यविवक्षितम् । . पशुना यजेतेत्यत्र तु यागं प्रति गुणभूतं पशुः । न हि प्रतिगुणं प्रधानस्यावृत्तिरिति कश्चिन्न्यायोऽस्ति । नत इयत्तायाः अनुभूतित्वाच्छ्रूयमाणमेकत्वं विवक्ष्यत इति वैषम्यम् । [जैमिनीयन्यायमालाविरतर on MS III 1 13 15], Also cf प्रधानसन्निधौ च गुणः शिष्यमाणं प्रति प्रधानं भिद्येतेति । [SB on X 3 39, 1882]

by KUMĀRILA BHATTĀ while commenting on S'ABARA'S *Bhāṣya* on MS IV 1 15f in the following statement KṚYĀ SĀDHYĀ SĀDHANAM IAT PARICCHEDAKĀNI CA LINGA-SAMKHYĀDĪN APEKṢA IAT/Ā IAH SARVA VIŚFSANA-VIŚISTĀ KṚYĀ VĪDHĪYATE These two rules regarding the *avivakṣita* or otherwise of the *vacana* (or *samkhyā*) are well-known by the names of the GRĀHIKATVA-VYĀYA and the PASTĒKATVA-VYĀYA respectively

4 Another text to be noted in this connection is 'Dars apūna-māsābhyām svarga-kāmo yajeta' where the question is whether the *katva* of *svargakāmah* is or is not *vivakṣita*. And the conclusion is that it is *vivakṣita*. The *pūrvā-pakṣin* argues that *purusa* is no *anga* either of the *yāga* or even of the *phala-nivṛtti*. Hence *purusa* can be connected with the *kṛyā* only as a *lakṣana* and not as being *upādya*, so that its *vacana* can't but be *avivakṣita*. The *Siddhāntin*, however, points out that the *kartā* is stated in such texts for *prayoga* and not for himself, so that he becomes *angabhūta* to the *kṛyā* and also to *phala*, for though it is not expressly stated, yet by the force of facts *phalākāma* is always the *kāma* of one's own desired *phala* and never of some one else. The *purusa* being thus *guna-bhūta* it follows that its *vacana* is *vivakṣita*.¹² Thus it would appear that the VACANA (or SAMKHYĀ) of a word is VIVAKṢITA if the word is ANGABHŪTA to a KṚYĀ while it is AVIVAKṢITA if it is not so ANGABHŪTA.

5 The next point that we have to note in connection with *vacana* is that between VACANA and the PRĀTIPADY-

12 प्रयोगाद्योपदिश्येत कर्ता, न स्वायेंन । कथम् । यजेतेत्यस्यार्थो याग कुर्यायागेन वा कुर्यादिति । सत्ताभिर्व्यक्तिमात्रं गम्यते, न फलस्य कर्ता धाता वा । स्वर्गकामशब्दश्च स्वर्गकाममात्रे वर्तते, न विशेषमवलम्ब्यते आत्मनः परस्य वेति । शब्दप्रमाणकाश्च वयमीदृशेष्वर्थेषु । कथं तर्हि कामस्यात्मसम्बन्धोऽवगम्यते । सम्बन्धात् फलकामोऽनुक्तेऽपि शब्दनात्मन एव फलं कामयते, न परस्य । ... गुणभूतस्तु पुण्यं धृष्टे भावयेदिति ।... अतो गुणभूतस्य पुरुषस्य सख्या विवक्षितेति । [SB on अपे वा कामयोगे सम्बन्धात् प्रयोगाद्योपदिश्येत प्रत्यर्थं हि विविश्रुतिर्विपाणावत् । MS VI 2 6, p 139-94]

KĀRIHA the former is stronger than the latter, so that if by sticking to the *rūdārtha* of the *prātipadika* we are led to take the *vacana* of a word as being *avivakṣita* we should set aside the *rūdārtha* and find out some other sense for it on the strength of etymology, which would be in keeping with the *vacana*. This rule is arrived at by S'ABARA while discussing the text '*Praitu hotus' camasah pra brahmanah, prodgā-trnām*'. Here the *pūrva-paksin* argues that as *udgātā* is only one, therefore, the *bahu-vacana* is *avivakṣita*. But S'ABARA points out that *udgātā* can be understood to mean *audgatrasya kartā* just as *audameghu* can be understood to mean *Udameghasya putrah*. Thus the word *udgātā* owing to *audgatra-sambandha* shall signify not only *udgātā* but *prastotā*, *pratihartā*, and *subrahmanya* as well. And thus the *bahu-vacana* also can be very well explained.¹

6 Passingly it may be noted here that the VACANA of a GUNA ŚABDA like LINGA is dependent upon its ĀŚRAYA or DRAVYA-ŚABDA, and hence can't be taken as VIHITA or enjoined.¹¹ Coming now to the signification of the three *vacanas* we may note that ordinarily DVI-VACANA denotes duality only and can never be used to denote *ekatva* or BAHUTVA.¹⁵ Conversely also it may be noted that *ekavacana*

13 वेदसंयोगात् । औद्गात्र नाम प्रवचनम् । तथौद्गात्रापि कर्माणि । औद्गात्रस्य कर्ता वाच्यता वोद्गातेत्युच्यते । कथम् । उद्गातु कर्मोद्गात्रमिति प्रसिद्धम् । एव चेद व्यक्त मौद्गात्रस्य कर्तोद्गातेति गम्यते । यस्योद्गाता प्रसिद्धस्तद्विशिष्ट कर्मानाख्यातमप्यौद्गात्रमिति वदति । शब्दश्च यस्यौद्गात्र प्रसिद्ध स तस्य कर्तारमुद्गातेति वदत्यनाख्यातमपि यथा यस्योदमेघ प्रसिद्ध स तस्यानाख्यातमप्यप्य उदमेघिरिति द्रुते । यस्योदमेघि स तस्य पितरमनाख्यातमप्युदमे प्रतिपद्यते । एवमौद्गात्रसम्बन्धादुपपद्यत उद्गातृशब्द , प्रस्तोताप्युद्गातापि प्रतिहर्तापि सुब्रह्मण्योऽपि । एव बहुवचनमुद्गातृशब्दश्चोभयमप्युपपन्न भविष्यति । न चान्य कश्चिदोषः । [SB on III 526, p 1004]

14 See n 2 on page 45 above

15 लक्षणत्वेऽप्युच्यमाने ब्राह्मणजातीयो न हन्तव्य इति न द्विवचनान्तेन निर्देशो भवति, ब्राह्मणौ न हन्तव्याविति । आह--जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचन भवति, बहुषु वैकवचन भवति । न त्वेकस्मिन्बहुषु च द्विवचन भवति । [SB on X 340, p 1883]

and BAHU-VACANA can never denote DAITV ॥¹⁶ And if 'at all in any case *dvi-vacana* is made to denote *ekatva* or *bahutva*, such an interpretation is open to the *dosa* called the *abhi-dhāna-vipratipatti*. This point has been clearly explained by S'ABARA while commenting on MS IX 3 14¹⁷ The EKA-VACANA, as a general rule, denotes EKATVA, but there are certain circumstances under which it may denote BAHUTVA also. Thus we find words like 'Kula', 'Yūtha', and 'vana' which, though singular in form are found to convey the idea of plurality. In such cases¹⁸ the *ekavacana* is used with reference to the *samudāya* as constituted of the several individuals. *Ekavacana* may denote *bahutva* again if the word in the singular has reference to the *jāti* i.e., is used as a *lakṣaṇa*¹⁹. Thus in sentence like 'Man is mortal' the word man stands for all mankind. This fact about the *ekavacana* signifying plurality is also otherwise stated by saying that *ekavacana* in such cases is *anvākṛta* because the word having that number is not *upādāya* but only *lakṣanabhūta*.

16 लोको हि शब्दार्थाविगमे प्रमाणम् । न च लोके द्वयोरर्थयोर्बहुवचनान्त एववचनान्तो वा प्रवर्तमानो दृश्यते । [SB on IX 3 13, p 1751]

17 न हि चोदकोऽन्याय्यमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिमभिप्रायति । किं कारणम् । प्रकृतावेकत्वात् पाशस्य प्रकृतत्वाच्च बहुवचनान्तस्य प्रत्यक्षाभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिः । केयमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिर्नाम । यदन्याभिधानमन्यथाभिधेयम् । न च प्रकृतावेकस्मिन् बहुवचनान्त प्रयुक्तमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिं कर्तुम् । किं हि । यद्येन शक्यते तत्कर्तुम् । किं चानेन शक्यते । अस्य सिद्धे प्रयोगेऽर्थमन्विच्छन्तो यदवगम्यते तदर्थं शब्द इत्यवधारयन् । — उह तु — प्रयोगेऽस्मदाद्यत्रे विमित्यवाचकं प्रयोक्ष्यामहे विद्यमाने वाचके । न चाश्वद्वयोऽग्नौ दृष्टो बहुवचनान्तः । — न च बहुवचं द्विवचनप्रत्ययार्थं लभ्यते लौकिके वेदिके च । न चाभिधिसिद्धे द्विवचे द्वयोर्बहुवचनं भवति । तद्यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्ताभ्यां वर्तव्यमिति देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तशब्दद्वयादेव द्विवचनं प्राप्तम्, न विभक्त्या विधिरस्यते । तथापि द्विवचनमेव भवति न बहुवचनम् । [SB on IX 3 14, p 1751 f]

18 भवति हि बहुनामकवचनान्त शब्द समुदायापेक्षो यथा यूथ कुल वन परिपदिति । [SB on II 2 3, p 480]

19 जात्याग्याद्यामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनं भवति बहुषु वैकवचनं भवति । [SB, p 1883], सूक्तवाक्यमात्रमन्यैकत्वात् सूक्तवाक्यो वर्तते इत्येकवचनं भवति । [SB on II 3 19, p 769]

Hence it is that the text '*Graham sammārṣi*' has to be understood as meaning '*Grahān sammārṣi*'. It must, however, be noted that there are certain ideas which have to be expressed in the singular only. Take, for example, the ideas of *pāṇīya*, *taila*, and *ghṛta*. We find that these substances do not admit of any *samkhyā* being predicated of them. We can speak of one two or more mangoes, but not of one, two or more *pāṇīyas* or *tailas* or *ghṛtas*. The reason for this is that mangoes, though put together, retain their individuality, while the quantities of *pāṇīya*, *taila* or *ghṛta* when put together merge into one whole losing all individuality. These *padārthas*, to use the expression used by S'ABARA, (or rather JAIMINI) are *samsargi*. Hence we come to the rule that *SAMSARGINAH ARIHĀH* shall always be denoted by *EKAVACANA* only.²⁰

7 Coming to the *bahuvacana* we find that just as *ekavacana* denotes plurality similarly sometimes *bahuvacana* also denotes singularity or unity when *pūjā* or *ādara* is intended to be conveyed thereby. Thus discussing the text '*Raksohāno balagahano vaiṣṇavān •khanāmi*' the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that this *mantra* is not to be repeated with every *uparava*, for if thus repeated the *bahuvacana* in *vaiṣṇavān* would not be compatible with the number of the *uparava* which is *eka*.²¹ But the *siddhāntin* points out that because of *karma-sannipāta* the *mantras* have to be repeated with every *uparava* and that the *bahuvacana* can be explained by saying that it conveys the idea of *pūja* or honour.²² Thus we see that the *bahuvacana* may be used to

20 ससर्गिषु चार्थस्थितपरिमाणत्वात् । [MS IX 327], ससर्गिष्वर्थेषु यद्यपि पशुभेदस्तथापि रस्मीनां ससर्ग एव । एकीभूतास्तेषां रश्मयः । यथा पानीयस्य तैलस्य वा स्तत्का नानादेशेषु भिन्ना समानदेशे एकीभूता भवन्ति तद्वद् रश्मयः । तस्मादेकवचनान्तस्तेषां वाचक इत्यनूहः स्यात् । [SB, p 1738]

21 यदि प्रत्युपरव प्रयुज्यत एकस्मिन्बहुवचनान्ताभिधानं न प्रयुज्यते । आप च सकृदुक्तं शङ्कोति सर्वोपरवानभिधातुम् । शङ्कोति चेदावृत्तिरनर्थिका । [SB on XI 452, p 2212]

22 यत् बहुवचनान्त एकस्याभिधायक इति । प्रातिपदिकार्थाऽभिहितो विभक्त्यर्थश्च कर्मत्वम् । उच्यते नानार्थं केवलो नाभिहितः । स च नैवाभिधानमर्हति ।

convey the idea of singularity or unity, if the idea of *pūjā* also is to be conveyed. The other circumstance under which *bahuvacana* may denote *ekatva* is 'reference to *jāti*'. Thus S'ABARA writes, '*Jā'yākhyāyām kasmīn bahuvacanam bahusu vā kavacanam bhavati*'²³

8 But the most important point that we have to notice about *bahuvacana* is what is generally known as the 'KAPINJALĀNĀYĀM' *Triv* is a text '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabheta*'. The main question there is as to what is the exact number that is conveyed by the word *kapiñjalān*. The *pūrva pakṣin* holds that any number from two onwards can be denoted by that word, for generally we find that the *bahuvacana* is used when we want to convey the idea of any number above two. It is true that *anekārthatva* is *anyāyya*, but there is no other alternative when we find that usage gives sentences like '*catvāro brāhmanāḥ*'. Here if *triv* alone were the signification of *bahuvacana* we shall get an absurd sense amounting to *catvārah trivah*. This shows that *triv* alone can't be the signification of *bahuvacana*. But can we not resort to *lakṣanā* and say that *bahuvacana* by *abhidhā* denotes *triv*, and that it is only through *lakṣanā* that it indicates all the other higher numbers?²³ The *pūrva-*

अभिधायकस्य शब्दस्याभावात् । एकस्यैव वा पूजार्थं बहुवचनम् । तस्मादविरोधः ।
[SB on XI 423, p 2213]

23 See n 15 and n 19 on page 47 above

23 (1) बहुवचनेन सर्वप्राप्तेर्विकल्पः स्यात् । [MS XI 138], सर्वे एते सन्त्राविशेषा बहुवचनेन प्राप्यन्ते । सर्वे तस्य वाक्या, सर्वत्र प्रयोगात् । तस्माद्विकल्पः नन्वेव सत्येकस्य शब्दस्यानेकार्थताद्विता भवति । न चैष व्याघ्रः । उच्यते । सत्यमेवमगत्याश्रीयते । सत्यां गतो नाश्रयितव्यः । अस्ति निवृत्त्य गतिर्दत्तः त्रिषु बहुवचनस्यार्थः स्यात् तद्योगाच्चतुरादिष्वपि वर्तते, सर्वेषु तेषु त्रिष्वमर्हतीति । नैतदप्यम यदि बहुवचनस्य त्रिष्वमर्थः स्यात् ततश्चत्वारो ब्राह्मणा इति सामानाधिकरण्यं नोपपद्यते । ब्राह्मणा इत्यस्य त्रयोऽर्थः, चत्वार इत्यस्य चत्वारः तयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं च प्राप्नोति । न हि भवति चत्वारश्च इति । एव सर्वत्र लक्षणया भविष्यति । तथा न्यग्रोधः क्षेत्रमिति । त्रिषु हि चतुष्वादीनि सादृश्याच्छब्दोक्ति रक्षरितुम् । सिध्यति । लक्षणा स्वाश्रिता भवति । किं क्रियताम्, अगत्याश्रीयते, सत्यां गतो नाश्रयितव्यः ।
[SB, p 2120 f]

paksin does not accept this proposal. For he takes his stand on *samākhyā* and points out that the word *bahu* means *vrddha* or *adhika* so that there is no *anekārthatva*, and usage shows that though *bahutva* is *sāpekṣa*, yet *bahutva* as denoted by the *bahuvacana* is *myata-sāpekṣa*, so that only *tri* and the subsequent numbers are called *bahu* as compared with *dvi*, and hence it is that they are never called *abahu*, just the *Uttara Kurus* are always *Uttara Kurus* and never otherwise, being *Daksina-kuru-sāpekṣa*. Hence it is that PANINI writes the *sūtra* as '*Bahusu bahuvacanam*' and not as '*Trisu bahuvacanam*' as he ought to have written if the *bahuvacana* meant three only. Thus the *pūrva-paksin* concludes that *bahu* means *adhika* and that this term may apply to all numbers from three onwards by *abhidhā* only, so that there is neither *anekārthatva* nor *lakṣanā*²⁴. Nor would it do, he adds, to argue that the *bāhuvacana* shows *tritva* only, when it is *nirupapada*, but it would denote the higher numbers when it is attended by some *upapada*. For we do find sentences like '*Triyo lokās trayo vedāḥ*'. And again if the *nirupapada bahuvacana* were to denote *tritva* only, there would have been no doubt what-so-ever as regards the exact number denoted by the word *kapiñjalān*, and as such there would have been no necessity to have this dis-

24 अस्ति चेय गतिर्यद्वदुत्त्व बहुवचनस्यार्थ इयात् । सर्वेऽपि ते बहव इति श्रुत्यैव सामानाधिकरणम् । यदि बहुत्व विज्ञायते, किं तद्वदुत्त्वम् । उच्यते । बहुत्व वृद्धिरपचय आधिक्यमित्यर्थः । वयं कृत्वा । बृहतिरयं वृथार्थः । तस्यैषादिक उकार प्रत्ययो बह्वर्णलोपयेति । तस्य रूपं बहुति । वृद्धमधिकमित्यर्थः । सर्वे चैते त्र्यादयोऽधिका । तस्मात्सर्वे बहुशब्दवाच्याः । नन्वापेक्षिकमेतद् बहुविधमिति । यदेव हि बहु तदेवान्वापेक्षयऽबहु भवति । सत्यमेवम् । यत्तु यदपेक्ष्य बहु न तत्तदेवापेक्ष्याबहु । तद्यथोत्तरा कुरवो दक्षिणान् कुरुनपेयोत्तरा इत्युच्यन्ते । न च ततोऽय उत्तरा देशा न सन्ति । अथ च नियतापेक्षत्वादुत्तरत्व न जहति । एव त्रिप्रभतरो द्वित्वमपेक्ष्य बहुत्व लभन्ते । न च ते कदाचिद्बहवः । — — — एव बहुवचनमिति समास्याऽन्वर्था भवति अभियुक्तवचनं च बहुवचनमिति । यदि त्रित्वं बहुवचनस्यार्थं स्यात् त्रिषु वचनमित्येव तद् ब्रूयात् । लाघवात्सन्देहात् । तस्माद् द्वित्वमपेक्ष्येते बहवः । अतोऽवस्थित, त्र्यादीनां बहुत्वम् । एव च सति नैक शब्दोऽनेकार्थो भवति । सर्वेषां च बहुस्वाङ्ग ऋद्धिलक्षणाया प्रयोगः । [SB on XI 1 38, p 2121 f]

cussion at all. We, for example, never raise any discussion regarding the *jāti* that is conveyed by this very word *kapiñjalān*²⁵. Thus the conclusion that the *pūrva-paksin* arrives at in this connection is '*Sarve trvādayah parārdhaparyantah bahuvacanasya arthah*'²⁶. The *siddāntin*, however, is not agreeable to this conclusion and points out that in such cases the sense of *bahu* shall be restricted to the least number i.e., three. Here the text enjoins the sacrificing of *bahu kapiñjulas* and this is accomplished when we sacrifice three of them. Now if the injunction is thus obeyed fully by sacrificing three only where is the necessity of going further and sacrificing more *kapiñjulas*? It can't be argued that sacrificing a greater number would yield *phala-bhūyastva* for *phala-bhūvastva* accrues from a *prayoga* which is *guru*. But this means that there must be more *kalpas* than one before we can say that some *prayoga* is *laghu* and that some other one is *guru*. But in the present case there is only one *kalpa* so that the question of comparative *guru* or *laghu* of the *kalpa*, or the *alpa* or *bhūvastva* of the *phala* does not crop up at all²⁷. On the contrary, if

25 अथोन्यते त्रिषु निरूपपद प्रयुज्यते चतुरादिपु त सोपपदम् । चत्वारो ब्राह्मणा इति । तच्च मिथ्या । त्रिष्वपि सोपपद प्रयुज्यते । यथा त्रयो लोकास्त्रयो वेदा इति । यदि च निरूपपद च त्रिष्व प्रत्याययेत् ततो वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानिन्दुक्तं विचार एवाय न प्रवर्तते । यथा अत्रैव न विचार्यते किं पित्रजला आलक्ष्येण उत मयूरा कपोता वेति । कस्य हेतो । यत् कपिञ्जलशब्दस्य न मयूरा कपोता वा वान्या । इहापि यदि बहुवचनस्य त्रित्वमेव वाच्यं स्यात् नेतरा समस्या पूर्ववद्विचार एवाय स्यात् । [SB on XI 138, p 212]

26 cf SB on MS XI 14L

27 प्रथमं वा नियम्येत कारणादतिक्रमः स्यात् । [MS XI 143]. प्रथमं वा बहुवचनं नियम्येत । किं कारणम् । न हि कश्चित्चतुर उपाददानो न त्रीनुपादत्ते । यत्कारणमनुगताख्यादयश्चतुर्षु उपात्तेषु कृतः शब्दार्थो, बहुनालभ्येति श्रुतमालम्ब्य बहवः । एव सति कारणादतिक्रमः स्यात् । यदि च यथाश्रतानुपादाने विचिदन्यत् कारणं त्रित्वातिक्रमे स्यात्ततोऽतिक्रमः । न तदस्ति । तस्मात् त्रित्वं नित्यमनं । ननु फलभूयस्त्वं कारणं भविष्यतीति । नैतदस्ति । यत्र बहवः वरूपा भूयन्ते तेषां कश्चिद्विषयः कश्चिद्गुरुः, तत्र गुरो वरूपस्यानुष्ठानान्मानं सामर्थ्यात् तदनुष्ठानमपलभ्यस्त्वमनुमोयते । यथा एका देया षड् देया द्वादश देयाः चतुर्विंशतिर्देया इति ।

one sacrifices more *kapiñja's* than three that are enjoined by *S'rutī*, one is liable to incur sin or at least *sista-vigarhanam* ²⁸ That *bahu-vacana* denotes the number three only is also shown by the text '*Kṛsnā yāmyā avaliptā raudrā nabho-rūpāḥ parjanyaḥ, tesām andrāḅno daśamah*' For it is then only that the *andrāḅna* will be the tenth as we find the three plurals used before it, would thus make nine ²⁹ The same again is shown by usage when we find that the word *madhya* is used without any specific *upapada* when the total number is greater we do get *sopapada* expression as *pañcānām madhyamah* and *astnām madhyamah* ³⁰ We must, therefore, conclude that the *bahu-vacana*, unless otherwise specified, shall denote the number three only

9 Now we come to the *vibhaktis* and *kāraḱas* about which also *S'ABARA* has much to say The *PRATHAMĀ* denotes *prātipadikārthamātra* ³¹ by *S'RUTĪ*, though by *lakṣanā* it may be conveyed something else This very idea may be negatively put by saying that an *apīathamānta pada* shall never denote *prātipadikārtha-mātra* ³ In a *SAMKHYĀ-PRADHĀNA NIRDEŚA*,

इह त्वेक एव कल्पो बहुनामालम्भः । स त्रिभिश्चतुर्गादिभिस्तुल्यः । अतस्तत्र यो लघुमुत्तृग्य गृहकल्पमातिष्ठेत तस्य फलभयस्त्व न भवितुमर्हति [SB, p 2123]

28 यथा पशुमालभेतेति श्रुत्ये महान्तं महार्घं वा पशुमालभेत न तस्य फलभयस्त्व भवति । यस्तु मासीयन् शिष्टमतिक्रामेत् स यदि तावद्वैदिकीषु द्विसासु प्रत्यवायस्तत् प्रत्यवेयात् । अवाप्रत्यवायस्तथापि शिष्टविगर्हणं च लभेत । कृते श्रुत्यर्थे मासीयन् पशून् इन्तीति । तस्मात् त्रय कपिञ्जला आलम्बय्याः । [SB on XI 1 44, p 2124]

29 यदि च त्रय एते त्रिका एव नियोगत एन्द्राग्नौ दशम सपद्यते । [SB on XI 1 45, p 2124]

30 ओदनानुद्धरतीति । तत्र मध्यमस्येति त्रयाणां निरुपपदं भवति । अन्यत्र सोपपदं पञ्चान्तं मध्यमः, अष्टानां मध्यम इति । [SB on XI 1 46, p 2124]

31 यदि कारकाभिधानमविवक्षितमिति गुणशब्देनैतेन द्वयमभिधातुमिच्छते तदा प्रातिपदिकार्यस्याव्यतिरेक इति प्रथमा विभक्तिः प्राप्नोति । [SB on III 1 12, p 866]

32 अप्रथमान्त शब्दो न कश्चिदव्यतिरिक्ते प्रातिपदिकार्थे भवितुमर्हतीति । [SB, p 866'f]

however where the *vis'esa* is for the *vis'ayana* of the *sāṃkhyā* we find that the former stands in the *prathamā*. Generally the *sāṃkhyeṣa* stands in the genitive as in 'S'advitms'atī vankrīnām'. But if the *nirdeś'a* is *sāṃkhyā-pradhāna* then the *sāṃkhyeṣa* may also stand in the *prathamā*. An illustration of this point may be found in the sentence 'Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣnumutrāḥ Parsad' ³³

10 The most important point to note about the *DAVITIYĀ* is what PĀNINI has stated in his *sūtra* 'Kartur īpsitatamam karma' which shows that *whatever is spoken of by the DAVITIYĀ IS PRADHĀNA*. This point viz the *prādhānya* of what is expressed in the accusative has been noticed and referred to by S'ABARA in several places from which it is obvious that any interpretation that loses sight of this fact about *dvitīyā* is bound to be wrong. And yet it must be observed that there are cases where the *dvitīyā* ending is applied to what is not *pradhāna*. Take, for example, texts like 'Srucam sammārṣti' and 'Agnim sammārṣti'. Here the *pūrva-paksin* argues that *sammārjana* is *adrstārtha* and hence *pradhāna*. But the *siddhānta* view is that these are *guna-karmas*. Here it is argued that because the *dravya* viz *sruc* or *agni* stands in the accusative therefore, it must be *pradhāna*, which ultimately shows that the *karma* must be *gauna* ³⁴. The *pūrva-paksin*, however cites texts like 'Sak-

33 ननु षड्विंशती इत्यभिवाने प्रथमा न प्राप्नोति । उच्यते । यदा षड्विंशतिगुणं प्राधान्येन विवक्षितो भवति तद्विशेषणार्थं सहायेयमुच्चार्यते तदा प्रथमान्ते नापि ऋक्षणाया सहया विशेष्यते ।-----यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्राः पर्यदिति । एव षड्विंशती वक्ष्य इति ।-----सह्यमुपपद्यत एव वचन षड्विंशती वक्ष्य इति । सहयाप्रधानस्त्वेव निर्देशः कृतो भवति । षड्विंशतिगुणं प्राधान्येन विवक्षितः । तद्विशेषणत्वेन वङ्कोणामुच्चारणम् वक्ष्य पुनः दृष्टौ प्रधानं, न सहया । [SB on IX 412 13, p 1772 f]

34 कार्यमात्रमेव जातीयकमपर्याप्तं यत्प्रयोजनस्य तद्धर्ममात्रमिति ब्रूम । तत्र प्रधानकर्मत्वं स्यात् । [SB on II 19, p 408]

35 द्वितीया विभक्तिः कर्तुरीप्सिततमे स्मर्यते । सा चेह द्वितीया विभक्तिः । तत एव तदीप्सिततममिति गम्यते । तच्चेटीप्सिततमवर्मं गुणभूतम् । यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षादिभिर्गुणभावो न गम्यते प्रमाणान्तरेण शब्देन गम्यते । तस्माद्गुणभूतमेव जातीयकमिति ! [SB on II 110 p 408 f]

tūn juhōti, '*Mūrutam-juhōti*', '*Ekakapālam juhōti*' in all of which the *homa-kṛiyā* is acceptedly *pradhāna* inspite of the *dvitīyā* ending of *saktus*, *mūrutas* and *ekakapālas*, which then can't but be *guna-bhūta* ¹⁶ Nor will it do to argue that such texts are to be explained away on the analogy of the *laukika vākyas* like '*Tandulān odanam pacati*' where *dvitīyā* ending is applied to *tandulas* which admittedly are *guna-bhūta* For in *laukika vākyas* the sense has to be perceived according to the intention of the speaker, which, however, is not the case with the *vaidika vākya* There the *s'abda* is the sole authority, so that what is expressed by *dvitīyā* must be accepted as being *pradhāna* ¹⁷ This view, however, has been refuted by the *siddhāntin* who shows that even in the *Veda* sometimes we have to take *dvitīyā* as standing for *trītiyā* and *vice versa* Thus in the text '*Saktūñ juhōti*' it is not possible to take *homa* as being *saktivartha*, for *saktūs* by themselves would thus be *nisprayojana*, which again would render the *homa* also *nisprayojana* If, therefore, this *nisprayojanaiva* is to be avoided we must take the *saktus* as serving the ultimate purpose by helping to perform the *homa* The *apūrvā*, it must be noted, will accrue from *homa* only and not from *saktūs* inspite of their being in the *dvitīyā* For as we have seen above if *homa* is taken as being

36 इति चेत्पश्यसि द्वितीयादर्शनस्यवानभूतमत्र द्रव्यमिति । गुणभूतेऽपि द्वितीया भवति । तथा हि दृश्यते सक्नु जुहोति मास्त जुहोति एकस्वपाल जुहोति । [SB on II 111, p 409]

37 न गुणभूतेऽपि द्वितीया । एव ह्यभियुक्ता उपदिशन्ति कर्मणि द्वितीया कर्तुंरीसिततम कर्मेति । न च लोके गुणभूते वक्चिद्वितीया पश्यम् । उदपि च तण्डुलानोदन पचति ओदनार्थं तण्डुलान्सस्त्रुर्विति ईसित्तमा एव तण्डुला । बल्वजान् शिखण्डकान्कुर्विति बल्वजा एव तेनाकारेण सबद्धा ईसिता इत्यभिप्राय । लौकिकश्च प्रयोग शब्दार्थपरिच्छेदे हेतुर्न वेदिक । यत्तु लौकिके जुहोतीति प्रथमे द्वितीया, शक्यते तत्र वक्तुमीसिततम एव स प्रयोग इति । तण्डुलानद्य जुहुधि तण्डुलानद्य होमेन सवन्वयेति । लोके भवति हि बहुप्रकारा विवक्षा । अन्यादधाने-कार्यस्वम् । तेन प्रधानभावेन सिद्धा सति द्वितीया गुणभावेन करयेत । वेदे तु कथं द्वितीयानिर्दिष्टे गुणभाव । इति । द्वितीयानिर्देशाध्याधान्यमेवादरन्ध्रम् । [SB on II 112, pp. 409-410]

saktvartha both the *saktūs* as well as the *homa* would be *nisprayojana* and thus the text would be rendered *anarthaka*. Hence we have to conclude that *dvitīvā* here only serves to bring about the *sambandha* between *saktūs* and *homa*. And as the rule goes whenever there is a *sambandha* between a *dāva* and a *karma* the former shall always be *gunabhūta* to the latter. Hence here the *saktūs* inspite of the *dvitīvā* ending have to be accepted as being *gunabhūta* to *homa*. But ordinarily it is the *tritīvā* that is used to express the idea of *gunabhūtatva*. Hence we say that in the texts under consideration we have *IRITĪYĀH STHĀNE DVI-TĪYĀ* "

11 There is another text '*Saha s'ākhayā prastaram praharati*' where the main question is as to whether *s'ākhā-harana* is *pratipatti-karma* or *artha-karma*. If *s'ākhā-harana* is the main point of the text then it shall be *pratipatti-karma* but otherwise it shall be *artha-karma*. Now as the *kāla* of the *prastara-harana* is known its mention serves to enjoin the *kāla* of *s'ākhā-harana* which is not known. This shows that the *s'ākhā-harana* with regard to its *kāla* is the main point of the text while the other is only subordinate being used to serve its purpose. But grammatically we find that *s'ākhā* is in the *tritīvā* while the *prastara* is in the *dvitīvā*, which seems to show the *gunabhāva* and the *pradhāna-bhāva* of the *s'ākhā* and the *prastara* respectively. Here, again we have to conclude that the *dvitīvā* and the *tritīvā* in the text stand for *tritīvā* and *dvitīvā* respectively for *sāmānyā* or purposefulness is stronger than *vibhakti* "

38 एवमवगते प्रवान्ये बलीयसा हेतुना नास्ति प्रवान्यमित्यवगम्यते । कुत । न होमस्य केनचित्प्रकारेण सवत्थताऽवकल्पते ।-----स एष द्वितीयान्त मन्तुर्ना होमस्य च मबन्व करोति । मबन्वे च सति द्रव्याणां कर्मसंयोगे गुणत्वेनाभि मबन्व इति । भवत्वात् । गुणभावे च तृतीया । तेनोच्यते तृतीयाया स्थाने द्वितीयेति । तेन तदर्थत्वादोमार्थत्वात्सकत्वात् न प्रवान्य द्वितीयासंयोगेऽपि । एव सत्यर्थवद्भवनम् । न चार्थवत्त्वे सत्यानर्थस्यमित्युच्यते । [SB on II 112 pp 410 12]

39 प्रतिपत्तिर्वा शाखाहरणम् ।-----द्वितीयाश्रवणात् ।-----तुल्ययोगे सदृशदोऽयम् । यदि प्रस्तर प्रहरणे प्रवान् शाखापि प्रस्तरविशेषण तर्हि तुल्ययोगः ।

This very point again is explained by ŚĀBARA in slightly different expressions while commenting on MS VI 3 44,⁴⁰ and XI 2 65⁴¹ There is one more circumstance under which *dvitīyā* stands for *trīṣṭhā* In texts like 'Sauryam carum nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmah' we know that *phala* is the *pradhāna* and that *karma* is *gunabhūta* to *phala* Hence we paraphrase such texts by 'Saurayāgena apūvam krtvā brahmavarcasam sādhayet brahmavarcasakāmah'⁴² Thus we find that *dvitīyā* stands for *trīṣṭhā* (1) in texts like 'Saktūñ juhoti' where the *ĀKHYĀ* denotes the *PRADHĀNA KARMA*, so that the *dravya* that is connected with it is bound to be *apradhāna*, or (2) in texts like 'Saha s'ākhayā prastaram praharati' where two acts are mentioned together with the help of *SAHA*, but one of these is *nirjñātakāla* (i.e. *nirjñātā-gunavis'esa*) and hence subordinate, being *kāla-laksanārtha*

तस्मात् प्रस्तरे द्वितीयार्थं स शाखायामपि । अतः शाखा प्रधानम् । ---- तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिर्न्याय्या । आह । ननु तृतीयाश्रवणापराधेन शाखोच्चारणेन भवितुं न्याय्यम् । उच्यते । भवेदेतन्न्याय्यम् यदि निज्ञातकाला शाखा स्यात् । ततः प्रस्तरस्य कालपरिच्छेदाय कीर्यमाना परार्थोच्चार्यते । इह पुनरेतद्विपरीतम् । निज्ञातकालः प्रस्तरोऽनिज्ञातकाला शाखा । तस्मात्सत्यपि तृतीयाश्रवणे प्रस्तर एव शाखायाः कालपरिच्छेत्स्यति । यथा द्वितीयानिर्दिष्टस्तथा शाखा द्रष्टव्या, यथा तृतीयानिर्दिष्टा तथा प्रस्तरः । मामर्थ्यं हि बलवत्तरम् । [SB on IV 2-11 pp 1233 f]

40 प्रस्तरस्याङ्गभूता शाखा । कतः । सह शाखायाः प्रस्तरः प्रहरतीति । सहयुक्तेऽप्रधाने तृतीयाविभक्तिर्भवति । सा च शाखायां तृतीया । तस्मात्प्रस्तरस्य शाखा गुणभूता । प्रस्तरे च द्वितीया । सहयोगे च तृतीया । तृतीया गुणतो, द्वितीया प्रधानतः । [SB on VI 4 43], ननु तृतीयाऽऽप्रधाने भवति, सा च शाखायाम् । अत्रोच्यते । यासौ शाखायां तृतीया सा द्वितीयार्थे, या च प्रस्तरे द्वितीया सा तृतीयार्थे । कथमवगम्यते । सहयोगे एकस्मिन्काले उभयमपि इदं कथमिति । अत्र यस्य निज्ञातः कालस्तस्यानुवादः । यस्य त्वनिज्ञातस्तस्य विविधः । शाखायाश्चानिज्ञातः, प्रस्तरस्य निज्ञातः । तस्य पुनरुच्चारणमनिज्ञातार्थम् । तदऽप्रधानम् । इतरस्योच्चारणं प्रधानम् । प्राधान्यं च द्वितीयार्थं तत्र तृतीया । पारार्थ्यमपि तृतीयार्थं तत्र द्वितीया । तस्मादयथार्थं विभक्तिवचनम् । [SB on VI 4 44, p 1455 f]

+1 अर्थकर्मणा ह्यस्य गुणभूतस्य सयोगो विज्ञायते तृतीयासामर्थ्यात् । प्रतिपत्तौ हि द्रव्यप्राधान्याद् द्वितीयया निरदेक्षेत । SB on XI 2-65 p 2163 f

(i.e. *gunavis'asakāśanārtha*), to the other which is *anurjñātakāla* i.e., *anurjñātagunavisesa*, and lastly (3) in texts like '*Sauryam carum nirvaped brahmavṛcasakāmah*' or '*Agnihotram jñhoti*' i.e., in a *phala-vidhi* or rather the *ADHIKĀRAVIDHI* where the *KARMA* is subordinate to *PHALA*.

12 In texts like '*Matrāvaruṇāya dandam prayacchati*' we find the accusative and the dative coming together in one text, and we ask which of these is stronger and signifies the *Pradhāna*, since both cases are used to signify the *pradhāna*. The *pūva pakṣin* counts on the above-mentioned characteristic of the *dvitīyā* and argues that *danda* which is in the *dvitīyā* is *pradhāna*, and hence that this act of giving away the *danda* is a *pratipatti-karma*. But the *siddhāntin* points out that here the *dvitīyā* is to be explained according to the *sūtra* '*Tathāvuktam cānīpstatam*' so that it does not denote what is *īpstatama* or *pradhāna*. Again the dative denotes *sampradāna* which is required even by *karma* as also for further *karmas* so that *sampradāna* is *pradhāna* while the *dandapradāna* is only *gauna*. This shows that among the two, *DAITĪYĀ* and *CAURTHĪ* the former is weaker than the latter,¹ owing to the nature of the purpose in view. In such cases *DAITĪYĀ* is to be secondarily taken as *APRADHĀNAVĀCINĪ* owing to *ARTHASĀMARTHYA* i.e., *KARISAM-YOGA*.

13 The last point to be noted in connection with the *DAITĪYĀ* is that it can never denote *ĪĀDARTHYA* which is conveyed by *CAURTHĪ* or by *taddhita*. Hence it follows that *dvitīyā* can never be used to enjoin a *devatā* which in other words means that anything that stands in the *DAITĪYĀ* can't be understood to be the *DEVATĪ* of the act spoken of in connection with it. This is stated by *S'ABARA* in his discussion on the text '*Samidho yajati*', '*Tanūnapāam yajati*'. In

43 द्वितीया च दण्डे विभक्तिस्तस्मात्प्रधान्यम् ।-----अथ यदुक्तं द्वितीयाश्रवणाद्दण्डप्रधान्यमिति । उच्यते । तथायुक्तं चानीप्सितमिति द्वितीया द्रष्टव्या । कुत । मन्त्रावरुणचतुर्थानिर्देशात् । समुदाने हि चतुर्थी भवति । सप्रदान च कर्मणा-भिप्रेत्ये । तत्र दण्डादभिप्रेततरो मन्त्रावरुण इति गम्यते । [SB on IV 2-16 17, p 1236 f]

such texts it is resolved that *samudhah* and such other things spoken of in the accusative shall be understood to be KARMA-NĀMADHEYAS ⁴¹

14. As for TRITĪYĀ we have already seen how in texts like 'Saha śākhayā prastaram praharati' TRITĪYĀ stands for DVITĪYĀ 'owing to SĀMARTHYA. The next thing that we now note is that TRITĪYĀ usually denotes PĀRĀRTHIYA and hence GUNABHŪTATVA. Thus in the text 'Istakābhur agnim cirute' we conclude that the *istakas* are *parārtha* ⁴² Another use of *trīyā* is to indicate a particular KĀLA as the *anga* of some *karma* which is already known, as explained by S'ABARA while discussing the text 'Barhīṣā vai pūrnāmāse vratam upayanti, vatsena amāvāsyāyām' where the *trīyā* ending is to be understood as being indicative of a particular *kāla* ⁴³ Another use of TRITĪYĀ is with the NIPĀTA SAHA where we have to note that the *nipāta saha* sometimes denotes *tulya-yoga*, so that in such cases both the *padārthas* that are thus connected by the word *saha* are to be understood as being on an equal

44 नात्र समिदादयश्चोद्यन्ते देवतात्वेन । कुत । द्वितीयानिर्देशात् । तद्वि-
निर्देशेन वा देवता चोद्यते चतुर्थानिर्देशेन वा । तत्र हि तादर्थ्यं गम्यते । तादर्थ्यं च
सति देवता भवति । न देवता नाम जात्या कचित् । सैव वक्ष्यचिद्रूपस्य देवता,
सैव नान्यस्य । यस्य यां प्रति तादर्थ्यं सा तस्य देवता । द्वितीया हीनिततमे कारके
भवति । तत्र न द्रव्यस्य तादर्थ्यं गम्यते । तस्मान्न द्वितीयान्तेन देवताविधानम् ।
अत्राह । तादर्थ्यं कल्पयिष्याम । यथा विष्णु यजति, वरुण यजतीति । अत्र न
विष्णुर्वरुणो वा याग । नापि यागादर्धान्तरम् । यागस्य कारकं यदोसितं तद्
द्वितीययाभिधीयते । तेन तत्र कल्प्यते तादर्थ्यम् । शब्दान्तरेण वा विहितं गम्यते ।
इह तु न शब्दान्तरविहितं, नचैव शक्यं परिकल्पयितुम् । न च यागस्य कारकत्वेन
संभवति । समिदादिशब्दकत्वात् यज्ञीनां समिदादयः शब्दा वाचका उपपद्यन्ते ।
क्रियायां चेप्सितायामिष्यते द्वितीया । यथा पाकं पचतीति । तस्मात्समिधो यज-
तीत्ययमर्थः समिधजः कर्तव्य इति । [SB on IX 260, p 1741 f]

45 इष्टकाभिरग्निं चिनुत इति तृतीयया विभक्त्या पारार्थ्यमिष्टकानामवगम्यते ।
यदि चयनमात्रमत्रोच्यते तदिष्टकासंस्कारार्थमवगम्यते । तत्र द्वितीयया विभक्त्या
संयोगः स्यात् । तृतीयया संयोगो बाध्यते । [SB on IX 1-27, p 1670 f]

46 परार्थतां चास्य योतयति विभक्तिस्तृतीया । साधकतमे हि सा भवति ।
तस्मादपि कारणं संयोगः । [SB on VI 436, p 1453]

footing, and if at all we have to assume *angāṅgrbhāva* between them we have to determine it on the strength of some such ground as the *sāmarthya* or *prayojana* of it being *nirjñāta* or *anirjñāta*. But in other case the rule for *saha* is that when two *padārthas* are brought together by the word *saha* that which is in *trīṭyā* is *gunabhūta*, while the other is *pradhāna*⁴⁷. Lastly we may note that *TRITĪYĀ* expresses generally the *KARANA* or *SĀDHANA* of the act spoken of by the *ĀKHYĀI* connected with it. Thus in texts like '*Sūktavākena prastāram praharati*' we see that *sūktavāka* is enjoined as the *karana* of *prastaraharana*⁴⁸. The same is seen again in texts like '*Udbhūdā vajta*' where *Udbhūdā* which is a *nāmadheya*, expresses *karana*⁴⁹.

15 Now we come to *CAURTHĪ* which as we have noticed above denotes *TĀDARTHYA* and hence is often used for enjoining or mentioning a *SAMBANDHA* or *DEVAIĀ*. Thus in texts like '*4dhvūdhnm hoti haranti*' we see that *caturthī* expresses *tādarthya*. In the text '*Tapte payasī dadhy ānayati vā vatsī vadevy āmukṣā vāṇbhyo vājnam*' it is possible to take *vatsī* as *devatā* as 'he *devatā* on the strength of the *taddhuta* and it is also possible to take *vājnah* as the *devatā* on the strength of *caturthī-samyoga*. But as the *taddhuta-nirdesha* is stronger than *caturthī-samyoga* it is concluded that the *devatā* enjoined in this text are *vatsī devatā* and not

47 See n 39 and n 40 on pages 158 and 159 above

48 उपदेशो वा प्रस्तरप्रहरण प्रति मन्त्रस्य स्यात् । एव श्रुतिविहितोऽथ भवति । सूक्तव केनेति करणविभक्तिसंयोगात् । इतरथा लक्षणा स्यात् । [SB on III 2 12, p 760]

49 यागेन कुर्यादिति यजेतेत्यस्यार्थः । करण हि यागः । उद्भिदाद्यपि तृतीया-निर्देशात्करणम् । तत्रोद्भिदा यागेनेति कर्मनामवेद्यत्वेन सामानाधिकरथ्यसामञ्जस्यम् । [SB on I 4 2, p 323 f]

50 चतुर्थी तादर्थ्ये भवति । होतृर्था अभ्यूनी । तथा होताऽभिप्रेयते । होत्रे सा उपकरोति । सा भक्ष्यमाणा सामर्थ्यजननस्य दृष्टस्य लाभाय । यथा च यावत्स्या च मात्रयोपकारिणी भवति तत्र चतुर्थीत्यतिरनुगृह्यते । इतरथा ह्यद्वयमान उपकारे चतुर्थीत्युक्तेर्बहि्येत । [SB on X 7 16, p 2031]

vāṇī ⁵¹ That DEVATĀNIRDEŚA as well as DEVATĀVIDHĀNA can be made with the help of CATURTHĪ has been noted by ŚĀBARA in several places both positively as well negatively ⁵² But the more general signification of *caturthī* is SAMPRADĀNA which may be *pradhāna* or *apradhāna* with reference to the *karma* according as the latter is *arthakarma* or *prati-pattikarma* It has been, time and again, noted by ŚĀBARA that *sampradāna* is more *īpṣita* than *karma* and hence *pradhāna* even with reference to the object ⁵³ This fact which generally goes by the name of the MAITRĀVARUNĀNYĀYA has been already noticed above while discussing the text 'Maitrā-varunāya dandam prayacchati' When, on the other hand, *devatā-nirdeśa* is done by it it signifies an *anga* in the form of the *devatā*

16 ABLATIVE is generally used to denote APĀDĀNA, but it may also be used to indicate KĀLASAMYOGA There is a text 'Yat pañcam ukthyāt nighrhnāti sodas'tnam' There the question is whether *ukthyāt* goes with *pañcam* or with *nighrhnāti* The *pūrvā-pakṣin* is inclined to favour the former alternative and take *ukthyāt* as *apādāna pañcamī* The *siddhāntin*, however, points out that here the *pañcamī* does not's *kāla-samyoga* as in the text '*pañcam agnyādhejāt punar ādadhāt*' But here it must be noted that it is only when it is found impossible to construe the PAÑCAMĪ as conveying the idea of *apādāna* that we should take it as conveying the idea of KĀLASAMYOGA In the text under consideration *pañcamī* is accepted as conveying the idea of *kāla-samyoga* because its construction as conveying the idea of *apādāna* leads to *kṛtsna-samyoge sat, vikalpa-samuccaya*, for if the *sodas't* the whole of it is taken from *āgravana* how is it possible to take it from *ukthya* also? ⁵⁴ In sentences like

51 See page 130 n 78 above

52 See page 130, n-77 above

53 संप्रदानं च नाम कर्मणोऽपीक्षितमादभिप्रेततरम् । [SB, p 1237]
संप्रदानं च कर्मणाभिप्रेयते । [SB, p 1237]

54 आप्रयणादेव वा गृहीतव्यं । नोक्त्यात् । कुत । यदाप्रयणाद् गृह्णाति षोडशिनमिति वचनाद् न शक्य आप्रयणात्कृत्स्नो गृह्यमाणं लब्ध्याद् गृहीतम्

'*Ghrtād yajati*' we find *PAÑCAMĪ* used in the sense of *SASTHĪ* and this use, *SABARA* points out, is sanctioned by the rule '*Aprāṇinah sasthī pañcamyarthē bhavati*'⁵⁵

17 *SAPTAMĪ* is the next *kāraka-vibhakti* that we have to note and the most general circumstance that we notice about it is that it like the *trīyā* conveys *gunabhūtatva* *Trīyā* conveys the idea of *karana* or *sādhana* while the *SAPTAMĪ* conveys the idea of *ās'raya* or *ādhāra* or *adhukarna*⁵⁶ In *laukika vākyas* like '*Svāgāre gāvo vāsyantām*' or '*Prāvāre kusumāni*' we do find the *saptamī* ending applied to *pradhānabhūta* also But as has been already noted a *laukika vākya* differs from a *Vaidika vākya* in this that the former deals with the *vidita arthas* and hence their sense depends upon the *vivaksā* of the speaker, while the latter deals with *avidita arthas* and hence in their case we have to depend solely on *ś'abda* Hence though in some *laukika vākyas* *saptamī* may be found to be used to convey the *pradhānabhūta padārthas* also, yet in *Vaidika vākyas* it can't but be taken as conveying *gunabhūtatva* of the *padārthas*⁵⁷ that are expressed by it While

इति । अगतिका ह्येता गतिर्यः कृत्स्नसयोगे सति विकल्पसमुच्चयौ स्याताम् । सस्या हि गतौ न तावाश्रयणीयौ स्त । अस्ति चात्र गति । यथम् । परावशब्दस्य देशवाचिनात् । दिग्देशकालवचनो हि परावशब्दो भवति । तथा सम्युक्त्यापरावचमिति सबन्धो भवेत्यति, न कृत्स्नसयोगो विरोक्त्यते । यथा परावचमस्यावेद्यात् पुनरादधातीति कलसयोगे पञ्चमी, नापादाने । एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB on X 5 47, 1963]

55 अग्निनिध पट्टो पञ्चम्यर्थे भवति । यथा शाकस्य देहि, शाक देहीति । तथा वक्त्रित् तृतीयार्थे—घृतस्य यजति, घृतेन यजति । पञ्चम्यर्थे—घृतायजति, घृतस्य यजतीति । द्वितीयार्थे वा—सोमस्य पिबति, सोम पिबति, सोमात् पिबतीति । [SB on MS IV 2-3, p 1226 f]

56 सप्तमी हि विभक्तिराधारे भवति । आधारश्च क्रियायास्तत्कारकाणां च विशिष्टानां वारणे वर्तते । तस्माद् गुणभूत । [SB XI 2 68, p 2165]

57 ननु प्रधानभूतेऽपि सप्तमी भवति । यथा स्वागारे गावो वास्यन्तां प्रावारे कुसुमानीति । भवति यत्र प्रमाणान्तरेण द्रव्य विदितम् । यत्र तु शब्दगम्य एवार्थस्त्र गुणभावो युक्त । यत्कारण कारकविभक्तिरियम् । कारक च क्रियार्थं भूतत्वात् । भूतमव्ययो समुच्चारे हि भूत मव्यर्थं भवति । दृष्टार्थत्वात् । अव्यस्य तु

discussing texts like 'Kavatīsu stuvate' Ś'ABARA has expressly stated that *kavatīs* can't be *karana* of the act of *stuvāṅ*, since they are expressed by the locative. For what is *karana* is always expressed by the *trīyā*⁵⁸. In cases, however, where the usual senses of *ādhāra* etc. are found to be inapplicable, the *SAPTAMĪ* may be understood as conveying the idea of *nimitta*. This has been declared by Ś'ABARA in his commentary on MS V 1 33⁵⁹. Thus we have seen that *saptamī* may convey the ideas of *ādhāra*, or *kāla* or *nimitta*.

18 We must, however, note that there are cases where the *saptamī* has to be taken as serving the purpose of mere *nirdeśa*. Take, for example, sentences like 'Odane dadhu dattvā abhyavahartavyam'. Here we find that *odana* is merely *nirdista*, and that its *adhikaranatva* is not *vivaṁsita*⁶⁰. Take another sentence 'Rukmapātryām samāhāryā manayah, eko bhāgo Devadattasya, rajatapātryām suvarnam nihitam aparo bhāgo Viṣnumitrasya'. Here we take the sentence to mean that the shares include the *pātrīs* also which are *ādhārabhūta*. They are not *viḥita*, but only *anuvāda-bhūta*. This sentence is *vibhāga-viśeṣa-pada* and hence the *saptamīyārtha* is understood as being *anuvāda* only. Similarly in the text 'S'ṛte carum, dadhan carum etc.' the *saptamī* ending of the expressions *s'ṛte* and *dadhan* are to be taken as *anuvāda-bhūta* and hence *s'ṛta* and *dadhu* should be taken as going to the *devatā* along with the *carus* just as the *pātrīs*

भूतार्थत्वेऽदृष्टार्थता कल्या स्वात् । न च दृष्टे सर्वदृष्टकल्पना सम्भवति ।
[SB on XI 2 67, p 2164 f]

58 सप्तमीश्रुतिसंयोगो भवति कवतीषु स्तुवते, शिपिविष्टवतीषु स्तुवत इति । यदि स्तुति तत कवत्यक्षरेषु आहिता, यदि प्रकाशन ततो देवतायाम् । तत्र करण तृतीययाऽश्रोभ्यत् । न सप्तम्या । [SB on II 1 24, p 428]

59 कालस्य निमित्तत्वात् । तदपायेऽश्रुतमेव सर्वं क्रियेत । निमित्तं चानुपादेयत्वेन श्रवणात् । सप्तमी आधारादिष्वसंभवाभिहितसप्तमी द्रष्टव्या । [SB on V 1-33, p 1308]

60 यद्यपि सप्तमीनिर्दिष्ट सप्तम्यर्थस्याभिहितत्वाभिर्देशमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । यथौदने दधि दत्त्वाऽन्यदहर्तव्यमित्यौदनस्य निर्देशमात्रं विवक्ष्यते नाधिकरणत्वम् । एवमिहापि, द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB on IX 4 32, p 1786]

go to *Devadatta* and *Viṣnumitra* along with the 1 shares⁶¹ This very principle is stated by S'ABARA again at MS VI 5 3 and VI 5 24

19 Having upto now dealt with the *karaka vibhaktis* let us now turn to *kāraka* in general The most important point that we have to note about the *kāraka* is that it is *always connected with kṛiyā* For *kāraka* is required by *kṛiyā* only and never by a *dravya*⁶² Hence it is that any word standing in any one of *kāraka vibhaktis* i.e. from *prathamā* to *pañcamī* and *saptamī* has to be construed with the verb In the text '*Caturō musīḥ nirvapati caturah*' is to be connected not with *musīḥ* but with *nirvapati*⁶³ Similarly in the text '*Hiraṇmayau prākāśau adhvaryave dadāti*'⁶⁴ *prākāśau* goes not with *adhvaryave* but with

61 विभाग कर्तव्य इति । पूर्ववाक्यवृत्त श्रेया तद्व्याख्यानमभेदिति । तदनन्तरं विभागविशेषपरमिदं भवति वाक्यम् । य एषविष्टास्तानिन्द्राय प्रदाशे दधत्स्व, येऽणिष्टास्तान् विष्णवे क्षिपिविष्टाय शृते चरमिति । अत्राविशेषाद्दधिपयसोरपि विभागो वक्तव्यः । यदि च दधिपयसी विभक्त्ये सतः ऽर्णतार्थेऽप्युच्छेदात् ततो भिद्येत वाक्यम् । अतो नैतयो ऽर्णतार्थे विधानम् । अविवोदमाने च सप्तम्यर्थे प्रातिपदिकार्थो देवतया सम्बन्धते । वाक्यसामर्थ्यादुभे च दधिपयसी देवतया सम्बन्धयेते चक्षुषा सह । दधनि चक्षुषोऽको भाग इन्द्राय प्रदाशे भवतीति । यथा विभज्यमानेषु नानाद्रव्येषु उच्येत—हन्मपयस्या समाहार्या मणय एको भागो देवदत्तस्य । रजतपात्र्या सुवर्णं निहितम्, अपरो भागो विष्णुमित्रस्येति । सह पात्रीभ्यां द्वौ भागौ गम्येते । विभागविशेषपरत्वाद्वाक्यस्य । पात्रयोश्च विभक्तत्वात् । अनुवादश्च सप्तम्यर्थो गम्यते । एवमिहापि विभागपरत्वादेव वाक्यस्यास्य, विभक्तत्वाच्च दधिपयसोः एको भाग इति गम्यते । अर्थप्राप्तत्वाच्च सप्तम्यर्थोऽनुवादो भविष्यति । तस्मात्प्रदानार्थे दधिपयसी । [SB on IX 4-41, p 1790]

62 क्रियासंबन्धे हि द्वितीया विभक्तिर्भवति । वचम् । कारकविभक्तिर्हि सा । कारकं च क्रियाया एव भवति, न द्रव्यस्य । [SB on X 2-65 p 1857]. द्वितीया कारकविभक्तिः सामर्थ्यादेवाख्यातेन सम्बन्धते न नाम्ना । [SB on X 3 63 p 1898]. कारकविभक्तिर्हि द्वितीया । साऽऽख्यातेन सम्बन्धते । [SB, 1930], कारकविभक्तिरियम् । कारकं च क्रियार्थं भूतत्वात् । [SB on XI 2 66, p 2164]

63 cf SB on X 2 64

64 cf SB on X 3 63 64

dadāu The same is the case with texts like 'Sauryam carum nirvapet brahmavarcaśakāmah where *saurya* goes with *nirvapet* and not *carum*⁶⁵ Thus though the *kāraka vibhakti* always helps the *kriyā*, yet it does not mean that all *kārakas*, because they serve only one purpose apparently, are the same We have to recognize a distinction among them, for we find that each *kāraka* has its own way of helping the *kriyā* so that no *kāraka* can be rightly said to be identical with any other *kāraka*⁶⁶ This very principle has been enunciated by ŚABARA in another place where he points out that though both *yajamāna* and *adhvaryu* are used as subjects of *yajate* yet what is meant by *yajate* in the case of the *yajamāna* is the performance of the *yājamāna padārthas* while in the case of the *adhvaryu* the performance of the *ādhvaryava padārthas* alone is meant by that word⁶⁷ Thus though *kāraka* is connected with *karma* or *kriyā* it must be noted that it is connected with *karma* only but not *karmaguna* also⁶⁸ We should also note that the *kārakas* can't be connected with one another by *viśesana-viśeṣya-bhāva* There is a text 'Apsu avabhrithena caranti' where the word *apsu* can't be construed with *avabhrithena* because both the words stand in the *kāraka vibhakti* Hence it is that we have to construe both the words as going with the verb *caranti*⁶⁹

65 cf SB on X 4-25

66 सर्वाणि च प्रधानस्योपकृत्य, भिन्नानि च कार्याणि कुर्युः । तद्यथा कारकाणि कर्त्रादीनि सर्वाणि तावत् क्रियाया उपकुर्वन्ति, अथ च प्रतिकारक क्रियाभेद' [SB on XI 17, p 2105]

67 प्रतिकारक क्रियाभेद । यजमानानव पदार्थान् परिक्रियादीन् कुर्वन् यजते इत्युच्यते यजमान । आध्वर्यवानेव कुर्वन्पर्युर्जतीत्येवमुच्यते । यस्य च कारकस्य य आरम्भीयो व्यापार स एकवचने विवक्षिते एकेन कर्तव्यो भवतीति । एव चेशावान व्यापारो यजमानस्य स तावान् न सम्यक् कर्तव्यः । [SB on VI 117, p 1362]

68 कारकस्य च कर्मणा सबन्धो न कर्मगुणेन । [SB on XI 2-2, p 2136]

69 न होतद्वचनमप्यवबृथ इति । कथं तर्हि । अप्सु अवबृथेनेति । द्वे अपि पदे कारकवचने । न च विशेषणविशेष्यता । उभयोश्चरन्तीति क्रियाया सबन्धो न नियन्त्रन्तीति प्रयोग उच्यते । तस्मात् प्रयोगाद्गमापः । [SB on X 6 25, 25, p 1998]

20 Now we take up the text '*Samsava ubhe kuryāt apactāṁ ubhe kuryāt*' where the question is whether *brhad* and *rathantara sāmāns* are to be used together or severally. The *pūrva-pakṣin* takes his stand on *laukika* experience and argues that when we say that *Devadatta* and *Yajñadatta* are cooking we mean that one of them is doing some portion of it while the other is doing the rest. Similarly here *rathantara* may be used in some portion of the *sava* and *brhad* in the rest.⁷⁰ But the *siddhāntin* points out that when the things thus mentioned are *puṣpa-savvapekṣa* we should rather take it that they help the *kriyā* together than severally. For just as the text tells that they should help the *kriyā*, so also it tells us that they should do it together. As for the *laukika* experience noticed above we should note that there the two persons do the *kriyā* severally because it is impossible for them to do it together. Thus even there the text does enjoin the *sāhitya*, but it is not literally obeyed since it is impossible to do so. Hence the conclusion is that both the *sāmāns* should be used together.⁷¹

21 The last thing that we note about the *kāraka* is the rule about the *vacana* viz. that if the *vacana* is *vivakṣita* then the *kāraka-vyāpāra* is to be performed by one agent only and so on

70 प्रवानक्रियापेक्षमनयो साहित्यम् । तत्र व्यस्तयोरपि क्रियमाणयो साहित्यं न विरुध्यते । यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयो वाक्नेन समस्तयोरपि सयोगे उत्थमाने एकं किञ्चित् करोति, अपरोऽपि किञ्चित् । न यदेवेन कृतं तदेवापरं करोति । तद्वदेकं सामं किञ्चिस्तोत्रमभिनिर्वर्तयिष्यति, द्वितीयमाद्यपरम् । प्रवानोपकारापेक्षं साहित्यमिति समस्तसयोगोऽपि न विरोक्ष्यते । [SB on X 6 25, p 1998]

71 तत्राभिधीयते । यत्र परस्परसव्यपेक्षयोर्द्योगो भवति तत्रैतदेव न्याय्यम् । येन क्रियावयवेनारम्भेण मध्येनावसानेन वा योगे तेन सहितयो, न पृथक् । कुत । यवानेनोपकर्तव्यमित्यवगम्यते एवमितरसहितेनेति । यत् लोके वारवासामस्त्ये अभिहिते भदेन व्यापारदर्शनमिति । अथासम्भवादसौ । न हि उखाया-मविश्रीयमाणयां मयोजविषयणं शक्यते कर्तुमित्यर्थविरोधान्न करोति । न तु शब्देनासौ तत्र न चोदित । यत्कर्तव्यं तत्त सहिताभ्यामेव नान्यथा । इह तु नासम्भवः । [SB on X 6 25, p 1998]

according to the *vacana* of the word in that *kāraḥa-vibhakti* ⁷² But how is *kāraḥa-kārtha* conveyed? S'ABARA declares that it is conveyed by *vibhakti* *Vibhakti-pratyaya* conveys the *vacana* no doubt, but along with it it also conveys the *kāraḥa-kārtha* so that if in some cases the *vacana* is not *vivakṣita* yet this 'circumstance will not lead to the *ānarthakya* of the *vibhakti*, for in such cases the *vibhakti* shall serve the purpose of conveying the *kāraḥa-kārtha* ⁷³ Thus in the text '*Graham sammārsi*' as we have already noted above the *ekatva* of *graham* is *avivakṣita* But the *vibhakti* of that word is useful because it yields the *kāraḥa-kārtha* and thus brings about the *sambandha* between the *graha* and the *mrj-kriyā*, so that we arrive at the sense that the *mrj-kriyā* is to be performed with reference to *graha* i.e. all *grahas* and not the *ekatvavisiṭa graha*

22 Now there remain only two *vibhaktis* which are not *kāraḥa-vibhaktis*, the *sasthi* and the *sambodhana* Of these the former is used to convey the idea of *sambandha* This point of distinction between *sasthi* on the one hand and the other *vibhaktis* on the other has been very clearly explained by S'ABARA in his commentary on MS III 1 12 *Kāraḥa-lakṣṇa vibhakti* is expressive of *kriyāsambandha* while *sasthi* is expressive only of *guṇa-sambandha* ⁷⁴ It is on this principle that *stotra* and *s'astha* have been declared to be *pradhāna-karmāṇi* For we find texts like '*Indrasya nu vīryam prāvocaṃ*' where the *sasthi vibhakti* is expressive of *sambandha*

72 यस्य च कारकस्य य आत्मीयो व्यापार स एकवचने विवक्षिते एकेन कर्तव्यो भवतीति । [SB on VI 1 17, p 1362]

73 अपि च न विभक्तेर्वचनमेवैक प्रयोजनम् । किं तर्हि । कारकसम्बन्धोऽपि ॥ अविवक्षिते एकत्वे कारकसम्बन्धवार्थमस्योच्चारण भविष्यति । तस्मान्नानर्थकम् । [SB on III 1 14, p 723]

74 वा पुन क्रियासम्बन्धस्य वाचिका (विभक्ति) वा वा गुणसम्बन्धस्येति । कारकलक्षणा क्रियासम्बन्धे विवक्षिते भवति द्वितीयादि । अविवक्षिते पुन कारके सम्बन्धमात्रविवक्षायां पठ्यते । [SB on III 1 12, p 688]

between *devatā* and *stuti*⁷⁵ While discussing the text '*Yūpasya svarum karoti*' S'ABARA points out that here the *svaru* must be construed as coming from the *yūpa-kāstha* only. For if the *chedana-kriyā* were meant for both the *yūpa* as well as the *svaru* then there would be no *sambandha* between the two and then we should not have the genitive *yūpasya*. This shows that the genitive ending must be construed as expressing *sambandha*⁷⁶ Another peculiarity that S'ABARA has noticed about the *sasthī* is that when applied to a word meaning an inanimate object it may convey the sense of the *dvitīyā*, *trītiyā*, or even *pañcamī* '*Sākasya dehi*', '*Ghrītasva yajati*', and '*Somasya pibati*' may serve as illustrations in point.⁷⁷

23 As regards the *sambodhana* it is needless to note that it is used for *anuvacana* or *sambodhana*. But it must be observed that it may also sometimes be used to convey mere *nirdeśa* also which ultimately would convey *stuti*.⁷⁸

75 अपि वा प्रधानकर्मणी स्तोत्रशब्दे स्याताम् । कुत । श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।—
अपि च श्रुतिसंयोगो भवति षष्ठीविभक्तिसंयोगः । यथा इन्द्रस्य तु वीर्याणि प्रबोध्यमिति ।
तेन देवताशब्दः स्तुतिसंबन्धार्थं इत्युच्यते । देवताभिधानार्थं प्रतिपदिकार्यत्वात्
प्रथमा स्यात् । [SB on II 1 24, p 428]

76 यूपमनुनिष्पन्नो वा गृह्येत स्वरः । तदङ्गदेशो हि सः । षष्ठीनिर्देशात्
यूपस्य स्वरं करोतीति । यदि हि छेदनमुभयार्थं स्यात् न स्वरयूपयोः कश्चित्संबन्धो
भवेत् । तत्र षष्ठी नोपपद्येत । अस्ति तु षष्ठी । तस्माद्यूपैकदेशः स्वरः । अवयवो
यूपस्य स्वरुर्नामैकदेशः कर्तव्यः यथा पुरोडाशशकलमिति । [SB on IV 2 3,
संक्षेपार्थं, p 1228 f]

77 See n 55 above

78 यस्यापि चैव पक्षो विग्रहवानिन्द्र इति तस्यापीन्द्रशब्देनामन्त्रेण संबोध-
नार्थम् । संबोधनमनुवचनाय । तत्र सङ्गः इत्यवगतेऽनुवचनं न्याय्यम् । न चासौ
केनचित्प्रकारेण सङ्गः इत्यवगम्यते । अनवगते संबोधनं व्यर्थम् । वचनप्रामाण्यात्
संबन्धत इत्येव गम्यत इति चेत् उक्तम् । अदृष्टकल्पनायां हस्तादिवत्पनानुपपत्ति-
रिति । न चासौ संबुद्ध इत्यवधार्यते । प्रमाणाभावात् । तस्मात् संबोधनवचनं न
संबोधनाय, निर्देशार्थमेव । अविग्रहपक्षेऽपि तन्निर्देशार्थमेव भविष्यति । तन्नामन्त्रित-
विभक्तिवचनं स्तुतये । एवमिदं देवतास्य साधकितुतमं दृच्छेत्तादिवत् संबुध्य

24 * Our discussion regarding the *kāraka* and *vibhaktis* can't be complete if it does not include observations on the *prātipadika* and *sāmānādhikaranyā*. As for the former we have already seen that *prātipadikārtha* is conveyed by *vibhakti* which also conveys the *prātipadikārtha-samkhyā*. It is this *vibhakti* that brings about the *sambandha* between the *prātipadikārtha* and a *kriyā* if the *vibhakti* is a *kāraka vibhakti*. But if the *vibhakti* is *sasthi* it shows *prātipadikārtha* as being *vis'esana* to *para-padārtha* as is seen in texts like 'Devasya tvā savituh prasave etc.' * We may also note that the *strī-pratyaya* is *vis'esana* to the *prātipadika* so that it may not be connected with any other *padārtha*. For the rule is that a *vis'esana* shall not be connected with any *padārtha* save its *vis'esya* ⁶⁰. The affixing of the *strī-pratyaya* may show that the *prātipadika* is intended to be feminine, but it must also be remembered that if the *prātipadika* is a *guna-vacana s'abda* its gender is got at by the force of its *vis'esya* and as such can't be *vivaksita*. It should also be noted that though it is true that a *prātipadika* denoting a female takes the feminine affix, yet it is not right to argue that because a *prātipadika* has taken a feminine affix, therefore it must be a *dravya-vacana s'abda*, i.e. a noun of the feminine gender. It is also possible that the *prātipadika* may be only a *guna-vacana s'abda*. For we know that *gunavacana s'abdās* take the *linga* and *vacana* of their *vis'esyas*. Thus in the text 'Arunayā pūṅkṣyā ekahāyanyā etc.' it is not possible to argue that *arunayā* is a *dravyavacana s'abda* and hence can easily be connected

सावयतीति चेतनादिवहुपचर्यमाण सञ्चुद्धिशब्देनामच्यते । तथा संबोधनशब्देन निर्दिश्योच्यते, गृहीतवन्तो वय तव हस्तम्, त्वदाश्रया ववमिस्त्वर्थ । अस्माभिरिन्द्रकर्म कर्तव्यमिस्त्येतदनन स्मार्यते । [SB on IX 19, p 1654]

79 सवित्रादय परविशेषण विभक्तिश्रुत्या क्रियन्ते । प्रातिपदिकार्थरतु अव्यतिरिक्त इति गम्यते । तत्र लिङ्ग श्रुत्या बाध्यते ।-----विभक्तिश्रुतिस्तु प्रातिपदिकार्थं पदार्थान्तरविशेषण ज्ञापयति [SB on IX 137, p 1682 f]

80 अपि च नैवात्र विवदितव्यम् । प्रातिपदिकविशेषण हि स्त्रीशब्दः । कियथा यत् प्रातिपदिक वर्तते ततश्चाबाधय इति । न विशेषणस्य पदोत्तरेण संबधो भवति । यथा राजपुत्री गच्छतीति । [SB on IX 137, p 1676]

with the *kṛaya* We must admit it as only *guṇa-s'abda* and, because it is *amūrta*, connect it with the *kṛaya* through the *dravya-s'abda* viz *ekahāyanyā* which we find nearby⁸¹

25 As regards the *balābala* of the *prātipadikārtha* and the *vibhaktyārtha* S'ABARA remarks that the former is *pradhāna* whereas the latter is *apradhāna* For *vibhakti* after all denotes some particular aspect of the *prātipadikārtha*, and also because *vibhaktyārtha* can't stand independently of the *prātipadikārtha* This naturally leads us to conclude that '*Yatra prātipadikārthas tatra vibhaktyartho bhaviṣyati*'⁸²

26 Coming to the *sāmānādhikaranya* we find S'ABARA stating that *sāmānādhikaranya* is *perceived from ekavibhakti-murdesa*⁸³ It is hence that in texts like '*Svāhākāram yajati*' *svāhākāra* and such other words in the *dvitīvā* are construed as being *sāmānādhikarana* to *vāgu* And hence it is further argued that acts enjoined by such

81 ननु नैवाय गुणवचन । किं तर्हि । द्रव्यवचन । कुत । स्त्रीलिङ्ग-सम्बन्धात् । द्रव्यविशेषा ह्येते स्त्री पुमान् नपुमकमिति । स्त्रियां यत्प्रातिपदिकं वर्तते तस्मात् स्त्रीप्रत्ययो भवतीति । स्त्रीप्रत्यय चारण्येऽनुपलभ्यमाने । तस्माद् द्रव्यवचनोऽरुणाशब्द इति । तदपेक्षलम् । तदेव हि द्रव्यमरुणिमन्ना परिच्छिद्यमानमरुणाशब्दाभिधानीयतां लभते । तदेवान्यगुणक नारुणाशब्द शङ्कोत्यभिविदितुम् । अरुणि मानमेव शब्दो न व्यभिचरति । व्यभिचरति पुनर्द्रव्यम् । अव्यभिचारि च कारण कारणवतामिष्टम् । अतोऽस्य गुण स्वार्थ इति गम्यते । तदस्य प्रत्यक्षतो गुणवचनता गम्यते । स्त्रीप्रत्ययदर्शनात् नूनमरुणाप्रातिपदिकं द्रव्यवचनमित्यनुमानम् । प्रत्यक्ष चाऽमानादवलीय । तस्माद् गुणवचन । कथं तर्हि स्त्रीप्रत्ययसम्बन्ध । भवति हि गुणवचनस्यापि स्त्रीलिङ्गता । यथा चारुणा बुद्धि एवमरुणेति । etc [SB on III 1 12, pp 681-685]

82 गुणैव न्यायकल्पना स्यादिति न प्रधाने । गुणश्च विभक्त्यर्थः । प्रधानं प्रातिपदिकार्थः । प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेषो विभक्त्याभिधीयते । सति प्रातिपदिकार्थे विभक्त्यर्थेन भवितव्यम् । ————— दर्शयति प्रातिपदिकार्थस्तत्र विभक्त्यर्थो भविष्यति । [SB on IX 3 15, p 1753]

83 अन्तरेणापि षष्ठीमेकविभक्तिनिर्देशात् सामानाधिकरण्यमवगमिष्यामः । यथा नीलमुत्पलमिति । [SB on III 1 12, p 685]

texts must be accepted as being *samskāra karmas* and not *ārūd-upakāraka karmas*⁸¹ Thus *Sāmānādhikārya* is also a means of stating the meanings of words. This is what can be clearly seen in sentences like '*Ayam Devadattah*' where the *sāmānādhikārya* between *ayam* and *Devadattah* helps us to connect the *samjñā* viz *Devadatta* with the *samjñi* viz the man himself.⁸² Sometimes the *sāmānādhikārya* helps us to know the *guna-mukhya-bhāva* also. Thus texts like '*Dars'apūrnāmāsūbhyām yajeta*' we see that here is *sāmānādhikārya* between *dars'apūrnāmāsau* on the one hand and the *yāga* on the other. But *trītyā* shows *pārūthva* or *gunatva* so that *yāga* being *sāmānādhikārya* with *dars'apūrnāmāsau* has to be taken as being *parārtha*. The whole text thus means '*Dars'apūrnāmāsāyāgābhyām anyat kimapī kuryāt*'⁸³ In texts like '*Indra āgaccha, Hariva āgaccha* etc.' the *sāmānādhikārya* would make *Indra* possessed of all the qualities like *harivattā*. But secondarily this may also be construed as conveying *stuti*. This is again what we find in sentences like '*Indro Brahaspati Devadattah*'⁸⁴

27 In all these cases we find that the *sāmānādhikārya* can be directly accounted for. Such, however, is not the

84 यागसामानाधिकरण्यं च द्वितीयया गम्यते । तस्मादागवचनं स्वाहाकार-
शब्दो यथा समिदादय इति । आह । यदि द्वितीयया सयोगात् तं यागवचनं मन्त्रसे
आरादुपकारकस्तर्हि यागः । ईप्सितमे हि द्वितीया विभक्तिर्भवति । इति । अत्रोच्यते ।
एवमेव प्राप्ते वदामः तन्न्यायत्वादिति । स एव न्याय इह यः स्वाष्वाहुतौ । अपि
वा शेषभूतस्वात्तस्स्कारः प्रतीयेतेति । [SB on X 114, p 1810 f]

85 अतः प्रसिद्धवदाचारात्सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनाच्च अयमस्यार्थः इति निश्ची-
कते । लोकेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यप्रयोगाद्वा आचाराद्वा अर्थविज्ञानं भवति । यथा अयं
देवदत्त इति । [SB on X 6 23, p 1997]

86 यागः कर्मश्रुतिर्दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिति । सा परार्था, तृतीयायोगात् । तथा
सामानाधिकरण्यायजेतेति यजिरपि परार्थ एव । तदेतदेवमापद्यते दशपूर्णमासयागे-
नान्यत् किमपि कुर्यादिति । [SB on X 6 23]

87 अधोच्यते अस्मादेव सामानाधिकरण्यवचनादिरे एते गुणा विद्यन्ते इति ।
तत्र । अविद्यमानेष्वपि स्तुरत्यास्य सामानाधिकरण्यवचनमुपपद्यते एव । यथा इन्द्रो
वृद्धस्यतिर्देवदत्त इति । [SB on IX 1 42]

case with texts like 'Somena yajeta' where we see the *sāmānādhikarānya* between *soma* and *yāga*. But how can this *sāmānādhikarānya* be accounted for? Here we see that for want of any better alternative we have to explain the *sāmānādhikarānya* by resorting to *matvartha-lakṣaṇa* and paraphrase the text by 'Somavatā yāgena īstam bhāvayet'. In texts like 'Udbhidā yajeta', however, we avoid this *matvartha-lakṣaṇa* by taking the word *Udbhid* as *karmānāmadheya*.

28 As regards the finite verbs we find that S'ABARA has to give us good information not only about the *vidhyartha* but also regarding some other tenses and moods and also about the *padas*. But before taking up these, we note one observation that S'ABARA has made regarding the *dhātvartha* and the *pratyayārtha*. In his commentary on MS IX 11 he remarks that *dhātvartha* can have no *ākāṅkṣā* for *dharma*s or vice versa. It is the *pratyayārtha* that has expectancy for *īkṛtavyatā* ⁸⁸. Of the tenses SABARA has noted only two the future and the present. The former he declares, can be understood as being *prarocanārtha*. Thus we may say that a young calf will yield abundant milk and good bulls and cows just by way of praise ⁸⁹. As for the present the most important point to bear in mind is that it can't taken as enjoining an act ⁹⁰. It, therefore, naturally follows that it

88 न हि धात्वर्थस्य धर्माणां च परस्परैकाकांक्षा विद्यते । प्रत्ययार्थेन हीति-
कर्तव्यता कल्प्यते, कर्तव्य कथमिति, न यजिः कीदृश इति । [SB on IX 11,
p 1639], प्रयोगवचनेनैते प्रत्ययार्थेन सम्बध्यन्ते । स हि साकांक्षो न धात्वर्थः ।
[SB, p 1640]

89 इति चेद्भवान्मन्यते नैकह्यन्यामेते समवेतानर्थानिबद्ध्यन्तीति । भवेदेत-
देव यद्येकह्यन्या इमे गुणा न भवेयुः । कालान्तरे तु तस्या उपपद्यन्ते, न साण्डस्य ।
भविष्यत्कालवचना अप्येते प्ररोचनायां भवन्ति । [SB on IX 1 43, p 1691]

90 नात्र विविगम्यते वर्तमानकालप्रत्ययनिर्देशात् । [SB, p 240], न हि
विवानशब्दोऽस्ति, अक्ता शर्करा उपपद्यतीति वर्तमानकालनिर्देशात् । [SB
p 367], वर्तमानापदेश एष, न विवायक । [SB p 946], नात्र विधिविभक्ति-
वर्तमानापदेशोऽग्रम् । [SB p 1215]

must be of the nature of an *anuvāda* or an *arthavāda* ⁹¹ Thus the texts like '*Yad āṅkte caksureva tad bhūtrvyasya vṅkte*' can't be understood as being *phala-vidhis*. They are rather to be taken as *phā'arthavādas* ⁹². In texts like '*Ubhayīr dadāti*' the *varitamānakāla* is *bhūtānūvādamātra*. In texts like '*Upas'āyo yūpo bhavati*' the *varitamānakāla* is to be understood as being *lā'varita*, and as referring to *gunas* or *samskāras* ⁹³. Sometimes the present may be taken as conveying *pras'amsā* or *stuti* when we find that it comes into conflict with *pratyakṣa*. This is best illustrated in text like '*Yasya parnamayī juhūrbhavati na sa pāpam ślokaṁ śṛnoti*'. This and such other statements containing a statement of *phala* have to be taken as *arthavādas* for want of any *vidhāyikā vibhakti*. And in *arthavāda vākyas*, as we shall see later on, *avartamāne varitamāna śabda* can convey *pras'amsā* alone. This very principle is again stated by

91 ता उभयीर्ददातीति नात्र विधिविभक्तिरस्ति । वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम् । प्रमाणान्तरमादायायमयमर्थं प्रापित ।—तदेतद्भूतानुवादमश्रम् । [SB on X 3 32, p 1878 f], नात्र वचनं यूप कर्तव्य इति, वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम् । ननु वर्तमानापदेशोऽपि न घटते सस्काराणामभावे । उच्यते । भक्त्या भविष्यति । यथा यजमानो वै यूप इति । तत्र सादृश्यात्, इह पुन कथमिति । उच्यते । गुणानामभिमानत्वात् ।—एवमेकदेशेनापि सस्काराणां सस्कृत इति स्तुत्याभिधीयते । [SB on VII 3 34, p 1535 f]

92 वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम्, नचायमर्थो वर्तमान । तस्मान्न खादिरस्रुवादि-सद्भावे तत्फलं भवेत् । तदेवमावर्तते । असत्यपि भवति वा न वेति । खादिरादौ सति भवति तत्फलं, नापि भवति । नैव विज्ञायते कुतस्तत्फलमिति । तस्मादेवजातीय-यूपेऽप्यवर्तितेषु न क्वचिदप्रवृत्ते न कुतश्चिद्वृत्तिरित्यानर्थक्यमक्रियार्थत्वात् । अर्थवादश्चे चावर्तमाने वर्तमानशब्द प्रशस्य उपपत्स्यते । [SB on IV 3 2, p 1247], अथ यदुक्तं यथा यस्य खादिर स्रुवो भवतीत्येवमादिषु फलश्रुतिरर्थवादो भवत्येवमिहापि स्यादिति । युक्तं तत्र फलार्थवाद फलविषयसम्भवात् फलार्थवाद-सम्भवाच्च । तदुक्तं द्रव्यसंस्कारकर्मसु परार्थत्वात्फलश्रुतिरर्थवाद स्यात् । [SB on IV 3 19, 1258]

93 See n 91 above [SB on X 3 32, p 1878 f]

94 See n 91 above [SB on VII 3 34, p 1535 f]

S'ABARA in his commentary on MS IX 19 and VIII 26 ⁹⁵ Slightly different, however, is the case with texts like 'Durvarnosya' *bhrātṛvvo bhavati* which is discussed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS III 4 23 In this connection S'ABARA points out that just as in the *Prajāpati vr̥tata* we have to connect the main *vidhi* with the *phala-vākya* similarly here also we have to connect the main *vidhi* with the *phala-vākya* For otherwise there would crop up *ānarthakya* Thus in such texts there is *varitamānāpadesa* no doubt, yet we resort to *viparināma* and assume that the *kāla* is *avivaksita* ⁹⁶

29 Among the moods again we find that S'ABARA has referred to only two moods - the *lot* i.e. *ājñāntika* and the *tin* i.e. *vidhyartha* That the *lot* is *prāptakālavacana* has been declared by him while discussing the text 'Agnīd agnīn iṣhara, barhiḥ strīḥ; puṇodās'analakṣuṇa' There S'ABARA shows that by following the *pravṛtti-rama* we can understand the *lodanta* forms in their natural signification ⁹⁷ At MS III 8 22 S'ABARA is discussing as to whether the *kartā* of the *praisa* and that of the *praisārtha* is the same The *pūrvapaksin* would like to say 'yes' But S'ABARA declares

95 अपि च नैतद्वचनम्, वर्तमानकालोपदेशत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षविरोधास्तुति-
बादोऽवधार्यते । [SB on IX 19,], प्रशसार्थोऽयं सोमशब्दे, न विध्यर्थः ।
विधायकस्याभावात् । [SB on VIII 26,], also see n 92 above

96 ननु वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम् । सत्त्वमेवमेतत् । आनर्थक्यपरिहाराय फल-
चोदनया सबन्ध एवित्युच्ये भवति । अन्यस्मादेवैषितव्यादेकवचनगतस्य विपरिणामो
लघीयान् । कुतः । प्रत्यक्षा तेनैकवाक्यता, परोक्षाऽन्येन । विपरिणामश्च वर्तमान-
कालस्याविवक्षा । सबन्धस्य च तात्पर्याभ्यवसानम् । तस्मादेवजातीयक प्रधानवर्गो-
पदेशः स्यात् । यथा प्रजापतिव्रतानां फलेन सबन्ध एतावता ह्येनसा विद्युको भवतीति
एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । तस्मादेवजातीयक पुरुषधर्म इति । [SB on III 4 24,
p 955], Also cf SB on MS IV 3 18, p 1257

97 शब्दश्च विप्रतिषिध्यते । अलङ्कुर्वित्युक्तं प्रोक्षणादीन् प्रतिपद्यते ।
अस्मत्पक्षे तु अलङ्कुर्वित्युक्तेऽलङ्करणमेव प्रतिपत्स्यते । तत्रालङ्करणे प्राप्तकालवचनो
ल्लेखन्तोऽनुग्रहीष्यते । तस्मादत्र प्रावृत्तिक क्रम इति । [SB on IV 3 18,
p 1357]

that the *kartā* of the *praisa* must be different from that of the *prāśārtha*. *Praisa* is naturally addressed never to one's own self but to some one else. Nor would it do to argue that in the *lodanta* form which conveys only *prāptakālatva* it is immaterial whether the verb is in the first or the second or the third person. For whatever be the person, what is *prāptakāla* is *prāptakāla* after all. For even thus we are doing injustice to the *purusa* of the *lodanta* form when we neglect the *yusmadartha* that is conveyed by it. Hence if we can find a construction where this *yusmadartha* will not be neglected we should certainly prefer it. Hence it is that we accept texts like '*Prokṣanīr āsādaya*' as being *praisas* and not mere statements of *prāpta-kāla padārthas*.⁹⁸

30 Coming next to the *vidhi lin* or the *vidhyertha* we notice that this is the *vibhakti* used for and has the power to convey an injunction. With a negative particle it can also convey prohibitions. It is thus this *lin* that expresses the *s'ābdī bhāvanā* which is said to urge a man on to the performance of a certain act. Ś'ĀBARA in one place⁹⁹ in his *bhāṣya* has quoted a *kārikā* wherein are enumerated all the forms of verbs which are found used in *vidhi vākyas* to enjoin an act. The *kārikā* runs '*Kuryāt kriyeta kartavyam bhavīṣyāt ity pañcamam / Etat svāt sarvavedesu nitya'm vidhulaksanam*'. From this *kārikā* it is clear that an injunction can't properly be conveyed by any other form but the potential. Thus if in some cases the *varṣamāna-kāla* is found used in a *vidhi-vākya* it has to be understood as deriving its injunctive force from some *lin* form occurring in some other related text. Hence it is that we find Ś'ĀBARA saying that though in the text '*sa eva vajamānah aṇṇasā svargalokam yāti*' the word *yāti* is not a *vidhi s'abda*, yet it can be understood as repeating the idea conveyed by the *vidhi s'abda* viz. *yajeta* which declares *svarga* as the fruit of

98 Read SB on MS III 8 22, p 1127 f

99 •SB on IV 3 3

Agnihōtra, as is evident from the text '*Svargakāmo yajeta*'¹⁰⁰

31 Now let us take a text like '*Dars'apūrnāmāsābhvām svargakāmo yajeta*'. In such texts one finds that both *yāga* as well as its result is spoken of by the words therein, and hence one is rather puzzled as to which of these is really intended to be enjoined. It is impossible that both the ideas be conveyed by *s'rutī*. Only one of these ideas can be conveyed by *s'rutī* while the other shall have to be taken as being conveyed by *vākya*, and that which is conveyed by *s'rutī* shall be understood as being the main point of the injunction. Hence it is concluded that all the *yāgas* such as *Āgneya* which together go to make up the bigger *yāgas* called the *Dars'a* and the *pūrnāmāsa*, shall yield the fruit not severally but conjointly. Thus we find that in the *phalavidhis* or rather the *adhikāravidhis karma* or the *yāga* is the main point of the injunction, the *phala* being only *uddīsta*¹⁰¹. One more point that we note regarding this *vibhakti* is that it is this *vidhivibhakti* that helps us to distinguish an *adhikāravidhi* from the *phalārthavāda*. Take, for example, the texts '*Dars'apūrnāmāsābhvām svargakāmo yajeta*' and '*Yasya parnamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpam slokam s'rnoti*'. In both these we find that there is a statement of *phala* with reference to some act that is enjoined. But what distinguishes the one from the other is the fact that while the *vidhivibhakti* is to be found in the former, it is conspicuous by its absence in the latter. A text containing the *vidhivibhakti* declaring the fruit is called the *adhikāra-*

100 यदुक्तं न चैव यातीति विधिशब्द इति । मा भूद्विधिशब्द । स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति वचनान्तरेणावगतमनुवदिष्यते । तस्मादविरोधः । [वृत्तिः, p 72], Also see n 96 above.

101 नात्र यागमुद्दिश्य फलं विधीयते, स्वर्गेण यागं कुर्यादिति । फलमुद्दिश्य यागो विधीयते स्वर्गं यागेन कुर्यादिति । किं कारणम् । यात्र विधायिका विभक्तिर्यजेतेति सा यागं श्रुत्या विदधाति, फलं वाक्येन विदध्यात् । न च श्रुत्यर्थे सम्भवति वाक्यार्थो ग्राह्यः । श्रुत्यर्थस्य मुख्यत्वात् । [SB on XI 13, 210]

vidhi, while a text which contains no such *vibhakti* is called the *phalārthavāda* ¹⁰²

32 The last and perhaps the most important fact about the *vidhyartha* has been noted by S'ABARA while discussing the texts like '*Nānrtam vadet*', or '*Tasmān na Brāhmanāya avagureṭ, na hanyāt, na lohutam kuryāt*', where the main question is whether the injunction or prohibition laid down in them is *purusadharma* or *kratudharma*. As for the former text there is no doubt that it contains a *pratisedhasva vidhih*. But the *pūrva-paksin* is not willing to accept that it is *kratudharma*. He argues that in the verb *vadet* we find the *purusaprayatna* directly conveyed by *s'ruti*, while *karma-sambandha* is conveyed only indirectly by *prakarana*. Thus if we take *anrtavadana* not as *purusadharma* but as *kratudharma* we shall be setting aside *s'ruti* for *vākya* which is inadmissible ¹⁰³. Again we shall be setting aside the *vidhyartha* which means that the world *vadet* in this text we shall be taking to stand for *vadanam bhavati* and not for *vadanam anutisthet* which is its legitimate signification. Hence it is better to take this text as laying down *anrtavadana-nisedha* as *purusadharma* and not as *kratudharma* ¹⁰⁴. The *siddhāntin*, however demurs and points

102 अथ यदुक्तं यथा स्वादिर वीर्यकामस्य यूप कुर्वाद् वैश्वमन्त्राद्यकामस्य पालाश ब्रह्मवर्चस्कामस्येति । युक्तं तेषु । विधिविभक्तिं कुर्यादिति वीर्यकादिरसंबन्धस्य विधात्री । न च वर्तमानापदेशिनी । तस्मात्तत्राविरोध इति विधिविभक्तिं विधायिका लिङ्गं मन्यमाना श्लोकमिमं समाचनन्ति । अस्ति चात्र विधिविभक्तिः । तस्मादनुपवर्णनमेतदिति [SB on IV 3 3, p 1247], फलार्थवादस्वरूपा एते शब्दाः । किं सारूप्यम् । विधिविभक्तेरभावः । [SB on IV 3 17, p 1256], युक्तं तत्र फलार्थवादः । फलविध्यसम्भवात् फलार्थवादसम्भवात् च । [SB on IV 3 19, p 1258]

103 तस्माद्विधिं प्रतिषेधस्यावम् । आह । गृहीम एतद् विधिरिति । पुरुषधर्म इति तु गृहीम । पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य श्रुतत्वात् । [SB on III 4 13, p 913], पुरुषस्यायमुपदिश्यते, न दर्शपूर्णमासयोः । कुतः । पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य श्रवणात् । वदेदिति वदनमनुतिष्ठेदिति श्रुत्या गम्यते । तस्य पुरुषसंबन्धः श्रुत्यैव । कर्मसंबन्धः प्रकरणात् । श्रुतिश्च प्रकरणाद् बलीयसी । [SB on III 4 12, p 907 f]

104 इतरथा वदनं भवतीत्येतावदर्थं वदनमनुतिष्ठेदित्यविवक्षितत्वात्

out that the *ākhyāta* conveys the idea of the action only and not of the *kartā* also as the *pūrva-paksin* would have it. The *vacana* of the *ākhyātas'abda* conveys only the *ekatva* or the *dvitva* or the *bahutva* of the *kartā*, but not the idea of the *kartā* himself. The idea of the *kartā* we do get from the *ākhyāta* but so do we get the idea of the other several *kārakas* also, and all these we get not directly from the *ākhyātas'abda*, but through its *artha* only i.e. by implication. This shows that *kartā* and such other ideas can't be accepted as being conveyed by the *ākhyātas'abda*. And if thus the *kartā* i.e. the *purusa* is not denoted by the verb then there is no ground to hold that *purusaprayatna* is spoken of in the text under consideration ¹⁰⁵ As for the *vidhivibhakṛ* it won't be *avivakṣatasvārtha* for it shall be useful in laying down the *anrtavadana-nisedha* as the *anga* of the main act ¹⁰⁶ Turning to the other text we find that according to the *pūrva-paksin* the *nisedha* in that text must be accepted as being *kratudharma* and not *purusadharma*. Thus according to him the sense of this text would be that *avagorana kanana* and *lohitakarana* in the case of a *Brāhmaṇa* shall be avoided during the performance of the *Dars'apūrnāmāsa* sacrifices only, but these need not be avoided under other

परार्थो विध्यर्थो भवेत् । पुरुषस्योपदेशे पुनर्विवक्षितस्वार्थ एव शब्दः । तस्मात्पुरुषस्यो-
पदेशः । यस्य चोपदेशस्तस्माद्य प्रतिषेधः । [SB on III 4 12, p 908]

105 अत्र ब्रूम । सर्वेष्वारूपातेषु क्रियानुष्ठानं श्रूयते न कारकं किञ्चित् ।
कथमेतद्ब्रूयते । प्रत्ययात् । [See p 116, n 43 above]—अर्थप्राप्ता हि
कर्मादयः । ते न भवन्ति शब्दस्याभिधेयभूताः । न त्वेकत्वादशोऽर्थान्प्राप्नुवन्ति ।
तेन ते शब्दार्थभूताः । तस्माद्यद्यपि विशेषणमेकत्वादयस्तथापि विशेषणमेवाभिधीयते ।
तस्मात् कर्तुरेकत्व शब्दार्थो, न कर्ता । [SB on III 4 13, p 913-21, 927-30]

106 यत्तु पुरुषप्रयत्नोऽनर्थको भवति कर्मधर्मपक्षे प्रयोगवचनेन कर्तव्यता-
वचनादिति । तदुच्यते । अङ्गं सरप्रकरणं गृह्येत । न चाविहितमङ्गं भवति । तस्मा-
दङ्गत्वाय विधातव्यमस्मिन्नपि पक्षे । अतो मन्यामहे प्राकरधिकस्याय निषेध इति ।
तस्मात्तदङ्गं यदनृतं तन्न बान्धमिति । तेन यत्सकल्पितं तदङ्गं तदेव वर्तकम् ।
वीद्विषय सकल्य न यवमयं प्रदेयः । [SB on III 4 13, p 940 f]

circumstances ¹⁰⁷ The *sīdhāntin's* view however is that the text contains *sarvāvasthasya brāhmanasya pratisedhaḥ* The *pūrva-pakṣin* connects this *pratisedha* with the *dars'apūrnamāsa* on the strength of the *prakarana*, but as the *sīdhāntin* points out it has to be connected with the *yajamāna* in obedience to the *vākya* And as *vākya* is stronger than *prakarana* we have to take this *pratisedha* as being connected with *Brāhmana* i.e. any *Brāhmana* under any circumstances and not with the *dars'apūrnamāsa* sacrifices ¹⁰⁸

33 A similar text we find in 'Tasmāḥ jañjabhyavaiṇāno anubrūyāt mayi daksakratū itī prānāpanāv evātman dhatte' Here, however, the *jañjabhyamānatva* has to be taken as a *kratudharma* and not as *purusadharma* The main point of distinction between this text and the one discussed just above is that here we don't get the *phalavidhāna* as we do get it in the other The statement of *phala* we find no doubt in both But in the last text we have the *vidhāyikā vibhakti* and we see that there is *phalavidhāna* . In the present text, however, there is no *vidhāyikā vibhakti* and hence we can't take the statement of *phala* occurring in it as a *phala-vidhāna* ¹⁰⁹ The *prajāpativrataḥ* also have to be taken as being *purusadharma* and not *kratudharma* on this very

107 प्रकरणादर्शपूर्णमासयोरवगोरणादिप्रतिषेधः । न दर्शपूर्णमासयोर्ब्राह्मणस्यावगोरित्वं वधो वा कार्यो लोहितः वा प्ररुन्धनीयम् । अन्य उपाय आस्थातव्य आन्तर्ये । तेनान्वाहार्येणानमन्ति इति प्रकरणात् प्राप्नोति । [SB on III 4 17, p 948 f]

108 सर्वावस्थस्य ब्राह्मणस्याथ प्रतिषेध उक्तः । दर्शपूर्णमासगतैवैव अवगोरणादि कर्तव्यमिति । ननु प्रकरणादर्शपूर्णमासधर्मोऽयम् । सत्य प्रकरणात् । एव वाक्येनावगुरमाणस्य धर्मः । वाक्यं च प्रकरणाद् बलीयः । [SB on III 4 17, p 950]

109 ननु अजन्ममानस्येव प्रकरणे निवेशो भवेत् । नेत्युच्यते । तत्र फल कल्पनीयम्, इह कल्पितम् । अस्ति ह्यत्र विधायकविभक्तिः । शतेन यातयात् सहस्रेण यातयात् स्वर्गं लोकं प्रजानीयादिति । [SB on III 4 17, p 950], Also see SB on III 4 14 16 •

principle ¹¹⁰ From this discussion about these texts we may now draw a few general rules (1) Generally a *vidhāyikā vibhakti* can be regarded as being *vivakṣitasvārtha* and construed as such if we take the text as laying down some *purusadharmā*, but if it is taken as laying down some *kratudharma*, the *vidhāyikā vibhakti* therein shall have to be understood as being *avivakṣitasvārtha* or its presence in the text will have to be explained on some other ground (2) Again if in any text we see a statement of *phala* side by side with that of an act we should first of all see whether the statement contains a *vidhāyikā vibhakti* or not If it contains a *vidhāyikā vibhakti* it shall be taken as laying down the act as *purusadharmā* i.e. with reference to *purusa*, rather than the act as restricted by *prakarana* But if it has no such *vibhakti* it shall be taken as laying down the act as a *kratudharma* only and not as pertaining to the man (3) The main point of distinction between the two is that in the former case (i.e. when the act enjoined is *purusadharmā*) the injunction (as also the prohibition) is quite general and has no reference to any act or acts as restricting its scope, while in the latter it is restricted to some particular *kratu* with reference to which it may be laid down Thus, as we shall note it below, a negation which is *purusadharmā* is an unrestricted and general negation, while the one which is *kratudharma* is naturally a restricted negation which applies under particular conditions only

34 And now we come to the *padas* about which also ŚABARA has to make a few observations Thus about the *Ātmanepada* he says it can be used if the fruit resulting from the action denoted by the root to which it is applied is to accrue to the *kartā* or the agent, But if it is to accrue to some one else only *Parasmaipada* shall be used Hence it is that in the text '*Vasante Brāhmano agnīnādadhīta*' the *ādīdhāna* is said to be *ātmārtha* to the *brāhmana* ¹¹¹ Hence

¹¹⁰ SB on MS IV 136

¹¹¹ कथं चारमार्थताधानस्य गम्यत इति । कर्त्रभिप्राये हि क्रियाफले आदधीतेत्येतदात्मनेपदं सम्भवति । असत्यस्मिन्वचने कामश्रुतिपरिग्रहे नाधानस्यास्मार्थता भवेत् । [SB on II 34]

again it is that *phala* is said to be *ātmārtha* to the *kartā* and hence it is declared that *phala* is not *kratvartha* but *purusārtha*.¹¹² But let us take the text '*Vaṣvānaram dvādas akapālam nirvapet putre jāte*' There the question is as to whether this *vaṣvānaresti*, that is enjoined in this text, is for the benefit of the father who performs it or for that of the son for whom it is performed. The *pūrva-paksīn* takes his stand on the *ātmanepada* in the text enjoining the *ādhāna* and argues that since *ātmanepada* can be used only when the *phala* accrues to the *kartā*, therefore in the present case the fruit of the *vaṣvānaresti* must accrue to the *kartā* i.e. the father because we find the *ātmanepada* used in the *ādhānavākya*. But the *siddhāntin* quotes the *phalavākya*s like '*Yasmiñ jāte etam iṣṭam nirvapati pūta eva sa tejasvī annāda indriyāvi paśumān bhavati*' which are found to occur in the sequel. Then he argues that these *phalavākya*s make it quite clear that the *phala* accrues to the son and not to the father.¹¹³ As for the *ātmanepada*, it is to be noted, the *siddhāntin* points out, that the obtainment of the *phala* by the *putra* is after all nothing short of *pituh ātmanah prītiḥ* so that there is nothing wrong if the *ātmanepada* is used in such a text. Thus we see that the *ātmanepada* can be used not only when the fruit, resulting from the act denoted by the root, accrues directly to the *kartā* of that act, but it may also be used even if the fruit

112 फलमपि पुरुष प्रत्युपदिश्यते । कुत । आत्मनेपदप्रयोगात् । कर्ष-
मिप्राय एतद्भवति । क्रियाफलमनुभवेत् कथं पुरुष इति यागा' प्रयुज्यते । तस्मात्फल
पुरुषार्थं यागच्छेद्यते, नात्मनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । तस्माच्छेषभूतम् । [SB on III 15,
५ 662]

113 नेमानि फलदानि परस्य भवन्ति कर्माणि । कुत । आधाने आत्मनेपद-
निर्देशात् । --तस्मादात्मनि श्रेयसमिति । एव प्राप्ते ब्रूमः । फलसंयोगो न
स्यात्पितुः । फलवचनं शेषभूतं पुत्रस्य, न पितुः । कथम् । एव श्रूयते । वैश्वानर
द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेत्पुत्रे जाते, यद्दशकपालो भवति गायत्र्येवैनं ब्रह्मवर्चसेन पुनाति ।
यस्मिञ्जात एतामिष्टिं निर्वपति पूत एव स तेजस्वी अन्नाद इन्द्रियावी पशुमान्
भवतीति । यो जातस्तस्य फलं श्रूयते । नास्ति वचनस्यातिभारः । तस्मात्पुत्रस्य
फलमिति । [SB on IV 3 38, p 1266]

is directly accruing to some one else provided that the *kartā* must have ultimately the feeling of satisfaction as 'he has when he does some act and its fruit accrues to his son' ¹¹⁴ This principle is very often referred to as the JĀRESTI NYĀYA or the VAIŚVĀNARĪYESTI-NYĀYA

35 The *parasmaipada* shows that the *phala* of the action enjoined by the root accrues not to the *kartā* but to some one else That is why texts like '*Tam abhyonakti*' and '*śaśeśikayānakti*' are construed to mean '*Anyo yajamāna- syābhyāñjanam karoti*' ¹¹⁵, while texts like '*Keśaśmas'rū vapate*' are taken as laying down an act which the *yajamāna* himself has to perform ¹¹⁶ It may be interesting to note that S'ABARA has referred to the rules laid down by PĀNINI regarding the *pada* of some roots when preceded by some prepositions as yielding a particular sense Thus at MS VI 3 34-36 while discussing the text '*Vasante brāhmanamupanayīta, grīṣme rājanyam, varsāsu vaiśyam*' SABARA declares that it lays down *adhyayana* with reference to the different castes, for he argues that here we find the word *upanayīta* a from of the root *nī* with *upa* which according to PĀNINI denotes *ācārya-karanam* This shows that *adhyayana* must be accomplished at the hands of *ācārya*, so that it will not do to say that a *Sūdra* may learn the *Veda* by himself without the aid of any *ācārya* and may thus be a *vidvān* and hence entitled to perform the *yāgas* laid down in *s'ruti* ¹¹⁷ The other reference

114 यदुक्तं न परस्य फलदान्यतानि कर्माणि । तदुच्यते । यत्पुत्रस्य फलं सा आत्मनः प्रीतिः । तस्मादात्मनेपदं न विरुध्यते । एतामेवात्मनः प्रीतिमभिप्रेत्य भवति वचनम्, आत्मा वै पुत्र इति । [SB on IV 3 38, p 1266]

115 परस्मैपदव्यपदेशश्च भवति । तमभ्यनक्ति शरंधीकयानवतीति च । अन्यो यजमानस्वाम्यञ्जनं करोतीति गम्यते । [SB on III 8 5, p 1113]

116 यजमानं वा कर्तव्याः । कुत । पुरुषप्रधानत्वात् । कथं पुरुषप्रधान्यम् । कर्त्रभिप्रायं क्रियाफलं गम्यते । तस्मात्पुरुषस्य कर्मकरणसामर्थ्यमुपजनयन्ति । न च कश्चिदेन कर्मकरणेन सामर्थ्यमुपजन्यते तदर्थं पुरुषान् प्रीणातीति । ईप्सितेभ्यः पदार्थेभ्यः प्रीणाति । येन यस्य सामर्थ्यं भवति तस्मैव कर्तव्यम् । कर्मवत् । यथा प्रधानकर्माणि पुरुषार्थानि यजमानस्य भवन्ति एवमेतदपीति । [SB on III 8 4, 1113]

117. गुणेनाध्ययनेनार्थी शूद्रोऽनुपनीत स्वयमुपेसाध्येष्यते । तथास्य सामर्थ्यं

to PĀNINI'S *sūtra* occurs in the discussion about the text 'Prsthair upatisthante' which according to him means 'Prsthair abhidadhāti'. Naturally the *pūrva-paksin* asks as to how this word viz *upatisthante* which has the power to denote *upasthāna* can be taken to denote *abhidhāna*. It is in reply to this question that ŚĀBARA quotes the *sūtra* 'Upān mantrakarane' and declares that the root *sthā* with *upa* when used in the *ātmanepada* denotes *mantrakarana* i.e. an act that can be accomplished with the help of *mantra* or of which *mantra* is the *karana*. And evidently *mantra* can be the *karana* of *abhidhāna* only and not of *upasthāna* which is to be performed with the help of *s'arīra* or *manas* ¹¹³

36 We have thus considered the *pada* from various points of view and have also seen what observations JAIMINI and ŚĀBARA have to make with reference to it. We have also referred to various texts and discussions about them as done by ŚĀBARA and have ultimately noted down all the general rules which have been explicitly or implicitly used and stated by JAIMINI as well as ŚĀBARA, so far as the interpretation of a *pada* in all its aspects is concerned. A similar investigation we have now to carry on in connection with the *vākya* which we shall proceed to do in what follows

जनयिष्यत इति । उच्यते । विद्यायामेवैषा पुरुषश्रुति । उपनयनस्य संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् । विद्यार्थमुपाध्यायस्य समीपमानीयते, नादृष्टार्थं, कुड्य वा कर्तुम् । सैषा विद्यायां पुरुषश्रुति । कथमवगम्यते । आचार्यकरणमेतदभिधीयते । कुत । आत्मनेपददर्शनात् । नयतिराचार्यकरणे वर्तते । तदर्थसंबन्धादुपनयनमाचार्यकरणप्रयुक्तम् । वेदाध्यापनेन चाचार्यो भवति । तस्माद्देदाध्ययने ब्राह्मणादयः श्रुता । ऋद्रस्य न श्रुत वेदाध्ययनम् । अतोऽवेदत्वादसमर्थं शूद्रो नाधिक्रियते । [SB on VI I 34-35, p 1380]

118 न चेत्तदेव कर्मणः पृष्ठशब्द इति । किं तर्हि । द्रव्येषु पृष्ठशब्द स्यात् । ऋद्रव्येषु अभि त्वा शूर नोन्म इत्येवमादीनामृचां वाचकः । कुत । अभिधानोपदेशात् । अभिधानोपदेशोऽयं पृष्ठश्रुतिष्ठत इति । पृष्ठश्रुतिभिदधातीत्यर्थः । कथं पुनरयमुपस्थानवचनोऽभिधानार्थं शक्यते विज्ञातुम् । उच्यते । उपग्रहविशेषान्मन्त्रकरणे उपतिष्ठते-रात्मनेपद भवति । मन्त्रस्तु अभिधानस्य करण, नोपस्थानस्य । उपस्थान शरीरेण क्रियते मनसा वा । तस्मादभिधानार्थः । [SB on VII 3 36, p 1567]

WHAT IS VĀKYA ?

1 Having thus far seen what JAIMINI and S'ABARA have to say about *s'abda* in general from various points of view, we now pass on to the next important section of our inquiry. It is but well-known that though JAIMINI and S'ABARA have incidentally and often expressed distinct and clear ideas regarding *s'abda* and its interpretation, their main concern is not *s'abda* which forms the main theme of grammar which on that account is by common consent called the *pada-s'āstra* as opposed to *Mīmāṃsā* which is called *vākya-s'āstra*. They are always more concerned with the task of interpreting the sentences in the Scriptural texts. It is the Vedic *vākyas* that they are handling and interpreting, and while doing that they are following certain principles which they have only occasionally cared to set out in clear terms. We have now to see what these principles are and how they have been applied by JAIMINI and S'ABARA to the material on which they are working. This we proceed to do by trying to find out what they have to say about the nature of *vākya*.

2 And we find Jaimini defining a *vākya* at MS II 1 46 in the words 'So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be wanting i.e. incapable of effecting their purpose, they form one sentence'.¹ In the preceding *sūtras* he has classified the *mantras* into *rk*, *sāman*, and *yajus* including the *nigadas*.² the main purpose of these all being the *prakāś'ana* of the *Devatā* &c at the proper moment.³ Of these there can be

1 अर्थैकत्वादेक वाक्य साक्षाद्भवेद्विभागे स्यात् ।

2 cf. तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन पादन्यवस्था । गीतिषु सामाख्या । शेषे यजुःशब्दः । निगदो वा चतुर्थः स्याद्धर्मविशेषात् । व्यपदेशात् । यजूषि वा तद्रूपत्वात् । वचनाद्धर्मविशेषः । अर्थाच्च । गुणार्थो व्यपदेशः । सर्वेषामिति चेत् । न, ऋग्व्यपदेशात् । [MS II 1 34-45]

3 कश्चिन्मन्त्रो यो विहितमर्थं प्रकाशयति प्रयोगकाले [SB, p. 321], मन्त्रस्य ह्येतत्प्रयोजनं यत्स्मारयति क्रिया साधनं वा । असति स्मरणे न क्रिया सवर्तेत ।

no ambiguity regarding the division of the *viks* and the *sāmāns* which are governed by metre and music respectively. But how to know where one *yajus* ends and another begins?⁴ It was here that JAIMINI thought it necessary to define a *vākya* which he has done in the words quoted above. From the words '*vibhāge sākāṅksa*' in the definition it is clear that a *vākya* is a *samudāya* of *padas* which if separated exhibit expectancy for one another. Thus then we find that JAIMINI has by implication laid down two conditions for words to form a *vākya*. (1) *samudāya* or *samabhivyāhāra*, and (2) *ākāṅksā* or *sākāṅksatva* of the constituent *padas*. There is, however, one more important condition laid by JAIMINI in the expression *arthakatvāt*. All the *padas* together must yield one sense i.e., they must serve one purpose. Thus we see that according to JAIMINI a group of words will form a *vākya* if (i) the constituent words separately have expectancy for one another, (ii) are uttered or placed together, and (iii) serve one purpose or yield one signification.

3 Let us take a concrete instance of the *mantra* 'Devasya tvā savituh prasaveśvinor bāhubhyām pūśno ha-tābhyām agnaye justam nirvapāmi'. Taking up the condition of *aikārthya* one may urge that each constituent *pada* here is *ekārtha* and may, therefore, be called a *vākya*. But such an argument is too flimsy because it does not take into consideration the other condition viz *vibhāge vi-kāṅksatva* which can't be fulfilled by the constituent *padas* taken singly. But, it may be urged if the *padārthas* are taken together they are bound to be *aneka*. How can the condition of *aikārthya* be then satisfied by the *padas* together? For whatever view you hold regarding *vākyārtha* it will be difficult to show that the constituent *padas* yield one single sense. Even this argument is, however, not sound,

[SB on IV 3 18, p 1418 f], एतद्धि मन्त्रपदानां दृष्ट प्रयोजनं यत्समवेतमर्थं प्रकाशयन्तीति । [SB on IX 1 36, p 1680]

4 अथ प्रलिङ्गपठितेषु यजुषु कथमवगम्येतेषुदेकं यजुरिति । [SB on II 1 46,

for what is meant by the term *artha* in the definition is not *sense* but *prayojana*, a fact which has been lost sight of by the *Pūrva-pakṣin*. Applying the criterion of *anākārthya* in this sense we find that it is very well satisfied by the *mantra* in question. The one purpose served by it is the *prakāś'ana* of the *vis'ista nirvāpa*. The conditions thus being fulfilled we may declare the above *pada-samuccaya* to be a *vākya*.⁵ But can we not say that '*Devasya tvā savituh prasave nirvapāmi*' is one *vākya*, and that the above group of words i.e., the *mantra* contains two more *vākyas* which are to be completed by supplying *nirvapāmi* by *ANUSANGA-NYĀYA*? No. For *nirvapāmi* is the *pradhāna* or the main word of the whole group and it is wrong in principle to repeat the main word for the sake of the subordinate ones. Hence we have to conclude that all the words in the group together speak of the *vis'ista nirvāpa*, the *prakāś'ana* of which is the *eka artha* served by them, so that they must be declared to form one *vākya*.⁶

4 *Bhago vām vibhajatu aryamā vām vibhajatu* and '*Syonam te sadanam 'krnomi ghrtasya dhārayā suś'evam kalpayāmi* | *Tasmin sīda amṛte pratitistha vrīhīnām medhas sumanasyamānah*'. These *mantras* are quoted by *S'ABARA*

5 किमुदाहरणम् । देवस्य स्वा सवितुः प्रसवे इति । ननु पद पदमत्रैकार्थम् । सत्यं, न तु तद्विभागे साकाङ्क्षम् । न तर्हि अर्थैकत्वमुपपद्यते । बहुत्वात्पदार्थानाम् । पदममुदायस्य च पृथगर्थो नास्तीत्युक्तम् । भेदः ससर्गो वा वाक्यार्थ इति यद्युच्यते तदाप्यनेकार्थता स्यात् । बहुपदे ससर्गाणां भेदानां च बहुत्वात् । एकप्रयोजनत्वाद्वाप्यप्यम्, यथा तावदेवस्य स्वेति निर्वापप्रकाशनम् । तस्य विशिष्टस्य वाचक एतावान्पद-समूहः । तद् वाक्यम् । [SB on II 1 46, p 446 f]

6 नन्वत्र देवस्य स्वा सवितुः प्रसवे निर्वपामीत्येक वाक्यम्, अश्विनोर्वहितुभ्यां निर्वपामीत्यपर, एव बहूनि वाक्यानि । यदि निर्वपामीत्युपपद्यस्ततो बहूनि वाक्यानि । न स्वेवमनुषङ्गो भवति । यदि गुणभूतो निर्वपामीति तदा प्रतिप्रधान भिद्येत । न च निर्वापो देवस्य स्वेत्येवमादीनामर्थनोच्यते । साधनप्राधान्ये हि अदृष्टार्थता वचनस्य स्यात् । निर्वापे पुनः प्रधाने दृष्ट कार्यं निर्वापप्रकाशनम् । तत्सर्वविशेषणैर्विशिष्टमुच्यते । तस्मादविरोधः । यथा च पद पदेन विशेष्यते तद्योक्तं तद्भूतानामिति । तस्मादेक वाक्यमिति । [SB on II 1 46, p 448]

to illustrate the necessity of putting down both the conditions viz *arthaukatva* and *vibhāge sākāṅksatva* as is done by JAIMINI in his definition. In the first of the above *mantras* we find that since both the parts of that *mantra* refer to *vibhāga* there is no harm in saying that they are *ekārtha*. And if *sākāṅksatva* is not laid down as another condition for *ekavākyatva* the *padas* will have to be accepted as forming one *vākya* which they are not. Such *pada-samudāyas* are excluded by the other condition, for separate the group into two or more parts and you will find that they are not *sākāṅksa*, and as such can't form one sentence. In the other quotation the condition of *vibhāge sākāṅksatva* is fulfilled and yet the words can't be taken as forming one *vākya* on account of their inability to fulfil the other condition viz *arthaukatva*. Thus we find that no definition of *vākya* can claim any accuracy unless and until it expressly lays down the two conditions as laid down by JAIMINI in his *sūtra* ⁷

5 Here it may be interesting to note what Ś'ABARA has said about the nature of a *vākya*. Commenting on MS II 1 46 he raises the question as to how one is to know the exact extent of one *yajurmantra* and answers it by declaring that one *yajurmantra* shall consist of all the *padas* with which one purpose of sacrifice is served. But how many are they? As many as are necessary for serving some useful purpose by bringing to mind the relevant *anga* of the sacrifice. These *padas* together are given the name of *vākya*.

7 अथ किमर्थमुभय सूत्रितमर्थकत्वादिति च विभागे साकाङ्क्षत्वादिति च । उच्यते । भवति किञ्चिदेकार्थं वाक्यं न तु विभागे साकाङ्क्षम् । यथा भगो वा विभजतु अयमा वा विभजतु इति । एकार्थाः सर्वे, विभागमभिदधति । ननु भगविशिष्टाद्विभागादर्थमविशिष्टोऽन्यो विभागः । नेत्युच्यते । विभागसामान्येनास्य प्रयोजनं, न विशेषेण । सामान्ये हि दृष्टोऽर्थो भवति न विशेषे । विभागे तु न साकाङ्क्षत्वम् । तस्माद्विभक्तिर्वाक्यं विभागे विकल्प्यते । तथा स्योनर्ते सदनं कुणोमि घृतस्य धारया सुषेव कल्पयामि । तस्मिन्सीदामृते प्रतितिष्ठ ब्रीहीणां मेघः सुमनस्यमान इति विभागे साकाङ्क्षम् । द्वे तु प्रयोजने क्रियेते, सदनकरणं पुरोडाशप्रतिष्ठापनं च । तस्माद्विभक्ते वाक्ये । तस्मात्सव्यङ्ग्यसूत्रितं, न सूत्रोपलम्भो भवति । [SB on II 1 46,

from the circumstance that they have to be uttered together * In another place S'ABARA has only incidentally given us two more sentences describing *vākya* in answer to the question 'Atha kva vākyaṃ nāma' They are 'Samhāṣya arham abhūdadhātū padāni vākyaṃ' and 'Ekārtham anekapādāni vākyaṃ' wherein, of course, the idea of *vibhāge sūkāṅksatva* is implied *

6 We have seen that JAIMINI has defined *vākya* in connection with the question of dividing one *yajus* from another. Hence it was that he did not think it necessary to lay down the third condition viz that of *samnidhi* which in the case of the *yajus* texts was too obvious to need any special mention. Nevertheless the condition is implied in the definition of JAIMINI and is taken as such by S'ABARA also, so that *samnidhi*, *ākāṅksā*, and *ekārthya* are the three conditions which according to JAIMINI and S'ABARA every group of words must satisfy before it can be called a *vākya*.

7 Now let us examine these conditions one by one in the light of the illustrations supplied and the remarks made by S'ABARA concerning each of them. And we take *samnidhi* first which at one extreme includes *ānantarya* also. Now if two *padas* have *ākāṅksā* for each other and stand next to one another thus having *ānantarya* there is no doubt that they will form one *vākya* provided that they are *ekārtha* also. But would they be allowed to form one *vākya* if they are not *ānantara* to one another? Will it do if they merely stand near one another, of course separated by some other *pada* or *padas*? The question in other words is 'What is the exact signification of the term *samnidhi* when it does not stand for *ānantarya*?' This point is made clear by S'ABARA by declaring that *samnidhi* may be said to be present as long as the two parts or *padas* remain capable of expecting one another

8 अथ प्रलिष्टपठितेषु यजुषु कथमवगम्येतेषुदेकं यजुरिति । याक्ता पदसमूहेने-
ज्यते तावान्पदसमूह एकं यजु । कियता चेज्यते । याक्ता क्रियाया उपकार प्रकाश्यते
तावद् वक्तव्यत्वाद् वाक्यमित्युच्यते । [SB on II 1 46, p. 444 ff]

And this, he adds, can happen if there is *ānantarya* or failing that if the intervention be by *sambandhu padas* only ¹⁰ This, of course, has been laid down by S'ABARA in connection with the principle of *anusanga*, but what he has stated in that connection is also true of the constituent *padas* of a *vākya* in general. It is thus now clear that for a group of words to form a *vākya* the first requisite is *samudhi* which means immediate sequence or immediate sequence marred at the most by the interception of relevant *padas* only. This requisite can be briefly stated in the negative by saying that *samudhi* or proximity is undisturbed so long as there is no interception of any disconnected or irrelevant *pada* or *padas*. The moment any such come in, this *samudhi* is lost. But how? It is self-evident that two or more *padas* can be connected with one another owing to *ānantarya* only if they are *sākāṅksa* for one another. This point we shall discuss in full in a subsequent paragraph. But if this *ākāṅksā* or *yogyatā* is wanting the *padas* can't combine into a *vākya* in spite of their *ānantarya*. This in other words means that *samudhi* presupposes *ākāṅksā* and will, therefore, continue to operate as long as this *ākāṅksā* can be realised. The moment this *ākāṅksā* is gone *samudhi* loses its scope and is, therefore, said to be lost. Now experience tells us that this *ākāṅksā* continues to stay on even if any relevant *padas* intervene. Hence it is that the requisite of *samudhi* is understood to be fulfilled as much by *sambandhupadas* as by *yavahita padas* as by *ānantarya-yukta padas* ¹¹

10 कियस्तु खलु कालः सनिधिरिति । उच्यते । यावति शक्नोत्युभावपेक्षितम् । कश्चासौ । आनन्तर्यं सन्धिपदव्यवायो वा । तावति हि शक्नोत्युभावपेक्षितम् । [SB on II 1 48, p 455]

11 सन्धिपदव्यवाये हि सन्धादेव पूर्वसंस्कारो नापैति । इन्द्राद्यपरेण साकाङ्क्षेण व्यवायस्तत्राप्यस्ति सन्धः । द्वयोरपि हि कार्यं वक्तव्यमिति । परं पूर्वमपेक्षते । अनपेक्षमाणेऽन्यतरं प्रमादपाठः स्यात् । शक्यते चासावपेक्षितम् । तस्माद्यथैवायमेकस्व सन्धिवेवमपरस्य । द्वयोरप्यसंबद्धैः पदैरस्यवदितत्वात् । द्वयोरप्याकाङ्क्षतोरेतावच्च वाक्यशेषसंबन्धे वारणम् । आनन्तर्यम् अव्यवधाने विच्छेदेऽपि भवति सन्धः । तस्मादनुषङ्गः । [SB on II 1 48, p 445 f] •

8 Another type of *samudhu* also has to be noticed in this connection. Sometimes there may be no *pada* at all actually mentioned, and yet the *padas* that we actually have before us may combine with that other *pada* which is not actually before us. This would happen if the *pada* or its *artha* is still lingering in our mind. In such cases we see that the *pada* (or *padas*) is *buddhau samnihita*¹². The first two types of *samudhu* need no illustration. The last type, however, can't be clearly understood in the absence of an illustration, and hence we shall take the following case. There is a text *Dars'apūrnāmāsābhīyām yajeta*. This text is evidently incomplete since it has as yet the expectancy for *itikartavyatā*. Hence it is that this *pada-samudāya* combines with the *agnyanvādhānādy-vidhāna kānda* which is *budhi-samnihita*, and thus forming itself into one *vākya* at last yields one complete sense¹³. '*Dando manoharo ramanīyas' ca praharānena s'ighram*' can very well illustrate the second variety of *samudhu*, for though the word *danda* is separated from the words *prahara s'ighram*, yet we find that it gets connected with them and forms one *vākya*¹⁴.

9 But why is it that in the absence of *samudhu* there can be no *ekavākyatā*? What harm is there if we take a group of *vayavahita padas* as forming one *vākya*? This

12 अपूर्णं यद्वाक्यं तत्परिपूर्णसमर्थनावयवेन बुद्धौ सनिहितेनैकवाक्यतां याति । [SB on VIII 12, p 1584] न च बुद्धावसनिहितेनैकवाक्यता भवति । द्वाभ्यां द्विवद्वाभ्यां पदार्थाभ्यां वाक्यार्थं सजन्यते । नान्यतरेण । [SB on III 121, p 734] तेन बुद्धौ सनिहितेन शक्यते साक्षात् शब्द संबंधयितुम् । [SB , p 690]

13 यथा दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेति विध्यादि कथमिति विध्यन्तापेक्षे 'अग्न्यन्वाधानादिविधानकाण्डेन पाठाद् बुद्धौ सनिहितेनैकवाक्यतां याति, दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेत्यमिति । एव विध्यन्तापेक्षो यो वैकृतो विध्यादि सोऽपि वैदिकेन विद्यन्तेनानुमानाद् बुद्धौ सनिहितेनैकवाक्यतां यास्यति । [SB on VIII 12, p 1584 f]

14 सनिहितत्वाच्च पदान्तरैः संबध्यते । यथा दण्डो मनोहरो रमणीयश्च प्रहरः शीघ्रमिति । रमणीयमनोहरसंबन्धेऽपि सति सनिहितत्वात् प्रहरः शीघ्रमित्येतैर्पदैः संबध्यते । एवमिष्टशब्दोऽपि सनिहितत्वात्संबध्यते । [SB on IX 39, p 1748]

point has been discussed by ŚABARA while commenting on MS III 1 21. The question there is with regard to the *sāmidhenī-vākya* occurring in the 7th and the 8th *anuvākas* of a *Brāhmaṇa*, and the text 'Upavayate devalaksmam eva tat kurute' occurring in the 11th *anuvāka* of the same *Brāhmaṇa*. If the latter is taken as forming one *vākya* with the former then it will refer to *sāmidhenīs* only, but if this *ekavākyatā* is not admissible and if the text is taken as forming a separate *vākya*, the *vajñopavīta* will be connected with the whole *prakaraṇa*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* takes his stand on the last type of *samudhu* discussed above and argues that *sāmidhenīs* are still *buddhau sammūḥita* and there is nothing wrong if we take the text in question as forming one *vākya* along with the *sāmidhenī* section. The text does arouse the expectancy as to when the *upavīta* is to be worn, and it is but natural that it should look to the *sāmidhenī-vākya* which is still lingering in our mind for its satisfaction¹⁵. The fact of this case, however, is just the reverse, though the principle put forth by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is quite all right. For here we find that the *sāmidhenī prakaraṇa* and the *upavīta vākya* are separated by the *nivāda-vākya* which shows that the top of the *sāmidhenī* has ended. Here *samudhu* is broken by *asambaddha-pada-vyavāya* which makes it impossible for the *ākāṅksā* to continue and thus locks the doors to *ekavākyatā*. The principle of a subsequent group of *padas* forming one *vākya* with some *buddhūtha* and hence *sammūḥita* group of *padas* is, no doubt, sound enough. But it is admissible only so long as the *buddhūtha samudhu* is not marred by the intervention of some *pada* or *padas* which have no connection with it. When, however, any such irrelevant *arthāntara* comes in, the older idea ceases to linger in our

15 सामिधेनीप्रकरणमनिवृत्तम् । तत्रोपवीत समागतामिति । कुतः । काम्यानां सामिधेनीकल्पानामानन्तर्यवचनात् । हृदयमनुविपरिवर्तमानासु सामिधेनीप्रपवीतमामनन्ति । ऋतुं वासोविन्यासमात्रं गुणो भवत्युपवीतं नाम । किं कुर्वता तत्कर्तव्यमिति भवति तत्र पदार्थाकाङ्क्षा । तत्र बुद्धौ सनिहितेनाविप्रकृष्टेन सामिधेनीवाक्येनैव वाक्यतामुपगम्य सामिधेनीप्रपवीतमुपव्ययते इत्येष शब्दो विदधातीति गम्यते । [SB on III 1 21, p. 733]

memory Even this last type of *samudhi* can't tolerate the interception of irrelevant matter In the present case it may be seen that the idea of *sāmudhenī* is followed by that of *nivida*, and naturally therefore, it no longer lingers in our memory Just as *asambaddha-pada-vyavadhāna* mars *ekavākya* in the same way *asambaddha-pada-vyavadhāna* in our *buddhi* mars *ekavākya* Hence it is that a *pada* or a group of *padas* can't be said to combine with another *pada* or group of *padas* if it is separated from it by an *asambaddha pada* or *pada-samudāya*¹⁶ But can we not by meditation or some such means recall the *pūrva padārtha* and thus make it *buddhi-samuhata*? Will it be wrong if *ekavākya* is thus established between two *padas* or *pada-samudāyas* on the basis of such *samudhi*? 'Certainly it will be wrong' we reply For in that case the *artha* will be man-made and not yielded by *śabda* Such attempts and the sense arrived at with their help can't have the authority and the sanction of *śabda* For it would be just like an attempt to make a *vākya* by taking one word from one section of the Scriptures and reading it with another word in some other part thereof and thus 'trying to get the required sense out of the Scriptures' Hence the conclusion is that there can be no *ekavākya* if the *samudhi*, even of last variety i.e. the *buddhistha* one, is marred by the interception of some irrelevant *pada* or *padas*¹⁷

16 इत्येव प्राप्ते ब्रूम । नास्मिन्संदेहे यस्यैवोक्तं स निर्णयः । अस्मिन्संदेहे वाक्यभेद इति निर्णयः । कुत । व्यवायात् । इह समाप्तस्य सानुबन्धस्य सामिद्वेनी-वाक्यस्यास्य चोपव्ययत इति वचनस्य निविदा विवायकेन सामिदेन भिरस्वद्वेन प्रकृतं व्यवधानं भवति । यम्य च पर्यवसितेऽपि वचने तदसंबद्धमेवार्थान्तरं प्रकमन्तं न तत्र बुद्धौ पूर्वं पदार्थं सनिधीयते । न च बुद्धावसनिहितेनैव व्यवहृता भवति । इत्याद्या हि बुद्धाभ्यां पदार्थाभ्यां वाक्यार्थं सजन्यते, नान्यतरेण । सनिधौ समाप्तात्स्थितदेव प्रयोजनं कथमुभाभ्यां पदार्थाभ्यां विशिष्टौ बुद्धिमुत्पादयेयुः । अनन्तराबुद्धेन सह वाक्यार्थं शक्यते कर्तुम् । असंबद्धपदोच्चारणे च नानन्तराबुद्धौ भवति । तस्माद् व्यवहितेन सह नैकवाक्यता भवति । [SB on III 121, p 733 f]

17 अथान्येन प्रकारेण यानादिना पूर्वपदार्थमवगम्य वाक्यार्थं सजनयेद् अवदिक स पुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वको वाक्याथो भवेत् । यथान्यस्मादनुवाकादास्यातपद् गृहीत्वाऽ-न्यस्माच्च नामपदयो वाक्यार्थं सजन्यते तादृशं तद्वदेत यत्रान्येन यानादिना

10 * Thus though *samnidhu* forms one of the main requisites of *ekavākyatā*, by itself it is incompetent to bring about *ekavākyatā* if *sākāṅkṣatva* is conspicuous by its absence. Even *ānantarya* helps to bring about *ekavākyatā* by satisfying the *ākāṅkṣā* and thus making the whole group *nirākāṅkṣa*. But if there is no *ākāṅkṣā* or in other words if the *padas* or the *pada-samudāyas* are *nirākāṅkṣa* in themselves what purpose can *samnidhu* or *ānantarya* serve? Surely it will have nothing to do, and hence will be of no avail if the *sākāṅkṣatva* is absent. *Sākāṅkṣatva* of the *padas* is, therefore, highly essential for *ekavākyatā* ¹⁵

11 This naturally leads us to discuss the second requisite, and what we notice at the outset is the fact that when JAIMINI and S'ABARA lay down *sākāṅkṣatva* as a requisite of *ekavākyatā* they imply that the *ākāṅkṣā* must be satisfied by *ekavākyatā*. This in other words means that the *padas* or the *pada-samudāyas* fulfilling the condition of *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* must do it in such a way that after combining to form one *vākya* they will be *nirākāṅkṣa*. But this can happen only if the *ākāṅkṣā* that they have is for one another alone. Otherwise the *padas* may be *sākāṅkṣa* and even after combining together may not cease to be so. Take for example the sentence '*Agninā sūcati*'. Both the *padas* here are *sākāṅkṣa* and yet even on combining they can't become *nirākāṅkṣā*. This shows that the *sākāṅkṣatva* that JAIMINI

पूर्वपदार्थमवगम्य वाक्यार्थं सज्जनयेत् । तस्मान्नासंबन्धार्थपदव्यवधानेनैकवाक्यता भवतीति निश्चीयते । [SB on III 1 21, p 734 f]

18 सत्यामाकाङ्क्षायामानन्तर्येण निराकाङ्क्षीकरणम् ।-न च पदार्थाकाङ्क्षायां सत्यामानन्तर्यमेकवाक्यत्वे कारणं भवति । [SB on III 1 21, p 740 f] अर्थानां हि अर्थवत्त्वेन हेतुना व्यवहितान्यपि वचनानि संबन्धन्ते । यानि पुनरर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानि तान्यानन्तर्येऽपि सति न परस्परेण संबन्धमर्हन्ति । यथा यापिनश्चि जरद्वयमित्येवमादीनि । तस्मान्न पौरुषेयता भविष्यति । [SB on IV 3 11, p 1254], असत्यां ह्याकाङ्क्षायां सन्निधानमकरणं भवति । यथा भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येति । एकवाक्यगतत्वात्तद्विशिष्टं गम्यत इति चेत् । नैतदेवम् । एकस्मिन्नपि वाक्ये तदवयवभूतस्यानपेक्षितस्य नैव भवति संबन्धः । यथा अश्वेन व्रजति श्वेतेन पटेनावत इति नानपेक्षितस्याश्वस्य श्वेत्य विशेषणं भवति । [SB on VI 4 23, p 1443] *

is speaking of has also the capacity of being satisfied by the other *pada* or *padas*. This very idea has been expressed by the rhetorician more explicitly by laying down *ākāṅksā* and *yogyatā* as two separate requisites in addition to the third viz *āsatti*. Thus for *ekavākyatā* the *padas* must not only have expectancy, but in addition, must have compatibility for one another as well. This point has been very well explained by Ś'ABARA while commenting on MS IV 3 11 where he writes 'Words even if separated from one another are connected with one another on account of their being possessed of some *arthas* which are suitable for one another, but words that are not thus compatible with one another from the point of the view of their *artha* can't connect themselves with one another even if they are possessed of *ānantarya*'. Here instead of harping on the usual term *sākāṅksatva* Ś'ABARA has expressed his idea in more explicit terms showing thereby that by *ākāṅksā* is meant not mere expectancy but also *artha-sāmarthya*, which is only another name for *yogyatā*. By way of illustration Ś'ABARA quotes the following couplet '*Itah preyasi dhāvantaṁ dūre jātam vanaspatim*.' *Tvāṁ brāviṁ visālākṣi jā pinakṣi jaradgavam*', and remarks that here the words '*itah preyasi*' go with '*jaradgavam*' in spite of the *vyaavadhāna* of a number of words simply because they are *arthataḥ samartha*. Hence he deduces a general rule to the effect that if the expectancy for the closely following or preceding *pada* is not possible the word may be connected with some other word or words with which it may be *arthataḥ samartha*. Mere *sākāṅksatva*, therefore, is nothing by itself, it must be aided by *yogyatā* or *artha-sāmarthya* which in simple terms means capacity to become or to make *nirākāṅksa*.¹⁹

12 This very idea is again expressed in slightly different terms by Ś'ABARA when taking the words '*Bhūryā rājñāḥ puruṣo devadattasya*' he points out that though the words *rājñāḥ* and *puruṣaḥ* have *ānantarya* and also *sākāṅksatva* they can't yet combine together. For it is evident that the word *rājñāḥ* is

meant to be connected with the word *bhāryā*, while *piusai* is meant for *devadattasya*. Thus if it is perceived that a particular word is meant for being connected with some other word it is impossible that a third word would connect itself with it. For if a word is already connected with another and has thus become *mrākāṅksa* on what ground can it be connected with a third word?¹⁰

13 It will thus be seen that the requisite of *vibhāge sākāṅksatva* as laid down by JAIMINI and explained by Ś'ABARA has more implication than one. The first implication is that each *pada* or group of *padas* must have expectancy for something i.e. the sense yielded by it must be incomplete, secondly, each must have the capacity of making the other *mrākāṅksa* by combining with it and lastly, none of these *padas* or group of *padas* must be meant for being connected with any other *pada* or *padas*. It is these factors together that go to make up the *sākāṅksatva* as intended by JAIMINI.

14 And as has been already noticed above this second requisite is far more important than the first viz *samudhi* or *ānantarya*, for, we find cases where *ekavākyatā* has to be accepted on the strength of *sākāṅksatva* in spite of the absence of *samudhi*, while there are other cases where presence of *samudhi*, nay even *ānantarya* is of no avail for want of *uk'ṅksā*. 'Agnūṁ sūcatī' or 'Udakena duhātī' clearly show that mere *samudhi* without *sākāṅksatva* is a failure while the couplet quoted above is fine illustration of the capacity of *sākāṅksatva* to bring about *ekavākyatā* even in the absence of *samudhi*. It must, however be remembered that this *vavahita-padūnām ekavākyatā* is to be accepted only as the last resort and that too for avoiding the *ānarthakya* *doṣa*. If however, there be any other way out of *ānarthakya* this

20 यो ह्यन्येन सबन्धमुच्चयते न तत्समीपगतोऽयन्यस्तेन सह सबन्धमर्हति ।
यथा भार्या राज्ञ पुत्रवो देवदत्तस्येति भार्याविशेषणार्थमुच्चयमाणो राज्ञाब्दो न
परिवेण सबन्धते । — भ्रष्टाश्रमाकाङ्क्षाश्रमानन्तर्यमकारणम् । [SB on III 1 12
p 688]

type of *ekavākyatā* is certainly to be condemned.²¹ The same holds good in the case of *ekavākyatā* arrived at by combining one *pada* with many *padas*, though only as the last resort and for avoiding *ānarthakya* it may be allowed. But even here it may be remembered as a general rule that it is only the *pradhāna pada* that can thus be connected with more *padas* than one.²² This *sākāṅksatva* then can be said to be the main basis of *ekavākyatā*, and we find Ś'ABARA in one place going even so far as to declare *sākāṅksatva* as the very form of *ekavākyatā*.²³ The importance of *sākāṅksatva* can be illustrated from the very fact that while we find some exceptions to the requisite of *sammudhi* as shown above and also to that of *akārthya* as will be shown below, there can be no exception to this requisite of *sākāṅksatva*. Let there be no *sākāṅk at, a* and there shall be no *ekavākyatā*. This is enough to prove the unique position that *sākāṅksatva* holds among the requisites of *ekavākyatā*.

15 And now we come to the *ekārthatva*, the third and the last requisite of *ekavākyatā*. Literally understood the term apparently seems to mean the state of having one sense or signification. But there are in a sentence more words than one, and as each one of these constituent words has a separate *artha* of its own to convey, it naturally follows that the sentence made up of these *padas* can't but be *an-ekārtha*. How can then the condition of *ekārthya* be fulfilled? But such a view regarding *ekārthya* is to be brushed aside as being too superficial. The word *artha* in this ex-

21 This topic will be discussed in greater details in a subsequent chapter.

22 अपि च सर्वस्यैव पदस्य पदान्तरसम्बन्धे सति च शब्दास्ते तृतीयेन पदेन सार्था गतो सन्निहितेनापि सम्बन्धो न युक्तः । न हि भवति भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येत्यत्र राजा पुरुषविशेषणम् । अन्यथा तु गतावुपादेयस्थानेकस्यापि प्रधानेन सम्बन्धोऽवकाशपते व्यवहितेनापि । व्यवधानादर्थान् बलीयानिति । [SB on VI 4 23, p. 1445]

23 भिद्यमाने (वाक्ये) एकवाक्यरूपं भाष्येत । किं तद् । साकाङ्क्षत्वम् । [SB on IX 4 18 p. 1776]

pression stands not for signification or sense, but for *prayojana* or purpose. Thus *aiikārthya* means the capacity to serve one single purpose. Thus for a group of *padas* to be admissible as forming one *vākya* they all together must serve one purpose. Thus in the text '*Devasya tvā &c*' we find that the whole text serves one purpose viz., the *prakāśana* of the *nirvāpa* and must, therefore, be admitted as one *vākya*. This very idea is again expressed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS II 2 27²⁴. It is on the strength of the principles of *samīdhu* and *sākāṅksatva* (or *ākāṅksitvatva*) and *aiikārthya* that *artha-vāda* texts are proved as forming a syntactical unit together with the *vidhu* texts and thus gaining the authentic position due to a Scriptural text²⁵.

16 It is in obedience to this principle of *aiikārthya* that texts like '*Etasyaiva revatīsu vāravanīyam agnistomasūma kṛtvā pas'ukāmo hy etena yajeta*' are accepted as yielding an injunction of *sarvaviś'esana-viś'ista yāga*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* here raises an objection pointing out that the text contains the *vidhāna* of *revatī* and also of the *vāravanīya*, and can't be as such free from *vākya-bheda*. But in reply S'ABARA points out that *ekārthatva* means *ekaprayojanatva* so that the *padas* that serve one *prayojana* can be said to form one *vākya*. Hence in the present case also there is no harm in saying that these *padas* form one *vākya* since they together serve one purpose only²⁶. Thus we see that *viś'istārthatā* is not incompatible with *aiikārthya* as intended by JAIMINI. In fact we find S'ABARA in several places resorting to this idea of *viś'istārthatā* for bringing about *aiikārthya*, and thus avoiding the *vākya-bheda doṣa*. But this point we shall discuss in fuller details in a subsequent chapter.

24 तस्माद् बहुषु विधीयमानेषु नैकार्थम् । अत्रोच्यते । अर्थ इति प्रयोजनमभिधीयते । यावन्ति पदान्येक प्रयोजनमभिनिर्वर्त्यन्ति तावन्त्येक वाक्यम् । न चात्र बहुभिः प्रयोजनानि । न ह्यत्रानेकस्याभिप्रेतस्यानेक विधायक पदमस्ति । . . . विधिष्ठस्तु यजतिर्न परार्थः । तदेकमेवा पदार्थानां प्रयोजनम् । तस्मादेकवाक्यत्वम् । [SB on II 2 27 p. 559 f.]

25 This topic will be fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.

26 cf. 6B on MS II 2 27

17 It may, however, be remembered here that this condition of *anākārthya* is not without an exception. The idea of *vis'istān'thatva* which is only another form of *anākārthatva* to all appearances has been already referred to. Another case we get in texts like '*Ardhapistam bhavati ardham apistam devatāvāya*' which has to be accepted as enjoining *pavana* and also *devatā-dharma*. Here the objection of the *Pūrvā-pakṣin* on the basis of *artha-bahutva* is answered by S'ABARA by pointing out that in cases like this we must accept *artha-bahutva* also, lest we should be rendering the whole text *anarthaka*. Here S'ABARA sounds a note of warning to the effect that this is admissible only as the last resort in the absence of any other way out of the *ānarthakya prasanga*. One more exception to *anākārthya* is to be found in sentences like '*S'veto dhāvati alambusānām vātā*' which is a statement expressing two ideas. On the analogy of such *laukika vākyas* an attempt is made to interpret texts like '*Godohana pas'ukāmasya pranyat*' as enjoining two different ideas viz. that *godohana* and such other acts are contingent acts and that they are meant for the *niitya godohana* and other acts. But such a construction is not admissible for the simple reason that in these texts we have the word *Kāma* in the expression *pas'ukāmasya* which shows that *godohana* is to be connected with *kāma* only and not with the verb so that this *godohana* spoken of in this text becomes a *naimittika* act and has nothing to do with the *niitya karma* bearing the same name. In the *laukika vākya* quoted above, however, there is no such deciding word, and hence it is but natural that they should be understood as express-

27 अवापर यत्कारणमुक्तं नैमपिष्टमिति द्विदेवत्वे पेदणं दर्शयति अर्धपिष्टं भवत्ययमपिष्टं द्विदेवस्यायेति देवतायमं दर्शयतीति । अत्रोच्यते । एव सति वचनमिदमप्राप्ते भवतीति । नन्वेकार्थविधानमेकं वाक्यं प्राप्नोति । उच्यते । सति पक्षान्तरेऽनर्थविधिः पक्षान्तराश्रयणेन परिह्रियते । असति पुनः पक्षान्तरं उच्चारणानर्थव्यप्रसङ्गपरिजिहीर्षयानेकार्थं वाक्यमन्युपगन्तव्यं भवति । तस्मै न द्विदेवत्वे पेदणमिति ।

ing two ideas. But that does not mean that a *vākya* can be *dvystha* or that it can have more *an̄thas* than one.

18 Having gone through the various illustrations given and the remarks made by ŚABARA we may now sum up the *Mīmāṃsā* view of *vākya* as follows — (1) For several words to form a *vākya* they must satisfy the three conditions viz *samudhā ākāṅksā* and *ākāṅthya*. (2) Of these *samudhā* primarily means *ānantarya*, but *samudhā* may not be marred even if this *ānantarya* is broken by the intervention of relevant *padas* only. And again this *samudhā* may even be *buddhystha*. (3) Mere *samudhā* in the absence of *ākāṅksā* can't bring about *ekavākyatā* for *samudhā* after all helps *ekavākyatā* by creating *ākāṅksā* so that *samudhā* without *ākāṅksā* is nothing. (4) *Ākāṅksā* means mutual *ākāṅksā* and implies the idea of *śogvatā* or capacity of *nuākāṅksīkarana*. If this capacity is absent mere *ākāṅksā* can't bring about *ekavākyatā* for *samudhā* after all helps that a *vākya* may be allowed to make a *vis'istavīdhāna* provided that the constituent *padas* together serve one purpose. (6) In some cases this condition of *ākāṅthya* has to be relaxed, of course for want of any other alternative and to avoid the *ānarthakya prasāṅga*. (7) Of all the conditions *ākāṅksā* or *sākāṅksatva* is the most essential and can't brook any exception.

28 भवन्ति च द्विष्टानि वाक्यानि यथा श्वेतो वाक्स्थलम्बुसानो यातेति । तस्मान्नैमित्तिकान्येव नित्यार्थे भवितुमर्हतीति । एव प्राप्ते ब्रूम । .. . । यत्त श्वेतो भावतीत्येवमादि भवेत्तत्र विशेषानवगमादुभयार्थावगति । इह तु गम्यते विशेष कमिषदोन्वारणम् । नेह श्रौतोऽर्थ । मन्येत यदि गोदोहनादे क्रियासम्बन्धो विवक्ष्यते कमिषद प्रमादो भवेत् । न चाय प्रमाद । नैवावान्तरवाक्यार्थे विवक्षिते कमिषदसम्बन्धोऽवकल्पते । तस्मान्न द्विष्ट वाक्यम् । गोदोहनादिकमिसम्बन्ध एवात्राभिधीयते, न नित्यकार्ये भवितुमर्हतीति । एव सर्वत्र । [SB on IV 3 4, pp 1248 ff]

WHAT IS VĀKYĀRTHA

1 In order to establish the accuracy of the implications of his definition of *Dharma*, JAIMINI deemed it incumbent on him to show that there can be no *purusānupraves'a* in the case of *s'abda*. In *laukika vyavahāra* it is the *purusānupraves'a* that contaminates *s'abda* and thus renders it sometimes *apramāna*. But the *Vedas* are above *apramānya* or they are *pramānam eva* owing to the absence of this *purusānupraves'a* in their case. To prove the absence of this *purusānupraves'a* JAIMINI has first of all shown that *s'abda*, *artha*, and *s'abdārtha-sambandha* are all *nitya*, and as such not open to *purusānupraves'a*. But that is not enough. An attempt is made by the opponent to show that *purusānupraves'a* is possible in the case of *vākya* and *vākyārtha*, for a *vākya* is after all a *pada-samghāta*, and like all *pada-samghātas* it must be accepted as being man-made. Again the *vākyārtha* also being different from the *s'abdārthas* must be *krtaka* and as such open to *purusānupraves'a*. Such a position, however, is not acceptable to the *Mīmāṃsakas* who show that there can be no scope to *purusānupraves'a* on this score also. It will be interesting to follow the discussion in details and see how both the parties try to present their own side and thus ultimately get the right idea as to what it is that exactly constitutes the *vākyārtha*.

2 Take, for example, the text '*Agnihotram juhuvāt svargakāmah*'. We find that from this sentence we get the *artha* '*Agnihotrāt svargo bhavati*'. But the question is as to how we arrive at this signification. Do we get it from any one of the *padas* constituting the sentence? Certainly not. It is, however, a fact that as soon as we hear all the three *padas* we do get at the signification. But is there any fourth word over and above the group of these three words? No. We don't perceive any. But why not say that it is the *pada-samudāya* from which we get the *artha*? Well, we can't say so because there is nothing like this *pada-samudāya* in com-

mon parlance. The words taken singly are known to be used in common parlance, and it is but proper to hold that the senses conveyed by them are *niṭya*. But the *samudāya* is not thus *prayukta*, and hence we can't but conclude that the sense conveyed by the *samudāya* must be *krtrima* or *vīyāmoha* ¹

3 But it may be argued that a *vākya* may give rise to the perception of its signification by its very nature, and in spite of its being *aprayukta* and *asambaddha*. And if the *Pūrvapakṣin* were to point out that it is not in the nature of *śabda* to yield *artha* in spite of its being *aprayukta* so that *śabda* will have to change its very nature if it were to justify the view of the *Siddhāntin*, the latter is ready with this reply saying that such, indeed, is the nature of *śabda* i.e. *pada* or word, but not of a *vākya*. And further he would add, do we not find people perceiving the sense of a *vākya* even on hearing it for the first time? This shows that *vākya* differs from *śabda* in the fact that whereas the latter can't be *artha-pratītyāka* if it is *aprayukta*, the former can convey its sense in spite of its being *aprayukta*. But it may be argued that this view is not right. For had it been so all would have been able to perceive *vāk्यārtha*. But our experience is that only those who know the *padārthas* can perceive the *vāk्यārtha*, but not those who do not know the *padārthas* ². Nor would it do to say that the *padārtha-jñāna* is only an accessory means

1 न ह्यग्निहोत्र जुहुयात्स्वर्गं काम इत्यतो वाक्यादन्वतमस्मात्पदात् स्वर्गो भवतीति गम्यते । गम्यते तु पदत्रय उत्तरि । न चात्र चतुर्थं शब्दोऽस्त्यन्यदत पदत्रयममुदायात् । न चायं समुदायोऽस्ति लोके यतोऽस्य ऋबहारादर्थोऽवगम्यते । पदान्धमूनि प्रयुक्तानि, तेषां निरव्योऽर्थः । अप्रयुक्तश्च समुदायः । तस्मात्समुदायस्यार्थः कृत्रिमो व्यामोहो वा । [SB on I 1 24 p 92]

2 स्यादेतत् । अप्रयुक्तादपि वाक्यादसति सबन्धे स्वभावादर्थोऽवगम इति । यदि कल्पेत, शब्दो धर्ममास्मीय व्युत्क्रामेत् । न चैष शब्दधर्मो यदप्रयुक्तादपि शब्दादर्थं प्रतीयते । न हि प्रथमश्रुतास्तुतश्चिच्छब्दात्केचिदर्थं प्रतिशन्ति । तदभिधीयते । पदधर्मोऽयं न वाक्यधर्मः । वाक्याद्धि प्रथमावगतादपि प्रतिशन्तोऽर्थः दृश्यन्ते । नैतदेवम् । यदि प्रथमश्रुतादवगच्छेयुः अपि तर्हि सर्वेऽवगच्छेयुः पदार्थविदोऽन्ये च । न त्वपदार्थविदोऽवगच्छन्ति । तस्मान्नैतदेवम् । [SB on I 1 24, p 93 f.]

of *vākyaārtha-jñāna*, and not a means of bringing about the *vākyaārtha-sambandha*, so that just as *dvitīyādś'avana* only helps a man to perceive the *padārtha*, but does not bring about the *padārtha-sambandha* similarly *padārtha-jñāna* only helps to perceive the *vākyaārtha* but can have no power to establish *vākyaārtha-sambandha*. For in fact *padārtha-jñāna* can't in any way help *vākyaārtha-jñāna*, for *vākyaārtha* is quite different from the *padārthas* and also because what conveys the *vākyaārtha* is not *padas* but the last syllable aided by the impressions left by the preceding syllables. This shows that *padārtha* and *vākyaārtha* have nothing to do with one another and that therefore *vākyaārtha* must be admitted as being *kṛtrima* or *vāmoha*.

4 But take for example the sentence '*Suklo gauh*' or '*Kṛśno's'ah*'. Here we find that *gauh* and *as'ah* are *sāmānya-vāci padas* and that *vis'esa-vāci padas* like *s'uklah* and *kṛśnah* find themselves in juxtaposition with them. It is only when in this way the *sāmānya-vāci padas* are accompanied by *vis'esa-vāci padas* that we get the *vis'tārtha* which is the same as *vākyaārtha*. Thus we can show that *vākyaārtha* is perceived from the *padārthas*. But this explanation is not silently accepted by the *Pūrva-paksin*. He points out that the *sāmānya-vāci pada* gives rise to a perception extending over all *go-vyaktis* and *as'va-vyaktis*. This perception is thus *s'ruti-janita*. And it is only for the sake of *vākya* that this perception is to be retracted from certain particular sections. But *vākya* is weaker than *s'ruti* and as such has no power to accomplish its purpose in spite of *s'ruti* so that retracting our perception from certain particular sections would be impossible. This in other words means that *vākyaārtha* will not be perceived in the manner shown above by the *Siddhāntin*. And if he were to argue that the

3 ननु पदार्थविद्विरेषवगमच्छद्भिः कृत एव वाक्यार्थसंबन्धो भविष्यति । पदार्थ-
वेदनेन हि संस्कृता अवगमिष्यन्ति यथा तमेव पदार्थं द्वितीयादिश्रवणेनेति । नेति
ब्रूम । यदि वाक्येऽन्यो वर्णः पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितः पदार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं प्रशयाय-
यति उपकारस्तु तदा न पदार्थज्ञानादवकल्पते । तस्मात् कृत्रिमो वाक्याधो-
व्यामोहो वेति । न पदार्थद्वारेण सम्भवति वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिति । [SB on P 24, p 94]

difficulty will be set aside by taking the *vis'esa-vāci padas* like *s'ukla* and *kṛsna* to signify *itara-nivṛtti*, the *Pūrva-paksin* would flatly refuse to accept that view as being quite untenable. To presume that words like *s'ukla* and *kṛsna* signify *itara-nivṛtti* just to save the *vākya* from being rendered *anarthaka* is also not possible for the *anarthakatva* can be avoided in some other way also. And even if no way is found out of *anarthakatva-prasanga* yet it is not possible to accept the view that a word conveys a signification which in fact is not perceived from it ⁴

5 All this shows that *vākyārtha* is not the outcome of the *padārtha* and that it must as such be *krtrima*. That *vākya* is *krtrima* is also evident from the fact that a *vākya* is after all a *pada-samghāta*, and like all *pada-samghātas* it is but natural to suppose that the *vaidika pada-samghātas* also must be man-made ⁵

6 The view thus propounded by the *Pūrva-paksin* is, however, not acceptable to JAIMINI and his commentator, who hold that *vākyārtha* is perceived from *padārthas* only and that it is as such *akrtrima* or *nitya* and hence always *pramāna* as regards *dharma*. If we look at any sentence we find that in it invariably some *tad-bhūta* words are used in connection with some *kriyārtha pada*. This is enough to show that the *vākyārtha* that we get comes not out of nothing, but out of the several *padas* that constitute the *vākya*.

4 नन्वेव भविष्यति । सामान्यवाचिनः पदस्य गौरिति वा अश्व इति वा विशेषकः शुक्ल इति वा कृष्ण इति वा पदमन्तिकादुपनिपतति यदा तदा वाक्यार्थोऽवगम्यते । तत्र । कथमिव गौरिति वा अश्व इति वा सामान्यवाचिनः पदासर्वगर्वाणु सर्वाश्वेषु च बुद्धिरपसर्पन्ती श्रुतिजनिता वाक्यानरोधेन कुतश्चिद्विशेषादपवर्तते । न च शुक्ल इत्यादेर्विशेषवचनस्य कृष्णादिनिवृत्तिर्भवति शब्दार्थः । न चानर्थको मा भूदित्यर्थपरिकल्पना शक्या । [SB on I 1 24, p 95]

5 अतो न पदार्थजनिता वाक्यार्थाः । तस्मात्कृत्रिमाः । पदसंघाताः स्वस्वेते । संघाताश्च पुरुषकृता दृश्यन्ते । यथा नीलोत्पलवनेष्वथ चरन्तश्चाहसरवा नीलकौशय-संघाताः प्रनश्यन्तीव कादम्बाः । अतो वेदिका अपि पुरुषकृता इति । [SB on I 1 24,

For there is nothing to prove that independently of the *padārthas* the *vākya* is endowed with some special power to convey its *artha*. For even if it is held that the last syllable of a *vākya* conveys the *vāk्यārtha* when aided by the impressions left by the preceding syllables and independently of the *padārthas*, yet experience shows that the sense that is ultimately conveyed is in no way different from the *padārthas*. The *vākyaṅtyavarna* has simply no power to do anything better than yielding the *padārthas* only.⁶ Where is then the propriety of presuming this elaborate process for accounting for the perception of *artha* from a *vākya*? Why not hold that *vāk्यārtha* is obtained from *padārthas* only?

7 Perhaps here the *Pūrva-pakṣin* might invoke the aid of *arthāpatti* to prove that *vākya* has got a special power to convey its sense. It is a fact that *vāk्यārtha* is not exactly identical with the *padārthas* or that *vāk्यārtha* is different from the *padārthas*. Now if we find that we get at some *artha* which is quite distinct and separate from the *padārthas* does it not stand to reason to say that it must have been conveyed by the *vākya* with the help of something which is quite distinct and separate from the *padārthas*? Since the fact of our perceiving the *vāk्यārtha* from the *vākya* can't be otherwise explained we have to presume that *vākya* has got some special power by which it conveys its *artha*. But this argument on the part of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* can be met by pointing out that since the phenomenon under consideration can be explained in another way also there is no scope for *arthāpatti* in this case. The other way, the *Siddhāntin* points out, is the *padārthas* themselves. We can very well explain how the *padārthas* can give rise to *vāk्यārtha*. In the sentence '*Suklo gauḥ*', for example, the words yield the ideas of *s'uklatva* and *gotva* and retire. But experience tells

6 तेष्वेव पदार्थेषु भूतानां वर्तमानानां पदानां क्रियार्थेन समुच्चारणम् । नानपेक्ष्य पदार्थान्पार्यगर्थेन वाक्यमर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धम् । कुतः प्रमाणाभावात् । न किञ्चन प्रमाणमस्ति येन प्रमिमीमहे । न ह्यनपेक्षितपदार्थस्य वाक्यान्त्यवर्णस्य पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितस्य शक्तिरस्ति पदार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरे वर्तितुमिति । [SB on I 1 25, p. 95 f.]

us that if a *guna* is perceived, the perception of *guna* can further give us the perception of the *gunavat* also. This is also shown by the usage of our common parlance. For we find that people intending to convey the idea of the *gunavat* individual utter only the *gunavācaka pada* being sure that their purpose will be served by that much, and we find that their purpose is thus actually served by that much alone since from the *guna-vācaka pada* there does arise the perception of the *gunavat* which in other words means that the *padārtha* yielded by the *guna-vācaka pada* ultimately yields a *viśiṣṭa artha*. But is not *viśiṣṭa artha* the same as *vākya-ārtha*? Does this not show that *viśiṣṭārtha* i.e. *vākya-ārtha* can be perceived from *padārthas* only? And if thus the phenomenon of the perception of *vākya-ārtha* from *vākya* can be explained on the basis of the *padārthas*, where is the necessity of admitting a special power to the *pada-samudāya*, an hitherto unproved thing as it is?⁷

8 That *padārthas* are the *nimitta* of *vākya-ārtha* is also proved by *anvaya-vyatiरेका*. If the *padārthas* are not perceived from the *padas* that are heard, we can't catch the *vākya-ārtha*. But on the other hand if *suklatva* is perceived then we do get the idea of the *śukla-gunaka* also even in the absence of the *pada*. This shows that the existence or non-existence of *vākya-ārtha* is co-eval with the existence or non-existence of the *padārthas*. But the same is not true of the *padas*. For we may hear the *padas* and yet may not have

7 नन्वर्थापत्तिरस्ति यत्पदार्थव्यतिरेकमर्थमवगच्छाम । न च शक्तिमन्तरेण तदवकल्पत इति । तत्र । अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् । भवेदर्थोपतिर्यस्यस्यमपि शक्तौ तस्य नान्यन्निमित्तमवकल्पेत । अवगम्यते तु निमित्तम् । किम् । पदार्था । पदानि हि स्व स्वमर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि । अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगता सन्तो वाक्यार्थं गमयन्ति । कथम् । यत्र हि शुक्ल इति वा कृष्ण इति वा गुण प्रतीतो भवति, भवति, खल्वसावल गुणवति प्रत्ययमाधानुम् । तेन गुणवति प्रत्ययमिच्छन्त केवल गुणवचनमुच्चारयन्ति । सपत्त्यत एषा यथायकल्पितोऽभिप्राय भविष्यति विशिष्टार्थसप्रत्यय । विशिष्टार्थसप्रत्ययश्च वाक्यार्थः । एव चेदवगम्यते अन्यत एव वाक्यार्थः को जातुचिददृष्टा पदसमुदायस्य शक्तिरर्थादवगम्यत इति वदियति ।

[SB on I 1 25, p 96 f]

the *vākyārtha-jñāna* if the *padas* have failed to yield the *padārthas*, or on the other hand we may not hear the *padas* at all and yet may have the *vākyārtha-jñāna* if by any other means the *padārthas* are conveyed to us. Thus there is no *anvaya-vyatireka* between *padas* and *vākyārtha*, as it exists between the *padārthas* and the *vākyārtha*. This shows, therefore, that *padārthas* and nothing else are the means of *vākyārtha-jñāna* ⁸

9 Having thus established that *padārthas* are the *nimitta* of *vākyārtha-jñāna* and that there is no reason why *pārthagarthyā* should be presumed for the *vākya*, the *Siddhāntin* now proceeds to refute the objections raised against his position by the *Pūrva-paksin*. As for the objection that *vākya* being weaker than *śruti* has no power to restrict the general perception arising from the *padas* by *śruti*, the *Siddhāntin* points out that *vākya* is, indeed, weaker than *śruti*, but in cases where there is the danger of the whole text being rendered *anarthaka* by sticking to *śruti* we have to give up *śruti* and abide by *vākya*, only to save the text from *anarthakya* ⁹. The same remark applies to the objection that a word has no power to convey *gunāntara-pratishedha*, for is it not better to save a whole text from being rendered *anarthaka* by setting aside the *vācyārtha* of one word and resorting to *lakṣanā*? ¹⁰

8 अपि चाव्यव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेतदवगम्यते । भवति हि वदविदियमवस्था मानसादय्याघाताद्यदुच्चरितेभ्यः पदेभ्यो न पदार्था अवधार्यन्ते । तदानीं नियोगतो वाक्यार्थं नावगच्छेयुः यद्यस्यापार्थग्यमभविष्यत् । नियोगतस्तु नावगच्छन्ति । अपि चान्तरेणापि पदोच्चारणं न शौक्ल्यमवगच्छति अवगच्छत्येवासौ शुक्लशुणकम् तस्मात्पदार्थप्रत्यय एव वाक्यार्थो, नास्य पदसमुदायेन संबन्धः । [SB on I 125, p 97 f]

9 यत्तु श्रुतः पदार्थो न वाक्यानुरोधेन कुतश्चिद्विशेषादपवर्तितुमर्हतीति । सत्यमेवमेतत् । यत्र केवलः पदार्थः प्रयुज्यमानः प्रयोजनाभावादनर्थकः सञ्जायते इत्यवगतं भवति । तत्र वाक्यार्थोऽपि तावद् भवत्विति विशिष्टार्थतावगम्यते । न सर्वत्र । [SB on I 125, p 98]

10 एव च सति गुणान्तरप्रतिषेधो न शब्दार्थ इत्येतदपि परिहृतं भवति । [SB, p 98]

10. But even this justification is not necessary, for, we can in another way show how *vis'istārtha* i.e. *vākyārtha* can be perceived by *s'ruti* only. The fact that the sense of a *vibhakti* is modified by that of the *prātipadikārtha* shows that the *prātipadikārtha* is *vis'esaka*. In other words this means that we get *vis'istārtha* from the inflected word by *s'ruti*. It is this *vis'ista-s'ruti* that will set aside the *sāmānva-s'ruti*¹¹ and thus pave the way for the *vis'istārtha* or *vākyārtha* so that the objection raised by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is swept off its ground altogether. Thus there is now no difficulty in holding that the *padārthas* give rise to *vākyārtha-jñāna*. As for the next objection based on the *anumāna* that *Vaidika* *vākyas* must be *purusa-kṛta* since they are after all *pada-samghātas* and all *pada-samghātas* are, as we know, man-made, no special efforts are required to refute it. For this idea we have already shown to be untenable when we discussed the *niyatva* or *akṛtakatva* of *śabdārtha-sambandha*. We may only add that these *codanās* differ from the *laukika* *pada-samghātas* in this that while the latter deal with *anubhūta* or *upalabdha arthas*, the former deal with *arthas* which are beyond the power of man to know. It is, therefore, impossible to conceive that *Vaidika* *vākyas* also could be composed by man as he can compose the *laukika* ones. *Dharma* with which the *Vaidika* *vākyas* concern themselves is *atīndriya* and man has no power to know it unless aided by the *Veda*. And if he does not know it how can he compose sentences about it?¹² Thus there can be no scope for *purusānupraves'a* in this way also.

11. Unimpeachable, therefore now emerges the conclusion out of the foregoing discussion that the sense '*Agnihot-rāt svargo bhavati*' we get from the senses perceived from

11 अपि च प्रातिपदिकादुत्तरन्ती द्वितीयादिविभक्तिः प्रातिपदिकार्थो विवेक इत्याह । सा च विशेषधृतिः सामान्यधृतिरिति बाधेत । [SB. p. 99]

12 यच्चैते पदसंघाताः पुरुषकृता इत्यन्त इति । परिहृतं तदस्मरणादिभिः । अपि च एवजातीयकेऽर्थे वाक्यानि सद्गुणं न किञ्चन पुरुषाणां बीजमस्ति । [SB. p. 99], लौकिकेषु पुरस्कर्तृषु प्रत्यक्षेणार्थमुपलब्धं सनियमं सनिबन्धनम् । शक्यं तत्र सद्गुणमेवजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नीलोत्पलवनेष्वप्येति । [SB., on I 1 26, p. 99]

the various words that constitute the sentence 'Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmāḥ' Hence in general we declare that words yield us the perception of their significations and from these in their turn it is that we arrive at the *vākyārtha*¹³

12 Ś'ABARA has in several places, referred to this view about *vākyārtha*. Discussing the exact signification of sentences like 'Yasya parnamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpam ślokaṁ s'ṛnoti' the *Pūrva-pakṣin* argues that such texts are *anarthaka* since they speak of results that never follow. Here in the course of his argument he points out that it won't do to say that the results will follow after some period, for there is no *pramāṇa* for such a supposition. *Pratyakṣa* and other *pramāṇas* are helpless in this matter, while *s'abda* also goes no further. For what is *vākyārtha* after all? If it is to be *pramāṇa* it must be yielded by the *padārthas*. This is what JAIMINI himself has declared in the *sūtra* 'Tad-bhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāvali arthasya tannimuttatvāt'. Hence other ways of *artha-kalpanā* such as *adhyāhāra* and *viparīnāma* have no scope here. The *Siddhāntin* only points out that such texts are to be construed as *arthavādas* only¹⁴. This very view has been repeated by Ś'ABARA in another place also. At MS V 15 however, a similar argument is put in the mouth of the *Pūrva-pakṣin*. The point at issue there is whether serial order is or is not conveyed when a number of things or acts are spoken of one after the other in one text. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* speaking against the proposition argues that *vākyārtha* is obtained from the *padas* through the *padārthas*, but from the *padas* we get only the *padārthas* and not *krama* also. It is, therefore not, possible to admit that *krama* is conveyed by a *vākya*. *Krama* might have been conveyed, had *vākyārtha* been conveyed by *pada-samudāya*. But that idea has been totally disproved at MS I 1 25 by JAIMINI. How can *krama* be conveyed

13 तस्मादग्निहोत्र जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्येतेभ्य एव पदेभ्यो येऽर्था अवगतास्तेभ्य एवैनद्वयमग्रतेऽग्निहोत्रास्त्वर्गो भवतीति । पदेभ्य एव पदार्थप्रत्यय पदार्थेभ्यो वाक्यार्थ इति । [SB on I 1 26, p. 100]

14 cf. अर्थवादाधिकरण 10 Ms I 21—8

then¹⁵? The *Siddhāntin*, however, points out that because *krama* is *artha-prāpta* owing to the multiplicity of acts to be performed by one agent we use the *pātha-krama* for determining the *krama* of the several acts to be performed, so that the very words that convey to us the idea of the acts, convey to us their *krama* also¹⁶. A similar point is raised as regards the text 'Agnaye' *nīkavute prātar astākāpālo marudbhyaḥ sāntapanebhyaḥ madhvandīre caruḥ marudbhyaḥ grhamedhibhyaḥ sāyam odanam*. Is the same day meant? *Vākya-rtha* is yielded by the *padārthas* and here we find no *pada* to yield the sense of *ekam ahaḥ* i.e. the acts are to be performed on one and the same day. The *Pūrvapakṣin*, therefore, concludes that the same day can't be meant. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that since *anga* and *pradhāna* are both *ekakāla*, therefore, we have to take all these acts as taking place on one and the same day¹⁷.

15 पदार्थपूर्वको वाक्यार्थः पदेभ्यश्च पदार्था एवावगम्यन्ते, न क्रमः । स्यादेतदेव यदि पदानां समूहस्य श्रवणं प्रत्यायकमर्थस्य स्यात् । न तु समुदायः प्रत्यायक इत्युक्तं तद्वृत्तानां क्रियार्थेन सामान्या इत्यत्र । तस्मात्क्रमस्य वाचकशब्दाभावाद् व्यामोह एव क्रमोऽवगम्यते । [SB on V-1 5, p 1291]

16 एकस्मिन्कृतावेकस्वाकर्तुरनेकस्मिन्पदार्थेऽर्थकृतत्वात्प्रसङ्गः । तत्रैष क्रमो नियम्येतानुमानेन । कुत । परार्थत्वाद्देदस्य । परार्थो हि वेदो यद्यदनेन शक्यते कर्तुं तस्मै तस्मै प्रयोजनायैव सामान्यायते । शक्यते चानेन पदार्थो विधातुः, शक्यते च क्रियाकाले प्रतिपत्तुम् । तस्माद्देदः पदार्थाश्च विधातुमुपादेयः, क्रियाकाले च प्रतिपत्तुम् । न शक्यते विशेषो, विधातुमयः सामान्यायते न प्रतिपत्तुमिति । अगम्यमाने विशेष उभयार्थमुपादीयत इति गम्यते । प्रतिपत्तुं चानेन क्रमेण शक्यते, नान्येन । अत एव च कृत्वा पाठकमापचारे विनष्ट इत्युच्यते । इतरथा हि यद् यस्य प्रयोजनं तस्मिन् निर्वर्त्तमाने एव किं नष्टं स्यात् । अदृष्टं कल्प्येत । तच्चान्याग्य दृष्टे सति । तस्मात्स्वशब्दः क्रमः । य एव पदार्थानां वाचकः शब्दः स एव क्रमस्यापि । [SB on V-1-6 p 1292]

17 अहं. कालेषु ये पदार्था उच्यन्ते प्रातर्मध्यन्दिने सायमिति क्रमेण त एकस्मिन्नहनीति प्रतीयन्ते । यथा देवदत्तः प्रातरपूणं भक्षयति मध्यन्दिने विविधमश्नाति अपराह्णे मोदकान्भक्षयतीति एकस्मिन्नहनीति गम्यते । [SB on V-1 20, p 1301]...

.ननु वाक्यादेकमहर्गम्यत इत्युक्तम् । उच्यते । पदार्थसामर्थ्यजनितो हि वाक्यार्थो

13 It may thus be seen how this view viz that *vākyaārtha* arises from the *padārthas* has been utilised to argue that we shall not read between the lines of a Scriptural text which is also the generally accepted principle of *Mīmāṃsā* and yet we see how in some cases by the force of facts we do get some sense which can't be said to spring up directly from the *pada* or *padārthas*

14 In another place S'ABARA has plainly stated the distinction between the *padārthas* on the one hand and the *vākyaārtha* on the other, and pointed out how we get the *vākyaārtha* from the *padārthas*. There is a text *Arunayā pingākṣyaikahāṣanyā somam krīṇāti*, and the question is whether *arunayā* is to be construed in this sentence with the verb *krīṇāti* without causing *vākya-bheda*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* is not favourable to such a construction, for he thinks that it can't but lead to *vākya-bheda*. But S'ABARA points out that we must accept such a construction, and that we can do it without exposing ourselves to *vākya-bheda*. *Vākyaārtha*, he argues, is perceived only after the *padārthas* are perceived. A *pada* denotes the *sāmānya* while a sentence denotes *viśeṣa*. This shows that *vākyaārtha* means referring to the *viśeṣa* those *padārthas* which pertain to *sāmānya*¹⁸. It is this principle that has been declared by JAIMINI at MS I 1 25. It may thus be clear that we arrive at the *padārthas* directly by *pratyakṣādī pramāṇas*, while *vākyaārtha* is always based on inference since it has to be obtained by construing the *sāmānya-vitti padas* as pertaining to some *viśeṣa*. For if we do not do so a *pada* which is left merely to denote its own sense i.e. the *sāmānya* will be *anarthaka*. It is for doing away with this *anarthakya* that a *pada* is to be construed

भवति । न चात्र पदार्थसामर्थ्यमस्ति येनैकमद्वयमेत । नैतदेदम् । इहमात् । तत्सबन्धात् । एककालसबद्धानि प्रवानान्वद्गे. सह ध्रुयन्ते । कथम् । साङ्ग हि प्रधान प्रातःकाले ध्रुयते । तथा म यन्नेने, साय च । नाड्यानि प्रातःकालादिषु । तत्रान्यकारेष्वद्गेषु अन्यकालेषु च प्रधानेषु न साङ्ग तेषु कालेषु कृत स्यात् । तस्मात् सद्यस्काला एवैता विकृतय इति । अपि च द्वयद्व साङ्गमेवेति ध्रुयते । तत्सद्यस्कालास्यपदत् । [SB on V 1 21-22 p 1301]

with some other *pada* or *padas*, and thus arrive at the *vākya-rthā*.¹⁸ In the present case also we find that though the word *ekahāyanyā* becomes *nirūkāṅkṣa* by connecting itself with the word *krīṇāti* and as such requires no other connection, yet the word *arunayā* is in the danger of being rendered *anarthaka* in the absence of any connection, and has on that account to be connected with the verb *krīṇāti*. But it is not possible to connect the word *arunayā* directly with the verb *krīṇāti* since a *guna* being *amūrta* has no capacity for being connected with a *kriyā* independently of any *dravya*, so that this we can do only if we connect it with the word *ekahāyanyā*. Thus what is to be noted in the present case is that it is by being connected with other *padas* that a *sāmānya-vāci pada* gives us *vis'esa artha* which is only another name for *vākya-rthā*.¹⁸

15 From this discussion we thus arrive at another point which has been expressly stated by S'ABARA at MS III 2 1. There it is in clear terms declared by S'ABARA that a *padārtha*, if it is not connected with another *padārtha*, can't give rise to *vākya-rthā*.¹⁹ This is obviously so because in the absence of any such connection the *pada* by itself will yield only the *sāmānya* which is its signification, and not *vis'esa* which is the *vākya-rthā*, since there is no reason why it should do so. For as we have already seen above it is only to avoid *ānarthakya-prasanga* that a *sāmānya-vāci pada* is made to yield some *vis'esa artha*, while as long as the word stands by itself there is no such *prasanga* at all.

16 We may now bring this section to a close by summing up the views of S'ABARA (and also of JAIMINI) on *vākya-*

18 सामान्यवृत्ति हि पद, विशेषवृत्ति वाक्यम् । सामान्येनाभिप्रवृत्तानां पदार्थानां यद्विशेषेऽवस्थापनं स वाक्यार्थः । तदेतदुक्तं तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन सामान्याद्योऽर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् । इति । तत्र प्रत्यञ्जतः पदार्थो वाक्यार्थः पुनरानुमानिकः । तदेतदवगम्यताम् । केवल स्वार्थवृत्ति पदमनुपदेशकमिति पदान्तरेण सनिहितेनैकवाक्यतामभ्युपैति, नान्यथेति ।

19 न ह्यनन्वित पदार्थो भवति वाक्यार्थः । [SB on III 2.1, p 1]

rtha in the following observations (1) *Padārtha* is *sāmānya* while *vākyārtha* is *viśeṣa* (2) We get *vākyārtha* out of the *padārthas* when they are connected with one another (3) As far as possible nothing that is not conveyed by the *padas* shall be taken as *vākyārtha* (4) Only such *vākyārtha* as we get from the *padārthas* can be accepted as *pramāna*, (5) Use of *adhyāhāra* and such other modes of interpretation are not admissible as far as possible while interpreting the Scriptural texts (6) If there is no connection between *padas* and *padas* there can be no *vākyārtha*

17 Besides these, however, there are some other facts which we shall have to note regarding the *vākyārtha*, but these we shall consider in details in the next section when we deal with the topics of *ekavākytā* and *vākya-bheda* which are two very important principles of *Mīmāṃsā* on its interpretative side

EKAVĀKYATĀ and VĀKYABHEDA

1 Having thus far studied the nature of a *vākya* and also the prerequisites for several *padas* to form a *vākya*, we now pass on to one of the most important topics of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* system of interpretation of a *vākya*. The most basic principle of this system has been very lucidly and concisely put by KUMARILA when he writes *Sambhāvaty-ekavākyatve vākyabhedaś'ca nesya*te'. From this it is quite clear that as far as possible every attempt must be made to establish *ekavākyatā* among the several *padas* as they stand, and that as long as it is possible to construe them as forming one *vākya* it is wrong to construe them as not forming one *vākya*. This latter is what is technically called the *vākya-bheda* which has been looked upon by the *Mīmāṃsaka* as a very grave draw-back which has to be avoided at any cost.

2 But let us first of all see the various factors that go to make this *vākya-bheda* as such a *dosa*. And the most obvious factor is what has been termed by S'ABARA as *ekavākyatā-rūpa-bādha*. Let us take the text 'Nivītam manvīnām prācīnāvītam pitṛnām upavītam devānām upavyayate devalakṣmam eva tat kurute'. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* would like to construe the text as a *vidhū*, but the *Siddhāntin* points out that in the text under consideration a *vidhū* is to be found in the words *upavyayate* &c so that if this part is also taken as a *vidhū* there can be no *ekavākyatā* between the two parts and their *ekavākyatārūpa* would disappear. They

1 विधिना चैकवाक्यत्वात् । [MS III-4-9¹] , इतश्च न विधि । कुत । विधिनैकवाक्यत्वात् । उपव्ययते देवलक्ष्ममेव तन्वृते इत्येष विधि । अनेनारय सहैकवाक्यता भवति । यदीतरोऽपि विधि स्याद्वाक्य भिद्येत । न हि विवेकवैधेयैकवाक्यता भवति । वचनव्यक्तिभेदात् । तत्रैकवाक्यतारूप बाध्येत । विमेकवाक्यतारूपम् । निवीत मनुष्याणामिति प्राप्तानुवादः । प्राप्तस्य किमर्थेन पुनर्वचनम् । स्तुत्यर्थत्वेन । — तस्मादर्थवाद । [SB , p 894f]

are, therefore, to be taken as being *archavadas* and not *vidhis*¹ Another illustration of this very factor is 'to' be found in the text '*Na catustrims'ad iti brūyāt sadvims'atir ity eva brūyāt*' where the latter portion is to be construed as *piāptasya anuvādah* for conveying *pras'amsā* of the *piāptas'dha* For otherwise there would arise the contingency of *ekavākyatārūpa-bādha*²

3 Now it may be asked what harm is there if there is *bhūyasī adrstakalpanā* When a group of words is looked upon as forming two sentences instead of one we make it *ekavākyatārūpa-bādha* The only answer to this question quired to assume not one but two *adrstas* But *adrsa-kal-*enjoin two things instead of one and hence we shall be *repānā* in itself as we have already seen is a *dosa* and has to be resorted to only when there is no way out of a contingency This being so it is certainly undesirable to go in for *bhūyasī adrsa-kalpanā* when we can do with less of it *Bhūyasī adrsa-kalpanā* is therefore, one more factor which makes *vākya-bheda* a *dosa*³

4 Yet another factor to be noticed in this connection is the inherent *virodha* that is found in such cases Let us, for example, take the text '*Athāto dharma-piñāsā*' Here the term *atha* means *vedān adhītya anantaram* Now it is easy to see that this contains two different factors or conditions one conveyed by *vedān adhītya* and the other by *anantaram*

2 न ह्यय षड्विंशतिशब्दो विधीयते । किं तर्हि । यथाप्राप्तिवचनमनूदते । कथमवगम्यते । एवकारकरणात् । यथाप्राप्ते एवकारकरणम् ।— षड्विंशतिसहस्रापरेऽनेकोऽथो विधीयते । षड्विंशतिसहस्रावचनं च । तत्र वाक्यं भिद्यत । भिद्यमाने एकवाक्यत्वरूपं वा येत । किं तत् । साक्षाद्भूतम् । चतुस्त्रिंशदिति ब्रूयात् षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयादिति । एतद्वि वचनं चतुस्त्रिंशद्वचनाभावे प्राप्तमेव सत् कर्तव्यतया प्रतिषेधप्रशंसितमुच्चर्यते । तदेकमेकवाक्यत्वरूपमापदते । सैकवाक्यता सहस्रापरे बाधिता स्यात् । [SB on IX 4.18, p 1775f]

3 भिन्नवाक्यरूपं स्वाश्रीयमाणे भूयस्यदृष्टानुमानवरूपना स्यात् । [SB on IX 2-40, p 1731], अनेकार्थविधानं चान्याय्यमेकार्थविधाने सम्भवति । भूयसी हि तत्रादृष्टकल्पना स्यात् । [SB on IX 4.18, p 1776]

But it is not possible to enjoin both these conditions by the *sūtra* under consideration. For if both these conditions are to be enjoyed or emphasised there would arise the *vacana-vyakti-bheda* which is only another name for the inherent *virodha*. To enjoin the former the latter portion will have to be looked upon as an *anuvāda*, while the former would be *anuvāda* when the latter is to be enjoined⁴. Thus it may be seen that one and the same section has to be construed as being *vidhi* (or *pradhānabhūta*) and *anuvāda* (or *guna-bhūta*) which it is not possible to do without falling a prey to *virodha*. A similar illustration is to be found in the word *mahendra* which the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would like to interpret to mean 'pertaining to *Indra* who is *mahān*'. But S'ABARA point out the inherent *virodha* that would crop up if we accept the view of the *Pūrva-pakṣin*. In the expression as it is construed by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* it may be seen that the word *Indra* is combined in a compound with the word *mahat* on the one hand and at the same time it is connected with the *taddhita* affix on the other. Now it is well-known that for a word to be connected with a *taddhita* affix or to be combined in a compound with another word, the most essential condition is that it must be *samartha*. Now let us suppose that the word *Indra* forms a compound with the word *mahat* so that it is *samartha*. Then it may be seen that the word *Indra* has an expectancy for the word *mahat* and as such would be rendered *asamartha* as soon as and as long it is separated from the word *mahat*. This means that the word *Indra* which is *samartha* for the *saṁāsa* will be *asamartha* with reference to the *taddhita*. In the same way if the word is taken as being *samartha* with reference to the *taddhita* formation it will be *asamartha* for the *saṁāsa*. But how can one and the same word be both *samartha* and

4 न ह्येतेदेक वाक्यं पुरस्ताच्च वेदाध्ययनाद्धर्मजिज्ञासा प्रतिषेधियति, परस्ताच्चानन्तर्यं प्रकरिष्यति । मिश्रेत हि तथा वाक्यम् । अन्या हि वचनवृत्तिरस्य पुरस्ताद्देदाध्ययनाद्धर्मजिज्ञासा प्रतिषेधियति, अन्या च परस्तादानन्तर्यमुपदिशति । वेदानधीत्येकैकस्या विधीयत अन्यानन्तर्यम् । विपरीतमन्यस्याम् । अर्थवत्त्वाच्चैक-वाक्यता वक्ष्यते । [SB ṣṇ I.1-1, p. 5]

asamartha at one and the same time? Hence it is concluded that the base viz *mahendra* of the *taddhita* formation is to be looked upon as one *samartha* expression and is not further to be split up and identified with *Indra* (as qualified by the expression *mahat*). Thus it may be seen that such *virodha* arises when one and the same expression is required to be construed in two different ways which are diametrically opposed to one another.

5 And lastly we may note *agamakatva* which has been adduced by S'ABARA as a ground for rejecting a construction giving rise to *vākya-bheda*. While discussing the text '*Darsa-pūrnāmāsūbhvām yajeta purnamāsyām purnamāsvā yajeta amāvāsyāvām amāvāsyavā yajeta* / *Dars'apūrnāmāsāyor vajñakratvos catvāra rtviṣa iti*' S'ABARA discusses the comparative merits and demerits of *laksanā* and *vākya-bheda*, and concludes that the former is to be preferred to the latter for *laksanā* although it involves *anyāyya-kalpanā* is yet *laukikī* and can as such be understood. Not so however the *vākya-bheda* which involves *agamakatva* owing to the *anekārthatva* which it contains⁵.

6 Having thus far seen the several factors that go to make *vākya-bheda* a grave *dosa* we now pass on to consider the various circumstances which give rise to *vākya-bheda*. And here again in the most general terms it may be stated that *ekārthatvūbhāva* or *anekārthatā* is mainly responsible for this *vākya-bheda* in more ways than one.

7 Thus in the text '*Vārtraghnī purnamāsyām anūcyete vrdhanvatī amāvāsyāvām iti*', if the *vārtraghnī* and 'the *vrddhanvatī* *rks* are understood as being enjoined with reference to the *dars'a* and the *purnamāsa* *yāgas*, we shall have to suppose that both the *dvitva* on the one hand and the *vārtraghnī* or the *vrddhanvatī* on the other are enjoined. And this would give rise to *vākya-bheda*. Hence to avoid this contingency it is concluded that *vārtraghnī* and

5 See page 128 n 74

6 See page 94 n 52

vidhānavattā alone are enjoined with reference to the *ājya-bhāgas* (which form an *anga* of the *darsa-pūrnāmāsas*) where the *dvitva* is already *prāpta*.⁷ Another illustration may be found in the text '*Ekādaśa prayājān yajati ekādaśānuryājān yajati*' where if these are taken as other independent acts it would mean that both the *yūgas* and the *samkhyā* are enjoined by the text under discussion. But this would be nothing short of *anekāthatva* and would, therefore, be open to *vākya-bheda* *dosa*. Hence it is concluded that these texts are to be construed as merely *guna-vidhis* enjoining only the *samkhyā*.⁸ Here it may be observed that these illustrations differ from one another in this that while the two *arthas* in the former are spoken of in one *pada*, in the latter they are couched in two separate *padas*. *Artha-dvaya-vidhāna* of both these varieties can very well be illustrated in texts like '*Agnisthā dve dve rasane ādāya &c.*'⁹ '*prajūpataye ghrte carum nirvapet*'¹⁰ and '*Yūpasyāntiko gnum mathutvā yūpāhutim juhoti*'¹¹ and a host of other texts which

7 मिथ सद् द्वाभ्यामनुवाक्याभ्यां न प्रधानस्य कार्यमस्ति । यत्र तु द्वे अनुवाक्ये तत्र तयोर्वार्त्रन्तता बध्न्वत्ता च विधीयते । प्रधाने चैकानुवाक्ये । तत्र द्विंश वार्त्रन्तता च बध्न्वत्ता च विद्वद्वाक्ये भिद्यते । आज्यभागयोस्तु द्वे प्राप्ते आप्रेयो सौमी च । तत्र वार्त्रन्तता बध्न्वत्ता च केवला दृश्यते विवातुम् । [SB on मिथस्थानार्थसम्बन्धात् । MS III 1 23, p 739]

8 न च शक्यते वदितुमेकादशादीन्वन्त्यन्त इति । अपूर्वाणि हि तान्यवश्य विधातव्यानि । तानि च वाक्येन यागे । अथ यागो विधीयते यागे च नष्टा तथा वाक्ये भिद्यते । तस्मादितिकर्तव्यतायां प्राप्तार्या गुणविधय एत इति । [SB on X-3 4, p 1867]

9 अग्निष्ठा द्वे द्वे रशने आदाय द्वाभ्यां रशनाभ्यामेकैकं यूपं परिचरयतीति । अग्नीषोमीयप्रकृतिस्तत्र एकैकरशन्य स्यात् । अथ वचनमिदं चस्मान्न भवति अग्निष्ठा द्वे द्वे रशने आदायेत्येतदेव विधीयते । यदि रशनाद्विन्वमपि विधीयते तदा वाक्ये भिद्यते । तस्मादनूद्यते । [SB on VIII-1-14, p 1590]

10 तस्मिन्वाज्ये श्रपणं श्रूयते घृते श्रपयतीति । किमतः । अत एतद्भवति । औष विन्वन्तेन श्रपणं प्राप्यते । तत्र केवलमाज्यं विवायिष्यते । आज्यविश्रयन्ते तु श्रपणमाज्यं च विधीयेयाताम् । तथा वाक्ये भिद्यते । [SB on VIII-1 39, p 1603]

11 आहवनीये जुहोतीत्युत्सर्गात् । सर्वदोमेष्वाहवनीयं प्राप्तं । तन्नामि

have been discussed by SABARA who has in such case shown how these may be interpreted so as to lay down *artha dvaya* and how such an interpretation can be and has to be avoided

8 Somewhat different is the case with the text '*Jāmu vā etad yajñasva kṛyate yad anvāñcau purodās'au upāms'uvājam antarā yajati visnur upāms'u yastavyo jāmutvāyat &c*' This evidently is a complex sentence formed of several *avāntara vākyaś*. The main injunction here is to be found in '*upāms'uvājam antarā yajati*' so that '*visnur upāms'u yastavyah &c*' have to be construed as *arthavādas*. For if they also are taken to be *vidhus* there would be *vidhāna* of more *vākyaārthas* than one and there would crop up the *vākya-bheda*¹². The main point here to be noted is that *vākya-bheda* in this case is caused by the assumption of *vākyaārthadvaya-vidhāna*. The same is the case with the text '*Apsu tṛnam prāsya āghārayati*' which if construed as enjoining both *apsu āghārah* and *tṛna-prāsanam* would be open to *vākya-bheda*¹³. Thus we see that *arthadvaya-vidhāna* in

मथित्वेति वक्ष्यम् । तदपि मन्थन प्राग्बशे कर्मणः प्रवृत्तत्वात्प्राग्बशे ऽप्यहम् । तत्रेदमपि वक्तव्यम् । यूपस्याग्निकेऽग्नि मथित्वेति । उभयस्मिन्वापि विधीयमाने वाक्यभेदो मन्थनस्य स्वर्यवद्भावात् । तस्मादन्यतरदिविहित मन्थनमन्तिक वा । [SB on XI-2 27, p 2145]

12 न हि विषयो विष्णुरुपांशु यष्ट्य इत्येवमादय । अर्थवादा हि ते । कथम् । अहिमन्वाक्ये विध्यन्तरस्य भावात् । उपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजतीत्येतदहिमन्वाक्ये विधीयते । यदीमेऽपि विधीयेरन् भियेत तर्हि वाक्यम् । अपि च यागस्य विष्णवादीनां च सवनोऽत्र गम्यते वाक्ये । न च यागस्य विधानम् । ननु चोपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजतीत्यत्राप्यन्तरा सवनोऽत्र गम्यते । बाढम् । स तु विधीयते उपांशुवादि सवनम् । एक हीद वाक्य नानेक विधातुमर्हति । कथम् । जामि वा एतद्यज्ञस्य क्रियत इत्येवमुपक्रम्य तद्वाक्यमजामित्वायेत्येवमन्तम् । तस्य मध्येसमाप्नात विष्णवादिवाक्यम् । तेन सक्त्यमान न वाक्यान्तर भवितुमर्हति । तस्माद्विष्णुरुपांशु यष्ट्य इत्येवमादयो न विषय । [SB on II 2 10 pp 491-494]

13 लिङ्ग चेतमर्थं दर्शयति अष्टु तृण प्रास्याधारयतीति । यद्यङ्गानामग्नौ वृत्ति स्यादुभय विधीयेत, अस्तु आधारयति तृण प्रास्यतीति च । तद्वाक्यभेददोष स्यात् । अथ यथोक्तो न्यायस्तथा अष्टु इत्यनूय तृणप्रासन केवल विधीयते इति नास्ति दोष । [SB on XI-2 33, p 2148]

both its forms viz *padārthadvaya-vidhāna* and *vāk्यārthadvaya-vidhāna* gives rise to *vākya-bheda*

9. Let us now take the text '*Dars'apūrnāmāsābhyām svaṅgakāmo yajeta*' In this connection it has been argued that such texts must be taken as enjoining *saguna karma* for those who are *samartha* and at the same time *viguna* for those who are not so. Thus though the text is only one and occurs once only, it is endowed with the power of yielding two *arthas*. But this interpretation adopted by the *Pūrva-paksin* is by its very nature inadmissible. Thus we see that when one and the same word or sentence occurring once only is made to yield more *arthas* than one with reference to two different persons or situations we are sure to fall a prey to *vākya-bheda*¹⁴

10. *Aneka-guna-vidhāna* is one more factor which results in *vākya-bheda*. Let us take some concrete examples. There is the text '*Māsam agnihotram juhota māsam dars'apūrnāmāsābhyām yajate*' which may be construed in two different ways. It may be construed as a *guna-vidhi* laying down time (*kāla*) for the *nyaya agnihotra*, and *dars'apūrnāmāsa* sacrifices or on the other hand it may be construed as laying two quite distinct and separate acts bearing the names *agnihotra* and *dars'apūrnāmāsa* which are not to be confounded with the *nyaya* sacrifices of the same names. The *Pūrva-paksin* is in favour of the former construction. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that this text comes after '*upasadas'caritvā*' and that the *upasads* have nothing to do with the *agnihotra* and the *dars'apūrnāmāsa* sacrifices. And if the *upasads* also are to be understood as being enjoined by this text under consideration then the text would be made to lay down more *gunas* than one which in a *gunavidhipara vākya* gives rise to *vākya-bheda*. Hence it is that the text under consideration must be understood as laying down not the *nyaya* sacrifices named *agnihotra* and *dars'apūrnāmāsa*,

14 अर्थतदेव वाक्य समर्थानां सगुण कर्म विनास्यति असमर्थानां विगुणमिति तत्र । सकृदुच्चारण उभयशक्तिविरोधाद्वाक्य भिद्येत । [SB on VI-1 5, p 1357]

but two quite different sacrifices having the same names¹⁵ Another illustration of this very principle is to be found in the text *Āsvīnam graham grhītvā trivrtā vūpam parivīya āgneyam savanīyam paśum upākaroti*, where also it is argued that the first part alone lays down the *lūla* while the latter part is to be understood as an *anuvāda*. For if both the parts are construed as laying down the *kāla* for *parivīyāna* and the *upākarana* respectively we shall be making the text enjoy more *gunas* than one and thus courting *vākya-bheda*¹⁶ *'Yadāgneyo'stākapālo' māvdśyāyām paurṇamāsyām cācyuto bhavati*' &c is yet another text where also it has been stated by Ś'ABARA in very clear terms that *anekaguna-vidhāna* by one sentence with reference to an act enjoined by some other text is neither possible nor admissible¹⁷ This in other words means that a *gunavidhupara* sentence must be so interpreted as to lay down one *guna* and one only. And the moment it is made to yield *anekagunavidhāna* it would be open to *vākya-bheda*.

11 From the foregoing discussion we get one more rule in this connection viz that *anekaguna-vidhāna* may be admitted in a *mukhya vidhi* i.e. a text which lays down the act itself. This rule has been explicitly stated by JAMINI when he says *'Tadgunās tu vidhīyeran avibhāgād vidhānīrthe na ced anyena śīstāh'*¹⁸ Under this *sūtra* it has been

15 प्रकरणान्तरे श्रूयमान वाक्य यस्य प्रकरणे तस्य वाचक भवितुमर्हति । ननु प्रत्यक्षोऽग्निहोत्रस्य दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्च गुणविधिः । नेत्युच्यते । कथम् । उपसद्भिश्च-
रित्वेत्युक्त्वा इदमभिधीयते । न चोपसदोऽग्निहोत्रस्य दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्च सन्ति । तस्माद-
शक्यस्त्वत्र मासविधिः । अथोच्येत उपसदोऽपि विधीयन्त इति । तथा गुणविधानार्थेऽ-
स्मिन्वाक्येऽनेकगुणविधानाद् वाक्यं भिद्येत । [SB on II.3 24, pp 614-617]

16 तत्र कालानियमे प्राप्त आश्विन षड् गृहीत्वेति कालमात्रं विधीयते । त्रिवृता-
यूपं परिवीर्योपकरोतीत्यनुवादः । इतरथा हि परिव्याणस्य कालो विधीयते उपाकरणस्य
च । तत्रानेकगुणविधानाद् वाक्यं भिद्येत । [SB on III 6 21, p 1046]

17 एकैर्न वाक्येनात्रानेको गुणो विधातुमिदमेव भवति । न च शब्दान्तरेण
चोदिते कर्मणे अनेको गुणः परस्परमन्वे चासति शक्यते विधातुम् । [SB on
II-2 6, p 485 f]

shown by S'ABARA that the expressions *āgneya*, *agnīsomaya* &c can't be taken to be *karmanāmadheyas*. The text 'Yad *āgñeyo'stākāpālo* &c' must be taken as laying down the main act together with the *gunas*. In this case, of course, we have to take the *gunas* also as being enjoined or *vihita* since they are not from any other source. Thus we see that a *mukhya-vidhi-para vākya* (i.e. an *utpatti-vidhi*) may be admitted as laying down more *gunas* than one provided that the *gunas* in question are not already enjoined by some other text. And this we have to admit, for if we don't do so the whole text will be in the danger of being rendered futile. If, however, the *gunas* are found to be enjoined by some other text then such texts (i.e. the words) should be taken as *nāmadheyas* and not as *guna-vidhis* as in the case of the text '*Agñihotram juhōti*'¹⁹

12. A similar discussion is made with regard to the text '*Vasante brāhmano'gnīn ādadhīta, grīśme vājanyah, s'aradī vaiśyah*' and on the basis of this very principle it is concluded that this text lays down the *ādihāna* with reference to *Brāhmanādis* and *vasantādis*. It is here that S'ABARA has raised the question as to how is *vākya-bheda* avoided in such cases, and has ultimately given the reply that in such cases we don't take the text as containing two or more *vidhis*, but interpret it as a *vis'ista-vidhi* i.e. a *vidhi* making only the *vidhāna* of the main act as characterized by the *gunas*²⁰. Thus it may be remembered that *aneka-guna-vidhāna* may be admitted in an *agunavidhi-para* text where it is possible to say that we have one *vis'istavidhāna*. But the same can't be said of a *gunavidhi-para* text which merely aims at laying down some *guna* with reference to some act that is already laid down by some other text. Hence it is that a

19 cf. SB on MS I-4-9

20 नन्वेकगुणविधानं स्वया वाक्येनाध्यवसितं भवति । नैष दोषः । अगुणविधिपरे हि वाक्ये भवत्यनेकगुणविधानमित्युक्तं तद्व्याप्तिस्तु विधीयेन्न विभागाद्विधानार्थं न चेदन्त्येन शिष्टाः । इति । तस्माद् ब्राह्मणादिसंयुक्ता विधायिका धृतिः । द्वाभ्यां तु विशेषणभ्यां विशिष्टमेकमाधानं विधायिष्यते । तेन न भविष्यति वाक्यभेदः ।
[SB on II 3-4, p. 593 f.]

gunavidhipara text can never be so interpreted as to make it enjoin more *gunas* than one, though an *agunavidhipara vākya* may be construed as such, of course, only as the last resort when no other construction is possible

13 '*Vasatkartuh*' *prathama-bhaksah*, is another text where it¹ is seen that two points are enjoined. And there this *anekaguna-vidhāna* is admitted because of the *samāsa* that is used to do it. Thus in such cases we see that a *samāsa* can be understood as *vis'ista-vidhāna* and as such be free from *vākya-bheda*²

14 One must, however, carefully distinguish between *vis'istavidhāna* on the one hand and *vidhīyamānasya vis'esanam* on the other which to an uncritical eye would appear to be the same. But Ś'ABARA has in very clear terms shown how *vidhīyamānasya vis'esanam* is open to *vākya-bheda* while *vis'ista-vidhāna* as we have already seen is immune to it. Even a *vis'esana*, Ś'ABARA points out, can't be recognized as such unless and until it is itself *vihata*. But as we very well know there can be no *ekavākyatā* between two *vidhīyamāna padārthas* or between a *vidhi* and a *vidhi*. Thus an attempt to construe some *padārtha* as a *vis'esana* to something that is *vidhīyamāna* is bound to crash against the rock of *vākya-bheda*²². This becomes clear from the text '*Yasya havir nirup'am pravastāccandramā abhyudeti tredhā tandulān vibhajet*'. Here the *havir* that is spoken of in the first part is of course, the *pravittam havir*. Now if the expression *nirup'am* is construed with *havir* as its *vis'esana* what we shall be having is not *vis'ista-vidhāna* but *vidhīyamānasya vis'esanam*, and hence such a construction is inadmissible²³.

21 वचनमेवेदम् । न मन्तव्यमनेकगुणविवानादविवक्षितं प्राथम्यमिति ।
etc. [page 133, n 85]

22 न हि द्वितीयमानस्य विशेषणं भवति । यन्कारणं विशेषणमप्यविवक्षितं न भवति । न च द्वयोर्विधानयोः परस्परसंबन्धो भवति । SB. on XI-1 3, p. 2 102], also cf. n. 25 below

23 यस्य हविरभ्युदेतीति हविर्विक्षित उदयो निमित्तं प्रवृत्तं हविर्विक्षयति, नोदासीनम् । तस्माद्वविरभ्युदेतीत्युच्यमाने प्रवृत्तं हविरभ्युदेतीति गम्यते । न हि तन्निवृत्त-

In a *vis'ista-vidhāna* we get the *vidhāna* of one *artha* (which is 'of course *vis'ista*) and one only²⁴ whereas here we get the *vidhāna* of two *arthas*, first the *vidhāna* of the *vis'esya* and then that of the *vis'esana* separately. Thus *vis'ista-vidhāna* satisfying the condition of *aikārthya* as it does is always above *vākya-bheda* and as such can never be *dusta*. But *vidhūyamānasya vis'esanam* which apparently is like *vis'ista-vidhāna* violates the condition of *aikārthya* and hence can never be free from *vākya-bheda*.

15 Let us now note the circumstances under which it is possible to construe a sentence as making a *vis'ista-vidhāna*. Take, for example, the sentence '*Ś'ōnam ānaya*'. Here we see that it is the bringing of *s'onatva-vis'ista as'va* that is enjoined by this sentence. But the point to be noted here is that this *vis'ista-vidhāna* is conveyed by a *guna-s'abda* only without the aid of any *dravya-s'abda* or *vis'esya*. Literally the sentence conveys the order to bring the *guna s'onatva*. But as the bringing of a *guna* like *s'onatva* is impossible the whole sentence would be rendered *anarthaka* unless we assume that the *guna-s'abda* conveys not merely the *guna* concerned but

मित्येतेन शक्य विशेषयितुम् । भिद्येत हि तदा वाक्यम् । यत्त्वं हविर्निर्हृप्तं नानिर्हृप्त-
मित्येवमपेक्षमाणे हविर्भयदेतीति न शक्यते विधातुम् । [SB on VI-513,
p 463 f]

24 नात्र द्वाभ्यां वाक्याभ्यां प्रयोजनम् । यथा रक्तमथ योजयेति यदा
गुणविधिपरं वाक्यं भवति तदा द्वाभ्यां वाक्याभ्यां प्रयोजनं गुणद्वयविधाने । etc [See
page 102, n 14 above], अथ कथमवाक्यभेदः । रेवतीषु ऋक्षु वारवन्तीयं सामं
कृत्वा पशुकामो यजेतस्यपूर्वो यागः सर्वैर्विशेषणैर्विशिष्टो विधीयते । तत्रैकार्थत्वं द्विभागे
च साक्षाद्भस्मिन्नेकवाक्यत्वमुपपद्यते । नन्वर्थभेदो, यागश्चैव तत्पूर्वं कर्तव्यो, रेवतीषु
वारवन्तीयमपूर्वमिति । नेति ब्रूम । निर्वृत्तवारवन्तीयरेवतीगुणको यागो विधीयते ।
न वारवन्तीयनिर्वृत्तिः । अर्थाद् रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमभिस्स्यति । शक्यते च
तन्निर्वर्तयितुम् । उच्यते । रेवतीनां वारवन्तीयस्य च संबन्धो न विहितः स्यात् । तत्र
रेवतीध्वन्यान्वयि सामानि भवेयुः । वारवन्तीयं चान्यास्त्वयूक्षु । नैष दोषः । कृत्वे-
त्यभिनिर्वृत्तः संबन्धो यागायोच्यते । तेन संबन्धो गम्यते । यथा शोणमानयेति
रक्तगुणसंबन्धोऽश्वः शब्देनैवानयतो विधीयते इति न वाक्यभेदो भवति एवमिहापि
द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB on II 227, pp 557-559]

in addition brings in the idea of *dravya* also by *ākṛpa*. Thus it is that ultimately the text in question conveys the order to bring not merely the *sonatva guna* but some *dravya* viz a horse as characterized by the *s'onatva guna*. This is how in such cases we arrive at the *vis'ista-vidhāna*²⁵. Here evidently this mode of interpretation has to be accepted just to avoid *ānarthakya*.

16 There is yet another circumstance calling for *vis'ista-vidhāna* which is best illustrated in texts like '*Lohtosnāṣā rtiṣṭjah pracaranti*' where the *vis'istārtha* is enjoined with the help of a *samāsa*. Similarly the expression *śatāgnistoma* being a *samāsa* can be understood as referring to *ubhaya-vis'esana-vis'ista guna* and as involving neither *anekārthatva* nor *vākya-bheda*²⁶.

17 *Vis'ista-vidhāna* as has been pointed out above is admissible in a *mukhya-vidhi* alone. That is why when we read '*Pas'unā yajeta*' we understand the text to enjoin *aneka vis'esana-vis'istah vāgah*²⁷. This rule, it may be observed is based on another rule that has been already discussed before, while discussing the significance of the verb. There it has been stated that when the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna* the other factors all combine together and form *vis'esana* thereof, while if it is *gama* the several factors spoken of in the sentence combine with the verb only severally. Now it may be seen that the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna* in a *mukhya vidhi* so that the rule noted above naturally applies to *mukhya vidhis* only. Hence we get the rule that *vis'istārthatā* in the case of *mukhya vidhis* is no *dosa*.

25 नन्वेवमपि बहवोऽर्था रेवत्यो वारवन्तीय तत्सम्बन्धो याग पशुकामश्चति । नैव दोषः । बहव श्रूयन्ते, एकोऽत्र विधीयते यागो विशिष्टः । ननु रेवत्योऽपि विधीयन्ते वारवन्तीयमपि । etc [See page 102 n 15 above]

26 वत्तु अनेकार्थमिति । नानेकार्थं भविष्यति । गणचोदनया प्राप्तानामहा पञ्चानां सस्थामात्र विधीयते । शताग्निष्टोममित्यपि समास उभयविशेषणविशिष्ट गणमाह । स एक एवार्थः । यथा लोहितोष्णीषा ऋन्विज प्रचरन्तीति [SB on VIII 8 9, p 1617]

27 नात्र जातिर्द्रव्यस्य लक्षणत्वेन श्रूयते । etc [See page 145 n 4]

18 But it may be asked, what harm is there if we do not accept such a text as containing a *vis'ista vidhu*. Can we not construe it as containing two independent *vidhus* pure and simple? 'No, certainly not' is our reply. For in that case we shall have to repeat the *ākhyātārtha* with each one of the details spoken of in the text. But since in such texts the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna* and the other details are *gauna*, the proposed construction would mean that we repeat the *pradhāna* for the sake of the *gauna*. This, however, is not right. Hence we must avoid the contingency of repeating the *pradhāna* for the sake of the *gauna*. And if it is to be avoided we must catch hold of as many details from the text as we possibly can along with the *ākhyātārtha* only. The best illustration of this rule is to be found in the text '*Arunayā pineākṣyaikahāvanyā somam kṛnāti*' where we have to conclude that the *kṛaya* is to be performed with the help of a ruddy, tawny-eyed, one-year-old cow²⁸.

19 Some conditions giving rise to *vākya-bheda* may best be stated only negatively by saying that there can be no syntactical unity between a *vidhī* and a *vidhu*, an *uldes'ya* and an *uldes'ya* a *guna* and a *guna* or finally between a *mantra* and a *brāhmaṇa-vākya*. These now we shall study separately one by one taking some concrete illustrations as they are supplied by Ś'ABARA.

20 Let us take the texts '*Dau's'apūnam īsābhyām yaṇ a'*' and '*Jyotistomena vajeta*'. In connection with these it has been argued that it is not possible for these texts to enjoin *dharma*s with reference to this particular *yaṇ* or *vāga*. For if the *dharma*s are thus enjoined the *yaṇ* with reference to which they are enjoined can't but be *anūḍita*, while if the *yaṇ* is taken as being enjoined then we shall have to accept the

28 न तर्हि ब्रूमो वाक्यभेद इति । कथम् । कस्य हि द्रव्याह्निमानानुपदिश्यते । न कस्यस्तथो । न च प्रधान प्रतिगुणं भिद्यते, प्रतिप्रधानं हि गुणो भिद्यत इति । अस्ति चायं दृष्टान्तः समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिरिति । यथा गर्गाः एतदण्डयन्तामिति । तथा अभिपुत्र्य हुत्वा भक्षयन्तीति तस्मादुभयविशेषणविशिष्टकथोऽभिधीयते । [SB on III 112, p. 697]

*dharma*s as being *anūḍita*. This we have got to do, for, if both the *yajñ* as well as the *dharma*s are accepted as being enjoined as such there can be no syntactical connection, between them. For the rule is '*Na hi dvayor vidhīyamānayoḥ parasparena sambandho bhavati*'²⁹. But the reason why this rule has to be accepted has been explicitly stated by Ś'ABARA in his *bhāṣya* on MS VI 1 3 while discussing the exact significance of the texts like '*Darsapūnamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta*'. The *Siddhānta* view in this connection is that *yāga* is *guna-bhūta* while *svarga* i.e. *phala* is *pradhāna-bhūta*. *Yāga* in these texts must be understood as being enjoined as *karana* to attain the *phala* viz. *svarga* and not *per se*. For if it is so understood then the desire for *svarga* would be *nusprajāna* since *yāga* not being taken as being a *karana* to any *phala* must be said to be *nusphala*. If on the other hand, both *yāga* as well as *svarga* are understood as being *viḥita* there would crop up the *vākyabheda-prasanga*. Hence it is concluded that '*svargakāmapadena svārtho na vidhīyate kim tarhi uddiśyate*'. The rule that we have now to note here is '*Dvayos'ca vidhīyamānayoḥ parasparenāsambaddhāyor vākyabhedaprasangah*'³⁰.

21 As a corollary to this rule we get another rule viz. that if a group of words which is connected with another group of words which is a *vidhi*, then the former can't be a *vidhi* itself. Far from being a *vidhi* it has to be construed as being *vidhi-s'esa* which in other words means

29 दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेत्यत्र न शक्यन्ते अगविर्द्वे धर्मा विधातुम् । किं कारणम् । यदा यज्ञो धर्मा विधीयन्ते तदा यजिरनूयते यजेतेत्यमिति । यदि यजिर्विधीयेत न धर्मे संबध्येत् । न हि द्वयोर्विधीयमानयो परस्परेण संबन्धो भवति । [SB on VII 1 2, p 1526 f]

30 स्वर्गसङ्गकर्मार्थं प्रति करणत्वेन यागो विधीयते । ननु यागः कर्तव्यतया धर्म्या विधीयते । सत्यमेवम् । आनर्थक्यं तु तथा भवति । स्वर्गं प्रत्यविहिते यागे स्वर्गकामस्तस्मिन्निष्फले विधीयमानोऽपि निष्प्रयोजनः स्यात् । तत्रोपदेशवैयर्थ्यम् । द्वयोश्च विधीयमानयो परस्परेणासंबद्धयोर्वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गः । [SB on VI 1 3, p 1352 f]

only an *arthavāda*. This is what has been explicitly stated by JĀMINI when he writes *Vidhinā tveka-vāyatvāt stutyarthena vidhānam syuh*³¹. We also find JĀMINI adducing this very ground by using the term *vākyaśeṣa* at MS 12.22³² and VIII 17-8³³. But at MS 12.25 he in clear terms declares that if such groups of words are taken as *vidhis* then there would crop up *vākya-bheda-prasanga*³⁴.

22 While discussing the *prāmānya* of the *arthavāda* texts it has been argued by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* that the injunctive portion of the text may by itself be said to yield the sense of injunction, so that nothing is left for the *arthavāda* portion of the text to do. Thus for example the injunctive portion '*Vāyavyam s'vītam alabheta bhūtikāmah*' may by itself be taken as enjoining the particular *ālambha*, while the *arthavāda* portion that follows viz '*Vāyur vaḥ kṣepisthā devatā*' would be only nugatory. ŚĀBARA, however, points out that it is not possible for one and the same text to lay down two *sambandhas*. If, for example the text in question were to lay down the *sambandhas* as *bhūtikāmah ālabheta* (i.e. *ālambhana*) and *ālambhena ca śeṣa guṇo bhavati* (i.e. *stuti*) then there would arise syntactical split. Hence it would be clear that in such cases the injunctive portion together with the *vākyaśeṣa* must be accepted as conveying the idea of *stuti* along with that of the *kārtavyatā* of the particular act³⁵. What we have to note here is that *sambandha*

31 cf. MS 12.7

32 उक्तं तु वाक्यशेषम् ।

33 विधिरिति चेत् । न वाक्यशेषत्वात् ।

34 विधौ च वाक्यभेदः स्यात् ।

35 यदा न स्तुतिपदानि विधिशब्देनैव तदा प्ररोचना । यदा स्तुतिवचनं तदा स्तवनेन । न चैव सति किं स्तुतिवचनेन यस्मिन्सत्यविधायकः, सा भूत्वा । तदभावेऽपि पूर्वविधिनैव प्ररोचयिष्यत इति । — निरपेक्षादपि विधिमवगमिष्याम । भवत्वैवम् । न सति कश्चिद्विरोधः । किन्त्वशक्यं स्तुतिपदसम्बन्धे सति विध्यो विवक्षितुम् । अथ हि सम्बन्धस्य विधायकः द्वौ सम्बन्धौ विदध्यात् भूतिवाम आकभेत, आलम्बनेन

dvaya-vidhāna by one *vākya* gives rise to *vākya-bheda*. This very principle is again expressly stated by S'ABARA in his *Bhāṣya* on MS IX 13 where he writes '*Anekasambandhe ca vākyaṃ bhūdyeta*'. This very argument is again hurled by the *Pūrva-paksin* when while discussing the text '*Purastād upasadam saumyena caranti &c*' he argues that if the word *upasad* is construed with *saumya* etc. on the one hand and *aurva* &c. on the other, there would be *vākya-bheda*. For as JAIMINI puts it '*Vipratyiddham hy ubhayam*',³⁶ This very rule is again referred to by JAIMINI and stated by S'ABARA at MS IV 3 33³⁷. There the text under discussion is '*samsthāpya paurṇamāsīm vaimrdham anunirvrapanti*'. The *Pūrva-paksin* tries to construe the text taking the expression *anunirvrapanti* as connecting *vaimrdha* with the *dars'a* and *paurṇamāsa* sacrifices, and also with *paurṇamāsi* the *kāla*, and thus understand *vaimrdha* as being *ubhayārtha* i.e. subsidiary to both *dars'a* as well as *paurṇamāsa*. But this says JAIMINI is impossible. For we have only one word with which to bring about the two *sambandhas*. Here S'ABARA clearly states that '*Ekasminneva vākye na dvau sambandhau saknoti vidhātum / Ekārthatvād dhu ekam vākyaṃ samadhi-gatam*' / Let us take one more illustration '*Yathācamasam anyāms camasāms' camasino bhaksayanti / Athaitasva hāriyojansya sarve eva lipsante*'. The *Pūrva-paksin* here argues that the *hāriyojana* is swallowed by the *camasinaḥ* only and not by the *grāvastut* also. Here according to him *sarve* means all the *camasinaḥ* who are already in the context. The *siddhānta* view, however, is that *sarve* here stands

वैध गुणो भवतीति भिद्येत तर्हि एव सति वाक्यम् ।——एवमिमानि सर्वाण्येव पदानि कञ्चिदर्थं स्तुवन्ति विदधति । [SB on I 2 7, pp 117-119]

36 विप्रतिषिद्धं ह्युभयम् । न शक्नोत्युपसदमित्येष शब्दः सौम्यादीन् विशेष्ट-मेकस्मिन्वाक्ये पूर्वादौ च । भिद्येत हि तथा वाक्यम् । [SB on IV 4 5, p 1272]

37 न शब्दैकत्वात् । [MS IV 3 33], एकः शब्दः अनुनिर्वपतीति एक-स्मिन्नेव वाक्ये न द्वौ संबन्धौ शक्नोति विधातुम् । वैमृधस्य दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां पौर्ण-मासीकालेन च । एकार्थत्वाद् श्लोकः वाक्यं समधिगतम् । [SB, p 1265 f]

not merely for the *camasinah* but for the *grāvastut* also, and hence the *camasinah* as well as the *grāvastut* partake of the *hāriyojana*. He points out that according to the interpretation of the *Pūrva-paksin* the expression *bhaksayanti* will be connected with *sarve* on the one hand and *camasinah* on the other. But we know that 'Dvau hi sambandhāv ekasmin vākya apūrvau na śakyete vidhātum'. Hence the construction should be 'Atha etasya hāriyojanasya nakevalam comtsinah sarve eva itī'. It is thus that the expression *sarve* can be understood in its literal sense, and the contingency of *sambandha-dvayavidhāna* be avoided¹⁸

23 Now let us take the text 'Na catustrims'ad itī brūyāt sadvims'atir ity eva brūyāt'. If this is understood as laying down the *sadvims'atī samkhyā* then it would be laying down two arthas viz *catustrims'at-pratisedha* and *sadvims'atī-samkhyā*. Thus there is one *pratisedha* and one *vidhi* which would have to be taken as being conveyed by one text. But this is nothing short of *vākya-bheda*. Hence it is concluded that the text under consideration does not lay down the *pratisedha samkhyā* but prohibits the whole of 'the *ik*, *Catustrims'at* &c. Here then we see that just as there can be no *ekavākyatā* between a *vidhi* and a *vidhi*, so also there can be no *ekavākyatā* between a *vidhi* and a *pratisedha*. For a *pratisedha* after all is nothing but a negative *vidhi*¹⁹. This very rule is again referred to by S'ABARA while discussing the question whether the *kāmya karmas* are to be performed only once. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues in favour of this view, but the

38 नैतदस्ति चमसिन एव हारियोजने लिप्सन्त इति । सर्वे तु विधीयन्ते हारियोजने । सर्वे भक्षयन्तीति । न पुनश्चमसिन इति संबन्धः शक्यते विधातुम् । तस्मादन्या वचनव्यक्तिः । का पुनरसौ । यथाचमसमन्याश्चमसाश्चमसिनो भक्षयन्तीत्यनुवादः । स्वममिनश्चमसान्भक्षयन्त्येव । ते भक्षयन्ती यथाचमसमेव । अथैतस्य हारियोजनस्य न केवलं चमसिन, सर्व एवेति । किमेव भविष्यति । सर्वशब्दश्च सर्वान्वदन् नैकदेशे कल्पितो भविष्यति । न च द्वौ संबन्धावपूर्वावेकस्मिन्वाक्ये भविष्यतः । [SB on III 5 30, p 1005 f]

39 षड्विंशतिसंख्यपरेऽनेकोऽर्थो विधीयते । etc [See page 216, n 2]

Siddhāntin points out that by laying this rule one would be required to adopt *pratishedhapara vākyas* also in the *gavādi vidhis*. Thus side by side with the *vidhis* like '*Prathamam yajeran*' one will have to assume the text '*Na dvitīyam yajeran*'. But this would be courting *vākya-bheda*. Hence the conclusion is that *kāmya karmas* may be performed more than once for *phalādhukya* ⁴⁰

24 Having thus seen how *vidhāna-dvaya* causes *vākya-bheda* we may now pass on to see how the same happens in the case of *uddesya-dvaya*. There is the text '*Bhūne juhōti śkannu juhōti*'. Here it is argued that the expression *bhūne* speaks of the *numitta* and is as such *uddis'yamāna* and not *upādīyamāna*, for *anupādīyamānam hi numittam ityucyate*. It, therefore, follows that the *yāga* of which this is the *numitta* cannot be *uddis'yamāna* also. For '*Dvayor uddis'yamānavoh sambandha eva na syāt*', and thus there would arise *vākya-bheda*. Hence the conclusion is that the *yāga* is enjoined, but not the *bhedana* ⁴¹

25 From all the foregoing discussion it would appear that there can be no *ekavākyatā* between two sections which are on a par with one another. And from this fact we come to one more factor which lies at the basis of *vākya-bheda*. This is what is given by JAIMINI in his *Gunānām ca parārthatvād asambandhah samatvāt syāt*' under which Ś'ABARA has discussed the text '*Tasmād vārāno vai yajñāvacarah syāt na tvetenna juhuyāt* | *Vatankato vati yajñāvacarah syāt juhuyād etena*'. Now because these *vārāna* &c are said to be *yajñāvacara*, therefore, they can't belong to *agnādhya* in sp. of *prakarana*. Hence according to the rule '*Pradhāne*' *sambha-*

40 यदि च नियोगतः सकृदेव कर्तव्यं भवेत् ततस्तेषां प्रथमयजेरभित्येवमादिगणदिविविधं वचनान्येतानि कल्पयेत्, न द्वितीययजेरभितिः । तथा च वाक्यानि भिद्येन् । [SB on XI 1 24, p. 2124]

41 अनुपादीयमानं हि निमित्तमित्युच्यते । यदि च यस्यापि निमित्तं सोऽप्युद्दिश्येत तत्र द्वयोर्दृश्यमानयोः सम्बन्ध एव न स्यात् । न चात्र भेदः कुर्यादिति विधीयते । भेदेन निर्वृते यदन्यच्छ्रूयत तद्विधीयते । [SB on VI 4 13, p. 1435]

van padārthas tadgune kalpyatc' they should belong to *pavamāna-havīmsi* which are *guna-bhūta* to *agnyādhāna*, in whose *prakarana* they are spoken of. It is here that JAIMINI points out that *pavamāna-havīmsi* can't be *guna-bhūta* to *ādhāna*, for just as *ādhāna* is a *samskāra* of and as such *gunabhūta* to *agni*, so also are the *pavamāna-havīmsi*. Thus we see that *saṃatva* is adduced as a ground for *asambandha*.⁴²

26 But the principle of *samesu vākyabhidhā* has been explicitly stated by JAIMINI at MS II 1 47 where it has been shown by S'ABARA how 'Ite tvā ūrjo tvā' must be construed as two different sentences and not one. It is on this very principle again that in the text 'Tapte payasi dadhy ānavati sā vaiśvadēvy āmīksā vājibhyo vājinaṃ' the *āmīksāgunaka karma* is declared to be different from the *vājina-gunaka karma*.⁴³

27 We have now to notice one more circumstance under which *ekavākyatā* is not possible. This has been stated by JAIMINI in the *Sūtra* 'Mantrasya avākyaś'caśatām gunopadiś'ātsyāt'. The question here is whether the text 'Vasatkāreṇa vā svāhākāreṇa vā devebhyo'mam pradīvati' which is *anārabhvyādhīta* should be construed as being *s'evabhūta* to the text 'Prthivyai svāhā antarīksāya svāhā vāyave svāhā' which occurs in the *Darvīhoma-prakarana*. The decision is that since one of the above texts is a *Brīhmana* while the other is a *mantra*, therefore they cannot be taken as forming

42 उक्तमेतत् प्रदानेऽसम्बन्धवदर्थस्तदूणे वर्णयत इति । अग्न्यावेष्टप्रकरणे च समाप्तानात् पवमानहविषा तदूणता । तस्मात्पवमानहविष । इत्येव प्राप्तम् । एव प्राप्ते ब्रह्म । गुणानां समत्वात् । पवमानहविषामग्न्यावेष्टस्य च न परस्परेण संबन्धः । यथा गानमग्नेर्गुणं सम्कारार्थं एव पवमानहविषि अग्नेरेव गुणभूतानि । अस्तत्र परस्परेण सम्बन्ध इति । [SB on III 1 22, p 737]

43 गुणध्वान्नकृतेन देवताभिधानेन सम्बन्धमानं वर्मान्तरं निदध्यात् । समे हि तदा एव वाक्ये भवत । उभे अग्न्यपूर्वयोर्वाग्योर्विधातृणी । [SB on II 2 23 p 532]

one *vākya*. The former is *vidhāyaka* while the latter is only *abhidhāyaka*, and the rule is 'Na hi vidhāyakāvidhāva-
yor ekavākyatvam bhavati' ⁴⁵ Another illustration of this
very rule is to be found in the texts 'So'nujuhōti agnave
svāhā krttikāyai svāhā &c' where the *Pūrva-paksin* would
take the *mantra* as *vihuta*. But S'ABARA points out that
'So'nujuhōti' is a *vidhi* all right, but thereafter what we
have is only the *mantra* and there we find no word which
may be said to enjoin it. And since the one is a *Brāhmaṇa-
vākya* and the other is only a *mantra* they have to be taken
as two different sentences and not one ⁴⁶

28 Lastly it may be noted that just as *anekārthābhudhāna*
results in *vākya-bheda*, so does *vibhāge nirākāṅksatvam*.
Discussing the texts 'Musṭi karoti | Vācam yacchati | &c' it
has been declared that these have to be construed as
independent sentences and not as *śeṣa* to the text 'Dikṣnam
āvedayati' on the ground that they convey *aneka arthas* and
are complete by themselves which means that they are *vibhā-
ge nirākāṅksa*. Hence inspite of *ānantarya* there can be no
ekavākyatā between the two portions in this particular
case ⁴⁷

29 Now it may be noticed that though *vākya-bheda* is a
dosa in several cases, yet there are cases where it is not to
be considered a *dosa*. In fact in some cases it is but
legitimate, so that in such cases it would be wrong to seek
to establish *ekavākyatā* among the various parts concerned.
Thus, for example, it would not be right to try to establish

45 मन्त्रेषु वाक्यशेषत्व न स्यात् । न हि विधायकाविधायकयोरेकवाक्यत्वं
भवति । विधायक ब्राह्मणमविधायको मन्त्र । [SB on X 8 20, p 2075 f]

46 भिन्नान्येतानि वाक्यानि, सोऽनुजुहोतीति विधिवाक्यम्, अग्नये स्वाहा
कृतिकाम्य स्वाहेत्येवमादीनि मन्त्रवाक्यानि । [SB on X.41, p 1902]

47 आनन्तर्यमचोदना । वाक्यानां च समाप्तत्वात् । [MS III 1 24-25],
स्वेन स्वेन पदसमूहेन परिपूर्णमेक वाक्य, तथापर, तथा सर्वाणि यान्यु-
दाहृतानि । तस्माद्विस्पष्टमर्थद्वयम् । विभागे च निराकाङ्क्षता । तेन वाक्यभेदः ।
[SB on III 1 25, p 742]

ekavākyatā between two *vidhis*, or between a *vidhi* and a *prātisēdha*, or between two *gunas*, or between a *Brāhmaṇa-vākya* and a *mantra-vākya*.

30 Besides these, however, there are circumstances under which it would be wrong to seek to establish *ekavākyatā*. These have very well been stated by ŚABARA in his commentary on MS II 11 when he writes '*Tad iha sadvidhah karmabhedo vaksyate śabdāntaram abhyāsah samkhyā gunah prakriyā nāmadheyam it'*'

31 Thus the text '*Somena yajeta dāksināni juhōti hiraṇyam ātreyaṃ dadāti*' is to be taken as containing three independent *vākyas* enjoining three different and independent acts viz *yāga*, *dāna*, and *homa* respectively, because of *śabdabheda* or *śabdāntara*. And if it is asked why we should accept *vākya-bheda* on the basis of *śabdāntara* the reply given by JAİMİNĪ is couched in the expression '*kṛtānubandhatvāt*' which ŚABARA explains when he writes '*Dadāti hi svena kāra-kena kṛtānubandho na yāgam homam vā'nubandham apeksate*.'⁴⁸ The second ground for *vākya-bheda* is set forth by JAİMİNĪ in '*Ekasyaivam punah s'rutur avis esād anarthakam hi syāt*'⁴⁹ The illustrative texts in this connection are '*Samudho yajati Tanūnapātam yajati &c*' where the word *yajati* is repeated five times. This *abhyāsa* would be *anarthaka* if the word every time is not taken as denoting some *apūrva karma*. But how can one and the same word

48 शब्दान्तरे कर्मभेदः कृतानुबन्धत्वात् । [MS II 21], शब्दान्तरं च यजतेर्ददातिः । तत्र यद्यपि परो भागो भावनावचनं सर्वेषु समानस्तथाप्येकैकस्य पूर्वोऽवयवोऽन्यः । अन्यश्च तेन समुदायः । शब्दान्तरमन्यस्मात्समुदायात् । तत्रार्थान्तरं व्यक्तम् । दद्यादिति दानेन साधयेदिति केवलमेव दानं करणं भावनायां प्रतीयते न यागहोमौ सहायावपेक्षते । तथा जुहोतीति होमसाधनां भावनामाह । न दानयागावपेक्षते । तत्रैतावच्छब्देनावगतं दानेन केवलेन सिध्यतीति । जुहोतीति अपि होमेन केवलेन सिध्यतीति, ननु दानेन केवलेन सिध्यतीति विज्ञानं निवर्तते । ददातिर्हि स्वेन कारकप्राप्तेन कृतानुबन्धो न याग होम वाऽनुबन्धमपेक्षते । तस्माद्विश्रानि वाक्यानि । [SB on II 21, p 466]

convey a different sense every time even if it is repeated a hundred times' Here it may be pointed out that the word *yajati* in all these sentences is only an *anuvāda*, for we already have it in the text '*Dars'apūrnāmāsābhyām yajata*' But the *devatā* that is spoken of in these can't pertain to those *yāgas* Thus the *devatā-yāga-sambandha* spoken of in these sentences would be rendered *anarthaka* if no separate *yāga* is performed Thus every time that the word *yajati* is repeated we have to accept the idea of performing the *yāga* and this *yāga* every time has to be looked upon as a separate *karman* Thus we see that *abhyāsa* leads to *karma-bheda* i.e. to *vākya-bheda* ⁵⁰

32 In the *sūtra* '*Samkhyayā prthaktvanives'āt karma-bhedah syāt*' ⁵¹ JAIMINI states the third ground for *vākya-bheda* The text discussed in this connection is '*Saptadas'a prājāpat-vān pas'uṇ ālabhate &c*' where it is concluded that seventeen different *ālambhas* are enjoined by it The main ground for such a conclusion is the number *saptadas'a* The verb 'speaks of *ālambha* of one *pas'u* only, so that if seventeen *pas'us* are to be sacrificed it follows that seventeen different *ālambhas* have to be performed' ⁵² Here it may be remembered that where the number of *karman*s is previously fixed the *samkhvā* may have no power to express *karma-bheda* or *vākya-bheda*, and the requisite number of acts in such cases will have to be made up by resorting to the repetition of one or more of

50 एकस्यैव पुनःश्रुतिरनर्थिका स्यात् । कर्मभेदं कुर्यादित्यर्थः । तावन्त्येव विधीयमानेऽपि कस्मिंश्चिद्विशेषे पुनःश्रुतिरनर्थिका भवेत् । ननूवत् न शब्दोत्पत्त्यन्तरविधातुमिति । उच्यते । समिधो यजतीत्यपि प्रथमोऽनुवाद एव । दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेति याग प्राप्त एव । तत्र देवता न शक्या विधातुम् । श्रुतिप्राप्ता हि तत्र देवता । इयं वाक्यारप्रकरणाद्वा । तथोर्विकल्पो न न्याय्यः । स एष देवतायागसंबन्धो विधीयमानोऽक्रियमाणे यागे न शक्यः कर्तुमिन्त्यनर्थकः स्यात् । क्रियमाणे तु शक्यते । तस्मादभ्यसितव्यो यागः । प्रत्यन्यास चादृष्टभेदः । [SB on II 2 2]

51 cf MS II 2 21

52 सम्प्रयागः कर्मभेदो भवेत् । पृथक्त्वे पशूनां सति सप्तदशसंख्या निविशेत् । तच्च पशूनां पृथक्त्वं बहुषु यागेष्वववर्ष्यते । नैकस्मिन् । वधम् । एकादशभिरवदा-

the constituent parts to the required extent⁵³ This idea as also the idea of the *prthaktvanives'itva* of *samkhyā* has been fully discussed while treating of numerical adjectives in one of the previous chapters

33 The next ground for *vākya-bheda* as given by JAİMİNĪ is *samjñā* or name, which has been illustrated by S'ABARA by the text '*Athaisa jyotih athaisa vis'vajyotih athaisa sarva-jyotih*' The *Pūrva-pakṣin* would take all this as one text or sentence speaking of the *prakṛta jyotistoma* and laying down some *guṇa* with reference to it This he concludes on the strength of the expression *jyotih* which is common in all the three sections, and also is to be found in the name *jyotistoma* But the *Siddhāntin* points out that one *samudāya* can't be said to be identical with another *samudāya* merely because of the circumstance that a section is found to be common to both Therefore, on the strength of

नैरसौ यागो निर्वर्तयितव्य इत्येव चोदक प्रतिदिशति । तानि चैवमदव पशोरवा-
प्यन्ते । तत्र द्वितीयादेरालम्भो नावदानसंपादनाय भवितुमर्हति । एकमात्रम्यमानम-
न्वात्म्येन ब्रह्मार्थाधिपरे । तथा सत्यतर्कत्वात् ते प्राजापत्या भवेयुः । तत्र प्राजापत्या-
निति श्रवणमुपपद्येत । तेनैकस्मिन्पशौ पृथक्त्वे निवेशिनी सख्या नावधारयेत् । बहुषु
यागेषु बहुभिरवावदानगणैः प्रयोजनम् । तेन सप्तदशभ्यो यागेभ्यः सप्तदश पशुपुण्ड-
रीन् । तत्र सख्यासामञ्जस्य भवति । तस्मात्सप्तदश यागाः । नन्वेकस्मिन्नपि या-
गे सप्तदशभिरवावदानगणैर्यज्यते, वचनात् । नैतदेवम् । पशुषु द्विसासख्या श्रूयते ।
नावदानगणेषु । अवदानानि हवीषि यागसाधनानि, न पश्नाकृतिः । सा ह्यवदानप्रकृति-
द्रव्यं विशिष्यन्ती (प्रकृतौ प्रधानस्योपकृतवतीति चिकृतावावदानप्रकृतिद्रव्यं विशि-
ष्यन्ती) प्रधानस्योपकरिष्यति । तत्र च पशोः सप्तदशसख्या विचारिका । नावदान-
गणस्य । तस्मादेकस्मा अवदानगणायैक पशुरालम्ब्य प्राप्नोति । तत्र सप्तदश-
सख्या नोपपद्यते । एवमेवावकल्पिष्यते यदि शृङ्गाभिप्राया वर्णाभिप्राया वा रूपाभिप्राया
वा भविष्यन् सप्तदश पशवः श्वेतः कुण्डो रोहितः इत्येवमादयः तेषामन्यतमो गृह्यत
इति, अथवा तुरराः शृङ्गिण एव शृङ्गा इत्येवमादयस्तेषामन्यतम इति । त द्वि-
श्यामास्तुरा एकरूपा श्रूयन्ते । तदेषु बहुषु यागेषूपपद्यत, नैकस्मिन् । तस्मात्सप्तदश
यागा इति । [SB on II 2 21, pp 524-527]

53 सर्वसंपाद्या सख्या कल्प्येत । etc [See page 111, n 36]

the direct *ekavākyatā* he concludes that these are three different acts distinct and separate from the *pyotistoma* also ¹

34 Gunt is the next ground for *vākya-bheda*, and 'Tapte pavasi dadhy ānavatī sā vās'vadevy āmiksā vājibhyo vājinarī' is the illustrative text taken by S'ABARA in this connection. Here the *Pūrva-paksin* would like to resort to *laksanā* and take the term *vājibhyah* to signify *vis've devāh* only, so that the whole text would speak of only one *karma* laying down *vājina* as an additional *guna*. The *Siddhāntin*, however, demurs and points out that the expression *vājibhvaḥ* can't be taken to signify the *prakṛtā vis've devāh*. These *devatās* are *apūrva*. And when a *guna* is found associated in a text with some *apūrva devatās* it must be regarded as speaking of some *karmāntara* and hence a separate sentence. And if the *Pūrva-paksin* were to ask why it should be so, S'ABARA is ready with the reply 'Same hi tadā ete vākye bhavataḥ ubhe api apūrvavor yāgayor vidhātṛnī' ²⁵. In this connection, of course it must be noted that whenever in the original *vidhu* the *guna* is not mentioned the text speaking of that *guna* in that connection should be taken as a *guna vidhu* only and not as laying down a *karmāntara*. Thus the text 'Dadhñā juhvati'

54 सज्ञा चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात् । [MS II 2 22], सज्ञा हि तिलो भेदिका-
स्तेषां ज्योतिराद्या । उत्पत्तिवाक्ये हेता श्रूयन्ते । तासामिमा पुन श्रुतम् । तस्मा-
दथैष ज्योतिरिति अपूर्वस्य कर्मणो विधायक वाक्यम् । अनुवादे हि सत्यप्रवृत्तिविशेष-
कर्मनर्थक स्यात् । प्रकृतस्य च गुणविवाने विकल्पो भवेत् । तत्र पक्षे बाध । न च
ज्योतिरादयो ज्योतिष्टोमस्य वदितार । समुदायान्तराणि हेतानि । न चावयवेन
समानेन समुदायान्तरं तदर्थमेव भवति । यथा शालाशब्दो गृहवचन । तत्र न
शालाशब्दसामान्यान्मालशब्दादयोऽपि गृहवचना भवन्ति । यत् ज्योतिष्टोमस्य ज्योति
रिति प्रतीकमुपादीयत इति । प्रकरणसामर्थ्यादि तत्र ज्योतिष्टोमशब्देन परोक्षेर्ग-
वाक्यता भवेत् । सा प्रत्यक्ष ज्योति शब्देन सहैकवाक्यता बाधेत । न चेत्तन्वाच्यम् ।
वाक्य हि प्रकरणाद्वक्तव्यः । —————तस्मान्न विश्वज्योति सर्वज्योतिरिति च
ज्योतिष्टोमस्य वदितारौ । न चेत् ज्योतिष्टोम उच्यते, सर्वाणि कर्मान्तराणि ।
[SB , pp 529-531]

55 गुणश्चापूर्वसंयोगे वाक्ययो समत्वात् । [MS II 2 23], and SB
thereon

is a *guṇa vidhi* with reference to the text '*Agnihotram juhoti*' which is a *mukhya vidhi* ⁵⁶ Similarly the text '*Dadhṇā m-driyakāmasya juhuyāt*' has to be construed as speaking of the same act as is laid down by the text '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakūmah*'. Here it must be noted that the two texts differ from each other in this that the *pha'a* in the one is *guṇa-samabhivyāhṛta* while in the other it is *karma-samabhivyāhṛta*. They being thus *atulya* need not be taken as independent sentences laying down two distinct and separate *karmas* ⁵⁷ When, however, texts speaking of *phala* are not thus *atulya* i.e. when they are *sama* they ought to be construed as two separate sentences speaking of two separate acts. This is what is illustrated by Ś'ABARA with the texts '*Trivrd agnistud agnistomas tasya vāyavyāsu ekavimsam agnistomam sāma krtvā brahmaṇa casakāmo yajeta* *Etasvaiva ieva-tisu vāravanītyam agnistoma sāma krtvā pasukāmo hy etena yajeta*' ⁵⁸

35 The texts '*Jyotistomena svargakāmo yajeta*' and '*yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt andrūvayavāgrān grahān ghnīyāt vadi brhatsāmā s'ukrāgrūn vadi jagatsāmā agrayanāgrān*' should be taken as speaking of one and the same act. The expressions *rathantarasāmā* and *brhatsāmā* of the latter refer to the *jyotistoma* only and as such what the latter speaks of is the *grahāgratā-vis'esa* of the *jyotistoma* under particular

56 अगुणे तु कर्मशब्दे गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत । [MS II 2 24]. अथ यद्वर्णितं ययामिहोत्र जुहोतीत्युक्ते दध्ना जुहोतीत्येवमादयो गुणविधय इति । तत्रोच्यते । युक्तं यत्तत्र गुणविधानम् । न तत्राप्रकृतेन केनचिदूणेन संबन्धः । प्रकृतेन स्वस्ति यागेन । इस्मादनपवर्णनमेतत् । [SB on II 2 24, p. 539]

57 फलश्रुनेस्तु कर्म स्यात् फलस्य कर्मयोगित्वात् । अनुव्यत्वात् वाक्ययोगुणेश्च प्रतीयेत । [MS II 2 25-26], न कर्मन्तरं, किन्तु गुणात्फलमिति । इयम् । अनुव्ये ह्येते वाक्ये । अमिहोत्र जुहुयास्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र कर्मसमभिव्याहृतं सः स्वर्गकामो होमेन कुर्यादिति । दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयादिति गुणसमभिव्याहृतम् । । अत्र होम इन्द्रियाय कर्तव्य इति प्रतीयते । किं तर्हि । दध्ना होम इन्द्रियकाम-पेति होमस्य दधिसंबन्ध इन्द्रियाय, न होमस्योत्पत्तिः । य इन्द्रियकाम स्यात्स दध्ना होम कुर्यादिति । [SB on II 2 26, p. 546 f.]

58 सप्तषु कर्मयुक्तं स्यात् । [MS II 2 27] and SB thereon

circumstances.” Slightly different, however, is the case with the text *Rājā rājasūyena yajeta*’ and *‘Yadi brāhmaṇo yajeta bārhaspatyam madhye nidhāya āhutim hutvā bhīghārayet yadi rājanya aindram yadi vaiś’yo vaiśvadevam iti’* Here we find that the *rājasūya* spoken of by the former can be performed by the *ksatriya* alone, while the latter is speaking of an act that may be performed by men of all the three castes. Hence we must take it that these texts speak of two different acts.⁵⁹

36 The text *‘Dāksūyanena prajākāmo yajeta &c’* has been understood by the *Pūrva-paksin* as enjoining *karmāntaris* and as comprising several separate and independent sentences on the strength of *saṃjñās* viz *dāksūyana*, *sākamprasthīya*, and *samkrama*, and also on account of some *phala* being spoken of along with each. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that these *saṃjñās* can very well apply to the *dars’a* and the *purnamāsa* sacrifices and that the mere mention of *phalas* along with each can’t prove that they are separate and independent acts, for such a mention of *phalas* can be found being made along with *gunas* also as in *‘Dadhñā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt’* Hence, he concludes, that the text under discussion speaks of the *dars’apūrnāmāsa* only and not of any other act so that the whole of it forms only one sentence along with the text *‘Dars’apūrnāmāsābyām svargakāmo yajeta’*⁶¹

37 When however an act is mentioned along with some *dravva* and also some *devatā*, the text doing it must be looked upon as an independent sentence and the act spoken of in it as a *karmāntara*. This is illustrated by the text, *‘Vāyavyam s’vetam ālabheta bhūtikāmah’* and *‘Sauryam carum nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmah’* which it should be noted, have nothing to do with the *ālambha* and the *nirvāpa*

59 एकस्य तु लिङ्गभेदात्प्रयोजनार्थमुच्येतैकस्य गुणवाक्यत्वात् । [MS II 3 2]

60 अत्रेष्टौ यज्ञयोगान्कतप्रधानमुच्यते । [MS II 3 3]

61 MS II 3 5-11 and SB thereon

enjoined in connection with the *dars'apūrnāmāsa* yūgas by the texts '*Isam ālabheta*' and '*Caturō musūr nirvapati*'⁶². But if an act is mentioned by the mere name without stating the *dravya* and the *devatā* it can't be *karmāntara*. This is illustrated by the text '*Esa vai havisā havir yajate yo'dābhyam grhītvā somāya yajate iti*'⁶³.

38 The last ground for *vākya-bheda* as given by JAIMINI is *prakriyā* or *prakarana*⁶⁴. There are the texts '*Māsam agnihotram juhōti*' and '*Māsam dars'apūrnāmāsābhyām yajati*' which, according to the *Pūṇva-pakṣin*, lay down the *kāla* with reference to the *niṭya agnihotra* and the *niṭya dars'apūrnāmāsa*, for the idea of *kāla* alone seems to be fresh in this text. But here it is pointed out by S'ABARA that the texts occur in a different *prakarana* and it is stated that whenever an act is mentioned in another context it must be accepted as being a *karmāntara* inspite of its having an identical name'. Similarly when an act is not described but the *phala* thereof is mentioned the text doing so should be understood as an independent sentence laying down an independent act. Thus the text '*Āgneyam astūkapālam nirvapedi rukkāmah &c*' has to be understood as speaking of not the *niṭya agnihotra* but of some special *kāmya karma*⁶⁵. If on the other hand there is found some text describing some *karma* by the side of

62 यजतिस्तु द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगादेतेषां कर्मसंबन्धात् । [MS II 3 14]

63 अद्रव्यत्वात् कर्मशेषः स्यात् । [MS II 3 20]

64 प्रकरणान्तरे प्रयोजनान्यत्वं । [MS II 3 24]

65 प्रकरणान्तरे श्रूयमाणं etc [See page 222, n 15 above] अस्मिन्पक्षे पुनरतन्त्रमग्निहोत्रशब्दो न कर्म विशेष्यति । तेन वाक्यभेदो न भविष्यति । तस्मात्कर्मान्तरमिति सिद्धम् । [SB on II 3 24, pp 614 ff]

66 फल चाकर्मसिद्धौ । [MS II 3 25] , फल च भेदकमकर्मनिधौ श्रूयमाणम् । कथम् । अनुवादे सति न शक्येत फलविधातुम् । विधायकस्याभावात् । न हि अविधीयमानो हि उपायो रचो भवतीति गम्यते । अपि च स्वकामेऽत्र विधीयमाने कामस्यानित्यत्वाद् आप्रेयादीनां नित्यत्वात्संबन्धो नावलप्येत । तस्मात् कर्मान्तराणि । [SB, p 618]

such a text as the one discussed just now, then such a text should be understood as laying down simply the *phala* with reference to the act described in the accompanying text. Thus 'Eṭayā'nnādyakāmo yājayet' must be taken as laying down *phala* with reference to the *avesti* only which is spoken of in the adjoining text 'Āgneyo'stākapālah purodās'o bhavati'. When, however, this latter text merely repeats the mention of an act and speaks of something else such as *phala* or *kāla* then the repetition is to be construed as a mere *arthavāda* and not as an independent text laying down a *karmāntara*.⁶⁷

39 It may thus be observed that there are cases where it is wrong to assume a group of words as forming one sentence. In all such cases certainly we have to admit the group of words as comprising more sentences than one. But this does not mar the value of the rule stated by KUMARILA and quoted in the beginning of this chapter. For even in all these cases it must be remembered *vākya-bheda* is accepted simply when it is found that it is impossible to establish *ekavākya-ā*. In other cases, of course, *vākya-bheda* is decidedly a *dosa* for the reasons already discussed at the very outset of this chapter. And yet as we have seen above again even this *dosa* is at least not so serious as *ānarthakya*, so that when it is found that *ānarthakya* can't be avoided by any other means one has as the last resort to accept even this *vākya-bheda* in as mild a form as possible. It is thus, indeed that in several cases ŚĀBARA has told that *anekārthatva* though a *dosa* has yet to be accepted only because there is no other go, and in such cases it is assumed that *vākya-bheda* is no *dosa*.

67 सन्निधौ स्वविभागात्फलार्थेन पुनर्धृतिः । [MS II 3 26], सन्निधौ फलार्थेन पुनर्धृतिरवेष्टेरेव । न कर्मन्तरमिति । कुतः । एतद्येतेषु शब्दो न शब्दोऽन्यवेष्टया विभक्त्यागमन्य वक्तुम् । सन्निहितस्य प्रतिनिर्देशक एष शब्दः । तस्मादवेष्टेरेकत्राय-कामस्य विधीयत इति । [SB, p. 619 f.]

68 cf MS II 3 27-29

KINDS of SENTENCES

1 Having thus far fully discussed as to what is *vākya* and what is *vākya-rtha* and also studied the principles of *ekavā-kaṭā* and *vākya-bheda* we may now pass on to the next topic viz the kinds of sentences SABARA,¹ it may be observed, clasifies all the vedic texts under three heads (1) *Vidhi*, (2) *Arthavāda*, and (3) *Mantra*. He also speaks of texts as being some of them *vidhāyaka* (injunctive) and some only *abhidhāyaka* (descriptive). Nor is he oblivious of the fact that some texts are expressive i.e. are to be taken in their literal sense while the others are only indicative i.e. to be understood figuratively, and that even among these injunctive texts some are purely injunctive in their force while others lay down a restrictive or an exclusive injunction. It may now be seen that though JAIMINI and S'ABARA have not used our modern grammatical terms they are well aware of almost all the different kinds of sentences that we can think of, and that they have given us rules for interpreting all these. These rules we shall study in details in subsequent chapters. Here we shall only consider and illustrate the various kinds of sentences that we come across in the *Veda*.

2 Look at the following groups of Vedic texts

A (i) *Agnithoram juhōti* (ii) *Dadhnā juhōti* (iii) *Same yaḥ ta* (iv) *Imām agrbhnān raś'anām rtasya ity aśvābhidhānīm ādatte* (v) *Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah* (vi) *Barhī devasadanam dāmi* (vii) *Vāyur vai ksepisthā devatā* and (viii) *Ādityo yūpah*

B (i) *Nānrtam vadet* (ii) *Nodyantam ādityam īkseta* (iii) *Nānuyājesu yeyajāmaham karoti* (iv) *Nātūrātre sodas' mṛṇ grhnāti* and (v) *Na prthivyām agnus' cetavyo nāntarikse na divi*

1 उक्तमस्माभिः समाध्यायस्यैदमर्थम् । कश्चिदस्य भागो विधिर्योऽविदितमर्थं वेदयति यथा सोमेन यजेतेति । कश्चिदर्थादो व' प्ररोचयन् विधिं स्तौति यथा वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवतेति । कश्चिन्मन्त्रो यो विदितमर्थं प्रयोगकाले प्रकाशयति यथा बहिर्देवसदनं दामीत्येवमादि । [SB on I 4 1, p. 320 f.]

Here we see that every text in group B has therein a word expressive of negation which is conspicuous by its absence in all the texts belonging to the other group. These texts, can, therefore be named negative and positive respectively, though it may be observed that neither JAIMINI nor ŚABARA have given us any comprehensive terms which can correspond to the terms positive and negative as we use them now.

3 Among the negative texts themselves, it may be seen, the first lays down a prohibition and has to be taken quite literally. In the second and the third, however *lakṣanā* has to be resorted to by construing the negative particle with the *ākhyāta* or some other word. Thus we see that the second text lays down a *vṛata* or a *niyama* while the third lays down an exception. Thus though *lakṣanā* has to be resorted to in these texts yet they also have an injunctive force. But the last is purely figurative and is totally destitute of any injunctive force. Thus, it may be observed, that a negative text may be *expressive or indicative* (i.e. it may have to be interpreted literally or figuratively) or from another point of view it may be *injunctive* (i.e. may have injunctive force) or *purely descriptive*.

4 Positive texts also, like the negative ones, may be either expressive or indicative and injunctive or descriptive. The first four texts of group A above are injunctive while the last four are only descriptive. The first text lays down *agnihotra* as the *sādhana* of attaining the *īśta phala*. But it does nothing more than that. A text, which thus lays down merely an act-of course a principal one-as *īśta-sādhana*, is according to the *Mīmāṃsā* terminology an *utpatti-vidhi* or a *mukhya vidhi*. We may call it a *principal injunctive sentence*. The second text differs from the first in this that it lays down not the act or *karma-svarūpa* but the *guṇa* or subsidiary detail of an act laid down by the *mukhya vidhi*. From it we know that the *agnihotra* enjoined by the first text is to be performed with *dadhi*. Texts or sentences like this which lay down some subsidiary detail or *guṇa* may be called *subsidiary injunctive sentences*, though in the *Mīmāṃsā* they are known as *guṇa-vidhis* or *vinīyoga-vidhis*.


5 Texts iii and iv stand on a different footing though they are also endowed with injunctive force. For whereas the first two lay down something that is totally *aprāpta*, the next two speak of something that is only partially *aprāpta*. Thus when one proceeds to perform the *Yāga*, some *deśa sama* or *visama*, is but *artha-prāpta*, so that the text *samajayeta* can't but be taken as speaking of something which is partly *prāpta* and partly *aprāpta*. What such a text does is to lay down not so much the *deśa* as the *nyama* or restriction. Such texts are called *nyama-vidhis*, a name that we may paraphrase as *restrictive injunctions*. The next text represents what is called *parisamkhyā*. Even there the *as'vābhūdhānī-grahana* is not totally *aprāpta*, and the main purport of the text is not to lay down the *as'vābhūdhānī-grahana* so much as the exclusion of the *gārdabha-ras'ēnū*. Such sentences may, therefore be called *exclusive injunctions*.

6 Now we come to texts that have no injunctive force in them. These may be called descriptive sentences. Such sentences may be found to describe the *phala* (or the *īsta* or the *sādhya*) of the act enjoined by the *mukhya vidhi*, or merely the acts or portions of acts that are performed during the main act. Thus the text '*Agnihotram juhuvāt svargakāmah*' describes with the help of the expression *svargakāmah* the *phala* that is to be attained by performing *agnihotra* which is enjoined by the text '*Agnihotram juhōti*'. Such texts are known as *adhikāra-vidhis*. But taking into consideration the fact that they describe the *phala* of the main act we may call them *descriptive sentences speaking of phala and thereby defining the adhikāra also*. '*Barhiḥ devasadanam dāmi*' represents the other variety of descriptive texts. These sentences merely state or describe acts or parts of acts that are performed during the performance of the main act and are called the *mantras*. These (i.e. the verbs in these) are merely *abhidhāyaka* and not *vidhāyaka*, and have to be understood in their literal sense.

7 The last two texts of group A have no injunctive force

Nor are they to be taken in their literal sense. Such texts are called *arthavādas* which if taken literally would be useless and have as such to be understood only figuratively. These, it will be seen through *lakṣanā* convey either praise (of what is enjoined) or censure (of what is prohibited) and thereby urge a man on to what is enjoined or deter him from what is prohibited. In these we have to resort to *lakṣanā* not merely on some portion thereof, but on the whole text. We may, therefore, rightly describe the *arthavādas* as *indicative sentences*.

8 We may now put down our classification of the simple sentence in a tabular form as follows —



9. But there are texts like '*Somena yajeta*' and '*Sauryam carum nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmah*' which differ from all the sentences that we have taken up above. For they are possessed of characteristics which would make them fall under more heads or classes than one simultaneously. As a general rule every sentence must be construed as falling under one class and one only. Any construction which would make it fall under more heads than one is marred by *vākya-bheda* and hence inadmissible. Thus it is wrong for example to take the text '*Udbhudā yajeta*' as enjoining the *vāga* and also *udbhud* (as a *guna* thereof). Nor can this be taken as a mere *guna-vidhi* like '*Dadhnā juhoti*', for there is no text which can be shown as the *utpatti-vākya* for this *vāga* enjoined here. It is, therefore, decided that *udbhud* is a *nāmadheya* i.e. the name of the main act viz. the *yāga*. The text '*Somena yajeta*' is like '*Udbhudā yajeta*' and one may be tempted to declare *soma* to be *nāmadheya*. But this is not possible. For whereas it is possible to make the name *udbhud* applicable to *yāga* by *yoga* (etymology), nothing like that can be done with reference to *soma*. *Soma*, therefore, can't be construed as *nāmadheya*, nor can the text be construed as merely a *guna-vidhi*. It must, therefore, be taken as enjoining the act as well as the *guna* thereof. But such a construction would be open to *vākya-bheda*. Hence by resorting to *matvartha-laksanā* the text is taken as a *visistavidhi* enjoining not merely the act, nor merely the *guna*, but the *guna-visista* act. Similarly the other text quoted above has characteristics of an *utpatti-vidhi* as well as an *adhikāra-vidhi*, and for want of any better construction has to be admitted as an *utpatti-adhikāra-vidhi*. Thus it may be observed that every simple sentence must belong to only one of the several classes tabled above but that when a text enjoins not merely the main act but also a subsidiary thereof or describes the *phala* of that act it has to be admitted as falling under two classes simultaneously and called *visista-vidhi* (i.e. *guna-visista-utpatti-vidhi*) and *utpatti-adhikāra-vidhi* respectively.

10 All these, however, are only simple sentences i.e. sentences having only one subject and one predicate. But a *mukhya-vidhī* together with all other sentences concerning the act that is enjoined by it is bound to form one bigger sentence with several subjects and several predicates. Thus for example, the texts '*Agnihotram juhōti*', '*Dadhnā juhōti*' '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah*' &c. will together form one big sentence supplying all the necessary information about the act called *agnihotra*. Such bigger sentences are known as *pravoga-vidhis* or *pravoga-vacanas*, as *SABARA* calls them. These are evidently made up of one principal clause (*utpatti-vidhī*) and one or more subordinate clauses (*guna-vidhī* &c.) and can, therefore be fittingly called complex sentences.

11 The last thing that we have to note in this chapter is that a compound sentence is an impossibility in the eye of a *Mīmāṃsaka*. For a sentence to be compound it is absolutely necessary that its constituent clauses are co-ordinate (which is the same as *samā*). But *samā* has been declared by *JAIMINI* as a ground for absence of *ekavākyatā* or *vākya-bheda*. Thus it is evident that according to *JAIMINI* if there is *ekavākyatā* there can be no *samā*, and if there is *samā* there can be no *ekavākyatā*. This shows how a compound sentence is an impossibility in the *Mīmāṃsa* view.

